The seafarer in this case entered into a ten-month employment contract and was engaged to work as an able seaman by his employer, Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd., through its agent, Marlow Navigation Philippines, Inc., onboard the vessel M/V BBC OHIO. His engagement was also subject to a collective bargaining agreement between the employer and its employees. The seafarer boarded the vessel on 23 November 2009.
While on duty on 30 December 2009, the seafarer fell from a height of four meters in his work area. The fall affected his side, shoulder, and head. He was brought to a hospital in Huangpu, China, where he was diagnosed with “Left l-4 Verterbra Transverse Bone broken (accident).” He was declared unfit to work for 25 days. On 7 January 2010, he was medically repatriated to the Philippines.
The seafarer arrived in Manila on 8 January 2010, where he was referred to the company-designated physician for examination and treatment. After undergoing several tests (which included a CT scan, audiometry and MRI, as well as therapy sessions with the company-designated physician that spanned six months) the company-designated physician gave him a combined 36% disability assessment.
The seafarer did not object to the company-designated physician’s assessment. Yet, he filed a claim for permanent total disability compensation against his employer.
The Supreme Court ruled that the seafarer was not entitled to permanent total disability compensation.
The Court noted that the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract and the collective bargaining agreement were instruments that governed the seafarer’s employment with the petitioners. According to the Court, these instruments are the law between the parties.
Under the Standard Employment Contract, it is the company-designated physician who not only declares/establishes the fitness to work or the degree of disability of a seafarer who is repatriated for medical reasons, but also determines whether a seafarer needs further medical attention. Thus, under the said contract, the seafarer is required to submit to a post-employment medical examination by the company-designated physician.
Furthermore, under the collective bargaining agreement, the disability suffered by the Seafarer shall be determined by a doctor appointed mutually by the employer and the union, and the employers shall provide disability compensation to the seafarer in accordance with the compensation scale prescribed therein. The Court found that the company-designated physician based her assessment of the seafarer’s disability on the said compensation scale.
In the present case, the seafarer was able to submit himself to the care of the company-designated physician upon his medical repatriation. The company-designated physician thereafter gave the seafarer a 36% disability assessment under the compensation schedule prescribed in the collective bargaining agreement.
The Court noted the seafarer’s own admission that he no longer disputed the findings of the company-designated physician. It was also not shown that the seafarer offered a contrary finding. And although the collective bargaining agreement stated that the seafarer’s disability shall be determined by a doctor mutually appointed by the employer and the union, it was was not established that the parties even resorted to this step.
The Court ruled that the absence of a disability assessment by a doctor chosen by the parties will not invalidate the company-designated physician’s assessment, not only because the seafarer accepted said physician’s findings, but also because record established that the seafarer refused the employer’s proposal that his medical condition be referred to a mutually appointed doctor for determination.
According to the Court, a seafarer could not claim full disability benefits on his mere say-so, in complete disregard of the Standard Employment Contract and the collective bargaining agreement.
The Court thus held that company-designated physician’s assessment should stand.
Further reading:
- Marlow Navigation Phils., Inc. v. Cabatay, G.R. No. 212878, February 1, 2016.
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