Paulino Ungos III

Lawyer | Law Professor | Author

Tag: decision

  • On Equal Footing

    In a case for illegal dismissal filed by members of a Health Service Team against La Salle Greenhills, Inc., the Supreme Court set aside the finding of said members’ fixed-term employment.

    The parties to the fixed-term employment contract were not on equal footing.

    The Court emphasized that the ruling in Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora1G.R. No. L-48494, February 5, 1990, 260 PHIL 747-765 should be strictly construed, in that it should apply to cases where it appears that the employer and employee are on equal footing. In the present case, the Court found that this was not so for the members of the Health Services Team.

    • The uniform one-page Contracts of Retainer signed by the Health Service Team members were prepared by La Salle Greenhills, Inc.
    • While the Health Service Team members were medical professionals, this fact had not placed them on equal footing with La Salle Greenhills, Inc. According to the Court, the Health Service Team members obviously did not want to lose their jobs that they had stayed in for fifteen years.
    • The contracts had no specificity regarding terms and conditions of employment that would indicate that the Health Service Team members and La Salle Greenhills, Inc. were on equal footing in negotiating it. The Court stated that without specifying what the tasks assigned to each Health Service Team member were, La Salle Greenhills, Inc. “may upon prior written notice to the retainer, terminate [the] contract should the retainer fail in any way to perform his assigned job/task to the satisfaction of La Salle Greenhills, Inc. or for any other just cause.”

    Power of control was exercised over the Health Service Team members.

    The power of control refers to the existence of the power and not necessarily to the actual exercise thereof, nor is it essential for the employer to actually supervise the performance of duties of the employee. It is enough that the employer has the right to wield that power.

    In ruling that La Salle Greenhills, Inc. exercised control over the Health Services Team members, the Court took into account:

    • The repeated renewal of each Health Service Team member’s contract for fifteen years, interrupted only by the close of the school year;
    • The necessity of the work performed by the Health Service Team members as school physicians and dentists; and
    • The control exercised by La Salle Greenhills, Inc. over the means and method pursued by the Health Service Team members in the performance of their job.

    The repeated renewals of each Health Service Team member’s fixed-term employment contract made for a regular employment.

    Finally, the Court noted the repeated renewals of the Contracts of Retainer of the Health Service Team members spanning a decade and a half. Said the Court: “The repeated engagement under contract of hire is indicative of the necessity and desirability of the [employee’s] work in respondent’s business and where employee’s contract has been continuously extended or renewed to the same position, with the same duties and remained in the employ without any interruption, then such employee is a regular employee.”

    The Court thus declared the Health Service Team members’ regular employment status. They were entitled to security of tenure and could only be dismissed for just and authorized causes.

    Further reading:

    • Samonte v. La Salle Greenhills, Inc., G.R. No. 199683, February 10, 2016.

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  • But One of the Three Witnesses Recanted his Testimony

    The Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati filed an information charging the accused-appellant and her two co-accused with illegal recruitment committed in large scale under the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995.1Republic Act No. 8042, as amended by Republic Act No. 10022, Section 6(n) of which provides: “(n) x x x Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.”

    The State presented four witnesses, namely: Virgilio Caniazares, Reynaldo Dahab, Basilio Miparanum and PO3 Raul Bolido.

    Worthy of note is what happened to Dahab, one of the witnesses. Dahab declared that on 27 January 27 2001, he had met the accused-appellant at the Guadalupe Branch of Jollibee to pay P2,500.00 for his medical examination. A week later, he had undergone the three-day training in Mandaluyong City, for which he paid P2,500.00. The accused-appellant had then demanded from him the placement fee of P25,000.00. When Dahab was unable to raise the amount, the accused-appellant was not seen again. He filed a complaint against the accused-appellant with the police authorities.

    Subsequently, Dahab recanted his testimony, and stated that he had only requested assistance from the accused-appellant regarding his medical examination. He insisted that he had voluntarily paid P5,000.00 to her, and she had then paid the amount to the Medical Center or his medical examination.

    The Regional Trial Court, nonetheless, convicted the accused-appellant for illegal recruitment committed in large scale.

    The accused-appellant asserts that the Regional Trial Court, as well as the Court of Appeals, unreasonably disregarded Dahab’s recantation. The recantation would have rendered her liable only for simple illegal recruitment instead of illegal recruitment committed in large scale.

    The Supreme Court found this assertion untenable. The Court ruled:

    Dahab’s supposed recantation to the effect that he had only sought the assistance of the accused-appellant for his medical examination by no means weakened or diminished the Prosecution’s case against her. Its being made after he had lodged his complaint against her with the PNP-CIDG (in which he supplied the details of his transactions with her) and after he had testified against her in court directly incriminating her rendered it immediately suspect. It should not be more weighty than his first testimony against her which that was replete with details. Its being the later testimony of the Dahab did not necessarily cancel his first testimony on account of the possibility of its being obtained by coercion, intimidation, fraud, or other means to distort or bend the truth.

    Recantation by a witness is nothing new, for it is a frequent occurrence in criminal proceedings. As a general rule, it is not well regarded by the courts due to its nature as the mere afterthought of the witness. To be given any value or weight, it should still be subjected to the same tests for credibility in addition to its being subject of the rule that it be received with caution. The criminal proceedings in which sworn testimony has been given by the recanting witness would be rendered a mockery, and put at the mercy of the unscrupulous witness if such testimony could be easily negated by the witness’s subsequent inconsistent declaration. The result is to leave without value not only the sanctity of the oath taken but also the solemn rituals and safeguards of the judicial trial. If only for emphasis, we reiterate that it is “a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before the court of justice simply because the witness who has given it later on changed his mind for one reason or another, for such a rule will make a solemn trial a mockery and place the investigation at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses.”

    Further reading:

    • People v. Bayker, G.R. No. 170192, February 10, 2016.

  • Seafarer’s Work-related Death During Employment

    On 24 April 2002, the seafarer was hired as a messman on board the M/T Umm Al Lulu by the employer, Abu Dhabi National Tanker Company, through its local manning agency, C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. The seafarer and the employer signed a ten-month contract of employment, which was approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration on 9 May 2002.

    Before embarkation, the seafarer underwent a pre-employment medical examination and was declared physically fit to work. He then boarded the M/T Umm Al Lulu on 20 May 2002.

    The seafarer was repatriated in Manila on 16 March 2003. The next day, 17 March 2003, he went to a medical clinic in Kawit, Cavite where he was examined by his personal doctor who then diagnosed him with “Essential Hypertension.” Said doctor advised the seafarer to take the prescribed medication and rest for a week.

    On 19 March 2003, the seafarer died. The certificate of death stated the causes for his death, thus:

    Immediate cause: Irreversible Shock
    Antecedent cause: Acute Myocardial Infarction
    Underlying cause: Hypertensive Heart Disease

    The seafarer’s legal heirs filed a complaint against the employer for the recovery of death compensation benefits and of burial and children’s allowances.

    Employer’s Contentions:

    The employer contended that the seafarer’s death was not compensable based on the following reasons:

    1) The death of the seafarer did not occur during the term of his employment.

    A seafarer’s term of employment commences from his actual departure from the airport or seaport in the point of hire and ceases upon completion of his period of contractual service, signing-off, and arrival at the point of hire.

    The seafarer’s ten-month contract was about to expire on 20 March 2003 when he was safely repatriated without any medical condition a few days earlier, on 16 March 2003, as he was already in a convenient port. In other words, the seafarer finished his employment contract upon signing off from M/T Umm Al Lulu and arriving in Manila, his point of hire, on 16 March 2003.

    Thus, the seafarer’s death on 19 March 2003 could not have been compensable because it happened beyond the term of his contract.

    2) The seafarer’s death was not work-related.

    As a messman, the seafarer’s duties were limited to assisting the chief cook in food preparation. Said duties could not have contributed to his demise or increased the risk of acquiring the illness which caused his death, for there was no showing that the seafarer was subjected to any unusual strain or required to perform any strenuous activity that could have triggered a heart attack.

    3) The seafarer failed to disclose his ailment during his pre-employment medical examination.

    Hypertensive heart disease takes years to develop and most probably the seafarer was already suffering from said disease even before the start of his employment contract. However, the seafarer failed to disclose his ailment during his pre-employment medical examination. This fact barred the seafarer’s heirs from receiving death benefits on the ground of concealment of a pre-existing illness.

    4) The seafarer likewise failed to submit himself to a mandatory post-employment medical examination within three working days from his disembarkation.

    The Court’s Ruling:

    The Supreme Court disagreed with the contentions of the employer and ruled that the seafarer’s heirs were entitled to the benefits they claimed.

    The Court noted the following provisions of Section 20 (A) of the 1996 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract, as these were applicable to the case:

    SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS. —

    A. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR DEATH

    1. In case of death of the seafarer during the term of his contract, the employer shall pay his beneficiaries the Philippine Currency equivalent to the amount of Fifty Thousand US dollars (US$50,000) and an additional amount of Seven Thousand US dollars (US$7,000) to each child under the age of twenty-one (21) but not exceeding four (4) children, at the exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment.

    x x x

    4. The other liabilities of the employer when the seafarer dies as a result of injury or illness during the term of employment are as follows:

    a. The employer shall pay the deceased’s beneficiary all outstanding obligations due the seafarer under this Contract.

    b. The employer shall transport the remains and personal effects of the seafarer to the Philippines at employer’s expense except if the death occurred in a port where local government laws or regulations do not permit the transport of such remains. In case death occurs at sea, the disposition of the remains shall be handled or dealt with in accordance with the master’s best judgment. In all cases, the employer/master shall communicate with the manning agency to advise for disposition of seafarer’s remains.

    c. The employer shall pay the beneficiaries of the seafarer the Philippine currency equivalent to the amount of One Thousand US dollars (US$1,000) for burial expenses at the exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment. (Emphasis supplied.)

    The Court addressed the employer’s contentions, as follows:

    1) Clarification of the phrase “work-related death of the seafarer, during the term of his employment contract”

    The Court found that Section 20 (A) (1) of the 1996 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract covered cases wherein the seafarer’s death occurred “during the term of his contract.” The Court also noted that the same phrase could be found in Section 20 (A) (1) of the 2000 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract, only this more recent version of the provision additionally required that the death be “work-related.”

    The Court acknowledged that although medical repatriation of the seafarer at the point of hire strictly meant the termination of his employment, heirs of a seafarer who has died after his medical repatriation could still recover compensation and benefits.

    Applying the rule on liberal construction, the Court stated that medical repatriation cases should be considered as an exception to Section 20 of the Standard Employment Contract.

    1.1)

    Accordingly, the phrase “work-related death of the seafarer, during the term of his employment contract” under Part A (1) of the Standard Employment Contract should not be strictly and literally construed to mean that the seafarer’s work-related death should have precisely occurred during the term of his employment.

    Rather, it is enough that the seafarer’s work-related injury or illness which eventually causes his death should have occurred during the term of his employment.

    According to the Court, it is by this method of construction that undue prejudice to the seafarer and his heirs may be obviated and the State policy on labor protection be championed. For if the seafarer’s death was brought about (whether fully or partially) by the work he had harbored for his employer’s profit, then it is but proper that his demise be compensated.

    1.2)

    It is not required that the employment be the sole factor in the growth, development or acceleration of the illness to entitle the seafarer or the heirs to benefits provided therefor. It is enough that the employment had contributed, even in a small degree, to the development of the disease and in bringing about seafarer’s death.

    1.3)

    Even assuming that the ailment of the seafarer was contracted prior to his employment, this still would not deprive him or his heirs of compensation benefits. For what matters is that the work of the seafarer had contributed, even in a small degree, to the development of the disease and in bringing about his eventual death.

    1.4)

    Neither is it necessary, in order to recover compensation, that the seafarer be in perfect health at the time he contracted the disease. A seafarer brings with him possible infirmities in the course of his employment, and while the employer is not the insurer of the health of his seafarers, he takes them as he finds them and assumes the risk of liability. If the disease is the proximate cause of the seafarer’s death for which compensation is sought, the previous physical condition of the seafarer is unimportant, and recovery may be had for said death, independently of any pre-existing disease.

    The Court concluded that medical repatriation is an exceptional circumstance and allows the heirs of the seafarer who died after he had been medically repatriated to recover the compensation and benefits provided in Section 20 (A) of the 1996 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract .

    The phrase “death of the seafarer during the term of his contract” in Section 20 (A) (1) of the 1996 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract should not be strictly and literally construed to mean that the seafarer’s death should have occurred during the term of his employment; it is enough that the seafarer’s work-related injury or illness which eventually caused his death occurred during the term of his employment.

    2) Context of the illness that caused the seafarer’s death

    According to the Court, for a seafarer’s death to be compensable under the said contract, the illness leading to the eventual death of the seafarer need not be shown to be work-related in order to be compensable, but must be proven to have been contracted during the term of the contract. Neither is it required that there be proof that the working conditions increased the risk of contracting the disease or illness. An injury or accident is said to arise “in the course of employment” when it takes place within the period of employment, at a place where the employee reasonably may be, and while he is fulfilling his duties or is engaged in doing something incidental thereto.

    The Court ruled in favor of the seafarer’s heirs since the particular circumstances in the present case revealed that the seafarer contracted the illness which eventually caused his death during the term of his contract or in the course of his employment.

    3) Seafarer’s hypertension and/or heart disease easily detected by standard/routine tests

    The Court found that before the seafarer boarded M/T Umm Al Lulu on 20 May 2002, he underwent a pre-employment medical examination and was declared fit to work. In this regard, the Court ruled that the same negated the employer’s claim that the seafarer concealed a pre-existing illness.

    The Court acknowledged its declarations that the pre-employment medical examination could not be relied upon to inform the employer/s of a seafarer’s true state of health, and there were instances when the pre-employment medical examination could not have divulged the seafarer’s illness considering that the examinations were not exploratory.

    However, the Court noted that the seafarer’s hypertension and/or heart disease could have been easily detected by standard/routine tests included in the pre-employment medical examination, i.e., blood pressure test, electrocardiogram, chest x-ray, and/or blood chemistry.

    The Court added that even assuming that the ailment of the seafarer was contracted prior to his employment on board the M/T Umm Al Lulu, this could not be a drawback to the compensability of the disease.

    The Court reiterated that it is not required that the employment be the sole factor in the growth, development or acceleration of the illness to entitle the claimant to the benefits provided therefor. It is enough that the employment had contributed, even in a small degree, to the development of the disease and in bringing about his death.

    Neither is it necessary, in order to recover compensation, that the seafarer must have been in perfect condition or health at the time he contracted the disease. Every workingman brings with him to his employment certain infirmities, and while the employer is not the insurer of the health of his seafarers, he takes them as he finds them and assumes the risk of liability. If the disease is the proximate cause of the seafarer’s death for which compensation is sought, the previous physical condition of the seafarer is unimportant and recovery may be had therefor independent of any pre-existing disease.

    4) Post-employment medical examination of the seafarer by a company-designated physician within three days from arrival not a requisite for recovery of compensation and benefits relating to a seafarer’s death

    Finally, the Court ruled that the insistence of the employer on the post-employment medical examination of the seafarer by a company-designated physician within three days from arrival at the point of hire was misplaced.

    Said post-employment medical examination was required under Section 20 (B) (3) of the 1996 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract for compensation and benefits for a seafarer’s injury or illness; it was not a requisite under Section 20 (A) of the 1996 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract for compensation and benefits for a seafarer’s death.

    In addition, Section 20 (B) (3) of the 1996 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract itself allowed as an exception from said requirement a seafarer who is physically incapacitated from complying with the same.

    The Court found that the seafarer in this case was already of poor health and weak physical condition upon his repatriation on 16 March 2003, which necessitated his immediate visit to a nearby clinic the very next day, on 17 March 2003.

    In any event, the seafarer still had until 19 March 2003 to see a company-designated physician but he died on the same day of a cause (“Hypertensive Heart Disease”) directly linked to the illness (“Essential Hypertension”) he developed during his term of employment on M/T Umm Al Lulu and for which he was medically repatriated.

    The Court reiterated the principle that the post-employment medical examination requirement is not absolute and admits of an exception, i.e., when the seaman is physically incapacitated from complying with the requirement.

    For a man who was terminally ill and in need of urgent medical attention, one could not reasonably expect that he would immediately resort to and avail of the required medical examination, assuming that he was still capable of submitting himself to such examination at that time.

    Under the circumstances, the seafarer’s surviving heirs cannot be denied their right to claim benefits under the law.

    Further reading:

    • C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. v. Legal Heirs of Repiso, G.R. No. 190534, February 10, 2016.

  • But the Employee Had No Wrongful Intent

    The employee in this case was declared to have been dismissed for a valid cause. It was found that the said employee not only violated Security Bank Savings Corporation’s Code of Conduct, but also committed gross and habitual neglect of duties when he repeatedly allowed his branch manager to bring outside the bank premises checkbooks and bank forms despite knowledge of the bank’s prohibition on the matter.

    Notwithstanding the foregoing findings, separation pay was awarded the employee for the following reasons:

    • it was a measure of social justice;
    • the employee’s infractions involved violations of company policy and habitual neglect of duties, not serious misconduct;
    • the employee’s dismissal from work was not reflective of his moral character;
    • the employee did not commit a dishonest act since he readily admitted to the bank that he allowed the branch manager to bring out the subject checkbooks; and
    • although the employee acquiesced to the branch manager’s improper marketing strategy, there was no showing that his conduct was perpetrated with self-interest or for an unlawful purpose.

    The Supreme Court, however, ruled that the award of separation pay in the employee’s favor was not proper.

    Rule:

    An employee dismissed for any of the just causes enumerated under Article 2971ARTICLE 297. (Formerly ARTICLE 282) Termination by Employer. — An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:

    (a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work;

    (b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;

    (c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative;

    (d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representatives; and

    (e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.     of the Labor Code of the Philippines, being causes attributable to the employee’s fault, is not, as a general rule, entitled to separation pay. According to the Court, the non-grant of such right to separation pay is premised on the reason that an erring employee should not benefit from his wrongful acts.

    Exception:

    As an exception, the grant of separation pay or financial assistance to a legally dismissed employee has been allowed in certain instances as a measure of social justice or on grounds of equity. The Court said:

    There should be no question that where it comes to such valid but not iniquitous causes as failure to comply with work standards, the grant of separation pay to the dismissed employee may be both just and compassionate, particularly if he has worked for some time with the company. It is not the employee’s fault if he does not have the necessary aptitude for his work but on the other hand the company cannot be required to maintain him just the same at the expense of the efficiency of its operations. He too may be validly replaced. Under these and similar circumstances, however, the award to the employee of separation pay would be sustainable under the social justice policy even if the separation is for cause.

    Clarification:

    The Court, nonetheless, stated that the grant of separation pay to such a dismissed employee is primarily determined by the cause of the dismissal.

    Instances excluded from the grant of separation pay based on social justice are those listed under Article 2972ARTICLE 297. (Formerly ARTICLE 282) Termination by Employer. — An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:

    (a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work;

    (b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;

    (c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative;

    (d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representatives; x x x

     of the Labor Code of the Philippines, namely, willful disobedience, gross and habitual neglect of duty, fraud or willful breach of trust, and commission of a crime against the employer or his family.

    However, with respect to analogous causes3ARTICLE 297. (Formerly ARTICLE 282) Termination by Employer. — An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:

    (e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.     for termination like inefficiency, drug use, and others, the social justice exception could be made to apply depending on certain considerations, such as the length of service of the employee, the amount involved, whether the act is the first offense, the performance of the employee, and the like.

    In the present case, the employee’s valid dismissal on the ground of gross and habitual neglect of duty had already been established, not having been contested on appeal.

    The Court noted that the employee was the custodian of accountable bank forms in his assigned branch and as such, was mandated to strictly comply with the monitoring procedure and disposition thereof as a security measure to avoid the attendant high risk to the bank.

    However, the employee’s repeated act of allowing the branch manager to bring checkbooks and bank forms outside of the bank’s premises violated bank policy, put the bank’s credibility and business at risk, and exposed the bank to regulatory sanction.

    The Court emphasized that the banking industry is imbued with public interest. Banks are required to possess not only ordinary diligence in the conduct of its business but extraordinary diligence in the care of its accounts and the interests of its stakeholders. The banking business is highly sensitive with a fiduciary duty towards its client and the public in general, such that central measures must be strictly observed.

    With regard to the employee’s excuse that the branch manager merely prompted him towards such ineptitude, the Court found no reason to lend credence to the same. The Court found that the employee readily admitted that he violated established company policy against bringing out checkbooks and bank forms, which meant that he was well aware of the fact that the same was prohibited. Nevertheless, he still chose to, regardless of his superior’s influence, disobey the same not only once, but on numerous occasions. All throughout, there was no showing that he questioned the acts of the branch manager; neither did he take it upon himself to report said irregularities to a higher authority.

    The Court maintained that the infractions, while not indicative of wrongful intent on the part of the employee, was, nonetheless, serious in nature when one considered the employee’s functions. The Court accordingly found no reason to award separation pay based on social justice. Said the Court: “A contrary ruling would effectively reward (the employee) for his negligent acts instead of punishing him for his offense, in observation of the principle of equity.”

    Further reading:

    • Security Bank Savings Corp. v. Singson, G.R. No. 214230, February 10, 2016.

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  • Contractor’s Supervision Over Its Employees Found to Be Dependent Upon Principal’s Needs

    Contracting arrangements for the performance of specific jobs or services under the law are allowed. However, jurisprudence dictates that contracting must be made to a legitimate and independent contractor since labor rules expressly prohibit labor-only contracting.

    Labor-only contracting exists when the contractor or subcontractor merely recruits, supplies or places workers to perform a job, work or service for a principal and any of the following elements are present:

    a)

    i. The contractor or subcontractor does not have substantial capital, or

    ii. The contractor or subcontractor does not have investments in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, supervision, work premises, among others; and

    iii. The contractor’s or subcontractor’s employees recruited and placed are performing activities which are directly related to the main business operation of the principal; or

    b)

    The contractor or subcontractor does not exercise the right to control over the performance of the work of the employee.1now Section 5, Rules Implementing Articles 106 to 109 of the Labor Code, as Amended, Department of Labor and Employment Order No. 174-17, March 16, 2017 (formerly Section 6, Department Order No. 18-A-11 and Section 5, Department Order No. 18-02).

    The Supreme Court ruled that the complainants in this case were regular employees of Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. (Manila Memorial) despite having been engaged by Ward Trading and Services (Ward Trading).

    • Ward Trading did not have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machinery, work premises and other material, as it was Manila Memorial which owned the equipment used by Ward Trading’s interment and exhumation services.
    • Ward Trading could not have raised substantial capital from its income alone without the inclusion of the equipment owned and allegedly sold to it by Manila Memorial.
    • Manila Memorial admitted that the complainants performed various interment services at one of its branches. Said activities were directly related to Manila Memorial’s business of developing, selling and maintaining memorial parks and interment functions.
    • Manila Memorial retained the right to control complainants’ performance of their work. Although Ward Trading was still in charge of the supervising the complainants, the exercise of its supervision was heavily dependent upon the needs of Manila Memorial.
    • The service contract between Manila Memorial and Ward Trading further provided that the former had the option to take over the functions of the complainants if it finds any part or aspect of their work or service to be unsatisfactory.

    According to the Supreme Court, Manila Ward Trading was a labor-only contractor. Consequently, Manila Memorial was deemed the employer of the complainants. Said complainants, as regular employees of Manila Memorial, were entitled to their claims for wages and other benefits.

    Further reading:

    • Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. v. Lluz, G.R. No. 208451, February 3, 2016.

  • No Objection to Company-designated Physician’s Assessment

    The seafarer in this case entered into a ten-month employment contract and was engaged to work as an able seaman by his employer, Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd., through its agent, Marlow Navigation Philippines, Inc., onboard the vessel M/V BBC OHIO. His engagement was also subject to a collective bargaining agreement between the employer and its employees. The seafarer boarded the vessel on 23 November 2009.

    While on duty on 30 December 2009, the seafarer fell from a height of four meters in his work area. The fall affected his side, shoulder, and head. He was brought to a hospital in Huangpu, China, where he was diagnosed with “Left l-4 Verterbra Transverse Bone broken (accident).” He was declared unfit to work for 25 days. On 7 January 2010, he was medically repatriated to the Philippines.

    The seafarer arrived in Manila on 8 January 2010, where he was referred to the company-designated physician for examination and treatment. After undergoing several tests (which included a CT scan, audiometry and MRI, as well as therapy sessions with the company-designated physician that spanned six months) the company-designated physician gave him a combined 36% disability assessment.

    The seafarer did not object to the company-designated physician’s assessment. Yet, he filed a claim for permanent total disability compensation against his employer.

    The Supreme Court ruled that the seafarer was not entitled to permanent total disability compensation.

    The Court noted that the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract and the collective bargaining agreement were instruments that governed the seafarer’s employment with the petitioners. According to the Court, these instruments are the law between the parties.

    Under the Standard Employment Contract, it is the company-designated physician who not only declares/establishes the fitness to work or the degree of disability of a seafarer who is repatriated for medical reasons, but also determines whether a seafarer needs further medical attention. Thus, under the said contract, the seafarer is required to submit to a post-employment medical examination by the company-designated physician.

    Furthermore, under the collective bargaining agreement, the disability suffered by the Seafarer shall be determined by a doctor appointed mutually by the employer and the union, and the employers shall provide disability compensation to the seafarer in accordance with the compensation scale prescribed therein. The Court found that the company-designated physician based her assessment of the seafarer’s disability on the said compensation scale.

    In the present case, the seafarer was able to submit himself to the care of the company-designated physician upon his medical repatriation. The company-designated physician thereafter gave the seafarer a 36% disability assessment under the compensation schedule prescribed in the collective bargaining agreement.

    The Court noted the seafarer’s own admission that he no longer disputed the findings of the company-designated physician. It was also not shown that the seafarer offered a contrary finding. And although the collective bargaining agreement stated that the seafarer’s disability shall be determined by a doctor mutually appointed by the employer and the union, it was was not established that the parties even resorted to this step.

    The Court ruled that the absence of a disability assessment by a doctor chosen by the parties will not invalidate the company-designated physician’s assessment, not only because the seafarer accepted said physician’s findings, but also because record established that the seafarer refused the employer’s proposal that his medical condition be referred to a mutually appointed doctor for determination.

    According to the Court, a seafarer could not claim full disability benefits on his mere say-so, in complete disregard of the Standard Employment Contract and the collective bargaining agreement.

    The Court thus held that company-designated physician’s assessment should stand.

    Further reading:

    • Marlow Navigation Phils., Inc. v. Cabatay, G.R. No. 212878, February 1, 2016.

  • Effect of Delaying Payment of Just Compensation

    The landowner in this case had a parcel of agricultural land in Camarines Sur which was taken in 1984 under Presidential Decree No. 27,1Entitled DECREEING THE EMANCIPATION OF TENANTS FROM THE BONDAGE OF THE SOIL, TRANSFERRING TO THEM THE OWNERSHIP OF THE LAND THEY TILL AND PROVIDING THE INSTRUMENTS AND MECHANISM THEREFOR (approved on 21 October 1972). then distributed to the farmer-beneficiaries. The Department of Agrarian Reform fixed just compensation of the said land at P66,214.03 using the formula provided under Executive Order No. 228, Series of 1987.2Entitled DECLARING FULL LAND OWNERSHIP TO QUALIFIED FARMER BENEFICIARIES COVERED BY PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 27; DETERMINING THE VALUE OF REMAINING UNVALUED RICE AND CORN LANDS SUBJECT OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 27; AND PROVIDING FOR THE MANNER OF PAYMENT BY THE FARMER BENEFICIARY AND MODE OF COMPENSATION TO THE LANDOWNER (approved on 17 July 1987).

    On 30 August 2000 and 17 December 2003, respectively, the landowner was issued Agrarian Reform Bond No. 0079665 in the amount of P11,674.59 representing the initial valuation of the taken land and AR Bond No. 0079666 in the amount of P30,428.83 representing the 6% increment under Presidential Decree No. 27 and Executive Order No. 228, and paid cash in the total amount of P4,678.16.

    The landowner found the valuation unreasonable, which is why he filed a petition for summary administrative proceedings for the determination of just compensation of the taken land before the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator.

    On 27 March 2001, the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator fixed just compensation in the amount of P1,147,466.73 24, using the formula, LV = AGP x 2.5 x GSP. However, in arriving at such values, the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator used the recent government support price for corn of P300.00/cavan (P6.00/kilo) as certified by the National Food Authority Provincial Manager of Camarines Sur, instead of the P31.00/cavan provided under Section 23SECTION 2. Henceforth, the valuation of rice and corn lands covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be based on the average gross production determined by the Barangay Committee on Land Production in accordance with Department Memorandum Circular No. 26, Series of 1973, and related issuances and regulations of the Department of Agrarian Reform. The average gross production per hectare shall be multiplied by 2.5, the product of which shall be multiplied by P35.00, the government support price for 1 cavan of 50 kilos of palay on 21 October 1972, or P31.00, the government support price for 1 cavan of 50 kilos of corn on 21 October 1972, and the amount arrived at shall be the value of the rice and corn land, as the case may be, for the purpose of determining its cost to the farmer and compensation to the landowner. of Executive Order No. 228.

    Hence, the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator no longer applied the 6% annual incremental interest granted under Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1994.4Entitled RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE GRANT OF INCREMENT OF 6% YEARLY INTEREST COMPOUNDED ANNUALLY ON LANDS COVERED BY PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 27 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 228 (approved on 27 October 1994). In a letter dated 5 September 2001, the landowner unconditionally accepted and called for the immediate payment of the valuations for the land.

    Dissatisfied with the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator’s valuation, the Land Bank of the Philippines instituted a complaint for the determination of just compensation before the Regional Trial Court, averring that the said office erred in disregarding the formula provided under Executive Order No. 228.

    In an Order dated 17 March 2010, the Regional Trial Court directed the Land Bank of the Philippines to submit a revaluation for the land in accordance with the factors set forth under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988,5Republic Act No. 6657, as amended; Entitled AN ACT INSTITUTING A COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM TO PROMOTE SOCIAL JUSTICE AND INDUSTRIALIZATION, PROVIDING THE MECHANISM FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES (approved on 10 June 1988). as implemented by Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 2010.6Entitled RULES AND REGULATIONS ON VALUATION AND LANDOWNERS COMPENSATION INVOLVING TENANTED RICE AND CORN LANDS UNDER PRESIDENTIAL DECREE (P.D.) NO. 27 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER (E.O.) NO. 228 which took effect on 1 July 2009.

    The Land Bank of the Philippines complied and reached an amount of P1,155,223.41, as recomputed value of the land. The landowner accepted the said computation.

    On 22 June 2011, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision adopting and approving the Land Bank of the Philippines’ uncontested revaluation the land in the amount of P1,155,223.41, as well as ordering its payment to landowner in accordance with Section 18 of Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, minus the initial valuation that had already been paid to him.

    The landowner moved for reconsideration, contending that the Regional Trial Court failed to order an additional payment of 12% interest in his favor, reckoned from the time his land was taken from him by the government in 1972 and distributed to the farmer beneficiaries until full payment of the just compensation.

    In an Order dated 31 August 2011, the Regional Trial Court granted the said motion and awarded 12% interest computed from 26 June 2000, when the Land Bank of the Philippines approved the payment of the initial valuation for the land up to the date the decision was rendered, or a total amount of P1,437,669.75.

    The Regional Trial Court modified its 31 August 2011 Order, by way of its Order dated 10 October 2011, holding that the 12% interest should be reckoned from 1 January 2010 until full payment since the revaluation the land already included the required 6% annual incremental interest under Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1994,7This Administrative Order granted an annual interest of 6% to lands covered under Presidential Decree No. 27 and Executive Order No. 228 compounded yearly from taking until November 1994. The reason is had the landowner been paid from the time of the taking of his land and the money deposited in a bank, the money would have earned the same interest rate compounded annually as authorized under banking laws, rules and regulations. Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 2, Series of 2004,8Entitled AMENDMENT TO ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 13, SERIES OF 1994 ENTITLED RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE GRANT OF INCREMENT OF 6% YEARLY INTEREST COMPOUNDED ANNUALLY ON LANDS COVERED BY PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 27 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 228’” dated 4 November 2004. This extended the grant of the 6% incremental annual interest up to December 2006. and Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 2008,9Entitled AMENDMENT TO DAR ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 2., SERIES OF 2004 ON THE GRANT OF INCREMENT OF 6% YEARLY INTEREST COMPOUNDED ANNUALLY ON LANDS COVERED BY PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 27 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 228 dated 28 July 2008. This further extended the grant of the six percent (6%) incremental annual interest up to 31 December 2009. from the time of taking until December 31, 2009.

    Is the landowner entitled to the payment of annual interest of 12% on the unpaid balance of just compensation, even if he was already granted the 6% annual incremental interest prescribed under Department of Agrarian Reform Order Nos.

    • 13, Series of 1994;
    • 02, Series of 2004; or
    • 06, Series of 2008?

    Yes.

    The Supreme Court ruled that in expropriation cases, interest is imposed if there is delay in the payment of just compensation to the landowner since the obligation is deemed to be an effective forbearance on the part of the State.

    The Court pegged said interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the unpaid balance of the just compensation, reckoned from the time of taking, or the time when the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as when title is transferred to the Republic, or emancipation patents are issued by the government, until full payment.

    The Court clarified that, unlike the 6% annual incremental interest allowed in the above-mentioned department orders, this 12% annual interest is not granted on the computed just compensation. Rather, it is a penalty imposed for damages incurred by the landowner due to the delay in its payment.

    The reason is that just compensation also embraces, not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the landowner, but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking, as otherwise, compensation cannot be considered “just,” for the owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for years before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss. Said the Court:

    Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The true measure is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. The word “just” is used to modify the meaning of the word “compensation” to convey the idea that the equivalent to be given for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, and ample.

    The concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also payment within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered “just” inasmuch as the property owner is made to suffer the consequences of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss.

    While prompt payment of just compensation requires the immediate deposit and release to the landowner of the provisional compensation as determined by the Department of Agrarian Reform, it does not end there. Verily, it also encompasses the payment in full of the just compensation to the landholders as finally determined by the courts. Thus, it cannot be said that there is already prompt payment of just compensation when there is only a partial payment thereof, as in this case.

    N.B.:

    Beginning 1 July 2013, the rate of six percent (6%) interest per annum shall be imposed until full payment, under the modification introduced by BSP-MB Circular No. 799 as affirmed in Nacar v. Gallery Frames, G.R. No. 189871, August 13, 2013.

    Further reading:

    • Land Bank of the Philippines v. Santos, G.R. No. 213863 & 214021, January 27, 2016.

  • To Strong-arm Colleagues and Superiors into Succumbing to One’s Arrogance

    Under the law1ARTICLE 297 (Formerly 282) Termination by Employer. — An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:

    (a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work;

    (b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;

    (c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative;

    (d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representatives; and

    (e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.     an employer may validly terminate the services of an employee for serious misconduct and willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer.

    Serious misconduct is characterized as a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment.

    For misconduct to be considered as a just cause for termination, the following requisites must concur:

    • the misconduct must be serious;
    • it must relate to the performance of the employee’s duties showing that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer; and
    • it must have been performed with wrongful intent.

    Loss of trust and confidence, in turn, will validate an employee’s dismissal when it is shown that:

    • the employee concerned holds a position of trust and confidence;2There are two (2) classes of positions of trust:

      First, managerial employees whose primary duty consists of the management of the establishment in which they are employed or of a department or a subdivision thereof, and to other officers or members of the managerial staff; and

      Second, fiduciary rank-and-file employees, such as cashiers, auditors, property custodians, or those who, in the normal exercise of their functions, regularly handle significant amounts of money or property. These employees, though rank-and-file, are routinely charged with the care and custody of the employer’s money or property, and are thus classified as occupying positions of trust and confidence.       and
    • he performs an act that would justify such loss of trust and confidence.

    Employers are allowed a wider latitude of discretion in terminating the services of employees who perform functions by which their nature require the employer’s full trust and confidence. Mere existence of basis for believing that the employee has breached the trust and confidence of the employer is sufficient and does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, when an employee has been guilty of breach of trust or his employer has ample reason to distrust him, a labor tribunal cannot deny the employer the authority to dismiss him.

    In this case, the Supreme Court affirmed the valid dismissal of this employee on the grounds of serious misconduct and loss of trust and confidence because it found that the employer was able to prove, through substantial evidence, the existence of the same.

    SERIOUS MISCONDUCT

    Employee’s misconduct was serious.

    The Court found that the employee frequently exhibited disrespectful and belligerent behavior, not only to his colleagues, but also to his superiors.

    Specifically, the employee had used his stature as a law graduate to insist that he is “above” his colleagues and superiors, often using misguided legalese to weasel his way out of the charges against him, as well as to strong-arm his colleagues and superiors into succumbing to his arrogance.

    The Court noticed the employee’s obnoxious attitude from the following documents:

    • his reply to HRD 202 File 2008.02.26.036 dated February 26, 2008 wherein he threatened HRD Manager Marquez with a lawsuit, stating that if the memorandum is “proven malicious, [she] might be answerable to a certain degree of civil liability which the 1987 Constitution has given to individuals”;
    • HRD 202 File 2008.06.26.086 dated June 26, 2008 wherein he berated COO Bentillo in front of her subordinates with the statement: “[y]ou’re the only one who doesn’t trust her, she is very qualified, you even lose in comparison to her[,]” and his reply thereto wherein he dismissed the charge as made with malicious intent and aimed to discredit his person;
    • HRD 202 File 2008.06.26.088 dated June 26, 2008 wherein he argued with the CEO Quevedo, insisting that he had the authority to hire a new staff, and his reply thereto where he cited the Philippine Law Dictionary to maintain that his act did not amount to insubordination;
    • HRD 202 File 2008.06.26.087 dated June 26, 2008 wherein he openly questioned the authority of HRD Manager Marquez in refusing to hire a new staff and his reply thereto where he again cited the Philippine Law Dictionary to insist that he did not commit acts of insubordination; and
    • HRD 202 File 2008.07.04.095 dated July 4, 2008 wherein he openly and improperly confronted the CPMPC CEO during a Board of Directors’ inquiry hearing, to which he again maintained that his acts did not constitute misconduct, gross disrespect, and loss of trust and confidence as he was only looking after the welfare of the cooperative.

    The Court stated that while management has the rightful prerogative to take away dissidents and undesirables from the workplace within the bounds of law, it should not be forced to deal with difficult personnel, else it be compelled to act against the best interest of its business.

    According to the Court, demeanor of the employee, as revealed by the evidence above, not only reflected his defiance, but also bred antagonism in his work environment.

    Employee’s conduct was work-related.

    The Court found that the employee’s demeanor were were incidents which sprung from the performance of his duties.

    Employee’s misconduct was performed with wrongful intent.

    The Court found that the complainant did not advance any justifiable reason for the same. According to the Court, the employee came off as a smart aleck who went to the extent of dangling whatever knowledge he had of the law against his employer in a combative manner. According to the Court:

    “[e]very time [the employee’s] attention was called for some inappropriate actions, he would always show his Book, Philippine Law Dictionary and would ask the CEO or HRD Manager under what provision of the law he would be liable for the complained action or omission.”

    The Court concluded that the employer was justified in no longer tolerating the grossly discourteous attitude of [the employee] as it clearly constituted conduct unbecoming of his managerial position and a serious breach of order and discipline in the workplace.

    LOSS OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE

    The employee occupied a position of trust and confidence.

    The Court found that he was employed as Credit and Collection Manager, and later on, as Legal and Collection Manager, tasked with the duties of, among others, handling the credit and collection activities of the cooperative, which included recommending loan approvals, formulating and implementing credit and collection policies, and conducting trainings.

    The employee performed acts that justified the employer’s loss of trust and confidence upon him.

    The Court noted the following acts of the employee:

    • the forwarding of the mediation settlements for notarization to a lawyer who was not the authorized legal retainer of CPMPC;
    • the pull-out of important records and vital documents from the office premises, which were either lost or returned already tampered and altered; and
    • the incurring of unliquidated cash advances related to the notarial transactions of the mediation agreements.

    Although the employee claimed that he had good intentions in entering into those transactions as he was only finding ways for his employer to save up on legal fees, the Court did not give credence to the same, considering that said transactions were not only highly irregular, but also done without the prior knowledge and consent of his employer.

    Further reading:

    • Cebu People’s Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. Carbonilla, Jr., G.R. No. 212070, January 27, 2016.

  • Union Deprived Member’s Right to Appeal

    Petitioner was a member of the Manila Water Employees Union (MWEU).

    On 11 April 2007, MWEU informed petitioner that it was unable to fully deduct the increased union dues from his salary because the latter failed to issue a check-off authorization. It warned petitioner that his failure to pay the union dues would result in sanctions upon him.

    MWEU, through its executive board, soon charged petitioner because he failed to pay his union dues. After hearing, the board imposed a penalty of suspension.

    Following the provisions of the MWEU constitution and by-laws, petitioner appealed the decision of the executive board to MWEU’s general membership assembly. The assembly denied the appeal, stating that the prescribed period for appeal had expired. Petitioner wrote the assembly demanding that it should entertain his appeal, but the latter did not act on the same.

    Thereafter, petitioner was charged again in connection with his failure to pay union dues. After hearing, the board penalized him with suspension.

    Petitioner invoked his right to appeal to the assembly. However, the board did not act on the same.

    Meanwhile, MWEU scheduled an election of officers, to which petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for Vice-President. MWEU disqualified him for not being a member in good standing on account of his suspension.

    MWEU charged petitioner with non-payment of union dues for the third time, but the latter did not attend the scheduled hearing. This time, the board imposed the penalty of expulsion from MWEU.

    Petitioner’s plea for an appeal to the assembly were once more unheeded.

    Petitioner filed a complaint against MWEU and its officers for unfair labor practices, damages, and attorney’s fees before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Petitioner accused the respondents of illegal termination from MWEU in connection with the events relative to his non-payment of union dues.

    Respondents countered:

    • the Office of the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over the dispute, it being intra-union in nature;
    • the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) was the proper venue, in accordance with law1Article 232 (Formerly Article 226) of the Labor Code of the Philippines and prevailing rules;2Section 1, Rule XI of Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Order 40-03, Series of 2003; and
    • they were not guilty of unfair labor practices, discrimination, coercion, or restraint.

    The Supreme Court acknowledged that some of petitioner’s causes of action constitute intra-union cases cognizable by the BLR under the Labor Code of the Philippines:

    “An intra-union dispute refers to any conflict between and among union members, including grievances arising from any violation of the rights and conditions of membership, violation of or disagreement over any provision of the union’s constitution and by-laws, or disputes arising from chartering or disaffiliation of the union. Sections 1 and 2, Rule XI of Department Order No. 40-03, Series of 2003 of the DOLE enumerate the following circumstances as inter/intra-union disputes.”

    However, the Court ruled that petitioner’s charge of unfair labor practices fell within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Office of the Labor Arbiter under law.3Article 224 (Formerly Article 217) of the Labor Code of the Philippines In addition, the law4Article 258 (Formerly Article 247) of the Labor Code of the Philippines provides that:

    “the civil aspects of all cases involving unfair labor practices, which may include claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages, attorney’s fees and other affirmative relief, shall be under the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters.”

    Unfair labor practices may be committed both by the employer5Under Article 259 (Formerly Article 248) of the Labor Code of the Philippines and by labor organizations6Under Article 260 (Formerly Article 249) of the Labor Code of the Philippines. With regard to labor organizations, the law provides:

    “ART. 260 (Formerly 249). Unfair labor practices of labor organizations. — It shall be unfair labor practice for a labor organization, its officers, agents or representatives:

    “(a) To restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization. However, a labor organization shall have the right to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership;

    “(b) To cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee, including discrimination against an employee with respect to whom membership in such organization has been denied or to terminate an employee on any ground other than the usual terms and conditions under which membership or continuation of membership is made available to other members;” x x x

    Petitioner contended that the respondents committed unfair labor practices when he was illegally suspended and expelled with the denial of his right to appeal his case to the assembly.

    On the other hand, respondents argued that such charge was intra-union in nature, and that petitioner lost his right to appeal when he failed to petition to convene the assembly in accordance with MWEU’s constitution and by-laws.

    The Supreme Court interpreted said constitution and by-laws and noted that:

    • When an MWEU member is suspended, he is given the right to appeal such suspension within three working days from the date of notice of said suspension, which appeal the board is obligated to act upon by a simple majority vote.
    • When the member is expelled, said member is given seven days from notice of said dismissal and/or expulsion to appeal to the board, which is required to act by a simple majority vote of its members.
    • The board’s decision shall then be approved/disapproved by a majority vote of the assembly in a meeting duly called for the purpose.

    The Court found that when the petitioner received the decision to suspend him for the second time, he immediately and timely filed a written appeal. However, the board did not act thereon. Then again, when petitioner was charged for the third time and meted the penalty of expulsion from MWEU, the board did not act on his timely appeal.

    Thus, the Court did not agree with respondents’ argument that petitioner lost his right to appeal when he failed to petition to convene the assembly under MWEU’s constitution and by-laws. The Court ruled that the petitioner was illegally suspended for the second time and thereafter unlawfully expelled from MWEU due to respondents’ failure to act on his appeals.

    According to the Court, the required petition to convene the assembly does not apply in petitioner’s case because the board must first act on his two appeals before the matter could properly be referred to the assembly.

    Because respondents did not act on the two (2) appeals, petitioner was:

    • unceremoniously suspended;
    • disqualified and deprived of his right to run for the position of MWEU Vice-President;
    • expelled from MWEU; and
    • forced to join another union.

    For these, the Court concluded that the respondents were guilty of unfair labor practices under law7Article 260 (Formerly Article 249) (a) and (b) of the Labor Code of the Philippines through the:

    • violation of petitioner’s right to self-organization;
    • his unlawful discrimination; and
    • illegal termination of his union membership.

    According to the court, petitioner’s case falls within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Office of the Labor Arbiter.8In accordance with Article 224 (Formerly Article 217) of the Labor Code of the Philippines

    Further reading:

    • Mendoza v. Officers of Manila Water Employees Union, G.R. No. 201595, January 25, 2016.

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  • Seafarer’s Unjustified Refusal to Continue His Medical Treatment

    On 30 September 2008, the respondents hired the seafarer in this case as fitter aboard the vessel Crown Garnet for a period of nine (9) months. He embarked on 4 October 2008.

    The seafarer claimed that in January 2009, he started experiencing neck and lower back pain. He then stated that he signed off from the vessel on 13 July 2009 (although it was not clear in the case whether the same was by way of medical repatriation or of the expiration of his employment contract).

    Upon arrival in the Philippines on 15 July 2009, he was referred to the company-designated physician and was diagnosed with “cervical radiculopathy, thoracic and lumbar spondylosis, as well as carpal tunnel syndrome of the left, and trigger finger, third digit of his right hand.” He underwent carpal tunnel surgery on his left hand, and physical therapy sessions for his cervical and lumbar condition.

    On 23 November 2009, the seafarer filed a complaint for disability benefits against the respondents.

    The Supreme Court denied the seafarer’s disability benefits in this case.

    At the time the complaint for disability benefits was filed, the seafarer had no cause of action.

    The Court found that when the seafarer filed said complaint, he was still under the care of the company-designated physician. He also had not even consulted a personal doctor before he instituted his complaint.

    The company-designated physician even advised the seafarer to seek the opinion of an orthopedic specialist. The seafarer, however, did not heed the advice and proceeded to file his complaint for disability benefits. It was only a day after its filing that the seafarer requested from the company-designated physician the latter’s assessment on his medical condition.

    Since the company-designated physician was yet to issue an assessment on the seafarer’s medical condition, and since the 240-day maximum period for determining the seafarer’s disability or fitness to work had not yet lapsed, the Court accordingly concluded that the seafarer prematurely filed his complaint.

    The seafarer reneged on his duties under the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract.

    In his report, the company-designated physician stated that while there was a good chance the seafarer will be declared fit to work, this was premised on the completion of his remaining therapy sessions to address the pain in his left hand and back. The seafarer thereafter complained of pain on the neck and additional pain of the lower back which was not originally present at the start of his treatment. Thus, the company-designated physician intended to prolong the seafarer’s treatment. However, the seafarer no longer reported to the clinic of the said physician.

    The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract1Under Section 20 (D) provides that

    “[n]o compensation and benefits shall be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity, disability or death of the seafarer resulting from his willful or criminal act or intentional breach of his duties, provided however, that the employer can prove that such injury, incapacity, disability or death is directly attributable to the seafarer.”

    The Court found that the seafarer was aware that he had the duty to undergo medical treatment, physical therapy sessions, including the recommended consultation to an orthopedic specialist, in order to give the company-designated physician the opportunity to determine his fitness to work or to assess the degree of his disability. His inability to continue his treatment without any valid explanation proved that he neglected his corresponding duty to continue his medical treatment. Consequently, the seafarer’s inability to regularly return for his treatment caused the regress of his condition. According to the Court, had the seafarer been cooperative with his treatment and shown interest in improving his condition, it would have been possible for the company-designated physician to declare him fit to work.

    The Court thus declared that the seafarer failed to comply with the terms of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract. The absence of a timely assessment was not caused by the company-designated physician, but had resulted from seafarer’s refusal to cooperate and undergo further treatment. Such failure to abide with the procedure under the said contract resulted in his non-entitlement to disability benefits.

    Further reading:

    • Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. v. Quillao, G.R. No. 202885, January 20, 2016.