Paulino Ungos III

Lawyer | Law Professor | Author

Tag: ofw

  • Use of a Person’s HIV-Positive Condition as a Ground for Dismissal

    Triple A alleged that sometime in 2017, he was hired as a Cleaning Laborer by Saraya Al Jazerah Contracting Est. (the foreign employer), through its agent, Bison Management Corporation, under a two-year employment contract with a monthly salary of One Thousand Five Hundred Saudi Riyal. He was deployed to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) on October 18, 2017 and commenced work thereafter.

    Triple A narrated that In January of 2019 — after working for fifteen months, he underwent a routine medical examination and was found positive for Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV). On this basis, the foreign employer terminated his employment because under the laws of the KSA, an HIV-positive individual is considered unfit to work.

    After his repatriation to the Philippines on February 8, 2019, Triple A filed a complaint on March 1, 2019 for illegal dismissal, discrimination, money claims, damages, attorney’s fees, and legal interest against the employer.

    The Office of the Labor Arbiter dismissed triple A’s complaint for illegal dismissal but ruled that he was entitled to his unpaid salary, vacation leave pay, and attorney’s fees. In its Decision, the Office of the Labor Arbiter took cognizance of KSA’s policy of disallowing HIV-positive persons for employment. The Office of the Labor Arbiter added that Republic Act No. 8504 or the “Philippine AIDS Prevention and Control Act of 1998” is a local law that should apply only within the Philippines and not to KSA.

    Triple A filed a Memorandum of Partial Appeal before the National Labor Relations Commission, asserting that he was illegally dismissed from employment.

    The Commission resolved the partial appeal in triple A’s favor and declared that he was illegally dismissed.

    The motion for reconsideration filed by the employer was denied by the Commission.

    Thus, the employer filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.

    The Court of Appeals denied the employer’s petition since it did not find any abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission. The Court of Appeals agreed with the Commission in that Philippine law governs the terms of the employment contract as well as the rights of the employee under the principle of lex loci contractus. The Court of Appeals also cited Section 35 of Republic Act No. 8504, which provides that discrimination in any form from pre-employment to post-employment, including hiring, promotion or assignment, based on the actual, perceived or suspected HIV status of an individual is prohibited. Termination from work on the sole basis of actual, perceived or suspected HIV status is deemed unlawful. The Court of Appeals reasoned that since the law categorically prohibits the use of a person’s HIV-positive condition as a ground for dismissal, no valid cause attended triple A’s termination from employment.

    The Court of Appeals denied the employer’s motion for reconsideration.

    Thus, the employer filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals.

    Was triple A illegally dismissed from employment?

    The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative.

    The Supreme Court began by highlighting the State’s promise to protect Filipino workers, whether here or abroad, under Section 3 of Article XIII of the Constitution. The Court stated that the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure extends to Filipino overseas contract workers. Employees are not stripped of their security of tenure when they move to work in a different jurisdiction.

    The Supreme Court noted the employer’s invocation of the principle of pacta sunt servanda based on the “Agreement on Labor Cooperation for General Workers Recruitment and Employment Between the Department of Labor and Employment of the Republic of the Philippines and the Ministry of Labor and Social Development of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia” (Agreement on Labor Cooperation), which provides that the Department of Labor and Employment of the Republic of the Philippines shall ensure that the recruited general workers satisfy health requirements and are free of all communicable diseases by virtue of thorough medical examinations through reliable medical facilities accredited by both governments.

    However, the Supreme Court found the employer’s argument untenable. According to the Court, such argument was belied by the employer’s own representation that prior to his deployment and as part of the requirements, triple A underwent a medical examination and received a clean bill of health and that he acquired HIV after working in the KSA for more than one year.

    The Court remarked that it will not engage in an academic discussion on the principle of pacta sunt servanda where the case is essentially one for illegal dismissal of an OFW.

    The Court rather stressed that the principle of lex loci contractus applies in that Philippine laws generally govern overseas employment contracts. The Court also stated that as a narrow exception, the parties may agree that a foreign law shall govern, but subject to the concurrence of the following requisites:

    • That it is expressly stipulated in the overseas employment contract that a specific foreign law shall govern;
    • That the foreign law invoked must be proven before the courts pursuant to the Philippine rules on evidence;
    • That the foreign law stipulated in the overseas employment contract must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy of the Philippines; and
    • That the overseas employment contract must be processed through the POEA.

    The Supreme Court acknowledged that the first and fourth requisites were present. However, it discovered that the more important second and third requisites were absent.

    Although the employer was able to present the Agreement on Labor Cooperation, certain documents, and a news article about a KSA envoy seeking stricter HIV/AIDS testing for OFWs, the Court underscored that a copy of the purported foreign law was not presented.

    The Court added that even if the KSA policy which disallows HIV-positive persons from employment were truly undeniable and all over the internet, prevailing jurisprudence dictates that if the foreign law stipulated is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy, then Philippine laws shall govern.

    The Court continued that contractual stipulation is not a bar to applicability of Philippine law. The labor relationship between an OFW and his or her foreign employer as much affected with public interest and that the otherwise applicable Philippine laws and regulations cannot be rendered illusory by the parties agreeing upon some other law to govern their relationship.

    The Supreme Court reminded that Republic Act No. 8504 had already been repealed by Republic Act No. 11166 at the time of triple A’s repatriation. Section 49 (a) of Republic Act No. 11166 makes it unlawful for employees to be terminated from work on the sole basis of their HIV status.

    The Court stated that since Philippine law categorically prohibits the use of a person’s HIV-positive condition as a ground for dismissal, the inescapable conclusion is that there was no valid cause to terminate triple A, and that doing so amounted to illegal dismissal.

    The Court observed that while it is true that disease may be a ground for termination under Article 299 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, the employer in this case conceded that an HIV-positive condition is not yet an illness/disease.

    The Court concluded that since there was no other reason proffered for triple A’s dismissal apart from his HIV status, the Court upheld the Court of Appeals ruling that the Commission did not commit grave abuse of discretion in finding that triple A was illegally dismissed.

    Further reading:

    • Bison Management Corp. v. AAA, G.R. No. 256540, February 14, 2024.

  • Regardless of the Cause of Repatriation

    Reynaldo entered into a three-month employment contract to work as an oiler with Maritime Management Services (Maritime Management), through its agent, Southeast Asia Shipping Corp. (SEASCORP). Before deployment, he underwent his pre-employment medical examination and was certified to be fit for sea duty. On January 30, 2010, Reynaldo boarded the M/V BP Pioneer.

    Reynaldo narrated that on March 29, 2010, he was carrying spare parts needed for his repair of the ship’s generators when the ship swayed due to big waves. This caused him to bend and nearly fall to his knees.

    Reynaldo claimed that he soon felt excruciating pain in his scrotal/inguinal area, including pain and numbness in his left leg to his foot. Despite this, he continued to carry the parts and repaired the generator until he was relieved by another oiler. After his duty, Reynaldo went to his cabin and took a pain reliever. He then went to the ship’s clinic to have himself checked by the doctor on board. In the Report of Illness by the ship’s doctor, the latter diagnosed Reynaldo to have epididymorchitis and advised him to rest until further observation since it may just be due to tiredness. The doctor also ruled out hernia and trauma.

    On May 19, 2010, Reynaldo visited the ship’s doctor and informed the latter that he still feels pain during prolonged standing or while walking, with numbness of his lower extremity. However, the doctor concluded that this was normal considering his age and just advised to take pain relievers.

    Upon the expiration of his contract on May 25, 2010, Reynaldo disembarked the vessel at the port of Takoradi, Ghana and was repatriated back to the Philippines. Believing that the pain in his scrotal/inguinal area was normal and, as the doctor had advised, Reynaldo took a complete rest for about a month.

    Eventually, SEASCORP called him for possible deployment. He was sent to Merita Diagnostic Clinic (Merita), the company-accredited clinic, for his pre-employment medical examination.

    During his examination, Reynaldo informed the doctor about the injury sustained while on board the M/V BP Pioneer. Thus, the doctor asked him to get an x-ray of his scrotal/inguinal area and lumbar spine.

    On July 30, 2010, Reynaldo also underwent Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) of the Lumbo-Sacral Spine. It was found that Reynaldo had spondylolisthesis, among others.

    On August 26, 2010, Reynaldo consulted two doctors who advised him to have surgery for his spondylolisthesis. Reynaldo found the procedure costly.

    Reynaldo approached SEASCORP to request for financial assistance. However, his request was denied.

    Reynaldo thus filed a complaint against his employer before the National Labor Relations Commission and claimed for permanent total disability benefits, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.

    The Office of the Labor Arbiter found that Reynaldo suffered an injury while performing his duties as an oiler. Being a work-related injury, it held that it must be compensable.

    On the other hand, the said Office found that the mandatory three-day reporting requirement for a post-employment examination under the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract (POEA SEC) did not apply in the case of Reynaldo because he was repatriated not because of a medical condition but due to the expiration of his contract.

    The Office of the Labor Arbiter thus ruled in favor of Reynaldo and required the employer to pay Reynaldo his permanent total disability compensation plus attorney’s fees.

    The National Labor Relations Commission reversed and set aside the Decision of the Office of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed Reynaldo’s complaint for lack of merit.

    According to the Commission, the injury suffered by Reynaldo that was reflected on record was the discomfort on his scrotal and inguinal area. His assertion that he suffered an injury while on board and felt pain on his left leg to his foot was unsupported by evidence.

    The Commission added that a seafarer who claims to be medically infirm must be examined by the company-designated physician within three days from repatriation. The failure of Reynaldo to report within the mandatory period without justifiable cause resulted in the forfeiture of his right to claim compensation and disability benefits under the POEA-SEC.

    The Court of Appeals denied Reynaldo’s petition in view of his failure to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement under the POEA-SEC. Such failure resulted in the forfeiture of his right to claim compensation and benefits.

    Reynaldo elevated his case to the Supreme Court.

    Was Reynaldo entitled to permanent total disability benefits?

    The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.

    The Court reiterated settled jurisprudence that in order to claim compensability under the POEA-SEC, it is required that the seafarer must have:

    • suffered a work-related illness or injury during the term of his contract; and
    • submitted himself to a mandatory post-employment medical examination within three (3) working days upon his arrival.

    The purpose of the three-day mandatory reporting requirement is to enable the company-designated physician to ascertain if the seafarer’s injury or illness is work-related. After that period, there would be difficulty in ascertaining the real cause of the illness. To ignore the rule would set a precedent with negative repercussions because it would open the floodgates to a limitless number of seafarers claiming disability benefits. It would certainly be unfair to the employer who would have difficulty determining the cause of a claimant’s illness considering the passage of time. In such a case, the employers would have no protection against unrelated disability claims.

    In the present case, the Court found that Reynaldo was repatriated due to the expiration of his contract. The Court stated that regardless of the cause of his repatriation, he was required to submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by the company-designated physician within three working days upon his return in order to ascertain if he was really suffering from a work-related injury or illness. Reynaldo may only be excused from such requirement if he was physically incapacitated to do so. The Court stressed that this was not Reynaldo’s situation.

    The Court equally found that Reynaldo complained of pain in the scrotal/inguinal area while on board which is why the initial diagnosis by the ship doctor was epididymorchitis.

    On the other hand, the Court noted that aside from his bare assertion, Reynaldo proffered no evidence establishing that he felt pain or numbness on his lower extremities while on board or that the ship doctor concluded that he contracted spondylolisthesis. According to the Court, it was only in July 2010, or after his repatriation, that the said findings were made by a doctor, which was well-beyond the three-day mandatory reporting period.

    The Court stated that while it commiserated with Reynaldo’s plight, non-compliance with the requirements set forth in the POEA-SEC had rendered it difficult to ascertain if his injury or illness was work-related.

    The Court accordingly denied Reynaldo’s claim for permanent total disability benefits.

    Further reading:

    • Cabatan v. Southeast Asia Shipping Corp., G.R. No. 219495, February 28, 2022.

  • Consequences of Deliberate Concealment

    Magno alleged that on November 13, 2014, he was hired by Goodwood Ship Management, Pte., Ltd., through its agent, Trans-Global Maritime Agency, Inc., as Oiler on board MT G.C. Fuzhou for a period of nine months. He stated that after he was declared fit for sea duty in his pre-employment medical examination, he boarded the vessel on November 15, 2014.

    Magno narrated that on January 25, 2015, he suddenly felt severe chest pain, accompanied by dizziness and weakness while carrying out his duties. He was made to endure his condition until his repatriation on May 18, 2015. Upon arrival in the Philippines, he was referred to the employer-company’s designated physician. From May 20, 2015, he was subjected to various tests and treatment for coronary artery disease. After five months of treatment, the company-designated physician discontinued his treatment. Consequently, he consulted his personal cardiologist, who concluded that the nature and extent of his illness rendered him permanently and totally unfit to work as a seaman. Thus, on January 19, 2016, he filed a complaint for disability benefits, medical expenses, damages and attorney’s fees against his employer.

    For its part, the employer retorted that Magno denied having a history of high blood pressure or any kind of heart disease when he ticked the “No” box opposite “High Blood Pressure” and “Heart Disease Vascular/Chest Pain” under the section, Medical History in his Pre-Employment Medical Examination (PEME). The employer stated that it was on May 17, 2015, that Magno complained of back and chest pains, with difficulty of breathing and easy fatigability, and was thereafter medically repatriated. During his treatment by the company-designated physician sometime in September 2015, Magno disclosed that he was diagnosed, as early as 2009, with coronary artery disease, for which he underwent Percutaneous Coronary Intervention of the left anterior descending artery. The company-designated physicians later stopped his treatment, prompting him to file a complaint for the payment of permanent total disability benefits.

    The Office of the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Magno and awarded him permanent total disability benefits. Said Office considered the company-designated physician’s continuation of Magno’s treatment despite his belated disclosure of his existing coronary artery disease as an instance of employer’s waiver of its right to deny liability for disability benefits. According to the Office of the Labor Arbiter, such treatment constituted an implied admission of compensability and work-relatedness of Magno’s lingering cardio-vascular illness. The Office of the Labor Arbiter further found that the company-designated physician failed to issue a final assessment of Magno’s illness or fitness to work, which failure deemed Magno totally and permanently disabled.

    On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission affirmed the Office of the Labor Arbiter’s ruling because Magno’s illness occurred within the duration of his contract, and his treatment lasted for more than 120 days. For the Commission, the award of permanent total disability benefits was justified.

    The employer then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the petition.

    Thus, the employer sought recourse before the Supreme Court, alleging that the Court of Appeals committed serious errors of law in upholding the Commission’s Decision. The employer insisted that Magno was not entitled to permanent and total disability benefits and his other monetary claims because of deliberate concealment of his coronary artery disease.

    For his part, Magno maintained entitlement to permanent total disability benefits since his illness was work-related and had contributed to the development of his condition that resulted in his disability.

    Is Magno entitled to permanent total disability benefits?

    The Supreme Court ruled that Magno is not entitled to permanent total disability benefits. The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission.

    The Court started by stating that entitlement of seafarers on overseas work to disability benefits is a matter governed, not only by medical findings, but by law and by contract. The Court stated that the material statutory provisions are Articles 197 to 199 of the Labor Code of the Philippines in relation to Section 2 (a), Rule X of the Amended Rules on Employee Compensation. By contract, the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC), the parties’ collective bargaining agreement, if any, and the employment agreement between the seafarer and the employer are pertinent.

    The Court pointed out that Section 20, paragraph E of the POEA-SEC clearly provides that “[a] seafarer who knowingly conceals a pre-existing illness or condition in the Pre-Employment Medical Examination (PEME) shall be liable for misrepresentation and shall be disqualified from any compensation and benefits.” The Court said that such rule seeks to penalize seafarers who conceal information to pass the pre-employment medical examination. It even makes such concealment a just cause for termination.

    Under the POEA-SEC, there is a “pre-existing illness or condition” if prior to the processing of the POEA contract, any of the following is present:

    • the advice of a medical doctor on treatment was given for such continuing illness or condition; or
    • the seafarer has been diagnosed and has knowledge of such illness or condition but failed to disclose it during the pre-employment medical examination, and such cannot be diagnosed during such examination.

    In the present case the Court found that:

    • In his September 18, 2014 PEME, Magno indicated that he was not suffering from any medical condition likely to be aggravated by service at sea or which may render him unfit for sea service;
    • Magno also indicated in the PEME that he did not have a history of heart disease/vascular/chest pain, high blood pressure, or that he underwent treatment for any ailment and was taking any medication; and
    • He signed the PEME certificate acknowledging that he had read and understood and was informed of the contents of such certificate.

    However, the Court further found a medical report issued by the company-designated physician, dated September 17, 2015, which stated therein Magno’s disclosure of a history of coronary artery disease for which he underwent percutaneous coronary intervention of the left anterior descending artery in 2009.

    With this disclosure, the Court declared that Magno had obscured his pre-existing cardiac ailment, and such concealment thus disqualified him from disability benefits notwithstanding the medical attention extended by the company-designated physician upon his repatriation.

    The Court discussed that even if the misrepresentation was discovered during Magno’s treatment with the company-designated physician, the same was immaterial and could not have canceled out his deception.

    The Court reiterated that a PEME is generally not exploratory in nature, nor is it a totally in-depth and thorough examination of an applicant’s medical condition. It does not reveal the real state of health of an applicant, and does not allow the employer to discover any and all pre-existing medical condition with which the seafarer is suffering and for which he may be taking medication. The PEME is nothing more than a summary examination of the seafarer’s physiological condition and is just enough for the employer to determine his fitness for the nature of the work for which he is to be employed.

    Since the PEME is not exploratory, the Court emphasized that its failure to reveal or uncover Magno’s ailments cannot shield him from the consequences of his deliberate concealment. In this regard, the “fit to work” declaration in the PEME cannot be a conclusive proof to show that he was free from any ailment prior to his deployment.

    For knowingly concealing his history of coronary artery disease during the PEME, Magno committed fraudulent misrepresentation which unconditionally barred his right to receive any disability compensation from his employer.

    The Court added that even if it were to disregard Magno’s fraudulent misrepresentation, his claim would still fail.

    Coronary artery disease, which is subsumed under cardio-vascular disease, and hypertension are listed as occupational diseases under item 11, Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC.

    However, before such disease to be compensable, a seafarer must establish concurrence of the following conditions enumerated in the first paragraph of Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC:

    • The seafarer’s work must involve the risk described therein;
    • The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer’s exposure to the described risks;
    • The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it; and
    • There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer.

    Relevant thereto, the Court reiterated prevailing jurisprudence in that the table of illnesses and the corresponding nature of employment in Section 32-A only provides the list of occupational illnesses. However, even if the illness may be considered as work-related for having been specified in the table, the seafarer is still not exempted from providing proof of the conditions under the first paragraph of Section 32-A in order for the occupational illnesses complained of to be considered as compensable. Whoever claims entitlement to benefits provided by law should establish his right thereto by substantial evidence which is more than a mere scintilla; it is real and substantial, and not merely apparent. Further, while in compensation proceedings in particular, the test of proof is merely probability and not ultimate degree of certainty, the conclusion of the courts must still be based on real evidence and not just inference and speculations.

    In the present case, the Court found that Magno failed to present sufficient evidence to show how his working conditions contributed to or aggravated his illness. According to the Court, the general statements in his Position Paper were not validated by any written document or other proof. Neither was any expert medical opinion presented regarding the cause of his condition.

    The Court expounded that although Magno suffered from coronary artery disease, a cardiovascular illness under item 11 of Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC, the conditions for compensability under the same section were not present since Magno did not present any proof of the required conditions to demonstrate that his illness is work-related and, therefore, compensable. Specifically, Magno failed to discharge his burden to prove the risks involved in his work, that his illness was contracted as a result of his exposure to the risks within the period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it, and that he was not notoriously negligent. The Court thus ruled that Magno was not entitled to permanent total disability benefits.

    In deciding against the seafarer in this case, the Court emphasized that the constitutional policy to provide full protection to labor is not meant to be a sword to oppress employers, as justice is for the deserving and must be dispensed within the light of established facts, the applicable law, and existing jurisprudence. The Court said that its commitment to the cause of labor is not a lopsided undertaking. The Court concluded by stating that such commitment cannot and does not prevent it from sustaining the employer when it is in the right.

    Further reading:

    • Trans-Global Maritime Agency, Inc. v. Utanes, G.R. No. 236498, September 16, 2020.

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  • PTSD and Claims for Disability Benefits

    On 30 October 2013, the seafarer entered into a 7-month employment contract with Anglo-Eastern (ANTWERP), NV, through its agent, Anglo-Eastern Crew Management Philippines (Anglo-Eastern Crew), Inc., to work as a Messman aboard the M/V Mineral Water. On 23 February 2014, the seafarer boarded the vessel.

    The seafarer claimed that sometime in June 2014, he was sexually harassed by the chief officer of the vessel during the course of his employment. He also claimed that the chief officer also threatened to kill him upon learning that he filed a complaint against the latter before the ship captain. After the incident, the seafarer opted for voluntary repatriation and was able to return to the Philippines on 12 July 2014.

    On 24 November 2014 the seafarer consulted his personal doctor, a clinical psychologist, who diagnosed him with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). The diagnosis of this doctor was verified by another doctor, who concluded that the seafarer cannot return to his job as a seafarer.

    Due to his illness, the seafarer requested for compensation from Anglo-Eastern Crew. However, his request remained unheeded.

    On 2 March 2015, the seafarer filed a complaint for constructive dismissal, sexual harassment and maltreatment. In addition, he prayed for the payment of disability benefits, damages and attorney’s fees since he claims to have been rendered permanently and totally disabled due to his post-traumatic stress disorder from his unfortunate experience onboard the vessel.

    The Office of the Labor Arbiter awarded the salaries of the seafarer for the unexpired portion of his employment contract because of the finding that the seafarer was forced to repatriate himself due to the hostile environment brought about by the filing of the complaint. The Office of the Labor Arbiter also awarded him moral damages for the mental torture that he endured and exemplary damages to dissuade such incident from further occurring. It also granted the claim for attorney’s fees since the seafarer was constrained to avail the services of a lawyer.

    When the case reached the Supreme Court, the seafarer insisted on his entitlement to disability benefits. However, the Court denied his claim for said benefits. The Court ruled:

    To support his claim for disability benefits, petitioner presented a psychiatric report and a medical certificate. These documents only prove that he was diagnosed with PTSD, prescribed to take medication, and recommended for psychotherapy sessions. However, there was no disability grading.

    The medical certificate states that “[a]t this point in time he cannot return to his work as a seafarer.” This statement is not sufficient for this court to conclude that petitioner is permanently and totally disabled to work as a seafarer. It does not instruct us how petitioner’s PTSD is work-related or work-aggravated. It also does not tell us whether petitioner underwent psychotherapy sessions, as recommended by his physicians. Assuming that petitioner underwent psychotherapy sessions and took his prescribed medication, no evidence was presented showing how he responded to treatment.

    It is established that petitioner suffered some form of injury, but the pieces of evidence he submitted are not sufficient to convince this Court that he has been rendered permanently and totally disabled. Thus, this Court is precluded from awarding disability benefits, not because of his non-compliance with the 3-day reportorial requirement, but because there is barely any evidence to support the claim for disability benefits.

    Further reading:

    • Toliongco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 231748, July 8, 2020.

  • Invalid Addendum

    Norly M. Baybayan (Baybayan) was hired by Wacoal through its agent, petitioner Prime Stars, for a contract period of 24 months or two years, with a monthly salary of NT$15,840.00. However, he soon discovered that he was only paid NT$9,000.00 a month. Upon inquiry, he was informed that an amount of NT$4,000.00 was being deducted from his salary for expenses for his board and lodging. Since he still had debts to pay back home, he finished the contract and returned to the Philippines on 19 May 2009. He then instituted a complaint for underpayment of salaries and the reimbursement of his transportation expenses against petitioners Prime Star and Peralta.

    Michelle V. Beltran (Beltran) was hired by Avermedia, through its agent, petitioner Prime Stars, as an “operator” who assembles TV boxes and USBs. Her contract duration was for two years with a monthly salary of NT$17,280.00. She was deployed on 22 June 2008. After a year, she was abruptly and unceremoniously dismissed by her supervisor and was immediately repatriated to the Philippines on 3 July 2009. Beltran then instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal and sought for the payment of salaries for the unexpired portion of her contract, the refund of her repatriation expenses, plus damages and attorney’s fees against the petitioners.

    Petitioners denied that Baybayan was underpaid as his payslips for the months of March and April 2009 indicated that he received a monthly salary of NT$17,280.00 during his employment with Wacoal. Petitioners explained that Baybayan signed an Addendum to the Employment Contract (Addendum), which authorized the deduction of the amount of NT$4,000.00 as payment for his monthly food and accommodation. In the same Addendum, Baybayan was apprised that the transportation expenses for his round trip tickets from the Philippines to Taiwan shall be at his own expense. Petitioners further explained that these were supported by Baybayan’s sworn statement, Written Acknowledgment, Foreign Worker’s Affidavit Regarding Expenses Incurred for Entry into the Republic of China to Work and the Wage and Salary and Overseas Contract Worker’s Questionnaire.

    With respect to Beltran, petitioners contended that it was Beltran who voluntarily preterminated her contract for personal reasons. According to petitioners, Beltran approached them and expressed her intent to return to the Philippines, as evidenced by her handwritten statement which she duly signed on 4 July 2009. Petitioners add that the handwritten statement was supported by her sworn statement, written acknowledgment, Foreign Worker’s Affidavit, and Overseas Contract Worker’s Questionnaire.

    The issues of illegal dismissal, salary differentials, transportation expenses, damages, attorney’s fees and liability of petitioner Peralta were elevated to the Supreme Court.

    RULING:

    Beltran did not voluntarily preterminate her employment contract. She was illegally dismissed.

    The Supreme Court found that petitioners’ complete reliance on Beltran’s alleged voluntary execution of the Mutual Contract Annulment Agreement and the Worker Discontinue Employment Affidavit to support the claim that Beltran voluntarily preterminated her contract was unavailing. This was because her supposed resignation was inconsistent with her filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal.

    Furthermore, the Court found the wordings of Beltran’s relinquishment of her contract of employment ambiguous and doubtful. The burden of proving that Beltran voluntary preterminated her contract fell upon petitioners as the employer. Petitioners failed to discharge such burden despite their claim that the latter resigned.

    Specifically, the Court found it highly unlikely that Beltran would just quit even before the end of her contract after all the expenses she incurred and still needed to settle and the sacrifices she went through in seeking financial upliftment. According to the Court, it was incongruous for Beltran to simply give up her work, return home, and be unemployed once again given that so much time, effort, and money have already been invested to securing her employment abroad and enduring the tribulations of being in a foreign country, away from her family.

    Beltran was accordingly awarded her salaries for the unexpired portion of her employment contract.

    Baybayan and Beltran should be granted salary differentials and refund of transportation expenses.

    Paragraph (i) of Article 34 of the Labor Code of the Philippines prohibits the substitution or alteration of employment contracts approved and verified by the Department of Labor and Employment from the time of the actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period of expiration of the same without the approval of the said Department.

    Furthermore, Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, explicitly prohibits the substitution or alteration to the prejudice of the worker of employment contracts already approved and verified by the Department of Labor and Employment from the time of actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period of the expiration of the same without the approval of the said Department.

    In the present case, petitioners admitted that the employment contracts of Baybayan and Beltran were indeed amended, but posited that the Addendum, while apparently did not appear to contain any indication of Philippine Overseas Employment Administration approval, actually contained provisions which have been approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration through Baybayan and Beltran’s Foreign Worker’s Affidavits.

    The Supreme Court did not agree.

    According to the Court, the clear and categorical language of the law imposes upon foreign principals minimum terms and conditions of employment for land-based overseas Filipino workers, which include basic provisions for food, accommodation and transportation. The licensed recruitment agency shall also, prior to the signing of the employment contract, inform the overseas Filipino workers of their rights and obligations, and disclose the full terms and conditions of employment, and provide them with a copy of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-approved contract, to give them ample opportunity to examine the same.

    Article IV of Baybayan and Beltran’s Employment Contract, in relation to Section 2, Rule 1, Part V of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Land-based Overseas Workers,1“Section 2. Minimum Provisions of Employment Contract. — Consistent with its welfare and employment facilitation objectives, the following shall be considered minimum requirements for contracts of employment of land-based workers:

    x x x

    b. Free transportation to and from the worksite, or offsetting benefit;

    c. Free food and accommodation, or offsetting benefit;”     provided Baybayan and Beltran with:

    • free food and accommodation for the duration of the contract
    • an economy class air ticket from the country of origin to Taiwan
    • a ticket back to the country of origin upon completion of the contract.

    Furthermore, it was stated therein that an employment contract cannot be altered or modified without the prior approval of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration.

    In the present case, the Addendum required Baybayan and Beltran shoulder their food and accommodation and transportation fare.

    Although the Court recognized the fact that the parties may stipulate on other terms and conditions of employment as well as other benefits, such stipulations should not violate the minimum requirements required by law as these would be disadvantageous to the employee. Section 3, Rule 1, Part V of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Land-based Overseas Workers states:

    “Section 3. Freedom to Stipulate. — Parties to overseas employment contracts are allowed to stipulate other terms and conditions and other benefits not provided under these minimum requirements; provided the whole employment package should be more beneficial to the worker than the minimum; provided that the same shall not be contrary to law, public policy and morals, and provided further, that Philippine agencies shall make foreign employers aware of the standards of employment adopted by the Administration.”

    The Court found that the minimum provisions for employment of Baybayan and Beltran were not met, and that there was diminution of their benefits which were already guaranteed by law and granted in their favor under their Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-approved contracts of employment.

    Accordingly, the Court ruled that the Addendum, absent the approval of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, was declared invalid for being contrary to law and public policy.

    Baybayan and Beltran should be awarded moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.

    This was because the acts of the petitioners were evidently tainted with bad faith. Petitioners’ failure to comply with the stipulations on the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-approved employment contracts constituted an act oppressive to labor and more importantly, contrary to law and public policy. Petitioners even tried to justify the execution and validity of the Addendum and cloak the latter as legal and binding through Baybayan and Beltran’s execution of Foreign Worker’s affidavits. According to the Court, petitioners’ circumvention of labor laws and the intentional diminution of employee’s benefits to land-based overseas workers were indicative of petitioners’ exercise of bad faith and fraud in their dealings with Filipino workers.

    With regard to Beltran’s dismissal from employment, the Court found nothing “voluntary” in putting words into Beltran’s own mouth in the guise of her handwritten statement of resignation. Petitioners’ attempt to demonstrate voluntariness should fail since “cooperate” was more of an imposition coming from the employer rather than from a disadvantaged overseas employee. The Court considered the execution of the documents plainly oppressive and violative of Beltran’s security of tenure.

    The Court accordingly awarded Baybayan and Beltran moral and exemplary damages to allay the sufferings they experienced and by way of example or correction for public good, respectively.

    Peralta should be solidarily liable with Prime Stars.

    Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 mandates solidary liability among the corporate officers, directors, partners and the corporation or partnership for any claims and damages that may be due to the overseas workers, viz.:

    “Section 10. Monetary Claims. — x x x The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under this section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The performance bond to be filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all money claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages.”

    Further Reading:

    • Prime Stars International Promotion Corp. v. Baybayan, G.R. No. 213961, January 22, 2020.

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  • But She Went Home for Personal Reasons

    On 7 November 2010, Hazel entered into a 2-year employment contract with Kuwait by Al-Masiya, through its agent, Saad Mutlaq Al Asmi Domestic Staff Recruitment Office (Saad Mutlaq)/Al Dakhan Manpower where she to work as a domestic helper with a monthly salary of US$400.00.

    Hazel arrived in Kuwait on 8 November 2010. Due to disagreement in the working conditions, Hazel’s employment with her first and second employers did not succeed. Her employment with her third employer also did not succeed as the latter could not obtain a working visa for her.

    On 16 December 2010, Hazel went to the Philippine Embassy where she related her employment problems to a Labor Attaché in Kuwait who offered to help them.

    On 5 January 2011, Hazel left the Philippine Embassy after a certain Mr. Mutlaq offered to give her a job at a chocolate factory. However, this chocolate factory turned out to be inexistent.

    Then, the employees of Al Rekabi, an employment agency, told her that they would be bringing her to Hawally at night. She refused to take the trip as it was cold and drizzling. She then attempted to report the matter to the Labor Attaché using her cellular phone, but the employees of Al Rekabi confiscated it. Mr. Hassan, the Manager of Al Rekabi, did not accede to her request to postpone the trip to the following day. It came to a point where Mr. Hassan scolded Hazel and forced her to make a written admission that her employers treated her well.

    Sometime after 6 January 2011, Hazel was brought to the office of Al Rekabi at Salmiya. On an unspecified date thereafter, at around 7:00 p.m., two men offered her a job at a restaurant in front of the main office of the agency. She accepted the offer. However, instead of being brought to a restaurant in Hawally, where she was supposed to work, Hazel was taken to a flat where she was told to apply makeup and wear attractive and sexy clothes. Another man joined them. Hazel was then told that she would be brought to her place of work. However, she was instead taken to an unlighted area which had buildings but no restaurant or coffee shop signboards. At the area, she saw another man walking. After recognizing that the man was an employee of Al Rekabi, she asked him to bring her to the main office of the agency. She was able to leave at around 11:00 p.m. when the three other men agreed to release her.

    On 7 February 2011, Hazel was asked to affix her signature on a letter that she copied purportedly showing that she admitted having preterminated her contract of employment and that she no longer had any demandable claim as she was treated well. Hazel’s execution of this letter of resignation was made as a precondition to the release of her passport and plane ticket which were in the possession of petitioners.

    Hazel arrived in the Philippines on 12 February 2011 and thereafter filed a complaint for constructive dismissal against her employer.

    In response to Hazel’s complaint, the employers filed a motion to dismiss on 11 May 2011, alleging that on 7 February 2011, Hazel executed an Affidavit of Quitclaim and Desistance, Sworn Statement, and Receipt and Quitclaim before the Assistant Labor Attaché in Kuwait, where she allegedly stated that she voluntarily agreed to release her employers from all her claims arising from her employment abroad. They also presented her handwritten statement where she expressed that her cause for terminating her employment was her own personal reasons.

    Was Hazel constructively dismissed from employment?

    The Supreme Court stated that in cases of constructive dismissal, the impossibility, unreasonableness, or unlikelihood of continued employment leaves an employee with no other viable recourse but to terminate his or her employment. “An employee is considered to be constructively dismissed from service if an act of clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer has become so unbea[r]able to the employee as to leave him or her with no option but to forego his or her continued employment.” From this definition, it can be inferred that various situations, whereby the employer intentionally places the employee in a situation which will result in the latter’s being coerced into severing his ties with the former, can result in constructive dismissal.1Torreda v. Investment and Capital Corporation of the Philippines, G.R. No. 229881, September 5, 2018 and Agcolicol, Jr. v. Casiño, G.R. No. 217732, June 15, 2016.

    The Court found that the circumstances of the present case strongly indicated that Hazel was constructively dismissed.

    First, Hazel’s foreign employer never secured a working visa for her, in violation of the categorical requirement for an employer’s accreditation with the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency.

    Second, Hazel was not properly paid in accordance with the terms of her employment contract. During her 3-month stay, she was only paid US$227.75 instead of the stipulated pay of US$400 per month.

    Third, Hazel was not assigned to a permanent employer abroad for the entire contractual period of 2 years. Upon her arrival in Kuwait, she was consistently promised job placements which were found to be inexistent. The Court found it clear that the foreign employer intended to use Hazel as an entertainer of some sort in places of ill repute; and she would have fallen victim to human trafficking “[w]ere it not for some favorable providence.”

    Finally, Hazel was made to copy and sign a prepared resignation letter and this was made as a condition for the release of her passport and plane ticket.

    For the Court, it was logical for Hazel to consider herself constructively dismissed. since the impossibility, unreasonableness, or unlikelihood of continued employment has left her with no other viable recourse but to terminate her employment. The Court further stated:

    Our overseas workers belong to a disadvantaged class. Most of them come from the poorest sector of our society. Their profile shows they live in suffocating slums, trapped in an environment of crimes. Hardly literate and in ill health, their only hope lies in jobs they find with difficulty in our country. Their unfortunate circumstance makes them easy prey to avaricious employers. They will climb mountains, cross the seas, endure slave treatment in foreign lands just to survive. Out of despondence, they will work under sub-human conditions and accept salaries below the minimum. The least we can do is to protect them with our laws.

    On that note, the Court reminds petitioners to observe common decency and good faith in their dealings with their unsuspecting employees, particularly in undertakings that ultimately lead to waiver of workers’ rights. The Court will not renege on its duty to protect the weak against the strong, and the gullible against the wicked, be it for labor or for capital. The Court scorns petitioners’ reprehensible conduct. As employers, petitioners are bound to observe candor and fairness in their relations with their hapless employees.

    Further reading:

    • Al-Masiya Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. v. Viernes, G.R. No. 216132, January 22, 2020.

  • Food Provisions on a Ship

    The seafarer entered into a 6-month employment contract with CTI, through UPLI, to work as a stateroom steward aboard the vessel Carnival Glory. After passing the pre-employment medical examination, he joined the vessel on 26 February 2014.

    Sometime in March 2014, the seafarer reported passing out fresh blood during bowel movement but with no fever, abdominal pain or vomiting. He was treated at the vessel infirmary. Thereafter, he was brought to the Charleston Endoscopy Center in South Carolina, USA for colonoscopy. His biopsy, however, indicated “Segments of Invasive Moderately Differentiated Adenocarcinoma.”

    On 12 June 2014, the seafarer was medically repatriated. Upon his arrival in Manila, UPLI immediately referred him to the Marine Medical Services for further evaluation and management. Thereafter, the company-designated doctor confirmed that respondent was suffering from “Moderately Differentiated Adenocarcinoma Rectum.” The seafarer underwent a surgical operation (Abdominal Resection) and was subsequently subjected to concurrent chemotherapy and radiation therapy.

    On 18 January 2016, respondent filed a complaint for permanent total disability benefits against UPLI and CTI.

    ULPI and CTI countered that the seafarer’s illness was not compensable because it was not work-related or listed among the occupational diseases under the Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Overseas Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Ships (POEA-SEC). It added that respondent likewise did not prove the causal relation between his illness and his work as stateroom steward.

    Should the seafarer be granted his claim for permanent total disability benefits?

    The Supreme Court granted the seafarer’s claim for permanent total disability benefits.

    The Court cited Section 20 (A) of the POEA-SEC, and ruled that in order for a disability to be compensable, (i) the injury or illness must be work-related; and, (ii) the work-related injury or illness must have existed during the term of the contract of the seafarer. In turn, “work-related illness” pertains to such sickness listed as occupational disease under Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC with the set conditions therein satisfied. An illness not listed as occupational disease is, nonetheless, disputably presumed work-related provided that the seafarer proves, by substantial evidence, that his or her work conditions caused or, at the least, increased his or her having contracted the same.1Ilustricimo v. NYK-Fil Ship Management, Inc., G.R. No. 237487, June 27, 2018.

    The Court also emphasized that for a disease to be compensable, the nature of work need not be the only reason for the seafarer to suffer his or her illness. What is crucial is the reasonable connection between the seafarer’s disease and one’s work leading a rational mind to conclude that such work contributed to or aggravated the development of the illness.2Ilustricimo v. NYK-Fil Ship Management, Inc., G.R. No. 237487, June 27, 2018.

    On the one hand, the Court found that the seafarer was able to establish a reasonable link between his having suffered rectal cancer and his work. Similarly, he was able to establish that his work conditions increased his having contracted his illness considering that the dietary provision on the vessel (food high in cholesterol and fat and low in fiber) was a known cause of rectal cancer.

    The Court mentioned that it has already taken judicial notice of the food provisions on a ship which are produced at one time for long journeys across the oceans and seas. In Skippers United Pacific, Inc. v. Lagne,3G.R. No. 217036, August 20, 2018, the Court recognized that the food provided to seafarers are mostly frozen meat, canned goods and seldom are there vegetables which easily rot and wilt and, therefore, impracticable for long trips. Also, in the case of Jebsens Maritime, Inc. v. Alcibar,4G.R. No. 221117, February 20, 2019. the Court similarly ruled that rectal cancer of therein respondent was work-related as the latter proved that the cause thereof was the poor provisions — high in fat and cholesterol and low in fiber — given to him while at sea. Such poor provisions were on the same level with those given to herein respondent while he was still aboard the vessel. Furthermore, the Court had already pronounced the compensability of colorectal cancer in Leonis Navigation Co., Inc. v. Villamater.5G.R. No. 179169, March 3, 2010, 628 PHIL 81-100. According to the Court, it cannot be gainsaid that the poor diet of the herein seafarer while at sea contributed to his having developed rectal cancer during the term of his employment contract.

    On the other hand, the Court also found that although UPLI and CTI argued that the company-designated doctor declared the seafarer’s illness as not work-related, the pronouncement of the company-designated physician had actually bolstered the contention that the seafarer’s diet on the vessel contributed to him having suffered from rectal cancer. The Court highlighted the company-designated physician’s medical report of 14 June 2014 which read:

    Adenocarcinoma’s risk factors include age, diet rich in saturated fat; fatty acid and linoleic acid and genetic predisposition and is likely not work-related.6Emphasis supplied.

    For the Court such report cited that one of the risk factors of rectal cancer was poor diet. Also, such report did not categorically state that respondent’s illness was not work-related but that it was just likely not work-related without any explanation for saying so.

    Further reading:

    • United Philippine Lines, Inc. v. Romasanta, Jr., G.R. No. 239256, January 15, 2020.

  • Seafarer’s Surviving Legitimate Spouse, a Necessary Party in a Complaint for Death Benefits

    In Leonis Navigation Agency, Inc. v. Dagos,1G.R. No. 241909, January 14, 2019. the Supreme Court ruled that the surviving legitimate spouse of the seafarer is not an indispensable party but only a necessary party in a complaint for death benefits. According to the Court, there is no law stating that only the legal spouse has the legal standing to institute a complaint to claim death benefits under the Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Overseas Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Ships2Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Memorandum Circular No. 10-10.. The failure to implead her will not result in the dismissal of the claim.

    Further reading:

    • Leonis Navigation Agency, Inc. v. Dagos, G.R. No. 241909, January 14, 2019.

  • Guarded Prognosis

    In one case, the Supreme Court reiterated the following rules relating to seafarer claims of total and permanent disability benefits:

    • The company-designated physician must issue a final medical assessment on the seafarer’s disability grading within a period of 120 days from the time the seafarer reported to him;
    • If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the said period of 120 days without any justifiable reason, then the seafarer’s disability becomes permanent and total;
    • If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the said period of 120 days with a sufficient justification (e.g., seafarer required further medical treatment or seafarer was uncooperative), then the period of diagnosis and treatment shall be extended for another 120 days (or up to 240 days from the time the seafarer reported to him). The employer has the burden to prove that the company-designated physician has sufficient justification to extend the period; and
    • If the company-designated physician still fails to give his assessment within the said extended period, then the seafarer’s disability becomes permanent and total, regardless of any justification.

    With regard to the company-designated physician’s medical assessment, the Court set forth the following requirements for determining the seafarer’s condition:

    • The assessment must be issued within the 120/240-day window; and
    • It must be final and definitive.

    In the present case, the Supreme Court found that the company-designated physician’s medical report was issued within the 240-day period. However, the Court ruled that the said report was not final and definitive.

    According to the Court, a final and definitive disability assessment is necessary in order to truly reflect the extent of the sickness or injuries to the seafarer and his or her capacity to resume work as such. To be conclusive, the medical assessments or reports:

    • must be complete and definite to give the proper disability benefits to seafarers
    • must also be supported with sufficient bases.

    The Court found that the company-designated physician’s medical report merely states that

    • the seafarer’s “prognosis for returning to sea duties is guarded” and
    • “if patient is entitled to disability, his suggested disability grading is Grade 10 — loss of grasping power for large objects.”

    The Court added that the report was notably bereft of any statement or explanation as to how the company-designated physician arrived with her medical conclusion. The report also did not even contain a definite statement as to the seafarer’s fitness to return to sea duties as it states that his prognosis of returning to his sea duties is still guarded.

    Furthermore, the company-designated physician failed to explain in detail the progress of the seafarer’s treatment and the approximate period needed for him to fully recover. Said physician merely adopted the findings or observations of the Orthopedics and Spine Surgery specialist.

    Thus, the Court ruled that the company-designated physician’s medical assessment was not final and definitive. The seafarer’s disability is deemed permanent and total by operation of law. The seafarer was awarded $110,000.00 under the CBA.

    Further reading:

    • Wilhelmsen-Smithbell Manning, Inc. v. Aleman, G.R. No. 239740 (Notice), January 8, 2020.

  • A Seafarer’s Cause of Action Arises Upon His Disembarkation from the Vessel

    On 4 February 2010, Khalifa Algosaibi, through its agent, 88 Aces, hired Apolinario as an ordinary seaman to board the vessel MV Algosaibi 42. His employment contract was for a duration of 6 months.

    After passing the required pre-employment medical examination, Apolinario left Manila on 26 February 2010 and embarked MV Algosaibi 42 in Ras Tanura, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

    After completing his contract in August 2010, Apolinario was not repatriated to the Philippines, for he directly entered into a new employment contract with 88 Aces’ foreign principal, Khalifa Algosaibi. This new contract with Khalifa Algosaibi lasted until April 2012.

    While on board MV Algosaibi 42 in December 2010, Apolinario suddenly experienced dizziness. As his condition did not improve, he was sent to As Salama Hospital in Al-Khobar, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where he was found to have high glucose and cholesterol. Apolinario notes that he was given medicine by the doctor and was advised to observe proper diet and avoid stress. After taking the doctor’s advice, his medical condition improved and he was able to perform his work well.

    However, after 2 years, particularly in January 2012, Apolinario alleged that his dizziness recurred, accompanied by the blurring of his vision. On 2 April 2012, he stated that he returned to As Salama Hospital where he was diagnosed to have diabetes mellitus and dislipedemia.

    In 11 April 2012, Apolinario was repatriated in Manila.

    Apolinario claims that he immediately reported to the office of 88 Aces to get his unpaid wages and for him to be referred to the company physician. However, 88 Aces viewed that his repatriation happened because he completed his 6-month Philippine Overseas Employment Administration standard employment contract. Thus it declined to shoulder his medical expenses. Apolinario no longer insisted on treatment and just continued taking the medicine given by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia doctor.

    Although Apolinario felt well, his illness recurred on 2 August 2013. Apolinario then consulted Dr. Joseph Glenn Dimatatac, an internal medicine physician, who informed him that his illness was indeed diabetes mellitus.

    On 17 March 2015, Apolinario consulted Dr. Rufo Luna, the Municipal Health Officer of the Municipality of San Jose, who declared him to be physically unfit to continue work due to his hyperglycemia. Consequently, Apolinario demanded, albeit unsuccessfully, the payment of his disability benefits from his employer.

    Apolinario filed his Request for Single Entry Approach at the National Labor Relations Commission on 25 March 2015. Then, on 8 May 2015, he filed a Complaint against Khalifa Algosaibi, 88 Aces, and Jocson (Respondents) before the Office of the Labor Arbiter for the payment of disability benefits.

    Respondents, on the other hand, denied liability for the following reasons:

    • Apolinario filed his Complaint 5 years after the completion of his employment contract in August 2010. Thus, his cause of action had already prescribed, not having been filed within the 3-year prescriptive period set by law.
    • Apolinario finished his 6-month employment contract in August 2010 without any medical issue whatsoever.
    • Apolinario actually failed to comply with the 3-day post-employment medical examination requirement.

    RULING:

    RE: Prescription

    Under the standard employment contract of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, a contract between an employer and a seafarer ceases upon its completion, when the seafarer signs off from the vessel and arrives at the point of hire.1Section 2, Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Memorandum Circular No. 10, Series of 2010 (Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Overseas Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Ships [October 26, 2010])

    In this case, while Apolinario’s 6-month contract may have ended as early as August 2010, he nonetheless was able to sign off from MV Algosaibi 42 and arrive at the point of hire only on 11 April 2012.

    (Significance: A seafarer’s cause of action arises upon his disembarkation from the vessel.)

    As Apolinario’s disembarkation from the Algosaibi 42 was on 11 April 2012, he had three years from the date, or until April 11, 2015, to make a claim for disability benefits.

    Apolinario had requested for a Single Entry Approach2The Single Entry Approach is an administrative approach to provide an accessible, speedy, and inexpensive settlement of complaints arising from employer-employee relationship to prevent cases from ripening into full blown disputes. All labor and employment disputes undergo this 30-day mandatory conciliation-mediation process. before the National Labor Relations Commission as early as 25 March 2015.

    The fact that Apolinario filed his Complaint before the Office of the Labor Arbiter only on 8 May 2015 is of no moment. Since the Single Entry Approach is a pre-requisite to the filing of a Complaint before the Office of the Labor Arbiter, the date when Apolinario should be deemed to have instituted his claim was when he instituted his Request for Single Entry Approach on 25 March 2015. Considering that the expiration of Apolinario’s cause of action was on 11 April 2015, his claim was filed well within the 3-year prescriptive period.

    RE: Disability benefits

    The Supreme Court ruled that Apolinario is entitled to permanent total disability benefits.

    Under the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract, those illnesses, such as diabetes mellitus, which are not listed as an occupational disease are disputably presumed as work-related.3Section 20 (A) (4), Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Memorandum Circular No. 10, Series of 2010 (Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Overseas Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Ships [October 26, 2010])

    According to the Court, the effect of the legal presumption in favor of the seafarer is to create a burden on the part of the employer to present evidence to overcome the prima facie case of work-relatedness. Absent any evidence from the employer to defeat the legal presumption, the prima facie case of work-relatedness prevails.

    To reinforce the prima facie case in his favor, Apolinario stated that during the existence of his contract, he experienced recurring dizziness and was diagnosed at As Salama Hospital in Al-Khobar Saudi Arabia to have contracted diabetes mellitus. In fact, while on board the vessel, he was twice sent to As Salama Hospital in Al-Khobar Saudi Arabia for medical treatment. To support his claim, Apolinario presented the medical record issued by the hospital and the different medical certificates of his physicians after his repatriation in Manila stating that he is already physically unfit to return to work due to his diabetes mellitus.

    On the other hand, the Supreme Court found that respondents failed to present a scintilla of proof to establish the lack of casual connection between Apolinario’s disease and his employment as a seafarer.

    The Court stated that had respondents granted Apolinario’s request to undergo a post-employment medical check-up, they could have presented a medical finding to contradict the presumption of work-relatedness of Apolinario’s illness. The post-employment medical check-up could have been the proper basis to determine the seafarer’s illness, whether it was work-related, or its specific grading of disability. Having failed to present any evidence to defeat the presumption of work-relatedness of Apolinario’s diabetes mellitus, the prima facie case that it is work-related prevails.

    Nonetheless, the Supreme Court clarified that the presumption provided under Section 20 (A) (4) is only limited to the “work-relatedness” of an illness. It does not cover and extend to compensability. In this sense, there exists a fine line between the work-relatedness of an illness and the matter of compensability. Work-relatedness merely relates to the assumption that the seafarer’s illness, albeit not listed as an occupational disease, may have been contracted during and in connection with one’s work, whereas compensability pertains to the entitlement to receive compensation and benefits upon a showing that a seafarer’s work conditions caused or at least increased the risk of contracting the disease.

    The Supreme Court noted the medically accepted finding that stress has major effects on a person’s metabolic activity. The effects of stress on glucose metabolism are mediated by a variety of counter-regulatory hormones that are released in response to stress and that result in elevated blood glucose levels and decreased insulin action. In diabetes, because of a relative or absolute lack of insulin, the increase in blood glucose on account of stress cannot be adequately metabolized. Thus, stress is a potential contributor to chronic hyperglycemia in diabetes.

    In this case, to prove that his work conditions caused or at least increased the risk of contracting the disease, Apolinario showed that part of his duties as an Ordinary Seaman in MV Algosaibi 42 involved strenuous workload such as assist in the handling and operation of all deck gear such as topping, cradling and housing of booms; aid the carpenter in the repair work when requested; scale and chip paint, handle lines in the mooring of the ship, assist in the actual tying up and letting go of the vessel and stand as a lookout in the vessel. Apolinario further stated that while inside the vessel for several months, he was exposed to physical and psychological stress due to rush jobs, lack of sleep, heat stress, emergency works and homesickness for being away from his family. From the above enumeration of Apolinario’s duties on board the vessel, he was certainly exposed to various strain and stress — physical, mental and emotional.

    Respondents failed to adduce any contrary medical findings from the company-designated physician to show that Apolinario’s illness was not caused or aggravated by his working conditions on board the vessel. There was also no showing that Apolinario is predisposed to the illness by reason of genetics, obesity or old age. Thus, the Supreme Court considered that the stress and strains he was exposed to on board contributed, even to a small degree, to the development of his disease. Inasmuch as compensability is the entitlement to receive disability compensation upon a showing that a seafarer’s work conditions caused or at least increased the risk of contracting the disease, Apolinario’s disease was thus declared compensable.

    RE: Reportorial Requirement

    While the requirement to report within three working days from repatriation appears to be indispensable in character, the Supreme Court enumerated the established exceptions to this rule:

    • when the seafarer is incapacitated to report to the employer upon his repatriation; and
    • when the employer inadvertently or deliberately refused to submit the seafarer to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician.4Falcon Maritime and Allied Services, Inc., et al. v. Angelito B. Pangasian, G.R. No. 223295, March 13, 2019.

    Here, Apolinario avers that two days after his repatriation to Manila on 11 April 2012, he reported to the office of 88 Aces to get his unpaid wages and for him to be referred to the company designated physician. However, since his repatriation was due to the completion of his six-month Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-approved employment contract, he was told by 88 Aces through Jocson that they could not shoulder his medical expenses. Having been denied to undergo the post medical examination, Apolinario just continued taking the medicine given to him by the doctor in Saudi Arabia.

    Between the two conflicting allegations from Apolinario and respondents, the Supreme Court resolved the doubt in favor of Apolinario. Besides, the factual backdrop of the case supports Apolinario’s allegation that he requested to be referred to a company designated physician. It noted that Apolinario repeatedly experienced dizziness and headaches, and needed medical attention while on board MV Algosaibi 42. In fact, because of his recurring sickness, he was examined twice at As Salama Hospital in Al-Khobar Saudi Arabia and even underwent thorough treatment thereat 10 days prior to his repatriation to Manila. Given Apolinario’s sensitive medical condition days prior to his repatriation, The Court doubted respondents’ allegation that Apolinario did not request to be referred to post-employment medical examination when he arrived in Manila. Apolinario’s medical condition during and after his employment on board lends credence to his claim that he asked to be medically examined by a company-designated physician but he was prevented so by respondents.

    According to the Supreme Court, respondents had the opportunity to refer Apolinario to a company-designated physician, but they chose to escape their responsibility. Between the non-existent medical assessment of the company-designated physician and the medical assessment of Apolinario’s doctor of choice — stating that his disability is permanent and total — the latter evidently stands. Absent a certification from the company-designated physician, the law steps in to conclusively characterize his disability as total and permanent.

    Further Reading:

    • Zonio, Jr. v. 88 Aces Maritime Services, Inc., G.R. No. 239052, October 16, 2019.