Paulino Ungos III

Lawyer | Law Professor | Author

Category: Social Legislation

  • No Objection to Company-designated Physician’s Assessment

    The seafarer in this case entered into a ten-month employment contract and was engaged to work as an able seaman by his employer, Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd., through its agent, Marlow Navigation Philippines, Inc., onboard the vessel M/V BBC OHIO. His engagement was also subject to a collective bargaining agreement between the employer and its employees. The seafarer boarded the vessel on 23 November 2009.

    While on duty on 30 December 2009, the seafarer fell from a height of four meters in his work area. The fall affected his side, shoulder, and head. He was brought to a hospital in Huangpu, China, where he was diagnosed with “Left l-4 Verterbra Transverse Bone broken (accident).” He was declared unfit to work for 25 days. On 7 January 2010, he was medically repatriated to the Philippines.

    The seafarer arrived in Manila on 8 January 2010, where he was referred to the company-designated physician for examination and treatment. After undergoing several tests (which included a CT scan, audiometry and MRI, as well as therapy sessions with the company-designated physician that spanned six months) the company-designated physician gave him a combined 36% disability assessment.

    The seafarer did not object to the company-designated physician’s assessment. Yet, he filed a claim for permanent total disability compensation against his employer.

    The Supreme Court ruled that the seafarer was not entitled to permanent total disability compensation.

    The Court noted that the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract and the collective bargaining agreement were instruments that governed the seafarer’s employment with the petitioners. According to the Court, these instruments are the law between the parties.

    Under the Standard Employment Contract, it is the company-designated physician who not only declares/establishes the fitness to work or the degree of disability of a seafarer who is repatriated for medical reasons, but also determines whether a seafarer needs further medical attention. Thus, under the said contract, the seafarer is required to submit to a post-employment medical examination by the company-designated physician.

    Furthermore, under the collective bargaining agreement, the disability suffered by the Seafarer shall be determined by a doctor appointed mutually by the employer and the union, and the employers shall provide disability compensation to the seafarer in accordance with the compensation scale prescribed therein. The Court found that the company-designated physician based her assessment of the seafarer’s disability on the said compensation scale.

    In the present case, the seafarer was able to submit himself to the care of the company-designated physician upon his medical repatriation. The company-designated physician thereafter gave the seafarer a 36% disability assessment under the compensation schedule prescribed in the collective bargaining agreement.

    The Court noted the seafarer’s own admission that he no longer disputed the findings of the company-designated physician. It was also not shown that the seafarer offered a contrary finding. And although the collective bargaining agreement stated that the seafarer’s disability shall be determined by a doctor mutually appointed by the employer and the union, it was was not established that the parties even resorted to this step.

    The Court ruled that the absence of a disability assessment by a doctor chosen by the parties will not invalidate the company-designated physician’s assessment, not only because the seafarer accepted said physician’s findings, but also because record established that the seafarer refused the employer’s proposal that his medical condition be referred to a mutually appointed doctor for determination.

    According to the Court, a seafarer could not claim full disability benefits on his mere say-so, in complete disregard of the Standard Employment Contract and the collective bargaining agreement.

    The Court thus held that company-designated physician’s assessment should stand.

    Further reading:

    • Marlow Navigation Phils., Inc. v. Cabatay, G.R. No. 212878, February 1, 2016.

  • Effect of Delaying Payment of Just Compensation

    The landowner in this case had a parcel of agricultural land in Camarines Sur which was taken in 1984 under Presidential Decree No. 27,1Entitled DECREEING THE EMANCIPATION OF TENANTS FROM THE BONDAGE OF THE SOIL, TRANSFERRING TO THEM THE OWNERSHIP OF THE LAND THEY TILL AND PROVIDING THE INSTRUMENTS AND MECHANISM THEREFOR (approved on 21 October 1972). then distributed to the farmer-beneficiaries. The Department of Agrarian Reform fixed just compensation of the said land at P66,214.03 using the formula provided under Executive Order No. 228, Series of 1987.2Entitled DECLARING FULL LAND OWNERSHIP TO QUALIFIED FARMER BENEFICIARIES COVERED BY PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 27; DETERMINING THE VALUE OF REMAINING UNVALUED RICE AND CORN LANDS SUBJECT OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 27; AND PROVIDING FOR THE MANNER OF PAYMENT BY THE FARMER BENEFICIARY AND MODE OF COMPENSATION TO THE LANDOWNER (approved on 17 July 1987).

    On 30 August 2000 and 17 December 2003, respectively, the landowner was issued Agrarian Reform Bond No. 0079665 in the amount of P11,674.59 representing the initial valuation of the taken land and AR Bond No. 0079666 in the amount of P30,428.83 representing the 6% increment under Presidential Decree No. 27 and Executive Order No. 228, and paid cash in the total amount of P4,678.16.

    The landowner found the valuation unreasonable, which is why he filed a petition for summary administrative proceedings for the determination of just compensation of the taken land before the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator.

    On 27 March 2001, the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator fixed just compensation in the amount of P1,147,466.73 24, using the formula, LV = AGP x 2.5 x GSP. However, in arriving at such values, the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator used the recent government support price for corn of P300.00/cavan (P6.00/kilo) as certified by the National Food Authority Provincial Manager of Camarines Sur, instead of the P31.00/cavan provided under Section 23SECTION 2. Henceforth, the valuation of rice and corn lands covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be based on the average gross production determined by the Barangay Committee on Land Production in accordance with Department Memorandum Circular No. 26, Series of 1973, and related issuances and regulations of the Department of Agrarian Reform. The average gross production per hectare shall be multiplied by 2.5, the product of which shall be multiplied by P35.00, the government support price for 1 cavan of 50 kilos of palay on 21 October 1972, or P31.00, the government support price for 1 cavan of 50 kilos of corn on 21 October 1972, and the amount arrived at shall be the value of the rice and corn land, as the case may be, for the purpose of determining its cost to the farmer and compensation to the landowner. of Executive Order No. 228.

    Hence, the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator no longer applied the 6% annual incremental interest granted under Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1994.4Entitled RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE GRANT OF INCREMENT OF 6% YEARLY INTEREST COMPOUNDED ANNUALLY ON LANDS COVERED BY PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 27 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 228 (approved on 27 October 1994). In a letter dated 5 September 2001, the landowner unconditionally accepted and called for the immediate payment of the valuations for the land.

    Dissatisfied with the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator’s valuation, the Land Bank of the Philippines instituted a complaint for the determination of just compensation before the Regional Trial Court, averring that the said office erred in disregarding the formula provided under Executive Order No. 228.

    In an Order dated 17 March 2010, the Regional Trial Court directed the Land Bank of the Philippines to submit a revaluation for the land in accordance with the factors set forth under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988,5Republic Act No. 6657, as amended; Entitled AN ACT INSTITUTING A COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM TO PROMOTE SOCIAL JUSTICE AND INDUSTRIALIZATION, PROVIDING THE MECHANISM FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES (approved on 10 June 1988). as implemented by Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 2010.6Entitled RULES AND REGULATIONS ON VALUATION AND LANDOWNERS COMPENSATION INVOLVING TENANTED RICE AND CORN LANDS UNDER PRESIDENTIAL DECREE (P.D.) NO. 27 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER (E.O.) NO. 228 which took effect on 1 July 2009.

    The Land Bank of the Philippines complied and reached an amount of P1,155,223.41, as recomputed value of the land. The landowner accepted the said computation.

    On 22 June 2011, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision adopting and approving the Land Bank of the Philippines’ uncontested revaluation the land in the amount of P1,155,223.41, as well as ordering its payment to landowner in accordance with Section 18 of Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, minus the initial valuation that had already been paid to him.

    The landowner moved for reconsideration, contending that the Regional Trial Court failed to order an additional payment of 12% interest in his favor, reckoned from the time his land was taken from him by the government in 1972 and distributed to the farmer beneficiaries until full payment of the just compensation.

    In an Order dated 31 August 2011, the Regional Trial Court granted the said motion and awarded 12% interest computed from 26 June 2000, when the Land Bank of the Philippines approved the payment of the initial valuation for the land up to the date the decision was rendered, or a total amount of P1,437,669.75.

    The Regional Trial Court modified its 31 August 2011 Order, by way of its Order dated 10 October 2011, holding that the 12% interest should be reckoned from 1 January 2010 until full payment since the revaluation the land already included the required 6% annual incremental interest under Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1994,7This Administrative Order granted an annual interest of 6% to lands covered under Presidential Decree No. 27 and Executive Order No. 228 compounded yearly from taking until November 1994. The reason is had the landowner been paid from the time of the taking of his land and the money deposited in a bank, the money would have earned the same interest rate compounded annually as authorized under banking laws, rules and regulations. Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 2, Series of 2004,8Entitled AMENDMENT TO ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 13, SERIES OF 1994 ENTITLED RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE GRANT OF INCREMENT OF 6% YEARLY INTEREST COMPOUNDED ANNUALLY ON LANDS COVERED BY PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 27 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 228’” dated 4 November 2004. This extended the grant of the 6% incremental annual interest up to December 2006. and Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 2008,9Entitled AMENDMENT TO DAR ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 2., SERIES OF 2004 ON THE GRANT OF INCREMENT OF 6% YEARLY INTEREST COMPOUNDED ANNUALLY ON LANDS COVERED BY PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 27 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 228 dated 28 July 2008. This further extended the grant of the six percent (6%) incremental annual interest up to 31 December 2009. from the time of taking until December 31, 2009.

    Is the landowner entitled to the payment of annual interest of 12% on the unpaid balance of just compensation, even if he was already granted the 6% annual incremental interest prescribed under Department of Agrarian Reform Order Nos.

    • 13, Series of 1994;
    • 02, Series of 2004; or
    • 06, Series of 2008?

    Yes.

    The Supreme Court ruled that in expropriation cases, interest is imposed if there is delay in the payment of just compensation to the landowner since the obligation is deemed to be an effective forbearance on the part of the State.

    The Court pegged said interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the unpaid balance of the just compensation, reckoned from the time of taking, or the time when the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as when title is transferred to the Republic, or emancipation patents are issued by the government, until full payment.

    The Court clarified that, unlike the 6% annual incremental interest allowed in the above-mentioned department orders, this 12% annual interest is not granted on the computed just compensation. Rather, it is a penalty imposed for damages incurred by the landowner due to the delay in its payment.

    The reason is that just compensation also embraces, not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the landowner, but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking, as otherwise, compensation cannot be considered “just,” for the owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for years before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss. Said the Court:

    Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The true measure is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. The word “just” is used to modify the meaning of the word “compensation” to convey the idea that the equivalent to be given for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, and ample.

    The concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also payment within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered “just” inasmuch as the property owner is made to suffer the consequences of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss.

    While prompt payment of just compensation requires the immediate deposit and release to the landowner of the provisional compensation as determined by the Department of Agrarian Reform, it does not end there. Verily, it also encompasses the payment in full of the just compensation to the landholders as finally determined by the courts. Thus, it cannot be said that there is already prompt payment of just compensation when there is only a partial payment thereof, as in this case.

    N.B.:

    Beginning 1 July 2013, the rate of six percent (6%) interest per annum shall be imposed until full payment, under the modification introduced by BSP-MB Circular No. 799 as affirmed in Nacar v. Gallery Frames, G.R. No. 189871, August 13, 2013.

    Further reading:

    • Land Bank of the Philippines v. Santos, G.R. No. 213863 & 214021, January 27, 2016.

  • Only an Applicant; Not a Recruiter

    Recruitment and Placement

    The Labor Code of the Philippines1Under Article 13 (b) defines recruitment and placement as

    “any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers; and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not.”

    Illegal Recruitment

    On the other hand, the Labor Code of the Philippines2Under Article 38 defines illegal recruitment as

    “any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority.”

    Illegal recruitment under the Labor Code of the Philippines3Article 38 encompasses recruitment activities for both local and overseas employment undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority.

    Illegal recruitment is thus committed by persons who, without authority from the government, give the impression that they have the power to send workers abroad for employment purposes.

    Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale

    The crime of illegal recruitment in large scale is committed when the following elements concur:

    • the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable one to engage lawfully in recruitment and placement of workers;
    • he or she undertakes either any activity within the meaning of “recruitment and placement” defined under Article 13, paragraph b, or any prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code; and
    • that the accused commits the acts against three or more persons, individually or as a group.

    The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995

    Notably, the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 broadened the concept of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code of the Philippines and provided stiffer penalties, especially for those that constitute economic sabotage, i.e., Illegal Recruitment Committed by a Syndicate and Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale.

    Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise, or scheme. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.

    Part II of the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 defines and penalizes illegal recruitment for employment abroad, whether undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority or by a licensee or holder of authority.

    The situation in People v. Dela Cruz4G.R. No. 197808 (Notice), January 25, 2016. was that the complainants all positively identified the appellant as the person who:

    • promised them employment abroad;
    • explained the nature of their work and their corresponding salaries;
    • asked for documentary requirements such as resumés, photos, and medical certificates;
    • asked for their placement fees;
    • and either directly or ultimately received the placement fees they paid.

    Nonetheless, the appellant raised the defense that she was a mere applicant for overseas work at a travel agency, and not a recruiter.

    The Court was not convinced of said defense.

    It held that to prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that the appellant gave complainants the distinct impression that she had the power or ability to send complainants abroad for work such that the latter were convinced to part with their money in order to be employed. The Court found the testimonies of these witnesses credible and convincing.

    It also noted that the appellant failed to present any evidence to substantiate her claim that she was recruited by the supposed owners of the agency as a domestic helper in Brunei. Record even showed that she signed some of the petty cash vouchers issued to the complainants. It thus ruled that the appellant’s mere denial failed over the positive and categorical testimonies of the complainants.

    Appellant was found guilty of committing illegal recruitment in large scale.

    Further reading:

    • People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 197808 (Notice), January 25, 2016.

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  • Seafarer’s Unjustified Refusal to Continue His Medical Treatment

    On 30 September 2008, the respondents hired the seafarer in this case as fitter aboard the vessel Crown Garnet for a period of nine (9) months. He embarked on 4 October 2008.

    The seafarer claimed that in January 2009, he started experiencing neck and lower back pain. He then stated that he signed off from the vessel on 13 July 2009 (although it was not clear in the case whether the same was by way of medical repatriation or of the expiration of his employment contract).

    Upon arrival in the Philippines on 15 July 2009, he was referred to the company-designated physician and was diagnosed with “cervical radiculopathy, thoracic and lumbar spondylosis, as well as carpal tunnel syndrome of the left, and trigger finger, third digit of his right hand.” He underwent carpal tunnel surgery on his left hand, and physical therapy sessions for his cervical and lumbar condition.

    On 23 November 2009, the seafarer filed a complaint for disability benefits against the respondents.

    The Supreme Court denied the seafarer’s disability benefits in this case.

    At the time the complaint for disability benefits was filed, the seafarer had no cause of action.

    The Court found that when the seafarer filed said complaint, he was still under the care of the company-designated physician. He also had not even consulted a personal doctor before he instituted his complaint.

    The company-designated physician even advised the seafarer to seek the opinion of an orthopedic specialist. The seafarer, however, did not heed the advice and proceeded to file his complaint for disability benefits. It was only a day after its filing that the seafarer requested from the company-designated physician the latter’s assessment on his medical condition.

    Since the company-designated physician was yet to issue an assessment on the seafarer’s medical condition, and since the 240-day maximum period for determining the seafarer’s disability or fitness to work had not yet lapsed, the Court accordingly concluded that the seafarer prematurely filed his complaint.

    The seafarer reneged on his duties under the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract.

    In his report, the company-designated physician stated that while there was a good chance the seafarer will be declared fit to work, this was premised on the completion of his remaining therapy sessions to address the pain in his left hand and back. The seafarer thereafter complained of pain on the neck and additional pain of the lower back which was not originally present at the start of his treatment. Thus, the company-designated physician intended to prolong the seafarer’s treatment. However, the seafarer no longer reported to the clinic of the said physician.

    The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract1Under Section 20 (D) provides that

    “[n]o compensation and benefits shall be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity, disability or death of the seafarer resulting from his willful or criminal act or intentional breach of his duties, provided however, that the employer can prove that such injury, incapacity, disability or death is directly attributable to the seafarer.”

    The Court found that the seafarer was aware that he had the duty to undergo medical treatment, physical therapy sessions, including the recommended consultation to an orthopedic specialist, in order to give the company-designated physician the opportunity to determine his fitness to work or to assess the degree of his disability. His inability to continue his treatment without any valid explanation proved that he neglected his corresponding duty to continue his medical treatment. Consequently, the seafarer’s inability to regularly return for his treatment caused the regress of his condition. According to the Court, had the seafarer been cooperative with his treatment and shown interest in improving his condition, it would have been possible for the company-designated physician to declare him fit to work.

    The Court thus declared that the seafarer failed to comply with the terms of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract. The absence of a timely assessment was not caused by the company-designated physician, but had resulted from seafarer’s refusal to cooperate and undergo further treatment. Such failure to abide with the procedure under the said contract resulted in his non-entitlement to disability benefits.

    Further reading:

    • Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. v. Quillao, G.R. No. 202885, January 20, 2016.

  • A Mere Employee; Not the Owner

    To constitute illegal recruitment in large scale, three elements must concur:

    • The offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully engage in recruitment placement of workers;
    • The offender undertakes any of the activities within the meaning of “recruitment and placement” under the Labor Code of the Philippines, or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995; and
    • The offender committed the same against three or more persons, individually or as a group.

    The Labor Code of the Philippines1Under Article 13 (b) defines “recruitment and placement” as

    “any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not.”

    It also provides that

    “any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee, employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.”

    The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995,2Under Section 6 in turn, provides:

    SEC. 6. Definition. — For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring, contract services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No, 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines: Provided, That any such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall likewise include the following acts, whether committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority:

    x x x

    (m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his documentation and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually take place without the worker’s fault. Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage.

    Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group. (Emphases supplied.)

    The accused in this case contended that the prosecution failed to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt as the first element of illegal recruitment in large scale, i.e., she undertook a recruitment activity as contemplated under the law. She pointed out that:

    • She was incapable of deploying workers to Istanbul, Turkey, for she only worked as a cashier at the agency. She issued vouchers for payments made by its clients and subsequently turned over such payments to the true owner of the agency;
    • She did not entice the private complainants to apply for work overseas. The private complainants themselves testified that they learned about the job opportunities abroad from the travel agency’s employees. The accused posits that these persons were so persuasive that private complainants traveled from their respective provinces to Manila just to meet her;
    • If it were true that she received money from private complainants, she would have already fled after getting private complainants’ money so as to evade arrest; and
    • The prosecution presented a mere photocopy of the handwritten agreement that she supposedly executed. Considering that the contents of such agreement are in issue in this case, the Court wrongfully accorded much weight to such evidence.

    The Supreme Court did not agree.

    First, the accused’s allegations lacked corroborative evidence. The accused failed to present her appointment papers, identification card, payslips or other pieces of evidence to establish her employment. Record shows that the vouchers for the placement fees paid by private complainants were issued and signed by the accused herself, without any indication that she issued and signed the same on behalf of the purported true owner of RBC. The accused was even unable to substantiate the claim that the said owner received the amounts paid by the private complainants.

    Second, there was no showing that agency was licensed as a recruitment agency. On the other hand, record revealed that the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration issued a certification on May 17, 2005 stating that the accused, in her personal capacity, and the agency were not licensed to recruit workers for overseas employment.

    Third, record established that the accused had engaged in recruitment activities. Employees of the agency brought private complainants to the former’s office and introduced them to the accused. It was the accused herself who offered and promised private complainants jobs in Istanbul, Turkey, in consideration of placement fees.

    Finally, the non-presentation of the original copy of the handwritten agreement was not fatal to the prosecution’s case. A private complainant personally testified before the Regional Trial Court as to the circumstances of her recruitment by the accused, who made verbal, and not only written, promises to the said complainant of employment abroad. According to the Court, the handwritten agreement merely substantiated the private complainant’s testimony at best.

    Further reading:

    • People v. Abella y Buhain, G.R. No. 195666, January 20, 2016.

  • Penalty for Illegal Recruitment of Migrant Workers

    In a case of illegal recruitment in large scale, the trial court found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime and sentenced her to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day as minimum to eight (8) years as maximum, and to pay a fine in the amount of P200,000.00 with subsidiary liability in case of insolvency.

    Was the penalty imposed correct?

    No.

    The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 19951SEC. 6. Definition. – x x x (m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his documentation and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually take place without the worker’s fault. Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage; and (n) To allow a non-Filipino citizen to head or manage a licensed recruitment/manning agency. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group. provides that illegal recruitment shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage if committed in large scale, viz., committed against three or more persons individually or as a group.

    Under the same law,2SEC. 7. Penalties. – x x x (b) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Two million pesos (P2,000,000.00) nor more than Five million pesos (P5,000,000.00) shall be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as defined therein. (as amended by Republic Act No. 10022) the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) nor more than Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) shall be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage.

    In the present case, six (6) private complainants testified against appellant’s acts of illegal recruitment, thereby rendering her acts tantamount to economic sabotage.

    For the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) nor more than Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) with subsidiary liability in case of insolvency ought to have been imposed against the appellant.

    Further reading:

    • People v. Solina, G.R. No. 196784, January 13, 2016.

  • Guiding Principle in Conversion of Agricultural Land

    On 15 June 2011, the Supreme Court promulgated a Decision in Ayala Land, Inc. v. Castillo1G.R. No. 178110, June 15, 2011, 667 PHIL 274-350. upholding the Conversion Order issued by the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform on 31 October 1997. The land in this case is in Silang, Cavite.

    The farmers who were parties in this case filed a Motion for Reconsideration to the said decision arguing that conversion is not a legal mode to exempt the property from the coverage of Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.

    The Court denied the motion because the guiding principle2Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 01, series of 2002, Section 1. in conversion governs only prime agricultural lands.3Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 01, series of 2002, Section 4 provides:
    SECTION 4. Areas Non-Negotiable for Conversion — An application involving areas non-negotiable for conversion shall not be given due course even when some portions thereof are eligible for conversion. The following areas shall not be subject to conversion:
    4.1. Lands within protected areas designated under the NIPAS, including mossy and virgin forests, riverbanks, and swamp forests or marshlands, as determined by the DENR;
    4.2. All irrigated lands, as delineated by the DA and/or the National Irrigation Administration (NIA), where water is available to support rice and other crop production, and all irrigated lands where water is not available for rice and other crop production but are within areas programmed for irrigation facility rehabilitation by the government;
    4.3. All irrigable lands already covered by irrigation projects with firm funding commitments, as delineated by the DA and/or NIA; and
    4.4. All agricultural lands with irrigation facilities.

    In the present case, the subject land could not even be classified as agricultural land.

    First, the subject land was already reclassified from agricultural to other uses as early as 7 May 1996.

    Second, various government agencies found that:

    • The property is about 10 kilometers from the Provincial Road;
    • The land sits on a mountainside overlooking Santa Rosa technopark;
    • The topography of the landholding is hilly and has an average slope of over 18%. It is undeveloped and mostly covered with a wild growth of vines, bushes, and secondary growth of forest trees;
    • The dominant use of the surrounding area is its industrial/forest growth as the landholding is sitting on a mountain slope overlooking the Sta. Rosa Technopark; and
    • The area is not irrigated and no irrigation system was noted in the area.

    Finally, the Department of Agrarian Reform had long investigated and ruled that the property was not suitable for agricultural use, as it had remained undeveloped with no source of irrigation.

    The Court thus concluded that the subject land was not prime agricultural land as contemplated under the law. The Department of Agrarian Reform properly issued the assailed Conversion Order.

    Further reading:

    • Ayala Land, Inc. v. Castillo, G.R. No. 178110 (Resolution), January 12, 2016.

  • Mere Reliance on a Causality Presumption

    A seafarer was hired as an assistant butcher on a certain cruise ship. On 22 August 2005, he entered into a 12-month contract of employment with the respondent incorporating the Standard Terms and Conditions the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels (Standard Employment Contract) as prescribed by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). Having passed the medical exam and having been declared fit for work, he boarded the said ship on 26 August 2005.

    During his employment, he was confined in a hospital sometime in December 2005 after suffering a month of rectal bleeding and lower abdominal pain. Soon he was medically repatriated, and upon arrival in the Philippines on 24 December 2005, he was immediately confined in a hospital, where he was found to be suffering from stage IV colon cancer. After months of confinement and treatment for his illness, he passed away.

    His widow thereafter filed a Complaint with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for death benefits, and the case went up to the Supreme Court.

    The Court denied her claims. The basis for the denial was the absence of showing that the cause of his death was one of those covered by the POEA Standard Employment Contract, and that the said cause was not work-related. It found that the Standard Employment Contract (under Section 32-A) lists down certain types of illnesses as compensable, but colon cancer is not one of them. And although there exists a disputable presumption of compensability (under Section 20 B (4)) for illnesses not listed therein, the Court ruled that it should be read in relation to said Section 32-A.

    In other words, she cannot simply rely on the disputable presumption provision mentioned in Standard Employment Contract, as she still has to substantiate her claim in order to be entitled to disability compensation.

    The widow, in this case, did not present any proof of a causal connection or at least a work relation between the employment of her husband and his colon cancer. Neither did she mention the risks that could have caused or, at the very least, contributed to the disease her husband had contracted.

    Because of these findings, the claim was not granted.

    Take away:

    “Claimants in compensation proceedings must show credible information that there is probably a relation between the illness and the work. Probability, and not mere possibility, is required; otherwise, the resulting conclusion would proceed from deficient proofs.”

    Further reading:

    • Joraina Dragon Talosig v. United Philippine Lines, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 198388, July 28, 2014.