Magno alleged that on November 13, 2014, he was hired by Goodwood Ship Management, Pte., Ltd., through its agent, Trans-Global Maritime Agency, Inc., as Oiler on board MT G.C. Fuzhou for a period of nine months. He stated that after he was declared fit for sea duty in his pre-employment medical examination, he boarded the vessel on November 15, 2014.
Magno narrated that on January 25, 2015, he suddenly felt severe chest pain, accompanied by dizziness and weakness while carrying out his duties. He was made to endure his condition until his repatriation on May 18, 2015. Upon arrival in the Philippines, he was referred to the employer-company’s designated physician. From May 20, 2015, he was subjected to various tests and treatment for coronary artery disease. After five months of treatment, the company-designated physician discontinued his treatment. Consequently, he consulted his personal cardiologist, who concluded that the nature and extent of his illness rendered him permanently and totally unfit to work as a seaman. Thus, on January 19, 2016, he filed a complaint for disability benefits, medical expenses, damages and attorney’s fees against his employer.
For its part, the employer retorted that Magno denied having a history of high blood pressure or any kind of heart disease when he ticked the “No” box opposite “High Blood Pressure” and “Heart Disease Vascular/Chest Pain” under the section, Medical History in his Pre-Employment Medical Examination (PEME). The employer stated that it was on May 17, 2015, that Magno complained of back and chest pains, with difficulty of breathing and easy fatigability, and was thereafter medically repatriated. During his treatment by the company-designated physician sometime in September 2015, Magno disclosed that he was diagnosed, as early as 2009, with coronary artery disease, for which he underwent Percutaneous Coronary Intervention of the left anterior descending artery. The company-designated physicians later stopped his treatment, prompting him to file a complaint for the payment of permanent total disability benefits.
The Office of the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Magno and awarded him permanent total disability benefits. Said Office considered the company-designated physician’s continuation of Magno’s treatment despite his belated disclosure of his existing coronary artery disease as an instance of employer’s waiver of its right to deny liability for disability benefits. According to the Office of the Labor Arbiter, such treatment constituted an implied admission of compensability and work-relatedness of Magno’s lingering cardio-vascular illness. The Office of the Labor Arbiter further found that the company-designated physician failed to issue a final assessment of Magno’s illness or fitness to work, which failure deemed Magno totally and permanently disabled.
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission affirmed the Office of the Labor Arbiter’s ruling because Magno’s illness occurred within the duration of his contract, and his treatment lasted for more than 120 days. For the Commission, the award of permanent total disability benefits was justified.
The employer then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the petition.
Thus, the employer sought recourse before the Supreme Court, alleging that the Court of Appeals committed serious errors of law in upholding the Commission’s Decision. The employer insisted that Magno was not entitled to permanent and total disability benefits and his other monetary claims because of deliberate concealment of his coronary artery disease.
For his part, Magno maintained entitlement to permanent total disability benefits since his illness was work-related and had contributed to the development of his condition that resulted in his disability.
Is Magno entitled to permanent total disability benefits?
The Supreme Court ruled that Magno is not entitled to permanent total disability benefits. The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission.
The Court started by stating that entitlement of seafarers on overseas work to disability benefits is a matter governed, not only by medical findings, but by law and by contract. The Court stated that the material statutory provisions are Articles 197 to 199 of the Labor Code of the Philippines in relation to Section 2 (a), Rule X of the Amended Rules on Employee Compensation. By contract, the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC), the parties’ collective bargaining agreement, if any, and the employment agreement between the seafarer and the employer are pertinent.
The Court pointed out that Section 20, paragraph E of the POEA-SEC clearly provides that “[a] seafarer who knowingly conceals a pre-existing illness or condition in the Pre-Employment Medical Examination (PEME) shall be liable for misrepresentation and shall be disqualified from any compensation and benefits.” The Court said that such rule seeks to penalize seafarers who conceal information to pass the pre-employment medical examination. It even makes such concealment a just cause for termination.
Under the POEA-SEC, there is a “pre-existing illness or condition” if prior to the processing of the POEA contract, any of the following is present:
- the advice of a medical doctor on treatment was given for such continuing illness or condition; or
- the seafarer has been diagnosed and has knowledge of such illness or condition but failed to disclose it during the pre-employment medical examination, and such cannot be diagnosed during such examination.
In the present case the Court found that:
- In his September 18, 2014 PEME, Magno indicated that he was not suffering from any medical condition likely to be aggravated by service at sea or which may render him unfit for sea service;
- Magno also indicated in the PEME that he did not have a history of heart disease/vascular/chest pain, high blood pressure, or that he underwent treatment for any ailment and was taking any medication; and
- He signed the PEME certificate acknowledging that he had read and understood and was informed of the contents of such certificate.
However, the Court further found a medical report issued by the company-designated physician, dated September 17, 2015, which stated therein Magno’s disclosure of a history of coronary artery disease for which he underwent percutaneous coronary intervention of the left anterior descending artery in 2009.
With this disclosure, the Court declared that Magno had obscured his pre-existing cardiac ailment, and such concealment thus disqualified him from disability benefits notwithstanding the medical attention extended by the company-designated physician upon his repatriation.
The Court discussed that even if the misrepresentation was discovered during Magno’s treatment with the company-designated physician, the same was immaterial and could not have canceled out his deception.
The Court reiterated that a PEME is generally not exploratory in nature, nor is it a totally in-depth and thorough examination of an applicant’s medical condition. It does not reveal the real state of health of an applicant, and does not allow the employer to discover any and all pre-existing medical condition with which the seafarer is suffering and for which he may be taking medication. The PEME is nothing more than a summary examination of the seafarer’s physiological condition and is just enough for the employer to determine his fitness for the nature of the work for which he is to be employed.
Since the PEME is not exploratory, the Court emphasized that its failure to reveal or uncover Magno’s ailments cannot shield him from the consequences of his deliberate concealment. In this regard, the “fit to work” declaration in the PEME cannot be a conclusive proof to show that he was free from any ailment prior to his deployment.
For knowingly concealing his history of coronary artery disease during the PEME, Magno committed fraudulent misrepresentation which unconditionally barred his right to receive any disability compensation from his employer.
The Court added that even if it were to disregard Magno’s fraudulent misrepresentation, his claim would still fail.
Coronary artery disease, which is subsumed under cardio-vascular disease, and hypertension are listed as occupational diseases under item 11, Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC.
However, before such disease to be compensable, a seafarer must establish concurrence of the following conditions enumerated in the first paragraph of Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC:
- The seafarer’s work must involve the risk described therein;
- The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer’s exposure to the described risks;
- The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it; and
- There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer.
Relevant thereto, the Court reiterated prevailing jurisprudence in that the table of illnesses and the corresponding nature of employment in Section 32-A only provides the list of occupational illnesses. However, even if the illness may be considered as work-related for having been specified in the table, the seafarer is still not exempted from providing proof of the conditions under the first paragraph of Section 32-A in order for the occupational illnesses complained of to be considered as compensable. Whoever claims entitlement to benefits provided by law should establish his right thereto by substantial evidence which is more than a mere scintilla; it is real and substantial, and not merely apparent. Further, while in compensation proceedings in particular, the test of proof is merely probability and not ultimate degree of certainty, the conclusion of the courts must still be based on real evidence and not just inference and speculations.
In the present case, the Court found that Magno failed to present sufficient evidence to show how his working conditions contributed to or aggravated his illness. According to the Court, the general statements in his Position Paper were not validated by any written document or other proof. Neither was any expert medical opinion presented regarding the cause of his condition.
The Court expounded that although Magno suffered from coronary artery disease, a cardiovascular illness under item 11 of Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC, the conditions for compensability under the same section were not present since Magno did not present any proof of the required conditions to demonstrate that his illness is work-related and, therefore, compensable. Specifically, Magno failed to discharge his burden to prove the risks involved in his work, that his illness was contracted as a result of his exposure to the risks within the period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it, and that he was not notoriously negligent. The Court thus ruled that Magno was not entitled to permanent total disability benefits.
In deciding against the seafarer in this case, the Court emphasized that the constitutional policy to provide full protection to labor is not meant to be a sword to oppress employers, as justice is for the deserving and must be dispensed within the light of established facts, the applicable law, and existing jurisprudence. The Court said that its commitment to the cause of labor is not a lopsided undertaking. The Court concluded by stating that such commitment cannot and does not prevent it from sustaining the employer when it is in the right.
Further reading:
- Trans-Global Maritime Agency, Inc. v. Utanes, G.R. No. 236498, September 16, 2020.
