Paulino Ungos III

Lawyer | Law Professor | Author

Tag: seafarer

  • Seafarer’s Surviving Legitimate Spouse, a Necessary Party in a Complaint for Death Benefits

    In Leonis Navigation Agency, Inc. v. Dagos,1G.R. No. 241909, January 14, 2019. the Supreme Court ruled that the surviving legitimate spouse of the seafarer is not an indispensable party but only a necessary party in a complaint for death benefits. According to the Court, there is no law stating that only the legal spouse has the legal standing to institute a complaint to claim death benefits under the Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Overseas Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Ships2Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Memorandum Circular No. 10-10.. The failure to implead her will not result in the dismissal of the claim.

    Further reading:

    • Leonis Navigation Agency, Inc. v. Dagos, G.R. No. 241909, January 14, 2019.

  • Guarded Prognosis

    In one case, the Supreme Court reiterated the following rules relating to seafarer claims of total and permanent disability benefits:

    • The company-designated physician must issue a final medical assessment on the seafarer’s disability grading within a period of 120 days from the time the seafarer reported to him;
    • If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the said period of 120 days without any justifiable reason, then the seafarer’s disability becomes permanent and total;
    • If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the said period of 120 days with a sufficient justification (e.g., seafarer required further medical treatment or seafarer was uncooperative), then the period of diagnosis and treatment shall be extended for another 120 days (or up to 240 days from the time the seafarer reported to him). The employer has the burden to prove that the company-designated physician has sufficient justification to extend the period; and
    • If the company-designated physician still fails to give his assessment within the said extended period, then the seafarer’s disability becomes permanent and total, regardless of any justification.

    With regard to the company-designated physician’s medical assessment, the Court set forth the following requirements for determining the seafarer’s condition:

    • The assessment must be issued within the 120/240-day window; and
    • It must be final and definitive.

    In the present case, the Supreme Court found that the company-designated physician’s medical report was issued within the 240-day period. However, the Court ruled that the said report was not final and definitive.

    According to the Court, a final and definitive disability assessment is necessary in order to truly reflect the extent of the sickness or injuries to the seafarer and his or her capacity to resume work as such. To be conclusive, the medical assessments or reports:

    • must be complete and definite to give the proper disability benefits to seafarers
    • must also be supported with sufficient bases.

    The Court found that the company-designated physician’s medical report merely states that

    • the seafarer’s “prognosis for returning to sea duties is guarded” and
    • “if patient is entitled to disability, his suggested disability grading is Grade 10 — loss of grasping power for large objects.”

    The Court added that the report was notably bereft of any statement or explanation as to how the company-designated physician arrived with her medical conclusion. The report also did not even contain a definite statement as to the seafarer’s fitness to return to sea duties as it states that his prognosis of returning to his sea duties is still guarded.

    Furthermore, the company-designated physician failed to explain in detail the progress of the seafarer’s treatment and the approximate period needed for him to fully recover. Said physician merely adopted the findings or observations of the Orthopedics and Spine Surgery specialist.

    Thus, the Court ruled that the company-designated physician’s medical assessment was not final and definitive. The seafarer’s disability is deemed permanent and total by operation of law. The seafarer was awarded $110,000.00 under the CBA.

    Further reading:

    • Wilhelmsen-Smithbell Manning, Inc. v. Aleman, G.R. No. 239740 (Notice), January 8, 2020.

  • A Seafarer’s Cause of Action Arises Upon His Disembarkation from the Vessel

    On 4 February 2010, Khalifa Algosaibi, through its agent, 88 Aces, hired Apolinario as an ordinary seaman to board the vessel MV Algosaibi 42. His employment contract was for a duration of 6 months.

    After passing the required pre-employment medical examination, Apolinario left Manila on 26 February 2010 and embarked MV Algosaibi 42 in Ras Tanura, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

    After completing his contract in August 2010, Apolinario was not repatriated to the Philippines, for he directly entered into a new employment contract with 88 Aces’ foreign principal, Khalifa Algosaibi. This new contract with Khalifa Algosaibi lasted until April 2012.

    While on board MV Algosaibi 42 in December 2010, Apolinario suddenly experienced dizziness. As his condition did not improve, he was sent to As Salama Hospital in Al-Khobar, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where he was found to have high glucose and cholesterol. Apolinario notes that he was given medicine by the doctor and was advised to observe proper diet and avoid stress. After taking the doctor’s advice, his medical condition improved and he was able to perform his work well.

    However, after 2 years, particularly in January 2012, Apolinario alleged that his dizziness recurred, accompanied by the blurring of his vision. On 2 April 2012, he stated that he returned to As Salama Hospital where he was diagnosed to have diabetes mellitus and dislipedemia.

    In 11 April 2012, Apolinario was repatriated in Manila.

    Apolinario claims that he immediately reported to the office of 88 Aces to get his unpaid wages and for him to be referred to the company physician. However, 88 Aces viewed that his repatriation happened because he completed his 6-month Philippine Overseas Employment Administration standard employment contract. Thus it declined to shoulder his medical expenses. Apolinario no longer insisted on treatment and just continued taking the medicine given by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia doctor.

    Although Apolinario felt well, his illness recurred on 2 August 2013. Apolinario then consulted Dr. Joseph Glenn Dimatatac, an internal medicine physician, who informed him that his illness was indeed diabetes mellitus.

    On 17 March 2015, Apolinario consulted Dr. Rufo Luna, the Municipal Health Officer of the Municipality of San Jose, who declared him to be physically unfit to continue work due to his hyperglycemia. Consequently, Apolinario demanded, albeit unsuccessfully, the payment of his disability benefits from his employer.

    Apolinario filed his Request for Single Entry Approach at the National Labor Relations Commission on 25 March 2015. Then, on 8 May 2015, he filed a Complaint against Khalifa Algosaibi, 88 Aces, and Jocson (Respondents) before the Office of the Labor Arbiter for the payment of disability benefits.

    Respondents, on the other hand, denied liability for the following reasons:

    • Apolinario filed his Complaint 5 years after the completion of his employment contract in August 2010. Thus, his cause of action had already prescribed, not having been filed within the 3-year prescriptive period set by law.
    • Apolinario finished his 6-month employment contract in August 2010 without any medical issue whatsoever.
    • Apolinario actually failed to comply with the 3-day post-employment medical examination requirement.

    RULING:

    RE: Prescription

    Under the standard employment contract of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, a contract between an employer and a seafarer ceases upon its completion, when the seafarer signs off from the vessel and arrives at the point of hire.1Section 2, Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Memorandum Circular No. 10, Series of 2010 (Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Overseas Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Ships [October 26, 2010])

    In this case, while Apolinario’s 6-month contract may have ended as early as August 2010, he nonetheless was able to sign off from MV Algosaibi 42 and arrive at the point of hire only on 11 April 2012.

    (Significance: A seafarer’s cause of action arises upon his disembarkation from the vessel.)

    As Apolinario’s disembarkation from the Algosaibi 42 was on 11 April 2012, he had three years from the date, or until April 11, 2015, to make a claim for disability benefits.

    Apolinario had requested for a Single Entry Approach2The Single Entry Approach is an administrative approach to provide an accessible, speedy, and inexpensive settlement of complaints arising from employer-employee relationship to prevent cases from ripening into full blown disputes. All labor and employment disputes undergo this 30-day mandatory conciliation-mediation process. before the National Labor Relations Commission as early as 25 March 2015.

    The fact that Apolinario filed his Complaint before the Office of the Labor Arbiter only on 8 May 2015 is of no moment. Since the Single Entry Approach is a pre-requisite to the filing of a Complaint before the Office of the Labor Arbiter, the date when Apolinario should be deemed to have instituted his claim was when he instituted his Request for Single Entry Approach on 25 March 2015. Considering that the expiration of Apolinario’s cause of action was on 11 April 2015, his claim was filed well within the 3-year prescriptive period.

    RE: Disability benefits

    The Supreme Court ruled that Apolinario is entitled to permanent total disability benefits.

    Under the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract, those illnesses, such as diabetes mellitus, which are not listed as an occupational disease are disputably presumed as work-related.3Section 20 (A) (4), Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Memorandum Circular No. 10, Series of 2010 (Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Overseas Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Ships [October 26, 2010])

    According to the Court, the effect of the legal presumption in favor of the seafarer is to create a burden on the part of the employer to present evidence to overcome the prima facie case of work-relatedness. Absent any evidence from the employer to defeat the legal presumption, the prima facie case of work-relatedness prevails.

    To reinforce the prima facie case in his favor, Apolinario stated that during the existence of his contract, he experienced recurring dizziness and was diagnosed at As Salama Hospital in Al-Khobar Saudi Arabia to have contracted diabetes mellitus. In fact, while on board the vessel, he was twice sent to As Salama Hospital in Al-Khobar Saudi Arabia for medical treatment. To support his claim, Apolinario presented the medical record issued by the hospital and the different medical certificates of his physicians after his repatriation in Manila stating that he is already physically unfit to return to work due to his diabetes mellitus.

    On the other hand, the Supreme Court found that respondents failed to present a scintilla of proof to establish the lack of casual connection between Apolinario’s disease and his employment as a seafarer.

    The Court stated that had respondents granted Apolinario’s request to undergo a post-employment medical check-up, they could have presented a medical finding to contradict the presumption of work-relatedness of Apolinario’s illness. The post-employment medical check-up could have been the proper basis to determine the seafarer’s illness, whether it was work-related, or its specific grading of disability. Having failed to present any evidence to defeat the presumption of work-relatedness of Apolinario’s diabetes mellitus, the prima facie case that it is work-related prevails.

    Nonetheless, the Supreme Court clarified that the presumption provided under Section 20 (A) (4) is only limited to the “work-relatedness” of an illness. It does not cover and extend to compensability. In this sense, there exists a fine line between the work-relatedness of an illness and the matter of compensability. Work-relatedness merely relates to the assumption that the seafarer’s illness, albeit not listed as an occupational disease, may have been contracted during and in connection with one’s work, whereas compensability pertains to the entitlement to receive compensation and benefits upon a showing that a seafarer’s work conditions caused or at least increased the risk of contracting the disease.

    The Supreme Court noted the medically accepted finding that stress has major effects on a person’s metabolic activity. The effects of stress on glucose metabolism are mediated by a variety of counter-regulatory hormones that are released in response to stress and that result in elevated blood glucose levels and decreased insulin action. In diabetes, because of a relative or absolute lack of insulin, the increase in blood glucose on account of stress cannot be adequately metabolized. Thus, stress is a potential contributor to chronic hyperglycemia in diabetes.

    In this case, to prove that his work conditions caused or at least increased the risk of contracting the disease, Apolinario showed that part of his duties as an Ordinary Seaman in MV Algosaibi 42 involved strenuous workload such as assist in the handling and operation of all deck gear such as topping, cradling and housing of booms; aid the carpenter in the repair work when requested; scale and chip paint, handle lines in the mooring of the ship, assist in the actual tying up and letting go of the vessel and stand as a lookout in the vessel. Apolinario further stated that while inside the vessel for several months, he was exposed to physical and psychological stress due to rush jobs, lack of sleep, heat stress, emergency works and homesickness for being away from his family. From the above enumeration of Apolinario’s duties on board the vessel, he was certainly exposed to various strain and stress — physical, mental and emotional.

    Respondents failed to adduce any contrary medical findings from the company-designated physician to show that Apolinario’s illness was not caused or aggravated by his working conditions on board the vessel. There was also no showing that Apolinario is predisposed to the illness by reason of genetics, obesity or old age. Thus, the Supreme Court considered that the stress and strains he was exposed to on board contributed, even to a small degree, to the development of his disease. Inasmuch as compensability is the entitlement to receive disability compensation upon a showing that a seafarer’s work conditions caused or at least increased the risk of contracting the disease, Apolinario’s disease was thus declared compensable.

    RE: Reportorial Requirement

    While the requirement to report within three working days from repatriation appears to be indispensable in character, the Supreme Court enumerated the established exceptions to this rule:

    • when the seafarer is incapacitated to report to the employer upon his repatriation; and
    • when the employer inadvertently or deliberately refused to submit the seafarer to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician.4Falcon Maritime and Allied Services, Inc., et al. v. Angelito B. Pangasian, G.R. No. 223295, March 13, 2019.

    Here, Apolinario avers that two days after his repatriation to Manila on 11 April 2012, he reported to the office of 88 Aces to get his unpaid wages and for him to be referred to the company designated physician. However, since his repatriation was due to the completion of his six-month Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-approved employment contract, he was told by 88 Aces through Jocson that they could not shoulder his medical expenses. Having been denied to undergo the post medical examination, Apolinario just continued taking the medicine given to him by the doctor in Saudi Arabia.

    Between the two conflicting allegations from Apolinario and respondents, the Supreme Court resolved the doubt in favor of Apolinario. Besides, the factual backdrop of the case supports Apolinario’s allegation that he requested to be referred to a company designated physician. It noted that Apolinario repeatedly experienced dizziness and headaches, and needed medical attention while on board MV Algosaibi 42. In fact, because of his recurring sickness, he was examined twice at As Salama Hospital in Al-Khobar Saudi Arabia and even underwent thorough treatment thereat 10 days prior to his repatriation to Manila. Given Apolinario’s sensitive medical condition days prior to his repatriation, The Court doubted respondents’ allegation that Apolinario did not request to be referred to post-employment medical examination when he arrived in Manila. Apolinario’s medical condition during and after his employment on board lends credence to his claim that he asked to be medically examined by a company-designated physician but he was prevented so by respondents.

    According to the Supreme Court, respondents had the opportunity to refer Apolinario to a company-designated physician, but they chose to escape their responsibility. Between the non-existent medical assessment of the company-designated physician and the medical assessment of Apolinario’s doctor of choice — stating that his disability is permanent and total — the latter evidently stands. Absent a certification from the company-designated physician, the law steps in to conclusively characterize his disability as total and permanent.

    Further Reading:

    • Zonio, Jr. v. 88 Aces Maritime Services, Inc., G.R. No. 239052, October 16, 2019.

  • Seafarer’s Obligation to Comply with His Medical Treatment

    Seachest Associates, through its manning agent, Maunlad Trans, Inc. hired the seafarer as a Galley Steward on-board MV Carnival. Several months into his employment, the seafarer began experiencing seasickness and extreme low back pains. Despite medications administered by the ship’s clinic, the pain persisted and extended down to the seafarer’s left thigh.

    Soon, the seafarer was medically repatriated and arrived in the Philippines on 23 January 2010. He reported to Maunlad Trans, Inc. and was referred to its designated physician. The seafarer underwent physical therapy sessions and was diagnosed with ‘lumbar spondylosis with disc extrusion, L3-L4.’ He was also advised to undergo surgery, spine laminectomy. However, he did not approve of the same and instead underwent physical therapy sessions. According to the seafarer, he refused because the company-designated physician informed him that the surgery will not guarantee a return to his normal condition.

    On 6 May 2010, the seafarer returned for a follow-up, and the report on his condition stated:

    Follow-up case of 28 years old male with Herniated Nucleus
    Pulposus, L3-L4, Left.
    EMG-NCV Study — chronic left L5-S1 radiculopathy
    Not keen on surgery.
    Continue rehabilitation.
    His suggested disability grading is Grade 8 — 2/3 loss of motion or lifting power of the trunk.
    To come back after 3 weeks.

    On 14 May 2010, the seafarer filed his complaint for total and permanent disability benefits since his condition did not improve for purposes of resuming regular duties as a seafarer. The employers retorted that the company-designated physician assessed the seafarer a disability rating of Grade 8, which had equivalent monetary benefits in the amount of US$16,795.00.

    The Office of the Labor Arbiter ruled that the company-designated physician’s Grade 8 disability rating was premature, in that it was made only to comply with the 120-day period as mandated in the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract. The said Office further ruled that the work-related disability incurred by the seafarer had prevented him from seeking employment. Permanent disability benefits was accordingly awarded in favor of the seafarer.

    The National Labor Relations Commission and the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the Office of the Labor Arbiter. The Court of Appeals added that:

    • the company-designated physician failed to arrive at a definite assessment of the seafarer’s fitness or disability within the 120/240-day periods provided under the law;
    • the company-designated physician’s last report on the seafarer’s condition which “suggested” a disability grading of “Grade 8 — 2/3 loss of motion or lifting power of the trunk” was not a final or definite assessment of his fitness or disability because the seafarer was still required to return after three weeks for further examination;
    • regardless of the fact that the seafarer was required to return for further examination, the statutory 120/240-day periods would have elapsed without the seafarer being issued either a final and definitive disability assessment or a fit-to-work certification;
    • the seafarer’s condition would not have improved even with the prescribed surgery, which he refused to undergo, because as admitted by the company-designated physician it did not guarantee improvement of seafarer’s condition;
    • the seafarer was unable to resume his regular sea duties, his inability to find work had continued, and he was not re-employed; and
    • with the lapse of the statutory 120/240-day periods without the seafarer’s having gone back to work, he should be deemed totally and permanently disabled.

    Ruling:

    The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the Court of Appeals and declared that the seafarer was entitled to disability benefits in the amount of US$16,795.00 only, equivalent to Grade 8 disability under the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract.

    Section 20(D) of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract states that “[n]o compensation and benefits shall be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity, disability or death of the seafarer resulting from his willful or criminal act or intentional breach of his duties, provided however, that the employer can prove that such injury, incapacity, disability or death is directly attributable to the seafarer.”

    According to the Supreme Court, the seafarer was duty-bound to comply with his medical treatment in order to give the company-designated physician the opportunity to determine his fitness to work or to assess the degree of his disability. His inability to continue his treatment without any valid explanation showed that he neglected such duty to continue his medical treatment.

    In the present case, the seafarer filed his complaint on 14 May 2010 — or just 110 days from his medical repatriation on 23 January 2010 — before the 120/240-day periods allowed under the Labor Code of the Philippines could elapse, and before the company-designated physician could render a definite assessment of his medical condition. According to the Court, the filing of the labor case was premature. By failing to continue with the treatment prescribed by the company-designated physician and instead filing the labor case before the expiration of the 120-day period, the seafarer violated the law and his contract with his employer and was thus guilty of abandoning his treatment.

    With regard to the claim of the seafarer that the surgery was not a guarantee that his condition will return to normal, the Court stated that the same does not entitle him to the indemnity he has sought. The fact remained that he violated his contract and the law. His infraction erased any benefit he may have derived from such argument. Although acknowledging that this was a medical opinion shared by the company-designated physician, the Court stated that it had the discretion to rely on such opinion or discard it altogether.

    The Court added that without the seafarer undergoing the prescribed 120/240-day periods for treatment, his employer was deprived of the opportunity to assist him in finding a cure for his condition and thus minimize any legal and pecuniary liability it may be held answerable for. At the same time, there was no way of assessing the seafarer’s medical condition with finality. Without such assessment, no corresponding indemnity was forthcoming. The seafarer must subject himself to treatment as prescribed by the law and the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract, for such requirement is patently for his benefit in all respects.

    Further reading:

    • Maunlad Trans, Inc. v. Rodelas, Jr., G.R. No. 225705, April 1, 2019.

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  • Extent of Disability vs. Determination of Fitness for Sea Duty

    If there is a claim for total and permanent disability benefits by a seafarer, the following rules shall govern:

    • The company-designated physician must issue a final medical assessment on the seafarer’s disability grading within a period of 120 days from the time the seafarer reported to him;
    • If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days, without any justifiable reason, then the seafarer’s disability becomes permanent and total;
    • If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days with a sufficient justification (e.g., seafarer required further medical treatment or seafarer was uncooperative), then the period of diagnosis and treatment shall be extended to 240 days. The employer has the burden to prove that the company-designated physician has sufficient justification to extend the period; and
    • If the company-designated physician still fails to give his assessment within the extended period of 240 days, then the seafarer’s disability becomes permanent and total, regardless of any justification.

    The extent of the disability (whether total or partial) of the seafarer is determined, not by the number of days that he could not work, but by the disability grading the doctor recognizes based on his resulting incapacity to work and earn his wages.

    However, the determination of the fitness of a seafarer for sea duty is the province of the company-designated physician, subject to the periods prescribed by law.

    Further reading:

    • Intermodal Shipping, Inc. v. Escalona, G.R. No. 243380 April 1, 2019.

  • The Party Who Secures the Opinion of a Third Doctor

    Under the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract, when the seafarer sustains a work-related illness or injury while on board the vessel, his fitness or unfitness for work should be determined by the company-designated physician.

    However, if the doctor appointed by the seafarer makes a finding contrary to that of the assessment of the company-designated physician, a third doctor might be agreed upon jointly by the employer and the seafarer, and the third doctor’s decision would be final and binding on both parties.

    The non-observance of the requirement to have the conflicting assessments determined by a third doctor would mean that the assessment of the company-designated physician prevails.

    The Supreme Court denied the seafarer’s claim for disability benefits in this case.

    According to the Court, the need for the third doctor’s evaluation of the seafarer arose after his personal doctor declared him unfit for seafaring duties. The seafarer could not initiate his claim for disability solely on the basis of the declaration of his personal doctor. He should have instead set in motion the process of submitting himself to assessment by the third doctor by first serving the notice of his intent to do so on the employer.

    The Court stressed that there was no other way to validate the claim of the seafarer but this. Without the notice of intent to refer the seafarer’s case to the third doctor, the employer could not itself initiate the referral.

    Unless the seafarer served the notice of his intent, he could not then validly insist on an assessment different from that made by the company-designated physician. This outcome, which accorded with the procedure expressly set in the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract, was unavoidable for him.

    The employer could insist on the disability rating of its company-designated physician even against a contrary opinion by another doctor, unless the seafarer signified his intent to submit the disputed assessment to a third doctor. The duty to secure the opinion of a third doctor belonged to the employee asking for disability benefits. Said employee must actively or expressly request for it.

    Further reading:

    • Maersk-Filipinas Crewing, Inc. v. Alferos, G.R. No. 216795, April 1, 2019.

  • Seafarer’s Work-related Death During Employment

    On 24 April 2002, the seafarer was hired as a messman on board the M/T Umm Al Lulu by the employer, Abu Dhabi National Tanker Company, through its local manning agency, C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. The seafarer and the employer signed a ten-month contract of employment, which was approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration on 9 May 2002.

    Before embarkation, the seafarer underwent a pre-employment medical examination and was declared physically fit to work. He then boarded the M/T Umm Al Lulu on 20 May 2002.

    The seafarer was repatriated in Manila on 16 March 2003. The next day, 17 March 2003, he went to a medical clinic in Kawit, Cavite where he was examined by his personal doctor who then diagnosed him with “Essential Hypertension.” Said doctor advised the seafarer to take the prescribed medication and rest for a week.

    On 19 March 2003, the seafarer died. The certificate of death stated the causes for his death, thus:

    Immediate cause: Irreversible Shock
    Antecedent cause: Acute Myocardial Infarction
    Underlying cause: Hypertensive Heart Disease

    The seafarer’s legal heirs filed a complaint against the employer for the recovery of death compensation benefits and of burial and children’s allowances.

    Employer’s Contentions:

    The employer contended that the seafarer’s death was not compensable based on the following reasons:

    1) The death of the seafarer did not occur during the term of his employment.

    A seafarer’s term of employment commences from his actual departure from the airport or seaport in the point of hire and ceases upon completion of his period of contractual service, signing-off, and arrival at the point of hire.

    The seafarer’s ten-month contract was about to expire on 20 March 2003 when he was safely repatriated without any medical condition a few days earlier, on 16 March 2003, as he was already in a convenient port. In other words, the seafarer finished his employment contract upon signing off from M/T Umm Al Lulu and arriving in Manila, his point of hire, on 16 March 2003.

    Thus, the seafarer’s death on 19 March 2003 could not have been compensable because it happened beyond the term of his contract.

    2) The seafarer’s death was not work-related.

    As a messman, the seafarer’s duties were limited to assisting the chief cook in food preparation. Said duties could not have contributed to his demise or increased the risk of acquiring the illness which caused his death, for there was no showing that the seafarer was subjected to any unusual strain or required to perform any strenuous activity that could have triggered a heart attack.

    3) The seafarer failed to disclose his ailment during his pre-employment medical examination.

    Hypertensive heart disease takes years to develop and most probably the seafarer was already suffering from said disease even before the start of his employment contract. However, the seafarer failed to disclose his ailment during his pre-employment medical examination. This fact barred the seafarer’s heirs from receiving death benefits on the ground of concealment of a pre-existing illness.

    4) The seafarer likewise failed to submit himself to a mandatory post-employment medical examination within three working days from his disembarkation.

    The Court’s Ruling:

    The Supreme Court disagreed with the contentions of the employer and ruled that the seafarer’s heirs were entitled to the benefits they claimed.

    The Court noted the following provisions of Section 20 (A) of the 1996 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract, as these were applicable to the case:

    SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS. —

    A. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR DEATH

    1. In case of death of the seafarer during the term of his contract, the employer shall pay his beneficiaries the Philippine Currency equivalent to the amount of Fifty Thousand US dollars (US$50,000) and an additional amount of Seven Thousand US dollars (US$7,000) to each child under the age of twenty-one (21) but not exceeding four (4) children, at the exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment.

    x x x

    4. The other liabilities of the employer when the seafarer dies as a result of injury or illness during the term of employment are as follows:

    a. The employer shall pay the deceased’s beneficiary all outstanding obligations due the seafarer under this Contract.

    b. The employer shall transport the remains and personal effects of the seafarer to the Philippines at employer’s expense except if the death occurred in a port where local government laws or regulations do not permit the transport of such remains. In case death occurs at sea, the disposition of the remains shall be handled or dealt with in accordance with the master’s best judgment. In all cases, the employer/master shall communicate with the manning agency to advise for disposition of seafarer’s remains.

    c. The employer shall pay the beneficiaries of the seafarer the Philippine currency equivalent to the amount of One Thousand US dollars (US$1,000) for burial expenses at the exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment. (Emphasis supplied.)

    The Court addressed the employer’s contentions, as follows:

    1) Clarification of the phrase “work-related death of the seafarer, during the term of his employment contract”

    The Court found that Section 20 (A) (1) of the 1996 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract covered cases wherein the seafarer’s death occurred “during the term of his contract.” The Court also noted that the same phrase could be found in Section 20 (A) (1) of the 2000 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract, only this more recent version of the provision additionally required that the death be “work-related.”

    The Court acknowledged that although medical repatriation of the seafarer at the point of hire strictly meant the termination of his employment, heirs of a seafarer who has died after his medical repatriation could still recover compensation and benefits.

    Applying the rule on liberal construction, the Court stated that medical repatriation cases should be considered as an exception to Section 20 of the Standard Employment Contract.

    1.1)

    Accordingly, the phrase “work-related death of the seafarer, during the term of his employment contract” under Part A (1) of the Standard Employment Contract should not be strictly and literally construed to mean that the seafarer’s work-related death should have precisely occurred during the term of his employment.

    Rather, it is enough that the seafarer’s work-related injury or illness which eventually causes his death should have occurred during the term of his employment.

    According to the Court, it is by this method of construction that undue prejudice to the seafarer and his heirs may be obviated and the State policy on labor protection be championed. For if the seafarer’s death was brought about (whether fully or partially) by the work he had harbored for his employer’s profit, then it is but proper that his demise be compensated.

    1.2)

    It is not required that the employment be the sole factor in the growth, development or acceleration of the illness to entitle the seafarer or the heirs to benefits provided therefor. It is enough that the employment had contributed, even in a small degree, to the development of the disease and in bringing about seafarer’s death.

    1.3)

    Even assuming that the ailment of the seafarer was contracted prior to his employment, this still would not deprive him or his heirs of compensation benefits. For what matters is that the work of the seafarer had contributed, even in a small degree, to the development of the disease and in bringing about his eventual death.

    1.4)

    Neither is it necessary, in order to recover compensation, that the seafarer be in perfect health at the time he contracted the disease. A seafarer brings with him possible infirmities in the course of his employment, and while the employer is not the insurer of the health of his seafarers, he takes them as he finds them and assumes the risk of liability. If the disease is the proximate cause of the seafarer’s death for which compensation is sought, the previous physical condition of the seafarer is unimportant, and recovery may be had for said death, independently of any pre-existing disease.

    The Court concluded that medical repatriation is an exceptional circumstance and allows the heirs of the seafarer who died after he had been medically repatriated to recover the compensation and benefits provided in Section 20 (A) of the 1996 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract .

    The phrase “death of the seafarer during the term of his contract” in Section 20 (A) (1) of the 1996 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract should not be strictly and literally construed to mean that the seafarer’s death should have occurred during the term of his employment; it is enough that the seafarer’s work-related injury or illness which eventually caused his death occurred during the term of his employment.

    2) Context of the illness that caused the seafarer’s death

    According to the Court, for a seafarer’s death to be compensable under the said contract, the illness leading to the eventual death of the seafarer need not be shown to be work-related in order to be compensable, but must be proven to have been contracted during the term of the contract. Neither is it required that there be proof that the working conditions increased the risk of contracting the disease or illness. An injury or accident is said to arise “in the course of employment” when it takes place within the period of employment, at a place where the employee reasonably may be, and while he is fulfilling his duties or is engaged in doing something incidental thereto.

    The Court ruled in favor of the seafarer’s heirs since the particular circumstances in the present case revealed that the seafarer contracted the illness which eventually caused his death during the term of his contract or in the course of his employment.

    3) Seafarer’s hypertension and/or heart disease easily detected by standard/routine tests

    The Court found that before the seafarer boarded M/T Umm Al Lulu on 20 May 2002, he underwent a pre-employment medical examination and was declared fit to work. In this regard, the Court ruled that the same negated the employer’s claim that the seafarer concealed a pre-existing illness.

    The Court acknowledged its declarations that the pre-employment medical examination could not be relied upon to inform the employer/s of a seafarer’s true state of health, and there were instances when the pre-employment medical examination could not have divulged the seafarer’s illness considering that the examinations were not exploratory.

    However, the Court noted that the seafarer’s hypertension and/or heart disease could have been easily detected by standard/routine tests included in the pre-employment medical examination, i.e., blood pressure test, electrocardiogram, chest x-ray, and/or blood chemistry.

    The Court added that even assuming that the ailment of the seafarer was contracted prior to his employment on board the M/T Umm Al Lulu, this could not be a drawback to the compensability of the disease.

    The Court reiterated that it is not required that the employment be the sole factor in the growth, development or acceleration of the illness to entitle the claimant to the benefits provided therefor. It is enough that the employment had contributed, even in a small degree, to the development of the disease and in bringing about his death.

    Neither is it necessary, in order to recover compensation, that the seafarer must have been in perfect condition or health at the time he contracted the disease. Every workingman brings with him to his employment certain infirmities, and while the employer is not the insurer of the health of his seafarers, he takes them as he finds them and assumes the risk of liability. If the disease is the proximate cause of the seafarer’s death for which compensation is sought, the previous physical condition of the seafarer is unimportant and recovery may be had therefor independent of any pre-existing disease.

    4) Post-employment medical examination of the seafarer by a company-designated physician within three days from arrival not a requisite for recovery of compensation and benefits relating to a seafarer’s death

    Finally, the Court ruled that the insistence of the employer on the post-employment medical examination of the seafarer by a company-designated physician within three days from arrival at the point of hire was misplaced.

    Said post-employment medical examination was required under Section 20 (B) (3) of the 1996 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract for compensation and benefits for a seafarer’s injury or illness; it was not a requisite under Section 20 (A) of the 1996 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract for compensation and benefits for a seafarer’s death.

    In addition, Section 20 (B) (3) of the 1996 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract itself allowed as an exception from said requirement a seafarer who is physically incapacitated from complying with the same.

    The Court found that the seafarer in this case was already of poor health and weak physical condition upon his repatriation on 16 March 2003, which necessitated his immediate visit to a nearby clinic the very next day, on 17 March 2003.

    In any event, the seafarer still had until 19 March 2003 to see a company-designated physician but he died on the same day of a cause (“Hypertensive Heart Disease”) directly linked to the illness (“Essential Hypertension”) he developed during his term of employment on M/T Umm Al Lulu and for which he was medically repatriated.

    The Court reiterated the principle that the post-employment medical examination requirement is not absolute and admits of an exception, i.e., when the seaman is physically incapacitated from complying with the requirement.

    For a man who was terminally ill and in need of urgent medical attention, one could not reasonably expect that he would immediately resort to and avail of the required medical examination, assuming that he was still capable of submitting himself to such examination at that time.

    Under the circumstances, the seafarer’s surviving heirs cannot be denied their right to claim benefits under the law.

    Further reading:

    • C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. v. Legal Heirs of Repiso, G.R. No. 190534, February 10, 2016.

  • No Objection to Company-designated Physician’s Assessment

    The seafarer in this case entered into a ten-month employment contract and was engaged to work as an able seaman by his employer, Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd., through its agent, Marlow Navigation Philippines, Inc., onboard the vessel M/V BBC OHIO. His engagement was also subject to a collective bargaining agreement between the employer and its employees. The seafarer boarded the vessel on 23 November 2009.

    While on duty on 30 December 2009, the seafarer fell from a height of four meters in his work area. The fall affected his side, shoulder, and head. He was brought to a hospital in Huangpu, China, where he was diagnosed with “Left l-4 Verterbra Transverse Bone broken (accident).” He was declared unfit to work for 25 days. On 7 January 2010, he was medically repatriated to the Philippines.

    The seafarer arrived in Manila on 8 January 2010, where he was referred to the company-designated physician for examination and treatment. After undergoing several tests (which included a CT scan, audiometry and MRI, as well as therapy sessions with the company-designated physician that spanned six months) the company-designated physician gave him a combined 36% disability assessment.

    The seafarer did not object to the company-designated physician’s assessment. Yet, he filed a claim for permanent total disability compensation against his employer.

    The Supreme Court ruled that the seafarer was not entitled to permanent total disability compensation.

    The Court noted that the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract and the collective bargaining agreement were instruments that governed the seafarer’s employment with the petitioners. According to the Court, these instruments are the law between the parties.

    Under the Standard Employment Contract, it is the company-designated physician who not only declares/establishes the fitness to work or the degree of disability of a seafarer who is repatriated for medical reasons, but also determines whether a seafarer needs further medical attention. Thus, under the said contract, the seafarer is required to submit to a post-employment medical examination by the company-designated physician.

    Furthermore, under the collective bargaining agreement, the disability suffered by the Seafarer shall be determined by a doctor appointed mutually by the employer and the union, and the employers shall provide disability compensation to the seafarer in accordance with the compensation scale prescribed therein. The Court found that the company-designated physician based her assessment of the seafarer’s disability on the said compensation scale.

    In the present case, the seafarer was able to submit himself to the care of the company-designated physician upon his medical repatriation. The company-designated physician thereafter gave the seafarer a 36% disability assessment under the compensation schedule prescribed in the collective bargaining agreement.

    The Court noted the seafarer’s own admission that he no longer disputed the findings of the company-designated physician. It was also not shown that the seafarer offered a contrary finding. And although the collective bargaining agreement stated that the seafarer’s disability shall be determined by a doctor mutually appointed by the employer and the union, it was was not established that the parties even resorted to this step.

    The Court ruled that the absence of a disability assessment by a doctor chosen by the parties will not invalidate the company-designated physician’s assessment, not only because the seafarer accepted said physician’s findings, but also because record established that the seafarer refused the employer’s proposal that his medical condition be referred to a mutually appointed doctor for determination.

    According to the Court, a seafarer could not claim full disability benefits on his mere say-so, in complete disregard of the Standard Employment Contract and the collective bargaining agreement.

    The Court thus held that company-designated physician’s assessment should stand.

    Further reading:

    • Marlow Navigation Phils., Inc. v. Cabatay, G.R. No. 212878, February 1, 2016.

  • Seafarer’s Unjustified Refusal to Continue His Medical Treatment

    On 30 September 2008, the respondents hired the seafarer in this case as fitter aboard the vessel Crown Garnet for a period of nine (9) months. He embarked on 4 October 2008.

    The seafarer claimed that in January 2009, he started experiencing neck and lower back pain. He then stated that he signed off from the vessel on 13 July 2009 (although it was not clear in the case whether the same was by way of medical repatriation or of the expiration of his employment contract).

    Upon arrival in the Philippines on 15 July 2009, he was referred to the company-designated physician and was diagnosed with “cervical radiculopathy, thoracic and lumbar spondylosis, as well as carpal tunnel syndrome of the left, and trigger finger, third digit of his right hand.” He underwent carpal tunnel surgery on his left hand, and physical therapy sessions for his cervical and lumbar condition.

    On 23 November 2009, the seafarer filed a complaint for disability benefits against the respondents.

    The Supreme Court denied the seafarer’s disability benefits in this case.

    At the time the complaint for disability benefits was filed, the seafarer had no cause of action.

    The Court found that when the seafarer filed said complaint, he was still under the care of the company-designated physician. He also had not even consulted a personal doctor before he instituted his complaint.

    The company-designated physician even advised the seafarer to seek the opinion of an orthopedic specialist. The seafarer, however, did not heed the advice and proceeded to file his complaint for disability benefits. It was only a day after its filing that the seafarer requested from the company-designated physician the latter’s assessment on his medical condition.

    Since the company-designated physician was yet to issue an assessment on the seafarer’s medical condition, and since the 240-day maximum period for determining the seafarer’s disability or fitness to work had not yet lapsed, the Court accordingly concluded that the seafarer prematurely filed his complaint.

    The seafarer reneged on his duties under the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract.

    In his report, the company-designated physician stated that while there was a good chance the seafarer will be declared fit to work, this was premised on the completion of his remaining therapy sessions to address the pain in his left hand and back. The seafarer thereafter complained of pain on the neck and additional pain of the lower back which was not originally present at the start of his treatment. Thus, the company-designated physician intended to prolong the seafarer’s treatment. However, the seafarer no longer reported to the clinic of the said physician.

    The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract1Under Section 20 (D) provides that

    “[n]o compensation and benefits shall be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity, disability or death of the seafarer resulting from his willful or criminal act or intentional breach of his duties, provided however, that the employer can prove that such injury, incapacity, disability or death is directly attributable to the seafarer.”

    The Court found that the seafarer was aware that he had the duty to undergo medical treatment, physical therapy sessions, including the recommended consultation to an orthopedic specialist, in order to give the company-designated physician the opportunity to determine his fitness to work or to assess the degree of his disability. His inability to continue his treatment without any valid explanation proved that he neglected his corresponding duty to continue his medical treatment. Consequently, the seafarer’s inability to regularly return for his treatment caused the regress of his condition. According to the Court, had the seafarer been cooperative with his treatment and shown interest in improving his condition, it would have been possible for the company-designated physician to declare him fit to work.

    The Court thus declared that the seafarer failed to comply with the terms of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract. The absence of a timely assessment was not caused by the company-designated physician, but had resulted from seafarer’s refusal to cooperate and undergo further treatment. Such failure to abide with the procedure under the said contract resulted in his non-entitlement to disability benefits.

    Further reading:

    • Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. v. Quillao, G.R. No. 202885, January 20, 2016.

  • Mere Reliance on a Causality Presumption

    A seafarer was hired as an assistant butcher on a certain cruise ship. On 22 August 2005, he entered into a 12-month contract of employment with the respondent incorporating the Standard Terms and Conditions the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels (Standard Employment Contract) as prescribed by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). Having passed the medical exam and having been declared fit for work, he boarded the said ship on 26 August 2005.

    During his employment, he was confined in a hospital sometime in December 2005 after suffering a month of rectal bleeding and lower abdominal pain. Soon he was medically repatriated, and upon arrival in the Philippines on 24 December 2005, he was immediately confined in a hospital, where he was found to be suffering from stage IV colon cancer. After months of confinement and treatment for his illness, he passed away.

    His widow thereafter filed a Complaint with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for death benefits, and the case went up to the Supreme Court.

    The Court denied her claims. The basis for the denial was the absence of showing that the cause of his death was one of those covered by the POEA Standard Employment Contract, and that the said cause was not work-related. It found that the Standard Employment Contract (under Section 32-A) lists down certain types of illnesses as compensable, but colon cancer is not one of them. And although there exists a disputable presumption of compensability (under Section 20 B (4)) for illnesses not listed therein, the Court ruled that it should be read in relation to said Section 32-A.

    In other words, she cannot simply rely on the disputable presumption provision mentioned in Standard Employment Contract, as she still has to substantiate her claim in order to be entitled to disability compensation.

    The widow, in this case, did not present any proof of a causal connection or at least a work relation between the employment of her husband and his colon cancer. Neither did she mention the risks that could have caused or, at the very least, contributed to the disease her husband had contracted.

    Because of these findings, the claim was not granted.

    Take away:

    “Claimants in compensation proceedings must show credible information that there is probably a relation between the illness and the work. Probability, and not mere possibility, is required; otherwise, the resulting conclusion would proceed from deficient proofs.”

    Further reading:

    • Joraina Dragon Talosig v. United Philippine Lines, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 198388, July 28, 2014.