Paulino Ungos III

Lawyer | Law Professor | Author

Category: Social Legislation

  • Effects of Withdrawal of Complaint/Desistance

    During a disciplinary investigation of a recruitment violation, the recruiter posited that it should not be held liable for sickness allowance in view of the seafarer’s Affidavit of Desistance.

    In Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. v. Valencia, Jr.,1G.R. No. 241621, January 7, 2019 the Supreme Court disagreed:

    Petitioner cannot escape liability on the strength of the Affidavit of Desistance executed by respondent. Suffice it to state that such act of desistance on the part of respondent will not bar the [Philippine Overseas Employment Administration] from proceeding with the case against petitioner x x x under relevant rules x x x.2Section 164, Rule V, Part VI of the Revised POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Landbased Overseas Filipino Workers of 2016 states: “SECTION 164. Effects of Withdrawal of Complaint/Desistance. — The withdrawal of complaint/desistance shall not bar the Administration from proceeding with the investigation of the recruitment violation. The Administration shall resolve the case on the merits, if there is evidence warranting the imposition of appropriate penalties.”<br/>

    Section 148, Rule V, Part VII, of the 2016 Revised POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Seafarers states: SECTION 148. Effects of Withdrawal of Complaint/Desistance. — The withdrawal of complaint/desistance shall not bar the Administration from proceeding with the investigation of the recruitment violation. The Administration shall resolve the case on the merits, if there is evidence warranting the imposition of appropriate penalties.

    Related Discussion on Sickness Allowance:

    Section 20 of the Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Overseas Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Ships3POEA Memorandum Circular No. 010, Series of 2010 provides:

    SECTION 20. Compensation and Benefits. —

    A. Compensation and Benefits for Injury or Illness

    The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows: x x x

    3. In addition to the above obligation of the employer to provide medical attention, the seafarer shall also receive sickness allowance from his employer in an amount equivalent to his basic wage computed from the time he signed off until he is declared fit to work or the degree of disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician. The period within which the seafarer shall be entitled to his sickness allowance shall not exceed 120 days. Payment of the sickness allowance shall be made on a regular basis, but not less than once a month.

    The grant of sickness allowance is to afford a remedy to a seafarer during the period of his treatment as his inability to perform his sea duties would normally result in depriving him of compensation income.

    Further Reading:

    • Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. v. Valencia, Jr., G.R. No. 241621, January 7, 2019.

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  • Concealment of Previous “Phlectenille, Right Eye”

    The seafarer was found to have concealed his previous illness: phlectenille, right eye. Nonetheless, this did not bar his disability claim for his present lower back injury.

    In TCM Tsakos Maritime Philippines, Inc.,1G.R. No. 241102, January 7, 2019. the Court ruled:

    [The seafarer’s] concealment of his previous illness and repatriation, as well as his receipt of corresponding disability benefits therefor, cannot bar his present claim because his previous illness, phlectenille, right eye, was not shown to be related in any way to his present illness of lower back injury.2Emphasis supplied.

    This Court had indeed disallowed the payment of disability benefits to seafarers in the past due to concealment or fraudulent misrepresentation. However, a review of these cases reveals that the prior injury or illness concealed by the seafarer was shown to be related to the injury or illness which was the subject of the seafarer’s pending claim.

    Further Reading:

    • TCM Tsakos Maritime Philippines, Inc. v. Calimpong, G.R. No. 241102, January 7, 2019.

  • Company-designated Physician’s Failure to Arrive at a Final Assessment of the Seafarer’s Fitness to Work

    In Teekay Shipping Philippines, Inc. v. Mateo,1G.R. No. 243258, January 7, 2019. the Supreme Court reiterated the effect should the company-designated physician fail to issue a final assessment of the seafarer’s fitness to work within the 120/240-day period from medical repatriation. The Court ruled:

    As correctly ruled by the CA, respondent’s work-related injury is deemed total and permanent by operation of law when the company-designated physician failed to arrive at a final assessment of respondent’s fitness to work within the 120/240-day treatment period following his repatriation on November 25, 2015. Moreover, the company-designated physician’s issuance of an Interim Disability Grade 11 is a mere initial determination of petitioner’s condition for the time being and therefore cannot be considered as a definite prognosis. Hence, the award of US$89,100.00 to respondent pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement of the Philippine Seafarers Union, which covered respondent’s employment contract, must be sustained. In this regard, the CA cannot be faulted in sustaining the award of attorney’s fees as respondent was clearly compelled to litigate to protect his interest.

    Further Reading:

    • Teekay Shipping Philippines, Inc. v. Mateo, G.R. No. 243258, January 7, 2019.

  • Starting the Third Doctor Referral Process

    Section 20 (A) (3) of the Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Overseas Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Ships,1Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Memorandum Circular No. 10, Series of 2010 provides that [i]f a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer. The third doctor’s decision shall be final and binding on both parties.

    Who should initiate the third doctor referral process?

    In Placio v. Bahia Shipping Service, Inc.,2G.R. No. 241926, January 7, 2019 the Supreme Court ruled that the seafarer should initiate such process. The Court said:

    Petitioner “was bound to initiate the process of referring the findings to a third-party physician by informing his employer of the same, which is mandatory considering that the POEA-SEC is part and parcel of the employment contract between seafarers and their employers.”3Magsaysay Mitsui Osk Marine, Inc. v. Buenaventura, G.R. No. 195878, January 10, 2018. Due to petitioner’s failure to abide by the procedure, the Court of Appeals gave more weight to the findings of the company-designated physician and correctly dismissed the complaint.

    Further Reading:

    • Placio v. Bahia Shipping Service, Inc., G.R. No. 241926, January 7, 2019.

  • Sale of Agricultural Land and Waiver of Retention Rights

    Decision in Department of Agrarian Reform v. Carriedo, G.R. No. 176549, January 20, 2016.

    On 26 June 1986, Romeo C. Carriedo bought approximately 70.4788 hectares of agricultural land covered by the following titles and tax declarations:

    • Transfer Certificate of Title No. 35055
    • Tax Declaration No. 48354
    • Transfer Certificate of Title No. 17681
    • Transfer Certificate of Title No. 56897
    • Transfer Certificate of Title No. 17680

    The area sold to Romeo C. Carriedo included a part covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 17680 of which herein petitioner, Pablo Mendoza, was a tenant.

    In June of 1990, Romeo C. Carriedo then sold these lands to the Peoples’ Livelihood Foundation, Inc. Except for that area covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 17680, the lands were subjected to the Voluntary Land Transfer/Direct Payment Scheme and were awarded to agrarian reform beneficiaries in 1997.

    On 5 October 1999, the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 17680 was divided into five (5) sub-lots.

    Three of these lots were then distributed to beneficiaries under Presidential Decree No. 27 and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 44384, 44385, and 44386, issued on 10 September 1999.

    The remaining two (2) lots, consisting of approximately 5 hectares and which was also the land being occupied by Pablo Mendoza, were registered in the name of Romeo C. Carriedo and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 344281 and 344282, respectively.

    On 26 February 2002, Pablo Mendoza, Corazon Mendoza, and Orlando Gomez filed a Petition for Coverage of these two (2) lots under Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. They claimed that they had been in physical and material possession of the said land as tenants since 1956 and had made the land productive. They prayed that

    • an order be issued placing the land under Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program; and
    • the Department of Agrarian Reform, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer, and the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer be ordered to proceed with the acquisition and distribution of the land in their favor.

    The Regional Director granted the petition in an Order dated 2 October 2002.

    The Supreme Court, in Department of Agrarian Reform v. Carriedo, G.R. No. 176549, January 20, 2016, however, reversed the said order and declared that the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 344281 and 344282 was Romeo C. Carriedo’s retained area.

    In said case, the Court ruled:

    The right of retention is a constitutionally-guaranteed right1Article XIII, Section 4, to wit:

    Section 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.    , subject to certain qualifications specified by the legislature2Through the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which provides:

    Section 6. Retention Limits. — Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a viable family-size farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. x x x

    The right to choose the area to be retained, which shall be compact or contiguous, shall pertain to the landowner: Provided, however, That in case the area selected for retention by the landowner is tenanted, the tenant shall have the option to choose whether to remain therein or be a beneficiary in the same or another agricultural land with similar or comparable features. In case the tenant chooses to remain in the retained area, he shall be considered a leaseholder and shall lose his right to be a beneficiary under this Act. In case the tenant chooses to be a beneficiary in another agricultural land, he loses his right as a leaseholder to the land retained by the landowner. The tenant must exercise this option within a period of one (1) year from the time the landowner manifests his choice of the area for retention.

    In all cases, the security of tenure of the farmers or farmworkers on the land prior to the approval of this Act shall be respected. x x x    . It serves to mitigate the effects of compulsory land acquisition by balancing the rights of the landowner and the tenant by implementing the doctrine that social justice was not meant to perpetrate an injustice against the landowner.

    Deparment of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 02, Series of 20033Under Section 6, which provides:

    SECTION 6. Waiver of the Right of Retention. — The landowner waives his right to retain by committing any of the following act or omission:

    6.1. Failure to manifest an intention to exercise his right to retain within sixty (60) calendar days from receipt of notice of CARP coverage.

    6.2. Failure to state such intention upon offer to sell or application under the VLT/DPS scheme.

    6.3. Execution of any document stating that he expressly waives his right to retain. The MARO and/or PARO and/or Regional Director shall attest to the due execution of such document.

    6.4. Execution of a Landowner Tenant Production Agreement and Farmer’s Undertaking (LTPA-FU) or Application to Purchase and Farmer’s Undertaking (APFU) covering subject property.

    6.5. Entering into a VLT/DPS or VOS but failing to manifest an intention to exercise his right to retain upon filing of the application for VLT/DPS or VOS.

    6.6. Execution and submission of any document indicating that he is consenting to the CARP coverage of his entire landholding.

    6.7. Performing any act constituting estoppel by laches which is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable length of time to do that which he may have done earlier by exercising due diligence, warranting a presumption that he abandoned his right or declined to assert it.     clearly shows that the disposition of agricultural land is not an act constituting waiver of the right of retention.

    The Court further found that Romeo C. Carriedo has not committed any of the acts found under Deparment of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 02, Series of 2003.

    1)

    Romeo C. Carriedo was not shown to have expressly waived in writing his right of retention, as required under sub-section 6.3, Section 6 of Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 02, Series of 2003.

    2)

    Romeo C. Carriedo was not said to have abandoned or declined to assert his right of retention, under subsection 6.7, Section 6 of Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 02, Series of 2003.

    According to the Court, prevailing rules4Section 4 of Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 02, Series of 2003 provides:

    Section 4. Period to Exercise Right of Retention under RA 6657. —

    4.1 The landowner may exercise his right of retention at any time before receipt of notice of coverage.

    4.2 Under the Compulsory Acquisition (CA) scheme, the landowner shall exercise his right of retention within sixty (60) days from receipt of notice of coverage.

    4.3 Under the Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) and the Voluntary Land Transfer (VLT)/Direct Payment Scheme (DPS), the landowner shall exercise his right of retention simultaneously at the time of offer for sale or transfer.     give Romeo C. Carriedo any time before receipt of the notice of coverage to exercise his right of retention, or if under compulsory acquisition, within sixty (60) days from receipt of the notice of coverage. Since the validity of the notice of coverage was the very subject of the present case, the Court ruled that the period within which Romeo C. Carriedo should exercise his right of retention had yet to commence.

    The Court added that even assuming that the period within which Romeo C. Carriedo could exercise his right of retention has commenced, he could not have been said to have neglected to assert his right of retention over the land, for he filed an application for retention which was even contested by Pablo Mendoza’s son, Fernando. Although Romeo C. Carriedo was shown to have subsequently withdrawn his application, his act of filing an application for retention had belied the allegation that he abandoned his right of retention or declined to assert it.

    3)

    Not even the sale made by the herein Romeo C. Carriedo of more than fifty (50) hectares in favor of the Peoples’ Livelihood Foundation, Inc. could have been considered as a waiver of his right of retention.

    In this case, it was asserted that Romeo C. Carriedo has waived his right of retention by way of estoppel under another rule, i.e., Item No. 4, Statement of Policies, Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 05, Series of 2006 which states:

    II. Statement of Policies

    x x x

    4. Where the transfer/sale involves more than the five (5) hectares retention area, the transfer is considered violative of Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6657.

    In case of multiple or series of transfers/sales, the first five (5) hectares sold/conveyed without DAR clearance and the corresponding titles issued by the Register of Deeds (ROD) in the name of the transferee shall, under the principle of estoppel, be considered valid and shall be treated as the transferor/s’ retained area but in no case shall the transferee exceed the five-hectare landholding ceiling pursuant to Sections 6, 70 and 73(a) of R.A. No. 6657. Insofar as the excess area is concerned, the same shall likewise be covered considering that the transferor has no right of disposition since CARP coverage has been vested as of 15 June 1988. Any landholding still registered in the name of the landowner after earlier dispositions totaling an aggregate of five (5) hectares can no longer be part of his retention area and therefore shall be covered under CARP. x x x (emphasis supplied)

    It was argued that Romeo C. Carriedo should have lost his right of retention over the land because he had already sold or disposed, after the effectivity of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, more than fifty (50) hectares of land in favor of Peoples’ Livelihood Foundation, Inc.

    The Court, however, found such assertions untenable. According to the Court, nowhere in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 was it indicated that a multiple or series of transfers/sales of land would result in the loss of retention rights. Neither did it provide that the multiple or series of transfers or sales would amount to the waiver of such right.

    The Court mentioned the following relevant portions of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, as referred to in Item No. 4, Statement of Policies, Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 05, Series of 2006:

    Section 6. Retention Limits. — Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a viable family-size farm, such as the commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. x x x

    x x x

    Upon the effectivity of this Act, any sale, disposition, lease, management, contract or transfer of possession of private lands executed by the original landowner in violation of the Act shall be null and void: Provided, however, That those executed prior to this Act shall be valid only when registered with the Register of Deeds within a period of three (3) months after the effectivity of this Act. Thereafter, all Registers of Deeds shall inform the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) within thirty (30) days of any transaction involving agricultural lands in excess of five (5) hectares.

    Section 70. Disposition of Private Agricultural Lands. — The sale or disposition of agricultural lands retained by a landowner as a consequence of Section 6 hereof shall be valid as long as the total landholdings that shall be owned by the transferee thereof inclusive of the land to be acquired shall not exceed the landholding ceilings provided for in this Act.

    Any sale or disposition of agricultural lands after the effectivity of this Act found to be contrary to the provisions hereof shall be null and void. x x x

    Section 73. Prohibited Acts and Omissions. — The following are prohibited:
    (a) The ownership or possession, for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Act, of agricultural lands in excess of the total retention limits or award ceilings by any person, natural or juridical, except those under collective ownership by farmer-beneficiaries; x x x

    The Court ruled that Sections 6 and 70 are clear in stating that any sale and disposition of agricultural lands in violation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall be null and void. The reasonable reading of these three provisions in relation to the constitutional right of retention reveals that the consequence of nullity pertains to the area/s which were sold, or owned by the transferee, in excess of the five (5)-hectare land ceiling. Thus, the Court ruled that the lands covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 344281 and 344282 fell within Romeo C. Carriedo’s retained area.

    The Court stressed that item No. 4, Statement of Policies, Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 05, Series of 2006 has attempted to defeat the above reading by providing that, under the principle of estoppel, the sale of the first five (5) hectares is valid. But, said rule has also hastened to add that the first five (5) hectares sold corresponded to the transferor/s’ retained area. Thus, since the sale of the first five (5) hectares was valid, therefore, the landowner had lost the five (5) hectares because it happened to be, at the same time, the retained area limit. In reality, Item No. 4, Statement of Policies, Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 05, Series of 2006 had operated as a forfeiture provision in the guise of estoppel. It punished the landowner who had sold agricultural land in excess of five (5) hectares. For the Court, forfeitures, however, partake of a criminal penalty.

    The Court stated that in order for an administrative regulation to have the force of a penal law, (1) the violation of the administrative regulation must be made a crime by the delegating statute itself; and (2) the penalty for such violation must be provided by the statute itself.

    The Court also found that Sections 6, 70 and 73 (a) of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 did not provide that a sale or disposition of land in excess of five (5) hectares results in a forfeiture of the five (5) hectare retention area. According to the Court, Item No. 4, Statement of Policies, Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 05, Series of 2006 imposed a penalty where none was provided by law.

    The Court further stated that the repugnancy between the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 and Item No. 4, Statement of Policies, Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 05, Series of 2006 was apparent by a simple comparison of their texts. The conflict undermined the statutorily-guaranteed right of the landowner to choose the land he shall retain, and Item No. 4, Statement of Policies, Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 05, Series of 2006, in effect, amended the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which should not have happened.

    Consistent with the principle that a statute prevails over an administrative order, the Court declared the invalidity of Item No. 4, Statement of Policies, Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 05, Series of 2006 for being ultra vires. Thus, Romeo C. Carriedo neither waived his right to retain the land, nor was placed under estoppel for his sale the land to the Peoples’ Livelihood Foundation, Inc.

    Resolution of Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration in Department of Agrarian Reform v. Carriedo, G.R. No. 176549, October 10, 2018.

    The Court gave due course to the motion filed by the Department of Agrarian Reform that sought the reconsideration of the Decision dated 20 January 2016.

    The Court noted that the Department of Agrarian Reform is legally mandated to implement the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. The said department possesses the special knowledge and acquired expertise on the implementation of the agrarian reform program. According to the Court, to pay no heed to the issues the said department has raised would ignore the basic precepts of due process. The Court accordingly revisited its Decision by taking into account the arguments and position of the department.

    The Court reversed and set aside its Decision dated 20 January 2016, taking into consideration Item No. 4, Statement of Policies, Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 05, Series of 2006, which provides:

    II. STATEMENT OF POLICIES

    x x x

    4. Where the transfer/sale involves more than the five (5) hectare retention area, the transfer is considered violative of Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6657.

    In case of multiple or series of transfers/sales, the first five (5) hectares sold/conveyed without DAR clearance and the corresponding titles issued by the Register of Deeds (ROD) in the name of the transferee shall, under the principle of estoppel, be considered valid and shall be treated as the transferor/s’ retained area but in no case shall the transferee exceed the five-hectare landholding ceiling pursuant to Sections 6, 70 and 73 (a) of R.A. No. 6657. Insofar as the excess area is concerned, the same shall likewise be covered considering that the transferor has no right of disposition since CARP coverage has been vested as of 15 June 1988. Any landholding still registered in the name of the landowner after earlier dispositions totaling an aggregate of five (5) hectares can no longer be part of his retention area and therefore shall be covered under CARP.

    In the present case, the Court acknowledged that the sale of the first (5) hectares of agricultural land to the Peoples’ Livelihood Foundation, Inc. made by Romeo C. Carriedo could be viewed as valid.

    However, said sale should also be treated as the exercise of Romeo C. Carriedo’s retention rights, such that he would no longer be able to lawfully claim the subject landholding as his retained area.

    Accordingly, the remaining landholding also can no longer be part of his retention area and therefore shall be covered under Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. As narrated above, the remaining land that pertained to Transfer Certificate of Title No. 17680 was divided into sub-lots, of which two (2) of the lots (the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 344281 and 344282) were thereafter registered in the name of Romeo C. Carriedo.

    1)

    Both the Constitution5ARTICLE XIII

    x x x

    Agrarian and Natural Resources Reform

    Sec. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing. (Emphasis supplied.)     and Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 19886Sec. 2. Declaration of Principles and Policies. — It is the policy of the State to pursue a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). The welfare of the landless farmers and farmworkers will receive the highest consideration to promote social justice and to move the nation toward sound rural development and industrialization, and the establishment of owner cultivatorship of economic-size farms as the basis of Philippine agriculture.

    To this end, a more equitable distribution and ownership of land, with due regard to the rights of landowners to just compensation and to the ecological needs of the nation, shall be undertaken to provide farmers and farmworkers with the opportunity to enhance their dignity and improve the quality of their lives through greater productivity of agricultural lands. (Emphasis supplied.)     underscore the underlying principle of the agrarian reform program, that is, to endeavor a more equitable and just distribution of agricultural lands taking into account, among others, equity considerations. The objective of Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 05, Series of 2006 is equitable — that in order to ensure the effective implementation of the law, previous sales of landholding (without Department of Agarian Reform clearance) should be treated as the exercise of retention rights of the landowner, as embodied in Item No. 4 of the said administrative order.

    2)

    The equity in this policy of Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 05, Series of 2006 is apparent and easily discernible. With the sale of the lands, it was reasonably presumed that the landowner already received an amount (as purchase price) commensurate to the just compensation conformable with the constitutional and statutory requirement. At this point, equity dictates that he ought not to claim anymore, either in the guise of his retention area or otherwise, that which he already received in the previous sale of his land.

    3)

    Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 05, Series of 2006 is in consonance with the Stewardship Doctrine, under which private property is supposed to be held by the individual only as a trustee for the people in general, who are its real owners. As a mere steward, the individual must exercise his rights to the property not for his own exclusive and selfish benefit but for the good of the entire community or nation. Property use must not only be for the benefit of the owner but of society as well. The State, in the promotion of social justice, may regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment, and disposition of private property, and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits.

    4)

    The objective of land distribution to the landless farmers and farmworkers is carried out by Item No. 4, Statement of Policies, Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 05, Series of 2006, as it provides for the consequences in situations where a landowner had sold portions of his/her land with an area more than the statutory limitation of five (5) hectares. In this scenario, such administrative order treats the sale of the first five hectares as the exercise of the landowner’s retention rights because, effectively, the landowner has already chosen, and in fact has already disposed of, and has been duly compensated for, the area he is entitled to retain under the law.

    5)

    Item No. 4, Statement of Policies, Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 05, Series of 2006 is consistent with Section 707Sec. 70. Disposition of Private Agricultural Lands. — The sale or disposition of agricultural lands retained by a landowner as a consequence of Section 6 hereof shall be valid as long as the total landholdings that shall be owned by the transferee thereof inclusive of the land to be acquired shall not exceed the landholding ceiling provided for in this Act. x x x of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, as the former likewise treats the sale of the first five hectares (in case of multiple/series of transactions) as valid, such that the same already constitutes the retained area of the landowner. This legal consequence arising from the previous sale of land therefore eliminates the prejudice, in terms of equitable land distribution, that may befall the landless farmers and farmworkers.

    6)

    Finally, the sale of Romeo C. Carriedo’s landholdings was made in violation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 19888Sec. 6. Retention Limits. — x x x

    x x x

    Upon the effectivity of this Act, any sale, disposition, lease, management, contract or transfer of possession of private lands executed by the original landowner in violation of the Act shall be null and void: Provided, however, That those executed prior to this Act shall be valid only when registered with the Register of Deeds within a period of three (3) months after the effectivity of this Act. Thereafter, all Registers of Deeds shall inform the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) within thirty (30) days of any transaction involving agricultural lands in excess of five (5) hectares.    , having been made without the clearance of the Department of Agrarian Reform. To rule that Romeo C. Carriedo was still entitled to retain the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 344281 and 344282 will, in effect, reward the violation, which the Court maintains will not allow. The Court stressed that the right of retention serves to mitigate the effects of compulsory land acquisition by balancing the rights of the landowner and the tenant, and by implementing the doctrine that social justice is not meant to perpetrate an injustice against the landowner.

    In this case, however, the Court noted that Romeo C. Carriedo has claimed his right over the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 344281 and 344282, not because he was “deprived” of a portion of his land as a consequence of compulsory land coverage, but precisely because he already previously sold his landholdings, so that the remaining portion would still be his.

    The Court accordingly stated that although the exercise by a landowner of his retention right is constitutionally guaranteed, the same should not be done without due regard to other considerations which may affect the implementation of the agrarian reform program. This is especially true when such exercise pays no heed to the intent of the law, or worse, when such exercise amounts to its circumvention.

    The Court upheld the validity of Item No. 4, Statement of Policies, Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 05, Series of 2006. As a corollary, Romeo C. Carriedo no longer possessed retention rights to the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 344281 and 344282.

    Further reading:

    • Department of Agrarian Reform v. Carriedo, G.R. No. 176549, January 20, 2016.
    • Department of Agrarian Reform v. Carriedo, G.R. No. 176549 (Resolution), October 10, 2018.

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  • No Danger to the Safety of the Crew or Vessel

    Rogelio was engaged by his employer, Free Bulkers, through its agent Evic, as Chief Mate on board the M/V Free Lady for a period of six (6) months with a basic monthly salary of US$1,088.00.

    On August 28, 2010, Rogelio boarded the vessel. However, on September 24, 2010, Rogelio was repatriated to the Philippines without completing the contracted employment period.

    On September 28, 2010, Rogelio filed an illegal dismissal complaint against his employer. According to Rogelio, the ship captain developed a hostile attitude towards him. Specifically, Rogelio narrated that on September 7, 2010, he took a sip from the small flask of whisky given to him by one of the stevedores he dealt with and went to bed; but the ship captain had him awakened and ordered him to make a report on some damages in the railings of the ship caused by the stevedores. When he submitted the report to the ship captain, the latter allegedly smelled a faint odor of whisky and asked him if he had been drinking, to which Rogelio truthfully replied that he drank a little whisky and was willing to take an alcohol test. The ship captain shrugged off his offer to take an alcohol test, but still made a logbook entry dated September 7, 2010, recommending Rogelio’s immediate replacement.

    The employer contended that Rogelio was dismissed for just cause. On the basis of a Crew Behavior Report dated September 8, 2010 prepared by the ship captain, Rogelio was claimed to have violated company policies, instructions, and stipulations of the employment contract:
    1) by being grossly negligent since he failed to observe the safety precautions during the mooring and unmooring operations;
    2) by displaying arrogance towards his co-employees on board; and
    3) by having been found intoxicated.

    According to the employer, it feared for the safety of the vessel and determined that the crew may be at risk with Rogelio’s continued presence. Thus, it was constrained to ask that Rogelio be relieved, invoking Section 33 of the POEA Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC).

    Was Rogelio validly dismissed from employment?

    The Court ruled in the negative. It declared that Rogelio was illegally dismissed from employment.

    The Court reiterated established principles in that in labor cases, the employer has the burden of proving that the dismissal of an employee was for a just or authorized cause, and failure to show this would necessarily mean that the dismissal was unjustified and, therefore, illegal. Furthermore, not only must the dismissal be for a cause provided by law, it should also comply with the rudimentary requirements of due process, that is, the opportunity to be heard and to defend one’s self. Hence, for dismissal to be valid, the employer must show through substantial evidence that (1) the dismissal was for a just or authorized cause; and (2) the dismissed employee was afforded due process of law.

    In the present case, the Court found that the employer failed to establish the existence of a just cause in the dismissal of Rogelio from employment.

    It noted that the Crew Behavior Report, from which Rogelio’s dismissal from employment was based, alleged Rogelio’s inefficiency, incompetence and gross negligence in the performance of his duties.

    However, the Court considered the said report sorely inadequate in meeting the required quantum of proof to discharge the employer’s burden.

    The Court discussed that incompetence or inefficiency, as a ground for dismissal, means the failure to attain work goals or work quotas, either by failing to complete the same within the allotted reasonable period, or by producing unsatisfactory results. Neglect of duty, on the other hand, must be both gross and habitual. Gross negligence implies a lack of or failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or the total absence of care in the performance of duties, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference insofar as other persons may be affected. Habitual neglect involves repeated failure to perform duties for a certain period of time, depending upon the circumstances, and not mere failure to perform duties in a single or isolated instance.

    Here, the Court found that the statements contained in the Crew Behavior Report were uncorroborated and self-serving because no other evidence was presented to support the statements of the ship captain. The Court added that while the report was signed by four (4) crew members, the statements contained therein were based on acts witnessed only by the ship captain.

    Specifically, the Court noted the claim of the ship captain that a crew was injured when Rogelio failed to observe safety precautions in the mooring and unmooring operations and that an agent informed him that Rogelio was hard to deal with because of intoxication. However, the Court found no affidavits of either the injured seaman or the concerned agent to corroborate the ship captain’s statements. For the Court, no basis constrained it to conclude that there was truth to the ship captain’s accusations.

    The Court found that the employer failed to show that Rogelio willfully or deliberately caused the alleged accident during the mooring operations or that Rogelio repeatedly committed mistakes or repeatedly failed to perform his duties. The Court stated that the single unverified incident on Rogelio’s supposed negligence was insufficient to warrant a finding of just cause for termination.

    With regard to the charge of intoxication, the Court applied Section 33 (6) of the POEA-SEC which provides that drunkenness must be committed while on duty to merit dismissal from employment.

    In the present case, the Court found that Rogelio was admittedly off duty when he was allegedly caught by the master drinking on board. The Court ruled that the penalty of dismissal from employment was unwarranted.

    The Court continued that the lack of just or valid cause of Rogelio’s dismissal was further exacerbated by the employer’s failure to afford Rogelio procedural due process. The Court stressed the two-notice rule in Section 17 of the POEA-SEC in that an erring seaman should be given a written notice of the charge against him and afforded an opportunity to explain or defend himself. Should sanctions be imposed, then a written notice of penalty and the reasons for it shall be furnished the erring seafarer. It is only in the exceptional case of clear and existing danger to the safety of the crew or vessel that the required notices are dispensed with; nonetheless, a complete report should be sent to the manning agency, supported by substantial evidence of the findings.

    In the present case, the Court found no evidence showing that Rogelio was given a written notice of the charges against him, or that he was given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. Neither was there proof that Rogelio was furnished with a written notice of the penalty imposed against him and the reasons for its imposition. Although the Court noted the employer’s claim that the required notices were dispensed with because of a clear and existing danger to the safety of the crew or vessel, no evidence was presented to prove such was the situation when Rogelio’s employment was terminated.

    With the illegality of Rogelio’s dismissal, the employer was held liable to pay Rogelio’s salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract under Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, as amended by Republic Act No. 10022.

    Further reading:

    • Evic Human Resource Management, Inc. v. Panahon, G.R. No. 206890, July 31, 2017.

  • The Goal of Adequate and Sustained Agricultural Production

    San Juan was a tenant to a 6,000-square meter parcel of land owned by Abella, and located at Balatas, Naga City, Camarines Sur (Balatas property). The portion was covered by Certificate of Land Transfer No. 843 (159301) issued on 18 October 1973.

    On 28 January 1981, San Juan and Abella entered into an agreement whereby the Balatas property will be exchanged with a 6,000-square meter agricultural lot situated at San Rafael, Cararayan, Naga City (Cararayan property). The parties agreed that in addition to the Cararayan property, San Juan shall receive from Abella a certain amount as disturbance compensation and a 120-square meter home lot situated at Balatas, Naga City.

    The Department of Agrarian Reform approved the said agreement.

    The controversy started when San Juan filed a complaint against Abella praying that she be declared the absolute and lawful owner of the Balatas property.

    San Juan’s Claims

    • The agreement is void as it contravened the prohibition on transfer under Presidential Decree No. 27.
    • Applying said law, the title to the Balatas property could not have been acquired by Abella, since its transfer ought to have been limited only to the government or the grantee’s heirs by way of succession.
    • The Department of Agrarian Reform’s approval of the agreement was of no moment.

    Abella’s Arguments

    • The agreement, being a mere relocation agreement, did not violate nor contravene the true spirit of Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian reform laws, rules and regulations.
    • The Department of Agrarian Reform, the agency tasked to implement Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws, rules and regulations relative to the disputed land, approved the agreement. Abella posits that this fact must be accorded great weight by the courts.
    • San Juan did not surrender the Balatas property to Abella as contemplated under Presidential Decree No. 27. Instead, San Juan received in return the Cararayan property.

    The Supreme Court did not agree with Abella.

    The Agreement was void for contravening Presidential Decree No. 27.

    Presidential Decree No. 27 provides for only two exceptions to the prohibition on transfer, namely,

    • transfer by hereditary succession; and
    • transfer to the Government.

    Sales or transfers of lands made in violation of Presidential Decree No. 271and Executive Order No. 228, July 17, 1987, “Declaring Full Land Ownership to Qualified Farmer Beneficiaries Covered by Presidential Decree No. 27” in favor of persons other than the Government by other legal means or to the farmer’s successor by hereditary succession are null and void.

    The prohibition even extends to the surrender of the land to the former landowner. The sales or transfers are void ab initio, being contrary to law and public policy under Article 5 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which states that “acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibiting laws shall be void.”

    The prohibition against transfers to persons other than the heirs of other qualified beneficiaries stems from the policy of the Government to develop generations of farmers to attain its avowed goal to have an adequate and sustained agricultural production. With certitude, such objective will not see the light of day if lands covered by agrarian reform can easily be converted for non-agricultural purposes.

    In the present case, the Court found that the agreement Abella and San Juan stipulated that the Cararayan property will be placed under Operation Land Transfer and that a new Certificate of Land Transfer shall be issued in the name of San Juan. The parties also agreed that after the execution of the Agreement, San Juan shall vacate the Balatas property and deliver its possession to Abella.

    Furthermore the Court took notice of a certain Deed of Donation of Land Covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 dated 1 July 1981 which provided that “for and in consideration of the [landowner-donor’s] generosity and in exchange of the [tenant-tiller donee’s] [farm lot] at Balatas, City of Naga, the [landowner-donor] do hereby transfer and convey to the [tenant-tiller-donee], by way of [donation] the parcel of land above-described.”

    The intended exchange of properties by the parties as expressed in the agreement and deed entailed transfer of all the rights and interests of San Juan over the Balatas property to Abella.

    According to the Court, it is the kind of transfer contemplated by and prohibited by law.

    Thus, the argument of Abella that the agreement was merely a relocation agreement, or one for the exchange or swapping of properties between him and San Juan, and not a transfer or conveyance under Presidential Decree No. 27, has no merit. The Court said that a relocation, exchange or swap of a property is a transfer of property. They cannot excuse themselves from the prohibition by a mere play on words.

    The Court added that the fact that there was an approval from the Department of Agrarian Reform did not validate the agreement. A transfer of lands under Presidential Decree No. 27 other than to successors by hereditary succession and the Government is void. A void or inexistent contract is one which has no force and effect from the beginning, as if it has never been entered into, and which cannot be validated either by time or ratification. No form of validation can make the void agreement legal.

    Further reading:

    • Abella v. Heirs of San Juan, G.R. No. 182629, February 24, 2016.

  • Secular View of Morality

    At the time of her indefinite suspension from employment in 2006, the employee was the Human Resource Officer of Brent Hospital and Colleges, Inc. (Brent), an educational and medical institution of the Episcopal Church of the Philippines.

    The cause of suspension was the employee’s Unprofessionalism and Unethical Behavior Resulting to Unwed Pregnancy.

    It appears that the employee became pregnant out of wedlock, and Brent imposed the suspension until such time that she marries her boyfriend in accordance with law.

    The employee then filed a complaint for unfair labor practice, constructive dismissal, non-payment of wages and damages with a prayer for reinstatement.

    The labor tribunals upheld the employee’s dismissal as one attended with just cause.

    The just cause consisted in her engaging in premarital sexual relations with her boyfriend, resulting in her becoming pregnant out of wedlock. The labor tribunals deemed said act to be immoral, which was punishable by dismissal under Brent’s rules and which likewise constituted serious misconduct under Article 297 (a) of the Labor Code of the Philippines.1ARTICLE 297. [Formerly Article 282] Termination by Employer. — An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:

    (a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work; x x x     For the labor tribunals, since the employee was Brent’s Human Resource Officer in charge of implementing its rules against immoral conduct, she should have been the epitome of proper conduct.

    The Supreme Court declared that the dismissal of the employee here was illegal.

    Immorality as a Just Cause for Termination of Employment

    The Supreme Court ruled that the employee’s premarital relations with her boyfriend and the resulting pregnancy out of wedlock did not constitute immorality, and thus could not be a just cause for termination of her employment.

    The Court noted that immorality was punishable under Brent’s policies by dismissal for the first offense.

    However, the Court also clarified that the determination of whether a conduct is disgraceful or immoral involves a two-step process:

    First, a consideration of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the conduct; and

    Second, an assessment of the said circumstances vis-à-vis the prevailing norms of conduct, i.e., what the society generally considers moral and respectable.

    1)

    In this case, the Court found that the surrounding facts leading to the employee’s dismissal were as follows:

    • she was employed as a human resources officer in an educational and medical institution of the Episcopal Church of the Philippines;
    • she and her boyfriend at that time were both single; and
    • they engaged in premarital sexual relations, which resulted into pregnancy.

    2)

    The labor tribunals characterized these as constituting disgraceful or immoral conduct and sweepingly concluded that as Human Resource Officer, the employee should have been the epitome of proper conduct and her indiscretion “surely scandalized the Brent community.”

    According to the Court, the foregoing circumstances, however, did not readily equate to disgraceful and immoral conduct:

    2a)

    Brent’s Policy Manual and Employee’s Manual of Policies did not define what constitutes immorality; it simply stated immorality as a ground for disciplinary action.

    Instead, Brent erroneously relied on the standard dictionary definition of fornication as a form of illicit relation and proceeded to conclude that the employee’s acts fell under such classification, thus constituting immorality.

    2b)

    Jurisprudence has already set the standard of morality with which an act should be gauged — it is public and secular, not religious.

    Whether a conduct is considered disgraceful or immoral should be made in accordance with the prevailing norms of conduct, which, refer to proscribed conduct because they are detrimental to conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society.

    The fact that a particular act does not conform to the traditional moral views of a certain sectarian institution is not sufficient reason to qualify such act as immoral unless it, likewise, does not conform to public and secular standards.

    2c)

    More importantly, there must be substantial evidence to establish that premarital sexual relations and pregnancy out of wedlock is considered disgraceful or immoral.

    The employee and her boyfriend were both single and had no legal impediment to marry at the time she committed the alleged immoral conduct. In fact, they eventually married on April 15, 2008.

    The labor tribunals’ respective conclusion that the employee’s indiscretion scandalized the Brent community was speculative, at most, and there was no proof adduced by Brent to support such sweeping conclusion.

    Even Brent admitted that it came to know of the employee’s “situation” only when her pregnancy became manifest.

    2d)

    Brent also conceded that at the time the employee and her boyfriend were just carrying on their relationship, there was no knowledge or evidence by Brent that they were engaged also in premarital sex. This only showed that the employee did not flaunt her premarital relations with her boyfriend and it was not carried on under scandalous or disgraceful circumstances.

    2e)

    Brent, likewise, could not resort to the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools2At that time the 1992 Revised Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, DECS Order No. 092-92, August 10, 1992 because premarital sexual relations between two consenting adults who have no impediment to marry each other, and, consequently, conceiving a child out of wedlock, gauged from a purely public and secular view of morality, did not amount to a disgraceful or immoral conduct under the said manual.

    The Court ruled that the totality of the circumstances of this case did not justify the conclusion that the employee committed acts of immorality.

    According to the Court there is no law which penalizes an unmarried mother by reason of her sexual conduct or proscribes the consensual sexual activity between two unmarried persons; that neither does such situation contravene any fundamental state policy enshrined in the Constitution.

    The fact that Brent is a sectarian institution does not automatically subject the employee to its religious standard of morality absent an express statement in its manual of personnel policy and regulations, prescribing such religious standard as gauge as these regulations create the obligation on both the employee and the employer to abide by the same.

    Marriage as a Condition for Reinstatement

    The Court noted that Brent imposed on the employee the condition that she subsequently contract marriage with her then boyfriend for her to be reinstated.

    According to Brent, this was “in consonance with the policy against encouraging illicit or common-law relations that would subvert the sacrament of marriage.”

    The Court did not agree.

    The doctrine of management prerogative gives an employer the right to “regulate, according to his own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring, work assignments, working methods, the time, place and manner of work, work supervision, transfer of employees, lay-off of workers, and discipline, dismissal, and recall of employees.”

    Statutory law is, however, replete with legislation protecting labor and promoting equal opportunity in employment.

    No less than the 1987 Constitution3Article XIII, Section 3 mandates that the “State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.”

    The Labor Code of the Philippines, meanwhile, provides:

    Art. 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman employee shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of her marriage.

    With particular regard to women, the Magna Carta of Women4Under Section 19 (b) Republic Act No. 9710, Approved on August 14, 2009 which provides: SECTION 19. Equal Rights in All Matters Relating to Marriage and Family Relations. — The State shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations and shall ensure: x x x

    (b) the same rights to choose freely a spouse and to enter into marriage only with their free and full consent. The betrothal and the marriage of a child shall have no legal effect; x x x     protects women against discrimination in all matters relating to marriage and family relations, including the right to choose freely a spouse and to enter into marriage only with their free and full consent.

    Weighed against these safeguards, the Court found that Brent’s condition was coercive, oppressive and discriminatory.

    Said the Court:

    There is no rhyme or reason for it. It forces the employee to marry for economic reasons and deprives her of the freedom to choose her status, which is a privilege that inheres in her as an intangible and inalienable right.

    The Court acknowledged that while a marriage or no-marriage qualification may be justified as a “bona fide occupational qualification,” Brent must have proven two factors necessitating its imposition, viz.:

    • that the employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation of the job involved; and
    • that there is a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the qualification would be unable to properly perform the duties of the job.

    The Court, however, found that Brent had not shown the presence of of these factors. Thus, it did not uphold the validity of said condition.

    Further reading:

    • Capin-Cadiz v. Brent Hospital and Colleges, Inc., G.R. No. 187417, February 24, 2016.

  • My Reliance on the Disputable Presumption of Work-relatedness is Sufficient

    Fred Olsen Cruise Lines, Ltd., through its local agent Bahia Shipping Services, Inc., hired the seafarer in 2008 to work as a casino attendant. After working with said employer on two occasions in 2008 to 2009, the seafarer re-boarded the M/S Braemer on 1 August 2009 to work as a senior casino attendant.

    In February 2010, the seafarer experienced profuse and consistent bleeding, extreme dizziness, and difficulty in breathing. She went to the ship’s clinic and was given medication. The next day, she experienced severe headache. She again went to the ship’s clinic and was prescribed a different medication. She claims that since her headache worsened after taking the said medication, she stopped taking the same.

    The bleeding of the seafarer intensified. She was later advised by the ship’s physician to rest. However, her condition did not improve, so she was taken to a clinic in Barbados. A transvaginal ultrasound conducted on the seafarer revealed that she had two ovarian cysts. She returned to the ship and was assigned to perform light duties.

    On 20 March 2010, the seafarer was medically repatriated to the Philippines.

    On 22 March 2010, the seafarer was placed under the care of the company-designated physician (an obstetrician-gynecologist). Said physician found that the seafarer had “Abnormal Uterine Bleeding Secondary to an Adenomyosis with Adenomyoma.” The seafarer underwent endometrial dilatation and curettage as part of her treatment.

    The company-designated physician was unable to declare the fitness of the seafarer for work by the end of the 120-day period from medical repatriation on 10 March 2010. However, the said physician was able to declare that the seafarer’s fitness to resume sea duties within the 240-day period from said repatriation.

    On 8 September 2010, the seafarer filed a complaint to claim permanent disability benefits based on the collective bargaining agreement she signed.

    Although the Office of the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission ruled in favor of the seafarer, the Court of Appeals reversed the award. The Court of Appeals found that the seafarer failed to provide substantial evidence to prove her allegation that her illness was work-related. Said court gave greater weight to the findings of the company-designated physician, holding that the latter had acquired detailed knowledge and was familiar with the seafarer’s medical condition.

    The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals.

    It stated that the seafarer should fulfill the following requisites for a grant of her claim for disability benefits, to wit:

    (1) She suffered an illness;

    (2) She suffered this illness during the term of her employment contract;

    (3) She complied with the procedures prescribed under Section 20 (B) of the 2000 Philippine Overseas Employment Agency Standard Employment Contract;1Section 20 (B) of the 2000 Philippine Overseas Employment Agency Standard Employment Contract provides:

    B. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS

    x x x

    For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.

    If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer. The third doctor’s decision shall be final and binding on both parties.

    Note: The present version of the above provision can be seen in the 2010 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract (Memorandum Circular No. 010-10, October 26, 2010), as follows:

    SECTION 20. Compensation and Benefits. —

    A. Compensation and Benefits for Injury or Illness

    x x x

    3. x x x

    For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. In the course of the treatment, the seafarer shall also report regularly to the company-designated physician specifically on the dates as prescribed by the company-designated physician and agreed to by the seafarer. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.

    If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer. The third doctor’s decision shall be final and binding on both parties.

    (4) Her illness is one of the occupational diseases within the Standard Employment Contract,2Please refer to Section 32-A of the 2000 (as well as the 2010) Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract or her illness or injury is otherwise work-related;3The 2000 Philippine Overseas Employment Agency Standard Employment Contract defines work-related illness as:

    Definition of Terms:

    x x x

    12. Work-Related Illness — any sickness resulting to disability or death as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of this contract with the conditions set therein satisfied.

    Section 20 (B) of the Standard Employment Contract provides:

    B. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS

    x x x

    4. Those illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this Contract are disputably presumed as work-related.

    Note: The present version of the above provision can be seen in the 2010 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract (Memorandum Circular No. 010-10, October 26, 2010), as follows:

    Definition of Terms:

    x x x

    16. Work-Related Illness — any sickness as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of this Contract with the conditions set therein satisfied.

    x x x

    SECTION 20. Compensation and Benefits. —

    A. Compensation and Benefits for Injury or Illness

    x x x

    4. Those illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this Contract are disputably presumed as work-related.     and

    (5) She complied with the four conditions enumerated under Section 32-A4Section 32-A of the 2000 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract provides:

    SECTION 32-A. OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES. — For an occupational disease and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, all of the following conditions must be satisfied:

    1. The seafarer’s work must involve the risks described herein;

    2. The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer’s exposure to the described risks;

    3. The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it;

    4. There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer.

    Note: The cited provision below also appears in the 2010 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract.     of the Standard Employment Contract for an occupational disease, or a disputably-presumed work-related disease, to be compensable.

    In the present case, the first four requisites appear to have been met.

    In February 2010, the seafarer experienced bleeding during her employment on board the M/S Braemer. The seafarer was medically repatriated to the Philippines and was able to visit the company-designated physician. Said physician thereafter diagnosed the seafarer as suffering from adenomyoma.

    Although adenomyoma is not included in the list of occupational diseases under the 2000 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract, the said contract, nevertheless, provides that those illnesses not listed therein are disputably presumed as work-related.

    However, it appears that the seafarer was unable to fulfill the fifth requisite.

    The Court clarified that while the law recognizes that an illness may be disputably presumed to be work-related, the seafarer must still show a reasonable connection between the nature of work onboard the vessel and the contracted or aggravated illness. The seafarer cannot argue that he does not have the burden to prove that his illness was work-related because it is disputably presumed by law. The seafarer cannot simply rely on the disputable presumption provision mentioned in Section 20 (B) (4) of the 2000 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract.

    In other words, to be entitled to compensation and benefits under this provision, it is not sufficient to establish that the seafarer’s illness or injury has rendered him permanently or partially disabled. It must also be shown that there is a causal connection between the seafarer’s illness or injury and the work for which he had been contracted. According to the Court, concomitant with this presumption is the burden placed upon the seafarer to present substantial evidence that his work conditions caused the disease, or at least increased the risk of contracting the same. Only a reasonable proof of work-connection, not direct causal relation, is required to establish compensability of illnesses not included in the list of occupational diseases.

    In the present case, the Court found no substantial evidence establishing the relation between the seafarer’s work and the illness she contracted.

    The Court also noted that there was no showing that the seafarer’s adenomyoma was pre-existing, thus it was not able to determine whether the adenomyoma was aggravated by the nature of her employment.

    The Court acknowledged the seafarer’s arguments that her illness is the result of her “constantly walking upward and downward on board the vessel carrying loads” and that she “acquired her illness on board the employer’s vessel during the term of her employment as a casino attendant.” However, the Court found that the seafarer did not discuss the duties of a casino attendant. She failed to show the causation between walking, carrying heavy loads, and adenomyoma. She merely asserted that since her illness developed while she was on board the vessel, it was work-related.

    The Court accordingly ruled that it had no means to determine whether the illness of the seafarer was work-related or work-aggravated, since the latter did not describe the nature of her employment as a casino attendant.

    In view of the seafarer’s failure to fulfill the requisites of compensability, the Court ruled against the grant of the seafarer’s claim for disability benefits.

    Further reading:

    • Nonay v. Bahia Shipping Services, Inc., G.R. No. 206758, February 17, 2016.

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  • But One of the Three Witnesses Recanted his Testimony

    The Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati filed an information charging the accused-appellant and her two co-accused with illegal recruitment committed in large scale under the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995.1Republic Act No. 8042, as amended by Republic Act No. 10022, Section 6(n) of which provides: “(n) x x x Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.”

    The State presented four witnesses, namely: Virgilio Caniazares, Reynaldo Dahab, Basilio Miparanum and PO3 Raul Bolido.

    Worthy of note is what happened to Dahab, one of the witnesses. Dahab declared that on 27 January 27 2001, he had met the accused-appellant at the Guadalupe Branch of Jollibee to pay P2,500.00 for his medical examination. A week later, he had undergone the three-day training in Mandaluyong City, for which he paid P2,500.00. The accused-appellant had then demanded from him the placement fee of P25,000.00. When Dahab was unable to raise the amount, the accused-appellant was not seen again. He filed a complaint against the accused-appellant with the police authorities.

    Subsequently, Dahab recanted his testimony, and stated that he had only requested assistance from the accused-appellant regarding his medical examination. He insisted that he had voluntarily paid P5,000.00 to her, and she had then paid the amount to the Medical Center or his medical examination.

    The Regional Trial Court, nonetheless, convicted the accused-appellant for illegal recruitment committed in large scale.

    The accused-appellant asserts that the Regional Trial Court, as well as the Court of Appeals, unreasonably disregarded Dahab’s recantation. The recantation would have rendered her liable only for simple illegal recruitment instead of illegal recruitment committed in large scale.

    The Supreme Court found this assertion untenable. The Court ruled:

    Dahab’s supposed recantation to the effect that he had only sought the assistance of the accused-appellant for his medical examination by no means weakened or diminished the Prosecution’s case against her. Its being made after he had lodged his complaint against her with the PNP-CIDG (in which he supplied the details of his transactions with her) and after he had testified against her in court directly incriminating her rendered it immediately suspect. It should not be more weighty than his first testimony against her which that was replete with details. Its being the later testimony of the Dahab did not necessarily cancel his first testimony on account of the possibility of its being obtained by coercion, intimidation, fraud, or other means to distort or bend the truth.

    Recantation by a witness is nothing new, for it is a frequent occurrence in criminal proceedings. As a general rule, it is not well regarded by the courts due to its nature as the mere afterthought of the witness. To be given any value or weight, it should still be subjected to the same tests for credibility in addition to its being subject of the rule that it be received with caution. The criminal proceedings in which sworn testimony has been given by the recanting witness would be rendered a mockery, and put at the mercy of the unscrupulous witness if such testimony could be easily negated by the witness’s subsequent inconsistent declaration. The result is to leave without value not only the sanctity of the oath taken but also the solemn rituals and safeguards of the judicial trial. If only for emphasis, we reiterate that it is “a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before the court of justice simply because the witness who has given it later on changed his mind for one reason or another, for such a rule will make a solemn trial a mockery and place the investigation at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses.”

    Further reading:

    • People v. Bayker, G.R. No. 170192, February 10, 2016.