Paulino Ungos III

Lawyer | Law Professor | Author

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  • History of Agricultural Tenancy Laws in the Philippines

    In Spouses Franco v. Spouses Galera, Jr.,1G.R. No. 205266, January 15, 2020., the Supreme Court expounded on the development of agricultural tenancy laws in the Philippines, as follows:

    “Agricultural tenancy laws in the Philippines have evolved throughout centuries and are tied with the country’s history. Prior to the Spanish colonization, lands were held in common by inhabitants of barangays. Access to land and the fruits it produced were equally shared by members of the community.

    “This system of communal ownership, however, was replaced by the regime of private ownership of property.2Dissenting Opinion of J. Leonen, J.V. Lagon Realty Corporation v. Heirs of vda. de Terre, G.R. No. 219670, June 27, 2018, http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/64252 [J. Martires, Third Division] citing R.P. BARTE, LAW ON AGRARIAN REFORM 6-7 (2003). When the Spaniards arrived, they purchased communal lands from heads of the different barangays and registered the lands in their names. With the regalian doctrine imposed, uninhibited lands were decreed to be owned by the Spanish crown. Consequently, the encomienda system was introduced, in which the Spanish crown awarded tracts of land to encomenderos, who acted as caretakers of the encomienda.3Id. Under this system, natives could not own either the land they worked on or their harvest. To till the land, they had to pay tribute to their encomenderos.4Id. citing R.P. Barte, Law on Agrarian Reform 7 (2003).

    “Encomiendas mostly focused on small-scale food production, until the hacienda system was developed to cater to the international export market. Still, natives were not allowed to own land, and the larger demand by the wider market required them to live away from their homes. Families of natives who worked on farms were reduced to being slaves pushed into forced labor either as aliping namamahay or aliping sagigilid.5Id.

    “The encomienda and hacienda systems were analogous to share tenancy arrangements, which persisted in our agricultural tenancy laws.

    “Enacted in 1933, Act No. 4054, or the Philippine Rice Share Tenancy Act, contained the earliest iteration of share tenancy in the country. To promote the well-being of tenants in agricultural lands devoted to rice production, the law regulated relations between landlords and tenant-farmers. Under this law, share tenancy was the prevailing arrangement.6Act No. 4054 (1933), sec. 2. Share tenancy contracts must be expressed in writing and registered with the proper office to be valid.7

    Act No. 4054 (1933), secs. 4-5 provide:

    SECTION 4. Form of Contract. — The contract on share tenancy, in order to be valid and binding, shall be drawn in triplicate in the language or dialect known to known to all the parties thereto, to be signed or thumb-marked both by the landlord or his authorized representative and by the tenant, before two witnesses, one to be chosen by each party. The party who does not know how to read and write may request one of the witnesses to read the contents of the document. Each of the contracting parties shall retain a copy of the contract and the third copy shall be filed with, and registered in the office of the municipal treasurer of the municipality, where the land, which is the subject-matter of the contract, is located: Provided, however, That in order that a contract may be considered registered, both the copy of the landlord and that of the tenant shall contain an annotation made by the municipal treasurer to the effect that same is registered in his office.

    SECTION 5. Registry of Tenancy Contract. — For the purposes of this Act, the municipal treasurer of the municipality wherein the land, which is the subject-matter of a contract, is situated, shall keep a record of all contracts made within his jurisdiction, to be known as Registry of Tenancy Contracts. He shall keep this registry together with a copy of each contract entered therein, and make annotations on said registry in connection with the outcome of a particular contract, such as the way same is extinguished: Provided, however, That the municipal treasurer shall not charge fees for the registration of said contract which shall be exempt from the documentary stamp tax.

    “In 1954, Republic Act No. 1199, or the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines, repealed Act No. 4054.8Republic Act No. 1199 (1954), sec. 59. In line with its objective of pursuing social justice, this subsequent law redefined agricultural tenancy arrangements and recognized more tenant-farmers’ rights.9Republic Act No. 1199 (1954), sec. 22. The law also expanded the coverage beyond lands devoted to rice production and included share arrangement provisions for crops other than rice.10Republic Act No. 1199 (1954), sec. 41.

    “More important, Republic Act No. 1199 categorized agricultural tenancy into either share tenancy or a new system called leasehold tenancy. Whereas under share tenancy, the landlord and tenant contribute land and labor and later divide the resulting produce in proportion to their contribution,11Republic Act No. 1199 (1954), sec. 4. under leasehold tenancy, the lessee cultivates the landlord’s piece of land for a fixed amount of money or in produce, or both.12Republic Act No. 1199 (1954), sec. 4, as amended by Republic Act No. 2263 (1959), sec. 1.

    “Over time, share tenancy proved to be an abusive arrangement that heavily disadvantaged tenant-farmers. Thus, for being contrary to public policy, it was abolished with the passage of Republic Act No. 3844, or the Agricultural Land Reform Code.13Republic Act No. 3844 (1963), sec. 4. President Diosdado Macapagal, in his address during the signing of the law, recognized the need to end the oppressive system of share tenancy:

    “‘This document before us, a bill which in a few minutes will become a statute to be known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, will provide us with the legal powers to remove once and for all the system of share-tenancy that has plagued our agricultural countryside. In one statement it declares share tenancy as violative of the law of the land, a system which will be abolished and will no longer be tolerated by law. But the Code does not only provide us with powers to remove an organic disease from our agricultural society; it also provides the means of injecting new health, new vigor, new muscles, and new strength into the new social order that will arise. Its first and immediate step is to destroy an oppressive and intolerable system; its ensuing objectives — which will constitute the sinews of land reform — is to nurse our agricultural economy into a state of healthy productivity. It not only aims to turn the Filipino tenant into a free man; it aims, most of all, to turn him into a more productive farmer.’14Address of President Macapagal at the Signing of the Agricultural Land Reform Code, August 8, 1963, https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1963/08/08/address-of-president-macapagal-at-the-signing-of-the-agricultural-land-reform-code/ (last accessed on January 14, 2020).

    “Still in line with the government’s policy of eliminating existing share tenancy arrangements, the law was amended such that all existing share tenancy relations are automatically converted to agricultural leasehold relations.15Republic Act No. 3844 (1963), sec. 4, as amended by Republic Act No. 6389 (1971), sec. 1. Today, agricultural leasehold relations remain to be the only form of agricultural tenancy arrangement under the law.”

    Further reading:

    • Spouses Franco v. Spouses Galera, Jr., G.R. No. 205266, January 15, 2020.

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  • Implied Tenancy Relationship

    On 5 February 2006, the spouses G filed a complaint for legal redemption against the spouses F before the Regional Adjudicator in Baguio City,

    The spouses G alleged therein that in 1990, they were instituted by B as tenants of 2 agricultural landholdings. Eventually, B agreed to sell the properties to the spouses G in 2005. However, on 13 June 2005, B canceled the sale. Soon, the spouses G learned that B had sold the two (2) lots to the spouses F, as embodied in a 19 July 2005 Extra-Judicial Adjudication of Real Property with Absolute Sale that B executed in favor of said spouses F.

    The spouses G thus filed the said complaint praying among others, that: (1) as agricultural tenants, they be allowed to redeem the two (2) lots from spouses F; and (2) the spouses F be ordered to reconvey the lots to them.

    The spouses F argued that the spouses G, not being parties to the sale, had no cause of action against them. They further pointed out that the spouses G were merely caretakers and had no tenancy relationship with B, and as such, had no right of redemption available to agricultural tenants under Section 12 of the Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines.

    Should the spouses G be considered as agricultural tenants

    The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative.

    The Court explained that for a valid agricultural tenancy arrangement to exist, these elements must concur:

    • The parties are the landowner and the tenant;
    • The subject matter is agricultural land;
    • There is consent between the parties;
    • The purpose is agricultural production;
    • There is personal cultivation by the tenant; and
    • There is sharing of the harvests between the parties.1Adriano v. Tanco, G.R. No. 168164, July 5, 2010, 637 PHIL 218-229 (Citation omitted)

    The Court added that all these elements must be proven by substantial evidence; “the absence of one or more requisites is fatal.” As with any affirmative allegation, the burden of proof rests on the party who alleges it. The tenancy relationship cannot be presumed.2Adriano v. Tanco, G.R. No. 168164, July 5, 2010, 637 PHIL 218-229 and J.V. Lagon Realty Corp. v. Heirs of Vda. De Terre, G.R. No. 219670, June 27, 2018. Agricultural tenancy arrangements under the Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines may be established either orally or in writing. The form of the contract is only prescribed when parties decide to reduce their agreement in writing, but it no longer affects the tenancy arrangement’s validity.3Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines, Sections 5 and 17.

    In the present case, the Court found that certain disinterested persons testified and established that the spouses G were tenants of B in the landholdings, as follows:

    • B installed the spouses G as their tenants;
    • They had a 50-50 sharing arrangement of the farm produce;
    • The spouses G delivered harvest shares to B; and
    • There was a practice in in the area that for one to be a tenant, he or she may simply secure the landowner’s verbal consent, without any written agreement.

    The Court further stated that even if the B had not expressly instituted the spouses G as tenants, agricultural tenancy may still be established either expressly or impliedly on the basis of Republic Act No. 1199 and the Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines.4Santos v. De Cerdenola, G.R. No. L-18412, July 31, 1962, 115 PHIL 813-820.

    Section 7 of Republic Act No. 1199 states:

    SECTION 7. Tenancy Relationship; How established; Security of Tenure. — Tenancy relationship may be established either verbally or in writing, expressly or impliedly. Once such relationship is established, the tenant shall be entitled to security of tenure as hereinafter provided.

    Section 5 of the Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines then states:

    SECTION 5. Establishment of Agricultural Leasehold Relation. — The agricultural leasehold relation shall be established by operation of law in accordance with Section four of this Code and, in other cases, either orally or in writing, expressly or impliedly.

    In other words, the Court clarified that an express agreement is not necessary to establish the existence of agricultural tenancy. The tenancy relationship can be implied when the conduct of the parties shows the presence of all the requisites under the law.

    In the present case, the Court ruled that the tenancy relationship was, nonetheless, implied from the conduct of the parties, based on the following findings:

    • The spouses G had been tilling and cultivating the lands since 1990;
    • B had been receiving their share of the harvest; and
    • After B’s death, the spouses G continued to deliver the landowner’s share of the harvest to the heirs.

    For the Court, these circumstances indicated that B and his successor-in-interest had known and consented to the tenancy arrangement.

    Were they entitled to legal redemption?

    The Supreme Court also ruled in the affirmative.

    The Court discussed that in agricultural leasehold relations, the agricultural lessor — who can be the owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor of the land — grants his or her land’s cultivation and use to the agricultural lessee, who in turn pays a price certain in money, or in produce, or both.5Dissenting Opinion of J. Leonen, J.V. Lagon Realty Corporation v. Heirs of vda. de Terre, G.R. No. 219670, June 27, 2018, http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/64252 [J. Martires, Third Division] citing R.P. BARTE, LAW ON AGRARIAN REFORM 6-7 (2003). The definition and elements of leasehold tenancy relations are similar to those of share tenancy.6Dissenting Opinion of J. Leonen, J.V. Lagon Realty Corporation v. Heirs of vda. de Terre, G.R. No. 219670, June 27, 2018, http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/64252 [J. Martires, Third Division] citing Spouses Cuaño v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107159, September 26, 1994, 307 PHIL 128-149. A slight difference, however, exists: a leasehold relation is not extinguished by the mere expiration of the contract’s term or period, nor by the sale or transfer of legal possession of the land to another. Section 10 of the Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines states:

    SECTION 10. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Expiration of Period, etc. — The agricultural leasehold relation under this Code shall not be extinguished by mere expiration of the term or period in a leasehold contract nor by the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the landholding. In case the agricultural lessor sells, alienates or transfers the legal possession of the landholding, the purchaser or transferee thereof shall be subrogated to the rights and substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor.

    The Court stated that from the foregoing discussion the agricultural lessor is not prohibited from selling or disposing of the property. In case he or she does, the agricultural leasehold relation subsists. Corollary to this, the law also grants the agricultural lessee the right to preempt an intended sale. But if the property has been sold without the agricultural lessee’s knowledge, he or she shall have the right to redeem the property, as in line with the law’s objective of allowing tenant-farmers to own the land they cultivate. The Court pointed to Section 12 of the Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines,7Republic Act No. 3844 (1963), sec. 12, as amended by Republic Act No. 6389 (1971), sec. 2. which provides:

    SECTION 12. Lessee’s Right of Redemption. — In case the landholding is sold to a third person without the knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter shall have the right to redeem the same at a reasonable price and consideration: Provided, That where there are two or more agricultural lessees, each shall be entitled to said right of redemption only to the extent of the area actually cultivated by him. The right of the redemption under this Section may be exercised within one hundred eighty days from notice in writing which shall be served by the vendee on all lessees affected and the Department of Agrarian Reform upon the registration of the sale, and shall have priority over any other right of legal redemption. The redemption price shall be the reasonable price of the land at the time of the sale.

    Upon the filing of the corresponding petition or request with the department or corresponding case in court by the agricultural lessee or lessees, the said period of one hundred and eighty days shall cease to run.

    Any petition or request for redemption shall be resolved within sixty days from the filing thereof; otherwise, the said period shall start to run again.

    The Court continued that under the law, the agricultural lessor must first inform the agricultural lessee of the sale in writing. From this point, a 180-day period commences, within which the agricultural lessee must file a petition or request to redeem the land. The written notice shall be served on the agricultural lessee as well as on the Department of Agrarian Reform upon registration of the sale. The right of redemption granted to the agricultural lessee enjoys preference over any other legal redemption that may be exercised over the property. Upon filing of the petition or request, the 180-day period shall cease to run, and will commence again upon the resolution of the petition or request or within 60 days from its filing.

    In the present case, since the spouses G were the agricultural tenants of the landholdings, they were also entitled to the right of redemption. Accordingly, the spouses G may exercise their right to purchase the lots by paying a reasonable price of the land at the time of the sale.

    In highlighting the significance of a tenant’s right of redemption, the Court stated:

    Our agrarian reform laws are witness to the country’s attempts at reversing unjust structures developed throughout centuries of oppressive land regimes. Agrarian justice aims to liberate sectors that have been victimized by a system that has perpetuated their bondage to debt and poverty. Its goal is to dignify those who till our lands — to give land to those who cultivate them.

    The protection of tenancy relations is only one of agrarian reform’s significant features. The State, acknowledging that tenancy relations have an inherent imbalance that disadvantages farmer-tenants and privileges landowners, sought to it that this relationship is regulated so that social justice might be achieved. Ultimately, the program aims to remove farmer-tenants from the system that had once oppressed them by making the tenant, once just the tiller, owner of his or her land.

    Further reading:

    • Spouses Franco v. Spouses Galera, Jr., G.R. No. 205266, January 15, 2020.

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  • Well Aware of Her Fixed-Term Employment

    Madelyn narrated that in April 2010, the school engaged her as a releasing clerk in its book sale, tasking her with the inventory and release of books to the school’s students.

    In July 2010, Madelyn worked as a filing clerk at the school’s Human Resources Department, where she updated employees’ files, delivered memoranda to different departments, and assisted in school programs. In April 2011, she was posted back as a releasing clerk. She held this position until July 14, 2011.

    On July 15, 2011, she worked as a secretary at the school’s Technical-Vocational Training Center (Claretech), which taught vocational and technical skills to underprivileged students. There she prepared materials, assisted in the delivery of correspondence to other departments, and encoded and filed documents.

    In May 2013, the school asked Madelyn to sign a Probationary Employment Contract covering the period of January 16, 2013 to July 15, 2013. When the contract expired, she was told that her tenure would expire on July 31, 2013 because of a change in school administration and due to cost-cutting.

    But Madelyn was able to work for the school starting August 1, 2013 as a substitute teacher aide at the school’s Child Study Center. When the permanent teacher aide returned on October 25, 2013, Madelyn stopped working for the school.

    Madelyn repeatedly pleaded to be reinstated at least as a checker at the school’s water station, but the school denied her requests.

    Thus, Madelyn filed her Complaint, claiming that she had been a regular employee since she performed various jobs that were usually necessary and desirable in the usual business of the school.

    The school denied Madelyn’s claims averring that she was merely a part-time fixed-term contractual employee whom the school accommodated because her husband was its longtime driver. It also argued that Madelyn was well aware of her fixed-term employment as confirmed by her application letters and biodata, which showed her employment’s duration.

    Moreover, the school claimed that Madelyn’s position at Claretech was not a plantilla position because the department was only at its experimental stage, merely relying on donations and the school’s marketing research fund. When Claretech began incurring deficits, the clerical functions were allegedly absorbed by the administrator’s functions, dissolving Madelyn’s position.

    Was Madelyn engaged under a fixed-term employment?

    The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.

    The Supreme Court reiterated the principles in Brent School v. Zamora which recognized the validity of fixed-term employment under both the Civil Code and the Labor Code of the Philippines, as follows:

    Brent recognized that the Civil Code and the Labor Code of the Philippines allow the execution of fixed-term employment contracts. But when periods have been imposed to prevent an employee from acquiring his or her security of tenure, the contract effectively runs counter to public policy and morals, and must, therefore, be disregarded.

    In drawing the line, Brent laid down the criteria under which a fixed-term employment cannot be deemed in circumvention of the security of tenure:

    • When the parties have knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon a fixed period of employment “without any force, duress[,] or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating his consent”; or
    • When “it satisfactorily appears that the employer and employee dealt with each other on more or less equal terms” with the employer not having exercised any moral dominance over the employee.

    The rationale behind this safeguard is that when a prospective employee, on account of special skills or market forces, is in a position to make demands upon the prospective employer, such prospective employee needs less protection than the ordinary worker. Lesser limitations on the parties’ freedom of contract are thus required for the protection of the employee.

    The Supreme Court has emphasized that Brent is the exception rather than the general rule, and a fixed-term employment is recognized as valid only under certain circumstances, particularly when a fixed-term is an essential and natural appurtenance.

    Moreover, the Court held that in determining the validity of a fixed-term employment, the level of protection accorded to labor is ascertained based on the nature of the work, qualifications of the employee, and other relevant circumstances.

    Hence, the criteria limit the application of Brent to particular cases where the employer and the employee are on a more or less equal footing in entering into the contract. If none of the aforementioned criteria are present, the Court will strike down a fixed-term employment contract.

    In the present case, the Supreme Court found no contract evidencing Madelyn’s fixed-term employment. The Court said that this militated against the school’s assertion of fixed-term employment. According to the Court, the decisive determinant in fixed-term employments is the day certain agreed upon by the parties for the commencement and termination of their employment relationship. For the Court no day certain was agreed upon by the parties.

    The Court noted that the school persistently asserted that Madelyn should have known that her employment was only for a fixed term given the circumstances and nature of her job. However, the Court found that the school failed to present the contracts for the positions held by Madelyn. The Court said that absent any contract, it cannot be said that Madelyn was informed of the nature of her employment, as well as the duration and scope of her work. A fixed-term employment, the Court said, cannot be held valid based on mere allegations and speculations.

    Furthermore, although the school argued that she executed a Memorandum of Agreement that provided for the terms of her employment, the Court found that such agreement referred to her engagement as a substitute teacher aide. As for the rest of the positions she held, the school failed to provide any contract.

    The Court ruled even then the criteria in Brent were absent. According to the Court the school did not deal with Madelyn in more or less equal terms with no moral dominance on its part. Madelyn’s whole family depended on the school. Her husband was the school’s longtime driver and their children were its scholars. Madelyn was a high school graduate whose ordinary qualifications compelled her to accept the various positions offered by the school. The Court said that given these circumstances, Madelyn was not in a position to bargain on the terms of her employment. It could not be said that no moral dominance was exerted by the school merely because both parties benefitted from the fixed-term employment.

    The Court added that there could be no genuine freedom to contract when a fixed-term employment is used as a vehicle to exploit the economic disadvantage of workers like Madelyn. Plain wage earners should not be faulted for tolerating jobs they desperately need. Brent recognized the validity of fixed-term employments only within the context that employers and employees are on an equal footing. That employees agree to be repeatedly hired on a fixed-term basis only reveals the deeper problem of poverty and growing economic inequality between labor and capital.

    The Court declared that Madelyn was a regular employee of the school for her repeated engagement under contract of hire was indicative of the necessity and desirability of her work. Her services as a clerk at the book sale, as a secretary at Claretech, and as a substitute teacher aide were found to be necessary and desirable to the school’s business as an educational institution. The school’s repeated hiring of Madelyn for over three (3) years only strengthened the conclusion that her services are necessary and desirable to its business.

    Further reading:

    • Claret School of Quezon City v. Sinday, G.R. No. 226358, October 9, 2019.

  • Exemptions under Section 10 of the CARL, an Exclusive List

    The MDA Corporation obtained a commercial loan from the Government Service Insurance System. This loan was secured by a mortgage over a parcel of agricultural land.

    Since the MDA Corporation was unable to pay the loan, the Government Service Insurance System foreclosed the agricultural land. After the lapse of the redemption period, ownership of said land was consolidated in the Government Service Insurance System.

    Subsequently, the Department of Agrarian Reform issued a Notice of Coverage concerning the agricultural land and offered to pay the Government Service Insurance System more than Php4 million for the property.

    The Government Service Insurance System, in turn, protested the coverage and filed before the Department of Agrarian Reform a Petition asking that the property be excluded from compulsory agrarian reform coverage. In support of its petition, the Government Service Insurance System asserts that under Section 39 of Republic Act No. 8291, or The Government Service Insurance System Act of 1997, its properties cannot be utilized for agrarian reform purposes as such provision exempts its properties from agrarian reform coverage.

    Should the property be excluded from coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program?

    No, the Court did not exclude the land from agrarian reform coverage because the exemptions under Section 10 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 form an exclusive list. Thus, it could not simply impute into a statute an exception which Congress did not incorporate. Moreover, general welfare legislation such as land reform laws is to be construed in favor of the promotion of social justice to ensure the well-being and economic security of the people. Since a broad construction of the provision listing the properties exempted under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 would tend to denigrate the aims of agrarian reform, a strict application of these exceptions is in order.

    Further reading:

    • Government Service Insurance System v. Datoy, G.R. No. 232863, July 24, 2019.

  • His Position Became Unnecessary upon Shipment Completion

    On November 1, 2009, the employer hired Manuel as a technical consultant. Under the agreement, Manuel was tasked to:

    • Prepare reports;
    • Be the intermediary of certain teams;
    • Attend coordination meetings;
    • Evaluate billings; and
    • Conduct Site visits.

    Through a letter dated June 27, 2013, the employer informed Manuel of the termination of his employment due to the cessation of delivery operations and diminution of activities. Aggrieved by the actions of his employer, Manuel filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against it.

    The employer contended that it had sufficiently established redundancy of Manuel’s position. It presented certain documents to prove that there was a significant diminution in the volume of materials business and that the completion of shipment had rendered his position irrelevant. The employer further argued that it did not dismiss Manuel in bad faith, contending that it complied with labor law requirements in terminating his employment. The employer pointed out that he was given a notice of termination with computation of his separation pay, and that the Department of Labor and Employment was also notified.

    Was Manuel validly dismissed from employment on the ground of redundancy?

    The Supreme Court ruled that Manuel was not validly dismissed on said ground.

    The Court stated that redundancy is recognized as one of the authorized causes for dismissing an employee under the Labor Code of the Philippines. Redundancy exists where the services of an employee are in excess of what is reasonably demanded by the actual requirements of the enterprise. A position is redundant where it is superfluous, and superfluity of a position or positions may be the outcome of a number of factors, such as overhiring of workers, decreased volume of business, or dropping of a particular product line or service activity previously manufactured or undertaken by the enterprise. The employer has no legal obligation to keep in its payroll more employees than are necessary for the operation of its business.

    The Court further stated that for the implementation of a redundancy program to be valid, the employer must comply with the following requisites:

    • written notice served on both the employees and the Department of Labor and Employment at least one month prior to the intended date of retrenchment;
    • payment of separation pay equivalent to at least one month pay or at least one month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher;
    • good faith in abolishing the redundant positions in that the employer must provide substantial proof that the services of the employees are in excess of what it requires; and
    • fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining what positions are to be declared redundant and accordingly abolished.

    In the present case, the Court acknowledged that the employer complied with the first and second requisites. It was able to notify Manuel and the Department of Labor and Employment at least a month before the planned redundancy. Manuel also received a computation of his separation pay corresponding to at least one month pay for every year of service with additional payment for economic assistance.

    However, the Court found that the employer failed to establish compliance with the third and fourth requisites.

    The Court discovered that the employer’s only basis for declaring petitioner’s position redundant was that his function, which was to monitor the delivery of supplies, became unnecessary upon completion of shipment.

    However, the Court discovered that Manuel’s employment agreement reveals the contrary as there was no mention of monitoring shipment as part of his tasks. The Court said that if his work pertains mainly to the delivery of supplies, it should have been specifically stated in his job description. Thus, the Court found no basis for the employer to consider Manuel’s position irrelevant when shipment had been completed.

    The Court also found that the employer failed to show that they used fair and reasonable criteria in determining what positions should be declared redundant.

    The Court explained that fair and reasonable criteria may take into account the preferred status, efficiency, and seniority of employees to be dismissed due to redundancy.

    However, the Court found that the employer never showed that it used any of these in choosing Manuel as among the employees affected by redundancy.

    The Court accordingly declared Manuel to have been illegally dismissed from employment.

    Further reading:

    • Acosta v. Matiere SAS, G.R. No. 232870, June 3, 2019.

  • Economic Terms of the CBA and GOCC Employees

    On December 20, 2013, employees of GSIS Family Bank, a non-chartered Government-Owned or Controlled Corporation, demanded for the payment of their Christmas bonus which had been annually given them pursuant to their Collective Bargaining Agreement with said bank.

    GSIS Family Bank refused to grant the said bonus. This was because it was advised by the Governance Commission for Government-Owned or Controlled Corporations (or the Governance Commission) that it could not grant incentives and other benefits to its employees, without authority from the President of the Philippines. According to the Governance Commission, as a government financial institution, GSIS Family Bank was not authorized to enter into a collective bargaining agreement with its employees based on the principle that compensation and position classification system of its employees is provided for by law and not subject to private bargaining.

    Was the refusal valid?

    The Supreme Court ruled that it was valid. The Court found that GSIS Family Bank could not be faulted for refusing to enter into a new collective bargaining agreement with petitioner as it lacked the authority to negotiate economic terms with its employees.

    In denying the claims of the employees of GSIS Family Bank, the Supreme Court illustrated the interplay between the provisions of the Labor Code of the Philippines and the provisions of the GOCC Governance Act of 2011 (or Republic Act Number 10149) on the life of a non-chartered government-owned or controlled corporation.

    The Court ruled that the power of a government-owned or controlled corporation to fix salaries or allowances of its employees is subject to and must conform to the compensation and classification standards laid down by applicable law, specifically the GOCC Governance Act of 2011. According to the Court, the said law does not differentiate between chartered and non-chartered government-owned or controlled corporations; hence, the provisions of this law equally apply to all GOCCs.

    Furthermore, the Court ruled that while government-owned or controlled corporations without original charters are covered by the Labor Code of the Philippines, employees of said government-owned or controlled corporations are bereft of any right to negotiate the economic terms of their employment, i.e., salaries, emoluments, incentives and other benefits, with their employers since these matters are covered by compensation and position standards issued by applicable law.

    According to the Court, the law1Section 9 of Republic Act No. 10149 categorically states, “Any law to the contrary notwithstanding, no [government-owned or controlled corporation] shall be exempt from the coverage of the Compensation and Position Classification System developed by the [Governance Commission] under this Act.” The law also directed the Governance Commission to develop a Compensation and Position Classification System, to be submitted for the approval of the President of the Philippines, which shall apply to all officers and employees of government-owned or controlled corporations, whether chartered or non-chartered. When it comes to collective bargaining agreements and collective negotiation agreements in government-owned or controlled corporations, the President of the Philippines, through Executive Order No. 2032Section 2 issued on March 22, 2016, stated that while it recognized the right of workers to organize, bargain, and negotiate with their employers, “the Governing Boards of all covered [government-owned or controlled corporations], whether Chartered or Non-chartered, may not negotiate with their officers and employees the economic terms of their [collective bargaining agreements].”

    Further reading:

    • GSIS Family Bank Employees Union v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 210773, January 23, 2019.

  • Dismissal of Employees for Minor Offenses

    Laura was hired to join ProHealth’s audit team in 2007. She was later promoted to Finance Officer.

    On November 26, 2007, Laura’s superior ordered her to give three thousand pesos from the training funds to Prohealth’s District Business Manager, to serve as cash advance.

    On November 27, 2007, Prohealth issued a show cause memorandum for Laura’s failure to release the cash advance. Laura was also relieved of her duties and reassigned to the Office of the Personnel and Administration Manager.

    In her explanation, Laura alleged that when the District Business Manager saw that she was busy receiving cash sales from another District Business Manager, he told her that he would just return the next day to collect his cash advance. When he told her that the cash advance was for car repairs, Laura told him to get the cash from his revolving fund, which she would reimburse after the repairs were done. Prohealth was dissatisfied with her explanation and transferred her to another office.

    On December 3, 2007, Laura was invited to a fact-finding investigation, which was held on December 10, 2007, where Laura was again asked to explain her actions.

    On December 17, 2007, she was handed a notice of termination effective December 31, 2007 for disobeying an order of her superior.

    Laura filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Prohealth.

    The Office of the Labor Arbiter declared the illegality of Laura’s dismissal from employment. This ruling was affirmed by the National Labor Relations Commission. However, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the Commission and ruled the validity of Laura’s dismissal from employment. The Court of Appeals viewed Laura failure to comply with her superior’s order, an instance of arrogance and hostility, that, in turn, warranted her dismissal.

    When the case reached the Supreme Court, Laura insisted that she was illegally dismissed from employment. According to Laura, she believed in good faith that the District Business Manager would just claim his cash advance the day after he tried to claim it and that there was nothing in her actions that would prove that she intended to disobey or defy respondent Prohealth’s order.

    Was the dismissal of Laura valid?

    The Supreme Court declared that Laura was illegally dismissed from employment.

    The Court stated that under the Labor Code of the Philippines an employer may terminate the services of an employee who commits willful disobedience of the lawful orders of the employer. The Court explained that for disobedience to be considered as just cause for termination, two (2) requisites must concur:

    • the employee’s assailed conduct must have been wilful or intentional; and
    • the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain to the duties which he [or she] had been engaged to discharge.

    For disobedience to be willful, the Court added, it must be characterized by a wrongful and perverse mental attitude rendering the employee’s act inconsistent with proper subordination. The conduct complained of must also constitute harmful behavior against the business interest or person of his [or her] employer. Thus, it is implied in every case of willful disobedience that the erring employee obtains undue advantage detrimental to the business interest of the employer.

    In the present case, the Court found that Laura, as Finance Officer, was instructed by her superior to give a cash advance of three thousand pesos to the District Branch Manager on November 26, 2007. For the Court, such instruction or order was reasonable, lawful, made known to Laura, and pertained to her duties.

    The Court then tried to determine whether Laura intentionally and willfully violated such order as to amount to insubordination.

    The Court ruled in the negative.

    The Court found that when the District Business Manager went to collect the money from Laura, he was told to return the next day as she was still busy. When Laura found out that the money was to be used for a car tune-up, she suggested to the District Business Manager to just get the money from his mobilization fund and that she just would reimburse it after.

    Diverging from the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court ruled that no ill will existed between the District Business Manager and Laura. According to the Supreme Court, Laura’s failure to immediately give the money to the District Business Manager was not the result of a perverse mental attitude but was merely because she was busy at the time. Neither did she profit from her failure to immediately give the cash advance for the car tune-up nor did respondents suffer financial damage by her failure to comply. For the Court, the severe penalty of dismissal was not commensurate to her infraction. Laura was illegally dismissed from employment.

    Further reading:

    • Malcaba v. ProHealth Pharma Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 209085 , June 6, 2018.

  • Substantial Compliance with Appeal Bond Requirements

    The situation in this case was that the Office of the Labor Arbiter found that the employer had illegally dismissed three of its employees. This decision of the Office of the Labor Arbiter was affirmed by the National Labor Relations Commission. All parties then filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals.

    A portion of the Decision of the Court of Appeals related to its finding that the employer substantially complied with the requirement of an appeal bond despite it not appearing in the records of the surety company since the employer believed in good faith that the bond it secured was genuine.

    However, the employees argued that the Court of Appeals should have dismissed the Petition for Certiorari outright since the employer failed to post a genuine appeal bond before the National Labor Relations Commission. The petitioner-employees alleged that when the Sheriff of the Commission attempted to enforce the judgment award against the appeal bond, said Sheriff was informed that the appeal bond procured by the employer did not appear in the records of the bonding company. The petitioners-employees also claimed that the employer was notified by the National Labor Relations Commission that its appeal bond was not genuine, showing that the employer did exhibit good faith.

    On the other hand, the employer countered that procedural rules should liberally be applied to their case since it acted in good faith in posting their appeal bond. The employer further asserts that the issue should have already been considered moot since the employees were able to garnish and collect the amounts allegedly due to them.

    Did the employer perfect its appeal upon discovery of its forged appeal bond?

    Yes, because the Supreme Court found that the employer had substantially complied with the requirements on the posting of an appeal bond.

    The Court reiterated the principles that an appeal is not a matter of right. Courts and tribunals have the discretion whether to give due course to an appeal or to dismiss it outright. The perfection of an appeal is, thus, jurisdictional. Non-compliance with the manner in which to file an appeal renders the judgment final and executory. In labor cases, an appeal by an employer is perfected only by filing a bond equivalent to the monetary award.

    The Court further stated that the ruled of the National Labor Relations Commission require that the appeal bond filed be genuine. An appeal bond determined by the National Labor Relations Commission to be irregular or not genuine shall cause the immediate dismissal of the appeal. The Court also stated that while the procedural rules strictly require the employer to submit a genuine bond, an appeal could still be perfected if there was substantial compliance with the requirement.

    In this instance, the Court found that the National Labor Relations Commission certified that the employer was able to file a security deposit in the amount of more than 6.5 million pesos showing that the premium for the appeal bond was duly paid and that there was willingness to post it. The Court also noted that the employees likewise attached documents proving that Alpha Insurance was a legitimate and accredited bonding company.

    The Court stressed that despite the employees’ failure to collect on the appeal bond, the employees never denied that they were eventually able to garnish the amount from the employer’s bank deposits. For the Court, such situation fulfilled the purpose of the bond, which was, to guarantee the payment of valid and legal claims against the employer.

    The Court accordingly considered the employer to have substantially complied with the requirements on the posting of an appeal bond.

    Further reading:

    • Malcaba v. ProHealth Pharma Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 209085 , June 6, 2018.