Madelyn narrated that in April 2010, the school engaged her as a releasing clerk in its book sale, tasking her with the inventory and release of books to the school’s students.
In July 2010, Madelyn worked as a filing clerk at the school’s Human Resources Department, where she updated employees’ files, delivered memoranda to different departments, and assisted in school programs. In April 2011, she was posted back as a releasing clerk. She held this position until July 14, 2011.
On July 15, 2011, she worked as a secretary at the school’s Technical-Vocational Training Center (Claretech), which taught vocational and technical skills to underprivileged students. There she prepared materials, assisted in the delivery of correspondence to other departments, and encoded and filed documents.
In May 2013, the school asked Madelyn to sign a Probationary Employment Contract covering the period of January 16, 2013 to July 15, 2013. When the contract expired, she was told that her tenure would expire on July 31, 2013 because of a change in school administration and due to cost-cutting.
But Madelyn was able to work for the school starting August 1, 2013 as a substitute teacher aide at the school’s Child Study Center. When the permanent teacher aide returned on October 25, 2013, Madelyn stopped working for the school.
Madelyn repeatedly pleaded to be reinstated at least as a checker at the school’s water station, but the school denied her requests.
Thus, Madelyn filed her Complaint, claiming that she had been a regular employee since she performed various jobs that were usually necessary and desirable in the usual business of the school.
The school denied Madelyn’s claims averring that she was merely a part-time fixed-term contractual employee whom the school accommodated because her husband was its longtime driver. It also argued that Madelyn was well aware of her fixed-term employment as confirmed by her application letters and biodata, which showed her employment’s duration.
Moreover, the school claimed that Madelyn’s position at Claretech was not a plantilla position because the department was only at its experimental stage, merely relying on donations and the school’s marketing research fund. When Claretech began incurring deficits, the clerical functions were allegedly absorbed by the administrator’s functions, dissolving Madelyn’s position.
Was Madelyn engaged under a fixed-term employment?
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.
The Supreme Court reiterated the principles in Brent School v. Zamora which recognized the validity of fixed-term employment under both the Civil Code and the Labor Code of the Philippines, as follows:
Brent recognized that the Civil Code and the Labor Code of the Philippines allow the execution of fixed-term employment contracts. But when periods have been imposed to prevent an employee from acquiring his or her security of tenure, the contract effectively runs counter to public policy and morals, and must, therefore, be disregarded.
In drawing the line, Brent laid down the criteria under which a fixed-term employment cannot be deemed in circumvention of the security of tenure:
- When the parties have knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon a fixed period of employment “without any force, duress[,] or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating his consent”; or
- When “it satisfactorily appears that the employer and employee dealt with each other on more or less equal terms” with the employer not having exercised any moral dominance over the employee.
The rationale behind this safeguard is that when a prospective employee, on account of special skills or market forces, is in a position to make demands upon the prospective employer, such prospective employee needs less protection than the ordinary worker. Lesser limitations on the parties’ freedom of contract are thus required for the protection of the employee.
The Supreme Court has emphasized that Brent is the exception rather than the general rule, and a fixed-term employment is recognized as valid only under certain circumstances, particularly when a fixed-term is an essential and natural appurtenance.
Moreover, the Court held that in determining the validity of a fixed-term employment, the level of protection accorded to labor is ascertained based on the nature of the work, qualifications of the employee, and other relevant circumstances.
Hence, the criteria limit the application of Brent to particular cases where the employer and the employee are on a more or less equal footing in entering into the contract. If none of the aforementioned criteria are present, the Court will strike down a fixed-term employment contract.
In the present case, the Supreme Court found no contract evidencing Madelyn’s fixed-term employment. The Court said that this militated against the school’s assertion of fixed-term employment. According to the Court, the decisive determinant in fixed-term employments is the day certain agreed upon by the parties for the commencement and termination of their employment relationship. For the Court no day certain was agreed upon by the parties.
The Court noted that the school persistently asserted that Madelyn should have known that her employment was only for a fixed term given the circumstances and nature of her job. However, the Court found that the school failed to present the contracts for the positions held by Madelyn. The Court said that absent any contract, it cannot be said that Madelyn was informed of the nature of her employment, as well as the duration and scope of her work. A fixed-term employment, the Court said, cannot be held valid based on mere allegations and speculations.
Furthermore, although the school argued that she executed a Memorandum of Agreement that provided for the terms of her employment, the Court found that such agreement referred to her engagement as a substitute teacher aide. As for the rest of the positions she held, the school failed to provide any contract.
The Court ruled even then the criteria in Brent were absent. According to the Court the school did not deal with Madelyn in more or less equal terms with no moral dominance on its part. Madelyn’s whole family depended on the school. Her husband was the school’s longtime driver and their children were its scholars. Madelyn was a high school graduate whose ordinary qualifications compelled her to accept the various positions offered by the school. The Court said that given these circumstances, Madelyn was not in a position to bargain on the terms of her employment. It could not be said that no moral dominance was exerted by the school merely because both parties benefitted from the fixed-term employment.
The Court added that there could be no genuine freedom to contract when a fixed-term employment is used as a vehicle to exploit the economic disadvantage of workers like Madelyn. Plain wage earners should not be faulted for tolerating jobs they desperately need. Brent recognized the validity of fixed-term employments only within the context that employers and employees are on an equal footing. That employees agree to be repeatedly hired on a fixed-term basis only reveals the deeper problem of poverty and growing economic inequality between labor and capital.
The Court declared that Madelyn was a regular employee of the school for her repeated engagement under contract of hire was indicative of the necessity and desirability of her work. Her services as a clerk at the book sale, as a secretary at Claretech, and as a substitute teacher aide were found to be necessary and desirable to the school’s business as an educational institution. The school’s repeated hiring of Madelyn for over three (3) years only strengthened the conclusion that her services are necessary and desirable to its business.
Further reading:
- Claret School of Quezon City v. Sinday, G.R. No. 226358, October 9, 2019.
