Paulino Ungos III

Lawyer | Law Professor | Author

Tag: illegal dismissal

  • Expletives, Dismissals, and Unfair Labor Practices

    “O” was a professor and the assistant chairperson of the Social Sciences Department of a university. “O” was also the president of the university union, a duly registered labor union and the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the university’s faculty and non-academic personnel.

    On 5 September 2014, the university received an administrative complaint filed by a student against “O.” The student claimed that “O” abused her and accordingly violated the university’s code of conduct and Republic Act No. 7610.

    According to the student, she encountered “O” as the latter was about to enter the university’s faculty room. She held the doorknob on her way out of the office, while “O” held the opposite end of the doorknob. When she stepped aside, “O” allegedly exclaimed the words “anak ng puta” and walked on without any remorse. The student claims that she experienced emotional trauma from “O”‘s conduct.

    The university thus charged “O” with gross misconduct and unprofessional behavior in violation of Section 16 (4) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 232, or the Education Act of 1982.1SECTION 16. Teacher’s Obligations. — Every teacher shall:

    1. Perform his duties to the school by discharging his responsibilities in accordance with the philosophy, goals, and objectives of the school.

    2. Be accountable for the efficient and effective attainment of specified learning objectives in pursuance of national development goals within the limits of available school resources.

    3. Render regular reports on performance of each student and to the latter and the latter’s parents and guardians with specific suggestions for improvement.

    4. Assume the responsibility to maintain and sustain his professional growth and advancement and maintain professionalism in his behavior at all times.

    5. Refrain from making deductions in students’ scholastic ratings for acts that are clearly not manifestations of poor scholarship.

    6. Participate as an agent of constructive social, economic, moral, intellectual, cultural and political change in his school and the community within the context of national policies. (Emphasis supplied)

    The university eventually dismissed “O” after complying with the requirements of procedural due process. “O” then proceeded to file a complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice against the university.

    “O” denied that he “unjustifiably, angrily” yelled “anak ng puta” at the student. He pointed out inconsistencies in her testimony, arguing that he was in his classroom, and not where she had claimed, when the incident happened. In any case, “O” insisted that he had no motive to malign the student, who was never enrolled in any of his classes, and whom he did not know before the alleged incident.

    “O” also contended that “anak ng puta” per se is neither defamatory nor constitutive of gross misconduct and unprofessional behavior. He argued that there was no proof that he had perverse or corrupt motivations in violating the school policy.

    “O” added that should he be found guilty, dismissal was too harsh a penalty for the alleged infraction, especially since it would have been his first offense after 20 years of service. He believed that he was well loved by his students and that he had been professional throughout his stint, mindful of others’ feelings.

    “O” further contended that his dismissal constituted unfair labor practice as it was done on account of his union activities, which involved taking a stand against the school’s K-12 policies. He claimed that the university saw the complaint as an opportunity to get rid of him for being critical of the university’s actions. He also asserted that the dismissal was done at the time the union was mourning the death of its secretary.

    Was “O” validly dismissed from employment?

    The Supreme Court ruled that “O”‘s dismissal was valid.

    Article 297 of the Labor Code of the Philippines provides that an employer may terminate an employment for serious misconduct.

    Misconduct is defined as improper or wrong conduct. It is the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character and implies wrongful intent and not mere error of judgment. The misconduct to be serious within the meaning of the act must be of such a grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial or unimportant. Such misconduct, however serious, must nevertheless be in connection with the work of the employee to constitute just cause from his separation.

    In order to constitute serious misconduct which will warrant the dismissal of an employee under paragraph (a) of Article [297] of the Labor Code, it is not sufficient that the act or conduct complained of has violated some established rules or policies. It is equally important and required that the act or conduct must have been performed with wrongful intent.

    Misconduct is not considered serious or grave when it is not performed with wrongful intent. If the misconduct is only simple, not grave, the employee cannot be validly dismissed.2National Labor Relations Commission v. Salgarino, G.R. No. 164376, July 31, 2006, 529 PHIL 355-376

    The Court stated that a teacher exclaiming “anak ng puta” after having encountered a student is an unquestionable act of misconduct. However, the Court also clarified that whether the said expression constitutes serious misconduct that warrants the teacher’s dismissal will depend on the context of the phrase’s use. “Anak ng puta” is similar to “putang ina” in that it is an expletive sometimes used as a casual expression of displeasure, rather than a personal attack or insult.3Pader v. People, G.R. No. 139157, February 8, 2000, 381 PHIL 932-937

    In the present case, the Court found that the utterance in question, “anak ng puta,” was an expression of annoyance or exasperation. Both “O” and the student were pulling from each side of the door, prompting “O” to exclaim frustration without any clear intent to maliciously damage or cause emotional harm upon the student. That they had not personally known each other before the incident, and that “O” had no personal vendetta against the student as to mean those words to insult her, confirm this conclusion.

    However, the Court considered other relevant circumstances that aggravated the misconduct he committed.

    First, he not only denied committing the act, but he also refused to apologize for it and even filed a counter-complaint against the student for supposedly tarnishing his reputation. He even refused to sign the receiving copy of the notices that sought to hold him accountable for his act.

    According to the Court, while uttering an expletive out loud in the spur of the moment is not grave misconduct per se, the refusal to acknowledge this mistake and the attempt to cause further damage and distress to a minor student cannot be mere errors of judgment. “O”‘s subsequent acts are willful, which negate professionalism in his behavior. They contradict a professor’s responsibility of giving primacy to the students’ interests and respecting the institution in which he teaches. In the interest of self-preservation, “O” refused to answer for his own mistake; instead, he played the victim and sought to find fault in a student who had no ill motive against him.

    The Court added that had he been modest enough to own up to his first blunder, “O”‘s case would have gone an entirely different way.

    Second, a similar complaint had already been filed against “O”: that of verbal abuse against another student.

    And third, “O” was found to have exhibited aggressive behavior to his colleagues in that he shouted at co-professors, displayed a dirty finger sign against his immediate superior, and challenged a co-professor to a fist-fight.

    For the Court, the foregoing circumstances revealed “O”‘s pugnacious character and ill-mannered conduct.

    The Court stressed that in determining the sanction imposable on an employee, the employer may consider the former’s past misconduct and previous infractions.4Sy v. Neat, Inc., G.R. No. 213748, November 27, 2017

    Employers are not expected to retain an employee whose behavior causes harm to its establishment. The law also recognizes the right of the employer to expect from its workers not only good performance, adequate work and diligence, but also good conduct and loyalty. The employer may not be compelled to continue to employ such persons whose continuance in the service will patently be inimical to its interests. 5Sugue v. Triumph International (Phils.), Inc., G.R. Nos. 164804 & 164784, January 30, 2009, 597 PHIL 320-342

    In the present case, “O” cannot rely on his 20-year stay in the university to shield him from liability. The longer an employee stays in the service of the company, the greater is his responsibility for knowledge and compliance with the norms of conduct and the code of discipline in the company.6Punzal v. ETSI Technologies, Inc., G.R. Nos. 170384-85, March 9, 2007, 546 PHIL 704-719

    For the Court, “O”‘s dismissal was valid.

    Did “O”‘s dismissal from employment constitute unfair labor practice?

    The Supreme Court ruled that the university was not guilty of unfair labor practice.

    Under Article 258 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, unfair labor practices are violative of the constitutional right of workers to self-organize.

    Jurisprudence teaches that the person who alleges the unfair labor practice has the burden of proving it with substantial evidence.7UST Faculty Union v. University of Santo Tomas, G.R. No. 180892, April 7, 2009, 602 PHIL 1016-1036 In determining whether an act of unfair labor practice was committed, the totality of the circumstances must be considered. If the unfair treatment does not relate to or affect the workers’ right to self-organize, it cannot be deemed unfair labor practice. A dismissal of a union officer is not necessarily discriminatory, especially when that officer committed an act of misconduct. In fact, union officers are held to higher standards.8Republic Savings Bank v. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. L-20303, October 31, 1967, 128 PHIL 230-247 and Great Pacific Life Employees Union v. Great Pacific Life Assurance Corp., G.R. No. 126717, February 11, 1999, 362 PHIL 452-466

    In the present case, the Court found that “O”‘s dismissal, which was brought about by his personal acts, did not constitute unfair labor practice as provided under the Labor Code of the Philippines. Dismissing him was not meant to violate the right of the university employees to self-organize. Neither was it meant to interfere with the Union’s activities. The Court further stated that “O” failed to prove that the proceedings against him were done with haste and bias. And although the Court noted “O”‘s defense that he was the union president, this does not make him immune from liability for his acts of misconduct.

    The Court reiterated the principle that the employer’s management prerogative to dismiss an employee is valid as long as it is done in good faith and without malice.9 In this case, this Court found no bad faith on the part of the university when it dismissed “O” from employment. “O”‘s claim of unfair labor practice thus failed.

    Further reading:

    • Adamson University Faculty and Employees Union v. Adamson University, G.R. No. 227070, March 9, 2020.

  • Invalid Addendum

    Norly M. Baybayan (Baybayan) was hired by Wacoal through its agent, petitioner Prime Stars, for a contract period of 24 months or two years, with a monthly salary of NT$15,840.00. However, he soon discovered that he was only paid NT$9,000.00 a month. Upon inquiry, he was informed that an amount of NT$4,000.00 was being deducted from his salary for expenses for his board and lodging. Since he still had debts to pay back home, he finished the contract and returned to the Philippines on 19 May 2009. He then instituted a complaint for underpayment of salaries and the reimbursement of his transportation expenses against petitioners Prime Star and Peralta.

    Michelle V. Beltran (Beltran) was hired by Avermedia, through its agent, petitioner Prime Stars, as an “operator” who assembles TV boxes and USBs. Her contract duration was for two years with a monthly salary of NT$17,280.00. She was deployed on 22 June 2008. After a year, she was abruptly and unceremoniously dismissed by her supervisor and was immediately repatriated to the Philippines on 3 July 2009. Beltran then instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal and sought for the payment of salaries for the unexpired portion of her contract, the refund of her repatriation expenses, plus damages and attorney’s fees against the petitioners.

    Petitioners denied that Baybayan was underpaid as his payslips for the months of March and April 2009 indicated that he received a monthly salary of NT$17,280.00 during his employment with Wacoal. Petitioners explained that Baybayan signed an Addendum to the Employment Contract (Addendum), which authorized the deduction of the amount of NT$4,000.00 as payment for his monthly food and accommodation. In the same Addendum, Baybayan was apprised that the transportation expenses for his round trip tickets from the Philippines to Taiwan shall be at his own expense. Petitioners further explained that these were supported by Baybayan’s sworn statement, Written Acknowledgment, Foreign Worker’s Affidavit Regarding Expenses Incurred for Entry into the Republic of China to Work and the Wage and Salary and Overseas Contract Worker’s Questionnaire.

    With respect to Beltran, petitioners contended that it was Beltran who voluntarily preterminated her contract for personal reasons. According to petitioners, Beltran approached them and expressed her intent to return to the Philippines, as evidenced by her handwritten statement which she duly signed on 4 July 2009. Petitioners add that the handwritten statement was supported by her sworn statement, written acknowledgment, Foreign Worker’s Affidavit, and Overseas Contract Worker’s Questionnaire.

    The issues of illegal dismissal, salary differentials, transportation expenses, damages, attorney’s fees and liability of petitioner Peralta were elevated to the Supreme Court.

    RULING:

    Beltran did not voluntarily preterminate her employment contract. She was illegally dismissed.

    The Supreme Court found that petitioners’ complete reliance on Beltran’s alleged voluntary execution of the Mutual Contract Annulment Agreement and the Worker Discontinue Employment Affidavit to support the claim that Beltran voluntarily preterminated her contract was unavailing. This was because her supposed resignation was inconsistent with her filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal.

    Furthermore, the Court found the wordings of Beltran’s relinquishment of her contract of employment ambiguous and doubtful. The burden of proving that Beltran voluntary preterminated her contract fell upon petitioners as the employer. Petitioners failed to discharge such burden despite their claim that the latter resigned.

    Specifically, the Court found it highly unlikely that Beltran would just quit even before the end of her contract after all the expenses she incurred and still needed to settle and the sacrifices she went through in seeking financial upliftment. According to the Court, it was incongruous for Beltran to simply give up her work, return home, and be unemployed once again given that so much time, effort, and money have already been invested to securing her employment abroad and enduring the tribulations of being in a foreign country, away from her family.

    Beltran was accordingly awarded her salaries for the unexpired portion of her employment contract.

    Baybayan and Beltran should be granted salary differentials and refund of transportation expenses.

    Paragraph (i) of Article 34 of the Labor Code of the Philippines prohibits the substitution or alteration of employment contracts approved and verified by the Department of Labor and Employment from the time of the actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period of expiration of the same without the approval of the said Department.

    Furthermore, Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, explicitly prohibits the substitution or alteration to the prejudice of the worker of employment contracts already approved and verified by the Department of Labor and Employment from the time of actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period of the expiration of the same without the approval of the said Department.

    In the present case, petitioners admitted that the employment contracts of Baybayan and Beltran were indeed amended, but posited that the Addendum, while apparently did not appear to contain any indication of Philippine Overseas Employment Administration approval, actually contained provisions which have been approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration through Baybayan and Beltran’s Foreign Worker’s Affidavits.

    The Supreme Court did not agree.

    According to the Court, the clear and categorical language of the law imposes upon foreign principals minimum terms and conditions of employment for land-based overseas Filipino workers, which include basic provisions for food, accommodation and transportation. The licensed recruitment agency shall also, prior to the signing of the employment contract, inform the overseas Filipino workers of their rights and obligations, and disclose the full terms and conditions of employment, and provide them with a copy of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-approved contract, to give them ample opportunity to examine the same.

    Article IV of Baybayan and Beltran’s Employment Contract, in relation to Section 2, Rule 1, Part V of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Land-based Overseas Workers,1“Section 2. Minimum Provisions of Employment Contract. — Consistent with its welfare and employment facilitation objectives, the following shall be considered minimum requirements for contracts of employment of land-based workers:

    x x x

    b. Free transportation to and from the worksite, or offsetting benefit;

    c. Free food and accommodation, or offsetting benefit;”     provided Baybayan and Beltran with:

    • free food and accommodation for the duration of the contract
    • an economy class air ticket from the country of origin to Taiwan
    • a ticket back to the country of origin upon completion of the contract.

    Furthermore, it was stated therein that an employment contract cannot be altered or modified without the prior approval of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration.

    In the present case, the Addendum required Baybayan and Beltran shoulder their food and accommodation and transportation fare.

    Although the Court recognized the fact that the parties may stipulate on other terms and conditions of employment as well as other benefits, such stipulations should not violate the minimum requirements required by law as these would be disadvantageous to the employee. Section 3, Rule 1, Part V of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Land-based Overseas Workers states:

    “Section 3. Freedom to Stipulate. — Parties to overseas employment contracts are allowed to stipulate other terms and conditions and other benefits not provided under these minimum requirements; provided the whole employment package should be more beneficial to the worker than the minimum; provided that the same shall not be contrary to law, public policy and morals, and provided further, that Philippine agencies shall make foreign employers aware of the standards of employment adopted by the Administration.”

    The Court found that the minimum provisions for employment of Baybayan and Beltran were not met, and that there was diminution of their benefits which were already guaranteed by law and granted in their favor under their Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-approved contracts of employment.

    Accordingly, the Court ruled that the Addendum, absent the approval of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, was declared invalid for being contrary to law and public policy.

    Baybayan and Beltran should be awarded moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.

    This was because the acts of the petitioners were evidently tainted with bad faith. Petitioners’ failure to comply with the stipulations on the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-approved employment contracts constituted an act oppressive to labor and more importantly, contrary to law and public policy. Petitioners even tried to justify the execution and validity of the Addendum and cloak the latter as legal and binding through Baybayan and Beltran’s execution of Foreign Worker’s affidavits. According to the Court, petitioners’ circumvention of labor laws and the intentional diminution of employee’s benefits to land-based overseas workers were indicative of petitioners’ exercise of bad faith and fraud in their dealings with Filipino workers.

    With regard to Beltran’s dismissal from employment, the Court found nothing “voluntary” in putting words into Beltran’s own mouth in the guise of her handwritten statement of resignation. Petitioners’ attempt to demonstrate voluntariness should fail since “cooperate” was more of an imposition coming from the employer rather than from a disadvantaged overseas employee. The Court considered the execution of the documents plainly oppressive and violative of Beltran’s security of tenure.

    The Court accordingly awarded Baybayan and Beltran moral and exemplary damages to allay the sufferings they experienced and by way of example or correction for public good, respectively.

    Peralta should be solidarily liable with Prime Stars.

    Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 mandates solidary liability among the corporate officers, directors, partners and the corporation or partnership for any claims and damages that may be due to the overseas workers, viz.:

    “Section 10. Monetary Claims. — x x x The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under this section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The performance bond to be filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all money claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages.”

    Further Reading:

    • Prime Stars International Promotion Corp. v. Baybayan, G.R. No. 213961, January 22, 2020.

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  • Human Barricades and Obstructions for Collective Self-Defense

    On 16 February 2000, the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) Employees and Workers Association (MEWA), the official bargaining unit of MERALCO, through its former President, Juanito, filed a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation Mediation Board (NCMB) due to bargaining deadlock.

    After conducting a strike vote in June 2000, Juanito informed the NCMB Administrator of its result in a Letter dated 12 July 2000. The letter was served through registered mail on 17 July 2000.

    After 4 days, or on 21 July 2000, MEWA staged a strike. Record showed that the following persons joined the strike:

    UNION OFFICERSUNION MEMBERS
    FedericoMarcelo
    CatalinoGerardo
    RomeoRolando
    DonatiloEdgardo
    AllanLeonides
    ArturoAmadeo
    RestitutoMelandro
    Dominador
    Lito
    Arnaldo
    Edwin

    The Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment issued an Assumption Order dated 21 July 2000, assuming jurisdiction and directing the striking workers to return to work within 24 hours from notice. Copies of the order were published in 3 major newspapers on 23 July 2000 and served to union officers and its lawyers. MERALCO’s security guards also exhibited the order to the strikers but they refused to obey.

    On 24 July 2000, several strikers wearing masks chained and padlocked the 3 gates of the MERALCO Center. They laid on the pavement and blocked the entry and exit gates of MERALCO. The strikers stated that they formed human barricades and placed obstructions, but only for collective self-defense because the guards used unnecessary force in dispersing them. Consequently, on 25 July 2000, the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment issued another Order reminding the parties to comply with the return-to-work order. He even deputized the PNP Chiefs of the National Capital Region, Region III and Region IV to ensure compliance.

    On 2 August 2000, MEWA and MERALCO executed an Agreement directing all employees who have not been placed on duty (except the 13 union officers and 13 members who were facing charges) to report for work. MERALCO also issued a Memorandum stating that the resumption of office was without prejudice to an administrative investigation for prohibited acts committed during the strike and/or defiance of the Assumption Orders. From 2 August to 11 October 2000, 66 employees were terminated from employment.

    Was the strike illegal?

    Yes.

    The Supreme Court stated that a strike is the most powerful weapon of workers in coming to an agreement with management as to the terms and conditions of employment. Premised on the concept of economic war between labor and management, staging a strike either gives life to or destroys the labor union and its members, as well as affect management and its members.1Phimco Industries, Inc. v. Phimco Industries Labor Association, G.R. No. 170830, August 11, 2010, 642 PHIL 275-307

    The Court added that in order to be legitimate, a strike should not be antithetical to public welfare, and must be pursued within legal bounds. The right to strike as a means of attaining social justice is never meant to oppress or destroy anyone, least of all, the employer.2Phimco Industries, Inc. v. Phimco Industries Labor Association, G.R. No. 170830, August 11, 2010, 642 PHIL 275-307 Since strikes affect not only the relationship between labor and management, but also the general peace and progress of the community, the law has provided limitations on the right to strike.3Phimco Industries, Inc. v. Phimco Industries Labor Association, G.R. No. 170830, August 11, 2010, 642 PHIL 275-307 According to the Court, Article 2634Art. 263. Strikes, picketing and lockouts of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6715, and Rule XXII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code outline the following procedural requirements for a valid strike:

    • A notice of strike, with the required contents, should be filed with the DOLE, specifically the Regional Branch of the NCMB, copy furnished the employer of the union;
    • A cooling-off period must be observed between the filing of notice and the actual execution of the strike thirty (30) days in case of bargaining deadlock and fifteen (15) days in case of unfair labor practice. However, in the case of union busting where the unions existence is threatened, the cooling-off period need not be observed. x x x
    • Before a strike is actually commenced, a strike vote should be taken by secret balloting, with a 24-hour prior notice to NCMB. The decision to declare a strike requires the secret-ballot approval of majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned.
    • The result of the strike vote should be reported to the NCMB at least seven (7) days before the intended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off period. (emphasis supplied)

    Jurisprudence5Pilipino Telephone Corp. v. Pilipino Telephone Employees Association, G.R. Nos. 160058 &160094, June 22, 2007, 552 PHIL 432-452 teaches that these requirements are mandatory in nature and failure to comply therewith renders the strike illegal.

    In the present case, the Court found that MEWA failed to comply with the 7-day strike ban rule which was counted from the time the union furnished the NCMB the strike vote result. It also found that MEWA also failed to furnish the NCMB the results of the vote at least 7 days before the intended strike. The Court noted that although the letter containing the strike vote result was dated 12 July 2000, it was sent through registered mail only on 17 July 2000, which was 4 days before the strike. The Court stressed that the NCMB thus did not have sufficient time to determine if the intended strike was approved by majority of the union workers. For the Court, the strike was illegal.

    Was the dismissal of strikers from employment valid?

    The Court relied on Article 264 of the Labor Code which enumerates the prohibited acts during a strike, to wit:

    ARTICLE 264. Prohibited Activities. — (a) No Labor organization or employer shall declare a strike or lockout without first having bargained collectively in accordance with Title VII of this Book or without first having filed the notice required in the preceding Article or without the necessary strike or lockout vote first having been obtained and reported to the Ministry.
    No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Minister or after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout.
    Any worker whose employment has been terminated as a consequence of any unlawful lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with full backwages. Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided, That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike.
    x x x
    (e) No person engaged in picketing shall commit any act of violence, coercion or intimidation or obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employer’s premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares. (emphasis supplied)

    The Court explained that the above-cited provision of the Labor Code presents a substantial distinction between the consequences of an illegal strike for union officers and mere members of the union. For union officers, knowingly participating in an illegal strike is a valid ground for termination of their employment. However, for union members who participated in an illegal strike, their employment may be terminated only if there is substantial evidence or proof that they committed prohibited and illegal acts during the strike.6Magdala Multipurpose & Livelihood Cooperative v. Kilusang Manggagawa ng LGS, G.R. Nos. 191138-39, October 19, 2011, 675 PHIL 861-877

    In the present case, the Court declared the dismissal of the following union officers valid considering the illegality of the 21 July 2000 strike for noncompliance with the law:

    • Federico;
    • Catalino;
    • Romeo;
    • Donatilo;
    • Allan;
    • Arturo; and
    • Restituto.

    Furthermore, the Court found substantial evidence proving that the following union members performed some of the prohibited acts mentioned in Article 264 of the Labor Code:

    • Marcelo;
    • Gerardo;
    • Rolando;
    • Edgardo;
    • Leonides;
    • Amadeo;
    • Melandro;
    • Dominador; and
    • Lito.

    The Court stated that photographs submitted by MERALCO revealed that these union members committed the prohibited acts, which were then corroborated by security guards who were present during the strike. The Court stressed that the security guards identified the said members to have barricaded the gates and prevented other employees from entering MERALCO’s premises. The Court accordingly declared their dismissal valid for their illegal acts during the illegal strike.

    However, the Court reached a different conclusion with regard to 2 union members (Arnaldo and Edwin), since it found that the testimonies of the security guards revealed that they only saw these members joining the picket line without performing any illegal act during the strike.

    The Court reiterated the proof required to terminate union members, to wit:

    For the rest of the individual respondents who are union members, the rule is that an ordinary striking worker cannot be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike. There must be proof that he or she committed illegal acts during a strike. In all cases, the striker must be identified. But proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required. Substantial evidence available under the attendant circumstances, which may justify the imposition of the penalty of dismissal, may suffice. Liability for prohibited acts is to be determined on an individual basis7Solidbank Corporation v. Gamier, G.R. Nos. 159460 & 159461, November 15, 2010, 649 PHIL 54-83.

    For the Court, absent any clear, substantial and convincing proof of illegal acts committed by Arnaldo and Edwin during the strike, MERALCO could not arbitrarily dismiss them from employment.

    Should Arnaldo and Edwin be granted backwages?

    No, the Court ruled that they should not be granted backwages in view of the illegality of the said strike.

    The Court reiterated the principles in G & S Transport Corporation v. Infante,8G & S Transport Corporation v. Infante, G.R. No. 160303, September 13, 2007, 559 PHIL 701-716 where the Court held:

    It can now therefore be concluded that the acts of respondents do not merit their dismissal from employment because it has not been substantially proven that they committed any illegal act while participating in the illegal strike. x x x
    x x x
    With respect to backwages, the principle of a “fair day’s wage for a fair day’s labor” remains as the basic factor in determining the award thereof. If there is no work performed by the employee there can be no wage or pay unless, of course, the laborer was able, willing and ready to work but was illegally locked out, suspended or dismissed or otherwise illegally prevented from working. While it was found that respondents expressed their intention to report back to work, the latter exception cannot apply in this case. In Philippine Marine Officers’ Guild v. Compañia Maritima, as affirmed in Philippine Diamond Hotel and Resort v. Manila Diamond Hotel Employees Union, the Court stressed that for this exception to apply, it is required that the strike be legal, a situation that does not obtain in the case at bar9G & S Transport Corporation v. Infante, G.R. No. 160303, September 13, 2007, 559 PHIL 701-716.

    Accordingly, the Court ruled although Arnaldo and Edwin N. Reyes could be reinstated, they are not entitled to backwages.

    Further reading:

    • Ilagan v. Manila Electric Co., G.R. Nos. 211746 & 212077, January 22, 2020.

  • IDs, Uniforms, and Vague Affidavits

    Arnulfo alleged that in 1994 he was hired as a butcher by Ernesto (the proprietor of Kalookan Slaughterhouse) and was made to work the entire week, from 6:30 P.M. to 7:30 A.M. with a daily wage of P700.00, that later became P500.00.

    Arnulfo narrated that on July 21, 2014, he suffered from a headache and was unable to report for duty. The next day, Ernesto informed him that he could no longer report for work due to his old age.

    Aggrieved by these developments, Arnulfo filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Ernesto.

    Ernesto, on the other hand, asserted that Arnulfo was an independent butcher engaged by his Operation Supervisor, Cirilo, and he was paid based on the number of hogs he butchered. Ernesto added that Arnulfo was only called into the slaughterhouse when customers brought hogs to be slaughtered.

    In arguing against Arnulfo’s claim of illegal dismissal, Ernesto contended that he imposed policies on the entry to the premises of Kalookan Slaughterhouse, which applied to employees, dealers, independent butchers, hog and meat dealers, and trainees. In this regard, Noelberto (one of Ernesto’s employees) stated that Arnulfo violated said policies and then misconstrued the disallowance to enter the slaughterhouse as an act of dismissal.

    Although the Office of the Labor Arbiter found that Arnulfo was hired by Ernesto himself, the National Labor Relations Commission and the Court of Appeals, however, ruled that Arnulfo was engaged by Cirilo (Ernesto’s Operation Supervisor) and he was Cirilo’s own employee.

    Was Arnulfo an employee of Ernesto?

    The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative.

    The Court reiterated the settled rule that to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship, four elements generally need to be considered, namely: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control the employee’s conduct. The Court stated that these elements or indicators comprise the so-called ‘four-fold’ test of employment relationship.

    In the present case, it was found that the butchering services rendered by Arnulfo at the Kalookan Slaughterhouse was undisputed.

    However, Arnulfo was also found to have presented the following pieces of evidence:
    (1) an identification card and three gate passes stating that he was a butcher at the Kalookan Slaughterhouse;
    (2) log sheets for three days showing that he reported for work; and
    (3) a trip ticket showing that Arnulfo was the captain of a group of personnel that went to Bataan.

    The Court also considered Ernesto’s admission (by way of Noelberto’s statement) that uniforms were given to all employees, including Arnulfo.

    The Court reiterated its ruling in Masonic Contractor, Inc. v. Madjos1G.R. No. 185094, November 25, 2009 in that it is common practice for companies to provide identification cards to individuals not only as a security measure, but more importantly to identify the bearers thereof as bona fide employees of the firm or institution that issued them. The provision of company-issued identification cards and uniforms, said the Court, indubitably constitutes substantial evidence sufficient to support the existence of the employment relation.

    For the Court, the totality of Arnulfo’s evidence and the admissions of Ernesto led it to conclude that Arnulfo was Ernesto’s employee.

    On the other hand, the Court looked into Ernesto’s claims that Cirilo was the employer of Arnulfo and the person who paid the latter’s wages. However, the Court found no evidence supporting said claims. The Court even stated that Cirilo was not shown to (1) possess substantial capital and investment to have an independent business; (2) be Arnulfo’s employer; and (3) pay his salaries. Other than Cirilo’s Sinumpaang Salaysay, no document was presented to show that he paid Arnulfo’s salaries.

    Moreover, the Court stated when Ernesto denied that Arnulfo was his employee but alleged that the latter rendered services as Cirilo’s employee, Ernesto effectively admitted the substantial fact that Arnulfo has been rendering butchering services for several years. The Court considered such denial as negative pregnants2denials pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied which acknowledged that Ernesto indeed employed Arnulfo.

    The Court stressed that while Cirilo claimed to be Arnulfo’s employer, he also admitted that he never exercised any control over the means and methods by which Arnulfo rendered butchering services. Said the Court, if Cirilo was Arnulfo’s employer, he should have had control over Arnulfo’s means and methods for doing his job. As the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Cirilo reads, he only monitored whether the butchers finished their work.

    However, record revealed that Noelberto (Ernesto’s employee), was the one who actually exercised control in that he reprimanded Arnulfo (1) for his failure to properly store his butchering knives; (2) for coming to Kalookan Slaughterhouse with dirty clothes; (3) for reporting for work drunk; and (4) for not having an I.D. before going to the slaughterhouse.

    The Court concluded that all the foregoing circumstances established that Ernesto (through Cirilo) engaged Arnulfo, paid for his salaries, and in effect had the power to dismiss him. Further, Ernesto (through Noelberto) exercised control over Arnulfo’s conduct.

    To the mind of the Court, Ernesto was Arnulfo’s employer.

    Was Arnulfo illegally dismissed from employment?

    The Court found that Arnulfo was illegally dismissed from employment. This was because Ernesto failed to specifically deny that on July 22, 2014, Arnulfo was informed that he could no longer report for work.

    According to the Court, Noelberto only alleged that he merely barred Arnulfo from entering the slaughterhouse in several instances because of his failure to wear his I.D. and uniform but he failed to state that this was done on July 22, 2014.

    The Court ruled that Noelberto’s silence on this matter was deemed as an admission by Ernesto that Arnulfo was indeed dismissed on July 22, 2014.3Section 11, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court provides: SECTION 11. Allegations Not Specifically Denied Deemed Admitted. — Material averments in a pleading asserting a claim or claims, other than those as to the amount of unliquidated damages, shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied.

    Having been illegally dismissed, the Court affirmed the Office of the Labor Arbiter’s awards of separation pay and backwages.

    Further reading:

    • Fernandez v. Kalookan Slaughterhouse, Inc., G.R. No. 225075, June 19, 2019.

  • His Position Became Unnecessary upon Shipment Completion

    On November 1, 2009, the employer hired Manuel as a technical consultant. Under the agreement, Manuel was tasked to:

    • Prepare reports;
    • Be the intermediary of certain teams;
    • Attend coordination meetings;
    • Evaluate billings; and
    • Conduct Site visits.

    Through a letter dated June 27, 2013, the employer informed Manuel of the termination of his employment due to the cessation of delivery operations and diminution of activities. Aggrieved by the actions of his employer, Manuel filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against it.

    The employer contended that it had sufficiently established redundancy of Manuel’s position. It presented certain documents to prove that there was a significant diminution in the volume of materials business and that the completion of shipment had rendered his position irrelevant. The employer further argued that it did not dismiss Manuel in bad faith, contending that it complied with labor law requirements in terminating his employment. The employer pointed out that he was given a notice of termination with computation of his separation pay, and that the Department of Labor and Employment was also notified.

    Was Manuel validly dismissed from employment on the ground of redundancy?

    The Supreme Court ruled that Manuel was not validly dismissed on said ground.

    The Court stated that redundancy is recognized as one of the authorized causes for dismissing an employee under the Labor Code of the Philippines. Redundancy exists where the services of an employee are in excess of what is reasonably demanded by the actual requirements of the enterprise. A position is redundant where it is superfluous, and superfluity of a position or positions may be the outcome of a number of factors, such as overhiring of workers, decreased volume of business, or dropping of a particular product line or service activity previously manufactured or undertaken by the enterprise. The employer has no legal obligation to keep in its payroll more employees than are necessary for the operation of its business.

    The Court further stated that for the implementation of a redundancy program to be valid, the employer must comply with the following requisites:

    • written notice served on both the employees and the Department of Labor and Employment at least one month prior to the intended date of retrenchment;
    • payment of separation pay equivalent to at least one month pay or at least one month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher;
    • good faith in abolishing the redundant positions in that the employer must provide substantial proof that the services of the employees are in excess of what it requires; and
    • fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining what positions are to be declared redundant and accordingly abolished.

    In the present case, the Court acknowledged that the employer complied with the first and second requisites. It was able to notify Manuel and the Department of Labor and Employment at least a month before the planned redundancy. Manuel also received a computation of his separation pay corresponding to at least one month pay for every year of service with additional payment for economic assistance.

    However, the Court found that the employer failed to establish compliance with the third and fourth requisites.

    The Court discovered that the employer’s only basis for declaring petitioner’s position redundant was that his function, which was to monitor the delivery of supplies, became unnecessary upon completion of shipment.

    However, the Court discovered that Manuel’s employment agreement reveals the contrary as there was no mention of monitoring shipment as part of his tasks. The Court said that if his work pertains mainly to the delivery of supplies, it should have been specifically stated in his job description. Thus, the Court found no basis for the employer to consider Manuel’s position irrelevant when shipment had been completed.

    The Court also found that the employer failed to show that they used fair and reasonable criteria in determining what positions should be declared redundant.

    The Court explained that fair and reasonable criteria may take into account the preferred status, efficiency, and seniority of employees to be dismissed due to redundancy.

    However, the Court found that the employer never showed that it used any of these in choosing Manuel as among the employees affected by redundancy.

    The Court accordingly declared Manuel to have been illegally dismissed from employment.

    Further reading:

    • Acosta v. Matiere SAS, G.R. No. 232870, June 3, 2019.

  • No Basis to Award Salary Equivalent to 3 Months

    In Alster International Shipping Services, Inc v. Acosta,1G.R. No. 242085, January 14, 2019. the Supreme Court reiterated the principle that an illegally dismissed migrant worker is entitled to payment of salaries for the unexpired portion of the employment contract. The Court said:

    With respect to the proper amount of indemnity due him, the provision of law, restricting wages recoverable by illegally dismissed overseas workers to three months only, having been struck down twice for its unconstitutionality, there is no more coherent legal basis for restricting the unpaid salaries award in favor of respondent to an amount equivalent to three months’ worth of work only. Hence, respondent is entitled to the payment of unpaid salaries equivalent to the remaining unexpired portion of his employment contract.

    Further reading:

    • Alster International Shipping Services, Inc v. Acosta, G.R. No. 242085, January 14, 2019.

  • Dismissal of Employees for Minor Offenses

    Laura was hired to join ProHealth’s audit team in 2007. She was later promoted to Finance Officer.

    On November 26, 2007, Laura’s superior ordered her to give three thousand pesos from the training funds to Prohealth’s District Business Manager, to serve as cash advance.

    On November 27, 2007, Prohealth issued a show cause memorandum for Laura’s failure to release the cash advance. Laura was also relieved of her duties and reassigned to the Office of the Personnel and Administration Manager.

    In her explanation, Laura alleged that when the District Business Manager saw that she was busy receiving cash sales from another District Business Manager, he told her that he would just return the next day to collect his cash advance. When he told her that the cash advance was for car repairs, Laura told him to get the cash from his revolving fund, which she would reimburse after the repairs were done. Prohealth was dissatisfied with her explanation and transferred her to another office.

    On December 3, 2007, Laura was invited to a fact-finding investigation, which was held on December 10, 2007, where Laura was again asked to explain her actions.

    On December 17, 2007, she was handed a notice of termination effective December 31, 2007 for disobeying an order of her superior.

    Laura filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Prohealth.

    The Office of the Labor Arbiter declared the illegality of Laura’s dismissal from employment. This ruling was affirmed by the National Labor Relations Commission. However, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the Commission and ruled the validity of Laura’s dismissal from employment. The Court of Appeals viewed Laura failure to comply with her superior’s order, an instance of arrogance and hostility, that, in turn, warranted her dismissal.

    When the case reached the Supreme Court, Laura insisted that she was illegally dismissed from employment. According to Laura, she believed in good faith that the District Business Manager would just claim his cash advance the day after he tried to claim it and that there was nothing in her actions that would prove that she intended to disobey or defy respondent Prohealth’s order.

    Was the dismissal of Laura valid?

    The Supreme Court declared that Laura was illegally dismissed from employment.

    The Court stated that under the Labor Code of the Philippines an employer may terminate the services of an employee who commits willful disobedience of the lawful orders of the employer. The Court explained that for disobedience to be considered as just cause for termination, two (2) requisites must concur:

    • the employee’s assailed conduct must have been wilful or intentional; and
    • the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain to the duties which he [or she] had been engaged to discharge.

    For disobedience to be willful, the Court added, it must be characterized by a wrongful and perverse mental attitude rendering the employee’s act inconsistent with proper subordination. The conduct complained of must also constitute harmful behavior against the business interest or person of his [or her] employer. Thus, it is implied in every case of willful disobedience that the erring employee obtains undue advantage detrimental to the business interest of the employer.

    In the present case, the Court found that Laura, as Finance Officer, was instructed by her superior to give a cash advance of three thousand pesos to the District Branch Manager on November 26, 2007. For the Court, such instruction or order was reasonable, lawful, made known to Laura, and pertained to her duties.

    The Court then tried to determine whether Laura intentionally and willfully violated such order as to amount to insubordination.

    The Court ruled in the negative.

    The Court found that when the District Business Manager went to collect the money from Laura, he was told to return the next day as she was still busy. When Laura found out that the money was to be used for a car tune-up, she suggested to the District Business Manager to just get the money from his mobilization fund and that she just would reimburse it after.

    Diverging from the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court ruled that no ill will existed between the District Business Manager and Laura. According to the Supreme Court, Laura’s failure to immediately give the money to the District Business Manager was not the result of a perverse mental attitude but was merely because she was busy at the time. Neither did she profit from her failure to immediately give the cash advance for the car tune-up nor did respondents suffer financial damage by her failure to comply. For the Court, the severe penalty of dismissal was not commensurate to her infraction. Laura was illegally dismissed from employment.

    Further reading:

    • Malcaba v. ProHealth Pharma Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 209085 , June 6, 2018.

  • Employment Status the Day Before the Occurrence of the Strike or Lockout

    The employer here found a need to improve its selling and distribution system if it wanted to remain viable and competitive in the business. Thus, it decided to implement a new cost-effective and simplified scheme of selling and distributing its products, that, in turn, led to a separation of twenty seven (27) rank-and-file, regular employees and union members on the ground of redundancy.

    The employer claimed that prior to the termination of employment, it had made a careful study of how to be more cost effective in operations and competitive in the business. It recognized in the process that its multi-layered selling and distribution system had to be simplified. Thus, it determined that the phasing out of said system was necessary which, however, resulted in the termination of employment of certain employees as their positions have become redundant.

    On May 29, 2009, the employer issued notices of termination to twenty seven (27) rank-and-file, regular employees and members of the union on the ground of redundancy due to the ceding out of its selling and distribution systems to the Market Execution Partners. The termination of their employment was made effective on June 30, 2009, but the union members were no longer required to report for work as they were put on leave of absence with pay until the effectivity date of termination. The union members were also granted individual separation packages, which many of them accepted, but under protest.

    The union asserted that the new selling and distribution system adopted and implemented by the employer would result in the diminution of the union membership amounting to union busting and to a violation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement provision against contracting out of services or outsourcing of regular positions. Thus, they filed a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board on June 3, 2009 on the ground of unfair labor practice, among others. On June 11, 2009, the union conducted a strike vote where a majority decided on conducting a strike.

    On June 23, 2009, the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute by certifying for compulsory arbitration to the National Labor Relations Commission the issues raised in the notice of strike. The Secretary also enjoined the parties from committing any act that may further exacerbate the situation.

    At this point, the union asserted that the employer should have enjoined the termination of employment which took effect on July 1, 2009. On the other hand, the employer contended that termination of employment was a certainty, from the time it issued the notices of termination and that the status quo prior to the issuance of the assumption order included the impending termination of the employment of the 27 employees.

    On March 16, 2010, the National Labor Relations Commission ruled that the employer implemented a valid redundancy program and that it did not commit unfair labor practice. The Commission further found no violation in the dismissal of the employees from employment because their respective notices of dismissal were received prior to the assumption order of the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment. The Commission found that the employer did not commit an act that exacerbated the dispute.

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission.

    The Supreme Court, in turn, affirmed the validity of the employer’s redundancy program.

    One issue that reached the Supreme Court was whether the employer’s implementation of the redundancy program was an unfair labor practice.

    The other issue resolved by the Court was whether the employer should have enjoined the effectivity of the termination of the employment of the 27 affected union members when the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment assumed jurisdiction over their labor dispute.

    The Court reiterated prevailing jurisprudence in that unfair labor practice refers to acts that violate the workers’ right to organize. The Court stated that there should be no dispute that all the prohibited acts constituting unfair labor practice in essence relate to the workers’ right to self-organization. Thus, an employer may only be held liable for unfair labor practice if it can be shown that his acts affect in whatever manner the right of his employees to self-organize. To prove the existence of unfair labor practice, substantial evidence has to be presented.

    In the present case, the Court found that the union failed to substantiate its charge of unfair labor practice against the employer. According to the Court, the consequent termination of employment due to redundancy is not per se an act of unfair labor practice amounting to union busting. For while the number of union membership was diminished due to the termination of the employment of union members, it cannot safely be said that the employer acted in bad faith in terminating their services because the termination was not without a valid reason. There was no showing that the redundancy program was motivated by ill will, bad faith or malice, or that it was conceived for the purpose of interfering with the employees’ right to self-organize.

    The findings of the National Labor Relations Commission and the Court of Appeals on said issue were affirmed.

    However, the Court found that the employer violated the return-to-work order in that the status quo was not maintained after the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment had assumed jurisdiction over the dispute on June 23, 2009.

    In this regard, the Court relied on Article 278 [Formerly 263] (g) of the Labor Code of the Philippnines, which provides the conditions for, and the effects of, the assumption of jurisdiction by the Secretary of the Departent of Labor and Employment over a dispute.

    The Court explained that the powers given to the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment under Article 278 [Formerly 263] (g) is an exercise of police power with the aim of promoting public good. In fact, the scope of the powers is limited to an industry indispensable to the national interest as determined by the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment. Industries that are indispensable to the national interest are those essential industries such as the generation or distribution of energy, or those undertaken by banks, hospitals, and export-oriented industries. And following Article 263 (g), the effects of the assumption of jurisdiction are the following:

    • the enjoining of an impending strike or lockout or its lifting, and
    • an order for the workers to return to work immediately and for the employer to readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout, or the return-to-work order.

    The Court added that when the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment exercises these powers, he is granted “great breadth of discretion” in order to find a solution to a labor dispute. The most obvious of these powers is the automatic enjoining of an impending strike or lockout or the lifting thereof if one has already taken place. Assumption of jurisdiction over a labor dispute, or as in this case the certification of the same to the National Labor Relations Commission for compulsory arbitration, always co-exists with an order for workers to return to work immediately and for employers to readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout.

    The Court then highlighted the significance of the return-to-work order, which is interlocutory, and is merely meant to maintain the status quo while the main issue is being threshed out in the proper forum. The Court stressed that the status quo is simply the status of the employment of the employees the day before the occurrence of the strike or lockout.

    According to the Court, from the date the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment assumes jurisdiction over a dispute until its resolution, the parties have the obligation to maintain the status quo while the main issue is being threshed out in the proper forum — which could be with Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment or with the National Labor Relations Commission. This is to avoid any disruption to the economy and to the industry of the employer — as this is the potential effect of a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest — while the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment or the National Labor Relations Commission is resolving the dispute.

    In the present case, the Court found that since the union voted for the conduct of a strike on June 11, 2009, when the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment issued the return-to-work order dated June 23, 2009, this meant that the status quo was the employment status of the employees on June 10, 2009. This status quo should have been maintained until the National Labor Relations Commission resolved the dispute in its Resolution dated March 16, 2010. For the Court, the said Resolution then took the place of the return-to-work order of the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment and the employer no longer had the duty to maintain the status quo after March 16, 2010.

    The Court accordingly awarded to the employees backwages and other benefits from July 1, 2009 until March 16, 2010, with a recomputation of their separation pay taking into consideration the termination of their employment beginning March 16, 2010.

    Further reading:

    • San Fernando Coca-Cola Rank-and-File Union v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 200499, October 4, 2017.

  • No Danger to the Safety of the Crew or Vessel

    Rogelio was engaged by his employer, Free Bulkers, through its agent Evic, as Chief Mate on board the M/V Free Lady for a period of six (6) months with a basic monthly salary of US$1,088.00.

    On August 28, 2010, Rogelio boarded the vessel. However, on September 24, 2010, Rogelio was repatriated to the Philippines without completing the contracted employment period.

    On September 28, 2010, Rogelio filed an illegal dismissal complaint against his employer. According to Rogelio, the ship captain developed a hostile attitude towards him. Specifically, Rogelio narrated that on September 7, 2010, he took a sip from the small flask of whisky given to him by one of the stevedores he dealt with and went to bed; but the ship captain had him awakened and ordered him to make a report on some damages in the railings of the ship caused by the stevedores. When he submitted the report to the ship captain, the latter allegedly smelled a faint odor of whisky and asked him if he had been drinking, to which Rogelio truthfully replied that he drank a little whisky and was willing to take an alcohol test. The ship captain shrugged off his offer to take an alcohol test, but still made a logbook entry dated September 7, 2010, recommending Rogelio’s immediate replacement.

    The employer contended that Rogelio was dismissed for just cause. On the basis of a Crew Behavior Report dated September 8, 2010 prepared by the ship captain, Rogelio was claimed to have violated company policies, instructions, and stipulations of the employment contract:
    1) by being grossly negligent since he failed to observe the safety precautions during the mooring and unmooring operations;
    2) by displaying arrogance towards his co-employees on board; and
    3) by having been found intoxicated.

    According to the employer, it feared for the safety of the vessel and determined that the crew may be at risk with Rogelio’s continued presence. Thus, it was constrained to ask that Rogelio be relieved, invoking Section 33 of the POEA Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC).

    Was Rogelio validly dismissed from employment?

    The Court ruled in the negative. It declared that Rogelio was illegally dismissed from employment.

    The Court reiterated established principles in that in labor cases, the employer has the burden of proving that the dismissal of an employee was for a just or authorized cause, and failure to show this would necessarily mean that the dismissal was unjustified and, therefore, illegal. Furthermore, not only must the dismissal be for a cause provided by law, it should also comply with the rudimentary requirements of due process, that is, the opportunity to be heard and to defend one’s self. Hence, for dismissal to be valid, the employer must show through substantial evidence that (1) the dismissal was for a just or authorized cause; and (2) the dismissed employee was afforded due process of law.

    In the present case, the Court found that the employer failed to establish the existence of a just cause in the dismissal of Rogelio from employment.

    It noted that the Crew Behavior Report, from which Rogelio’s dismissal from employment was based, alleged Rogelio’s inefficiency, incompetence and gross negligence in the performance of his duties.

    However, the Court considered the said report sorely inadequate in meeting the required quantum of proof to discharge the employer’s burden.

    The Court discussed that incompetence or inefficiency, as a ground for dismissal, means the failure to attain work goals or work quotas, either by failing to complete the same within the allotted reasonable period, or by producing unsatisfactory results. Neglect of duty, on the other hand, must be both gross and habitual. Gross negligence implies a lack of or failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or the total absence of care in the performance of duties, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference insofar as other persons may be affected. Habitual neglect involves repeated failure to perform duties for a certain period of time, depending upon the circumstances, and not mere failure to perform duties in a single or isolated instance.

    Here, the Court found that the statements contained in the Crew Behavior Report were uncorroborated and self-serving because no other evidence was presented to support the statements of the ship captain. The Court added that while the report was signed by four (4) crew members, the statements contained therein were based on acts witnessed only by the ship captain.

    Specifically, the Court noted the claim of the ship captain that a crew was injured when Rogelio failed to observe safety precautions in the mooring and unmooring operations and that an agent informed him that Rogelio was hard to deal with because of intoxication. However, the Court found no affidavits of either the injured seaman or the concerned agent to corroborate the ship captain’s statements. For the Court, no basis constrained it to conclude that there was truth to the ship captain’s accusations.

    The Court found that the employer failed to show that Rogelio willfully or deliberately caused the alleged accident during the mooring operations or that Rogelio repeatedly committed mistakes or repeatedly failed to perform his duties. The Court stated that the single unverified incident on Rogelio’s supposed negligence was insufficient to warrant a finding of just cause for termination.

    With regard to the charge of intoxication, the Court applied Section 33 (6) of the POEA-SEC which provides that drunkenness must be committed while on duty to merit dismissal from employment.

    In the present case, the Court found that Rogelio was admittedly off duty when he was allegedly caught by the master drinking on board. The Court ruled that the penalty of dismissal from employment was unwarranted.

    The Court continued that the lack of just or valid cause of Rogelio’s dismissal was further exacerbated by the employer’s failure to afford Rogelio procedural due process. The Court stressed the two-notice rule in Section 17 of the POEA-SEC in that an erring seaman should be given a written notice of the charge against him and afforded an opportunity to explain or defend himself. Should sanctions be imposed, then a written notice of penalty and the reasons for it shall be furnished the erring seafarer. It is only in the exceptional case of clear and existing danger to the safety of the crew or vessel that the required notices are dispensed with; nonetheless, a complete report should be sent to the manning agency, supported by substantial evidence of the findings.

    In the present case, the Court found no evidence showing that Rogelio was given a written notice of the charges against him, or that he was given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. Neither was there proof that Rogelio was furnished with a written notice of the penalty imposed against him and the reasons for its imposition. Although the Court noted the employer’s claim that the required notices were dispensed with because of a clear and existing danger to the safety of the crew or vessel, no evidence was presented to prove such was the situation when Rogelio’s employment was terminated.

    With the illegality of Rogelio’s dismissal, the employer was held liable to pay Rogelio’s salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract under Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, as amended by Republic Act No. 10022.

    Further reading:

    • Evic Human Resource Management, Inc. v. Panahon, G.R. No. 206890, July 31, 2017.

  • Secular View of Morality

    At the time of her indefinite suspension from employment in 2006, the employee was the Human Resource Officer of Brent Hospital and Colleges, Inc. (Brent), an educational and medical institution of the Episcopal Church of the Philippines.

    The cause of suspension was the employee’s Unprofessionalism and Unethical Behavior Resulting to Unwed Pregnancy.

    It appears that the employee became pregnant out of wedlock, and Brent imposed the suspension until such time that she marries her boyfriend in accordance with law.

    The employee then filed a complaint for unfair labor practice, constructive dismissal, non-payment of wages and damages with a prayer for reinstatement.

    The labor tribunals upheld the employee’s dismissal as one attended with just cause.

    The just cause consisted in her engaging in premarital sexual relations with her boyfriend, resulting in her becoming pregnant out of wedlock. The labor tribunals deemed said act to be immoral, which was punishable by dismissal under Brent’s rules and which likewise constituted serious misconduct under Article 297 (a) of the Labor Code of the Philippines.1ARTICLE 297. [Formerly Article 282] Termination by Employer. — An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:

    (a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work; x x x     For the labor tribunals, since the employee was Brent’s Human Resource Officer in charge of implementing its rules against immoral conduct, she should have been the epitome of proper conduct.

    The Supreme Court declared that the dismissal of the employee here was illegal.

    Immorality as a Just Cause for Termination of Employment

    The Supreme Court ruled that the employee’s premarital relations with her boyfriend and the resulting pregnancy out of wedlock did not constitute immorality, and thus could not be a just cause for termination of her employment.

    The Court noted that immorality was punishable under Brent’s policies by dismissal for the first offense.

    However, the Court also clarified that the determination of whether a conduct is disgraceful or immoral involves a two-step process:

    First, a consideration of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the conduct; and

    Second, an assessment of the said circumstances vis-à-vis the prevailing norms of conduct, i.e., what the society generally considers moral and respectable.

    1)

    In this case, the Court found that the surrounding facts leading to the employee’s dismissal were as follows:

    • she was employed as a human resources officer in an educational and medical institution of the Episcopal Church of the Philippines;
    • she and her boyfriend at that time were both single; and
    • they engaged in premarital sexual relations, which resulted into pregnancy.

    2)

    The labor tribunals characterized these as constituting disgraceful or immoral conduct and sweepingly concluded that as Human Resource Officer, the employee should have been the epitome of proper conduct and her indiscretion “surely scandalized the Brent community.”

    According to the Court, the foregoing circumstances, however, did not readily equate to disgraceful and immoral conduct:

    2a)

    Brent’s Policy Manual and Employee’s Manual of Policies did not define what constitutes immorality; it simply stated immorality as a ground for disciplinary action.

    Instead, Brent erroneously relied on the standard dictionary definition of fornication as a form of illicit relation and proceeded to conclude that the employee’s acts fell under such classification, thus constituting immorality.

    2b)

    Jurisprudence has already set the standard of morality with which an act should be gauged — it is public and secular, not religious.

    Whether a conduct is considered disgraceful or immoral should be made in accordance with the prevailing norms of conduct, which, refer to proscribed conduct because they are detrimental to conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society.

    The fact that a particular act does not conform to the traditional moral views of a certain sectarian institution is not sufficient reason to qualify such act as immoral unless it, likewise, does not conform to public and secular standards.

    2c)

    More importantly, there must be substantial evidence to establish that premarital sexual relations and pregnancy out of wedlock is considered disgraceful or immoral.

    The employee and her boyfriend were both single and had no legal impediment to marry at the time she committed the alleged immoral conduct. In fact, they eventually married on April 15, 2008.

    The labor tribunals’ respective conclusion that the employee’s indiscretion scandalized the Brent community was speculative, at most, and there was no proof adduced by Brent to support such sweeping conclusion.

    Even Brent admitted that it came to know of the employee’s “situation” only when her pregnancy became manifest.

    2d)

    Brent also conceded that at the time the employee and her boyfriend were just carrying on their relationship, there was no knowledge or evidence by Brent that they were engaged also in premarital sex. This only showed that the employee did not flaunt her premarital relations with her boyfriend and it was not carried on under scandalous or disgraceful circumstances.

    2e)

    Brent, likewise, could not resort to the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools2At that time the 1992 Revised Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, DECS Order No. 092-92, August 10, 1992 because premarital sexual relations between two consenting adults who have no impediment to marry each other, and, consequently, conceiving a child out of wedlock, gauged from a purely public and secular view of morality, did not amount to a disgraceful or immoral conduct under the said manual.

    The Court ruled that the totality of the circumstances of this case did not justify the conclusion that the employee committed acts of immorality.

    According to the Court there is no law which penalizes an unmarried mother by reason of her sexual conduct or proscribes the consensual sexual activity between two unmarried persons; that neither does such situation contravene any fundamental state policy enshrined in the Constitution.

    The fact that Brent is a sectarian institution does not automatically subject the employee to its religious standard of morality absent an express statement in its manual of personnel policy and regulations, prescribing such religious standard as gauge as these regulations create the obligation on both the employee and the employer to abide by the same.

    Marriage as a Condition for Reinstatement

    The Court noted that Brent imposed on the employee the condition that she subsequently contract marriage with her then boyfriend for her to be reinstated.

    According to Brent, this was “in consonance with the policy against encouraging illicit or common-law relations that would subvert the sacrament of marriage.”

    The Court did not agree.

    The doctrine of management prerogative gives an employer the right to “regulate, according to his own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring, work assignments, working methods, the time, place and manner of work, work supervision, transfer of employees, lay-off of workers, and discipline, dismissal, and recall of employees.”

    Statutory law is, however, replete with legislation protecting labor and promoting equal opportunity in employment.

    No less than the 1987 Constitution3Article XIII, Section 3 mandates that the “State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.”

    The Labor Code of the Philippines, meanwhile, provides:

    Art. 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman employee shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of her marriage.

    With particular regard to women, the Magna Carta of Women4Under Section 19 (b) Republic Act No. 9710, Approved on August 14, 2009 which provides: SECTION 19. Equal Rights in All Matters Relating to Marriage and Family Relations. — The State shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations and shall ensure: x x x

    (b) the same rights to choose freely a spouse and to enter into marriage only with their free and full consent. The betrothal and the marriage of a child shall have no legal effect; x x x     protects women against discrimination in all matters relating to marriage and family relations, including the right to choose freely a spouse and to enter into marriage only with their free and full consent.

    Weighed against these safeguards, the Court found that Brent’s condition was coercive, oppressive and discriminatory.

    Said the Court:

    There is no rhyme or reason for it. It forces the employee to marry for economic reasons and deprives her of the freedom to choose her status, which is a privilege that inheres in her as an intangible and inalienable right.

    The Court acknowledged that while a marriage or no-marriage qualification may be justified as a “bona fide occupational qualification,” Brent must have proven two factors necessitating its imposition, viz.:

    • that the employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation of the job involved; and
    • that there is a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the qualification would be unable to properly perform the duties of the job.

    The Court, however, found that Brent had not shown the presence of of these factors. Thus, it did not uphold the validity of said condition.

    Further reading:

    • Capin-Cadiz v. Brent Hospital and Colleges, Inc., G.R. No. 187417, February 24, 2016.