Paulino Ungos III

Lawyer | Law Professor | Author

Tag: #BarNiJLo2024

  • I Skipped Work as I Felt Sick

    Laurence alleged that on September 3, 2007, he was hired by Verizon Communications Philippines, Inc. (Verizon) as network engineer.

    Laurence narrated that sometime in January 2012, his doctor diagnosed him with pulmonary tuberculosis and pneumonia for which he was recommended to isolate and rest for 60 days.

    Laurence informed his manager of his medical condition, and did not report for work from February 3, 2012 to recuperate from his illness. He went to Guimaras Island to quarantine himself and avoid the spread of his disease.

    On March 14, 2012, Laurence received a notice to explain. When he called his manager to ask why he was being made to explain, the latter answered that the employer already terminated his employment on March 12, 2012.

    Two weeks later, Laurence received a letter of termination from his employer, prompting him to file a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages against the latter.

    In his case, Laurence claimed to have been illegally dismissed and entitled to his money claims. He asserted that there was no just or authorized cause for his dismissal and that the employer failed to observe the requirements of due process. Laurence also claimed that he did not abandon his work since he was able to notify the employer of his illness and the need for medical treatment on isolation. According to Laurence, his absence is justified due to his sickness that needed a long rest and quarantine period to prevent the spread of the disease to his co-workers.

    For its part, the employer acknowledged that on February 3, 2012, Laurence notified his manager through text message on his absence. However, the employer pointed out that Laurence did not indicate the duration of his leave and no longer answered its manager’s phone calls. After more than a month of not hearing from Laurence, the employer sent its nurse, who was able to check on Laurence and serve him a notice requiring him to explain his unauthorized absence and why he should not be considered to have abandoned his work. It was only on March 14, 2012 that Laurence called his manager regarding the notice and explained that he had no cellphone reception in the place where he was. On the same day, Laurence sent an email in which he admitted his mistake, apologized for his unauthorized absence, and sought reconsideration of his dismissal. In view of Laurence’s admission, the employer terminated his employment on March 28, 2012.

    The employer further averred that Laurence was aware of its policies on attendance and absences. Nonetheless, he failed to notify the employer of the duration of his leave. The notice he gave to his manager was not enough because he did not mention the length of his absence and did not submit a medical certificate or medical test results. For the employer, his 38-day absence, as well as his admission, warranted his termination from employment.

    In its Decision dated February 11, 2013, the Office of the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.

    According to the Office of the Labor Arbiter, Laurence, a Network Engineer whose presence was always expected by the employer in the worksite, went on prolonged absence without official leave for 38 consecutive days, without informing his manager or the employer about it and without even offering any reasonable explanation for his failure to inform the employer of his prolonged absences. For the Office of the Labor Arbiter, the employer cannot be faulted in applying its rule on unauthorized absences for 5 consecutive days, which carried a penalty of dismissal from employment.

    Aggrieved, Laurence appealed before the National Labor Relations Commission, pointing out that his prolonged absence was due to health reasons and he did not intend to abandon his work. Laurence thus insisted on his stand that no valid cause attended his dismissal from employment.

    The National Labor Relations Commission reversed the Office of the Labor Arbiter’s ruling and upheld Laurence’s stand that the employer failed to show just cause in terminating his employment. The Commission explained that the rules of the employer only mandates its employees to notify their manager 4 hours before taking a sick leave and to submit his/her medical certificate upon return. The Commission found that Laurence was able to notify his immediate manager through text message about his sickness and his leave on February 3, 2012. Since the Commission did not consider the absences of Laurence as unauthorized, his dismissal from employment was declared illegal.

    The employer filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, but the latter upheld the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission. The Court of Appeals added that the length of his absence is justified considering that pulmonary tuberculosis and pneumonia are commonly considered to be serious infectious diseases.

    The employer elevated its case to the Supreme Court and asserted that Laurence was validly dismissed because of his deliberate violation of the employer’s rules on unauthorized absences and excessive absenteeism. The employer stated that it validly exercised its management prerogative in applying its rules. Finally, it granted Laurence ample opportunity to be heard.

    Was Laurence validly dismissed from employment?

    The Supreme Court ruled in the negative, because Laurence was not found to have violated the employer’s rules on authorized and unauthorized absences.

    The Court reiterated prevailing principles in that the employer in an illegal dismissal case has the burden of proving that an employee’s dismissal from service was for a just or authorized cause. Otherwise, the employer’s failure shall result in a finding that the dismissal is unjustified.

    Record showed that the employer dismissed Laurence because of his alleged violation of its rules. Under such rules, the absence of an employee may be authorized or unauthorized. An authorized absence, due to sickness, requires that the employee send his manager notice 4 hours before his shift, with a reasonable description of his illness, and the submission of the employee’s proof of illness on his return date. On the other hand, the employee’s absence becomes unauthorized if the employee fails to notify his/her immediate superior, or if the employee fails to submit a medical certificate on his/her return date.

    However, the Supreme Court found that on February 3, 2012, Laurence sent his manager a text message, informing the latter that he will be absent because he was sick with pulmonary tuberculosis, a contagious disease, and was advised to take medication. It was also found that the manager did not deny having received this message from Laurence.

    The Supreme Court thus stated that the information given by Laurence was sufficient to properly apprise the employer of his condition. Furthermore, Laurence’s failure to submit proof of illness while he was on sick leave and to indicate a return date did not render his absence unauthorized. The Court added that Laurence was no longer given the opportunity to submit his medical certificate and other documents to prove his illness.

    With regard to the employer’s policy on excessive absenteeism, which prescribes dismissal as penalty, the Court ruled that the same was harsh.

    The Court mentioned that the Constitution looks with compassion on the working class and is intent on protecting their rights. A worker’s employment is property in a constitutional sense, and he/she cannot be deprived thereof without due process and unless the deprivation is commensurate to his/her acts and degree of moral depravity. While the right of an employer to terminate the services of an employee for a just or authorized cause is recognized, the dismissal must be made within the parameters of law and pursuant to the tenets of equity and fair play. An employer’s power to discipline his employees must not be exercised in an arbitrary manner as to erode the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure.

    The Court continued that although the power to dismiss employees is a formal prerogative of the employer, such power is not without limitations. The employer is bound to exercise caution in terminating the services of his employees and dismissals must not be arbitrary and capricious. Due process must be observed and employers should respect and protect the rights of their employees. To effect a valid dismissal, the law requires not only that there be just and valid cause; it must also be supported by evidence. There must be a reasonable proportionality between the offense and the penalty. Even when there exist some rules agreed upon between the employer and employee on the subject of dismissal, the same cannot preclude the State from inquiring on whether their rigid application would work too harshly on the employee. Dismissal, without doubt, is the ultimate penalty that can be meted to an employee. Hence, where a penalty less punitive would suffice, whatever missteps may be committed by labor ought not to be visited with a consequence so severe. The Court stressed that it will not hesitate to disregard a penalty that is manifestly disproportionate to the infraction committed.

    In the present case, the Court noted that since the employer raised Laurence’s violation of its rules, it is incumbent upon the employer to prove that Laurence clearly, voluntarily and intentionally committed the infraction. However, the Court found that Laurence’s absence from work was due to sickness and that he gave proper notification of his absence, which reason should have been given kind consideration by the employer. The Court remarked that an employee cannot anticipate when an illness may happen, thus, he may not be able to give prior notice or seek prior approval of his absence, but could only do so after the occurrence of the incident.

    The Court added that even assuming that Laurence was found to have deliberately violated the employer’s rules, the penalty of dismissal imposed upon him was too harsh and disproportionate to the wrongdoing committed. In this regard, the Court maintained that it is not bound by the employer’s rules, as well as the employer’s findings of violation and dismissal. It is settled that the law serves to equalize the unequal. The labor force is a special class that is constitutionally protected because of the inequality between capital and labor. This constitutional protection presupposes that the labor force is weak. However, the level of protection to labor should vary from case to case; otherwise, the State might appear to be too paternalistic in affording protection to labor.

    The Court also found that Laurence was not accorded procedural due process.

    The Court stated that to effect a valid dismissal on the ground of just cause, the employer is bound to observe procedural due process. Procedural due process consists of the twin requirements of notice and hearing. The employer must furnish the employee with 2 written notices before the termination of employment can be implemented:

    • the first apprises the employee of the particular acts or omission for which his dismissal is sought; and
    • the second informs the employee of the employer’s decision to dismiss him.

    In the present case, the Court found that the notices issued by the employer failed to observe the standards set forth in case law. The Court said that while the employer ostensibly afforded Laurence the opportunity to refute the charge of AWOL and abandonment against him, the employer deprived him of due process when he was not given ample time to prepare his defense and later on, when his explanation was not given consideration on the ground that it was submitted beyond the 48-hour period.

    What reliefs were granted to Laurence?

    In view of the finding of illegal dismissal, the Court upheld the grant of separation pay, but it deleted the award of backwages.

    With regard to reinstatement, the Court discussed that usually, reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and full backwages are granted to illegally dismissed employees.

    However, if actual reinstatement is no longer possible, the employee becomes entitled to separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. Based on jurisprudence, reinstatement is not feasible:

    • in cases where the dismissed employee’s position is no longer available
    • the continued relationship between the employer and the employee is no longer viable due to the strained relations between them; and
    • when the dismissed employee opted not to be reinstated, or the payment of separation benefits would be for the best interest of the parties involved.

    In these instances, said the Court, separation pay is the alternative remedy to reinstatement in addition to the award of backwages. The payment of separation pay and reinstatement are exclusive remedies. Stated differently, the payment of separation pay replaces the legal consequences of reinstatement to an employee who was illegally dismissed.

    In the present case, the Court upheld the grant of separation pay in favor of Laurence since it was consistently found that he opted to receive separation pay instead of reinstatement.

    On the other hand, with regard to backwages, the Court elaborated that in labor cases, the Court is tasked with the delicate act of balancing the employee’s right to security of tenure against the employer’s right to freely exercise its management prerogatives. Even though it is basic in labor law that an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to reinstatement, or separation pay if reinstatement is not viable, and payment of full backwages, in some instances, the Court has carved out exceptions where the reinstatement of an employee was ordered without an award of backwages. This is on account of: (1) the fact that dismissal of the employee would be too harsh of a penalty; and (2) that the employer was in good faith in terminating the employment.

    The Court held that the employer is excused from paying backwages to Laurence because it considered the penalty of dismissal to be harsh. Although Laurence did not violate the employer’s rules on authorized and unauthorized absences since he was able to notify his immediate manager of his absence on February 3, 2012 because of his sickness, the Court found that he cannot be deemed entirely faultless. Aside from the text message he sent, he did nothing else to comply with the employer’s rules. He did not inform the employer that he would leave his residence nor leave any information on how he may be reached. On the other hand, his manager exerted efforts to contact Laurence, albeit to no avail. For such reasons, the Court held that no basis supported an award of backwages. Such award of backwages was thus deleted.

    Further reading:

    • Verizon Communications Philippines, Inc. v. Margin, G.R. No. 216599, September 16, 2020.

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  • Appalling Disregard of Physical Safety and Property

    Wilfredo alleged that he was engaged as a bus driver by the employer bus company since August 5, 2005.

    Wilfredo narrated that on May 31, 2015, a representative from the head office of the employer bus company instructed him to alight from his assigned bus and no longer allowed him to continue his supposed trip that day. When Wilfredo reported for work the next day, he was advised not to come to work in the meantime. He was told that the employer bus company will just send him an e-mail as to when he will be given a bus assignment.

    Wilfredo thus filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, money claims, damages and attorney’s fees against the employer bus company.

    Since the employer bus company failed to file its position paper during the proceedings, the Office of the Labor Arbiter deemed Wilfredo’s allegations to be admitted. The Office of the Labor Arbiter declared Wilfredo to be illegally dismissed from employment and ordered the employer bus company to pay Wilfredo separation pay and backwages, among other awards.

    In its appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission, the employer bus company averred that it filed its position paper with respect to the claim of Wilfredo and mailed the same to the Office of the Labor Arbiter.

    The Commission admitted the position paper of the employer bus company and ruled that just cause attended the dismissal of Wilfredo from employment. The Commission found that Wilfredo was involved in several reckless driving incidents that constituted misconduct.

    Wilfredo’s petition before the Court of Appeals was dismissed for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals found that there was valid ground to dismiss Wilfredo from employment and that the employer bus company complied with the procedural requirements of due process in such dismissal.

    Wilfredo elevated his case before the Supreme Court. Wilfredo insisted that the employer bus company failed to substantiate his alleged cumulative infractions of company rules for reckless driving that warranted his dismissal. Wilfredo further mentioned that the employer bus company failed to afford him procedural due process since he was not given a notice to explain, there was no hearing or conference to afford him an opportunity to present evidence to support his claim, and he did not receive a notice of termination.

    Was Wilfredo validly dismissed from employment?

    The Supreme Court ruled that Wilfredo was validly dismissed from employment.

    The Court discussed that dismissal from employment has two facets: first, the legality of the act of dismissal, which constitutes substantive due process; and second, the legality of the manner of dismissal, which constitutes procedural due process. The burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the disciplinary action was made for lawful cause or that the termination of employment was valid. In administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings, the quantum of evidence required is substantial evidence or “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Thus, unsubstantiated suspicions, accusations, and conclusions of the employer do not provide legal justification for dismissing the employee.

    With regard to the substantive aspect, the Court found that the employer bus company terminated Wilfredo’s employment on the ground of serious misconduct. The Court stated that for serious misconduct to be a just cause for dismissal, the concurrence of the following elements is required: (a) the misconduct must be serious; (b) it must relate to the performance of the employee’s duties showing that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer; and (c) it must have been performed with wrongful intent.

    In the present case, the Court found that the employer bus company presented sufficient evidence to prove that Wilfredo committed numerous infractions of company rules and regulations since he started working with the employer bus company. According to the Court, the infractions can be traced as far back as 2002 up to the time he was rehired in 2008 when he admitted to hitting a concrete mixer truck in Baliuag, Bulacan. The Court added that in the year 2009, the side mirror of Wilfredo’s assigned bus was destroyed while he was trying to overtake another bus; and in 2013, he had an altercation with an inspector of the employer bus company for which he was meted a penalty of suspension. The Court continued that the last infraction was in March 2015 when he figured in a vehicular accident that caused injuries to his passengers.

    For the Court, the repeated and numerous infractions committed by Wilfredo in driving the passenger bus assigned to him cannot be considered minor. The Court took judicial notice of the gross negligence and the appalling disregard of the physical safety and property of others so commonly exhibited today by the drivers of passenger buses. Taking into account the nature of Wilfredo’s job, the Court determined Wilfredo’s infractions to be numerous to be ignored or treated lightly that the same may already be subsumed as serious misconduct. The Court accordingly held that Wilfredo was validly dismissed from employment on the ground of serious misconduct.

    With regard to requirements of procedural due process, the Court found that the employer bus company failed to comply with the same. The Court expounded that the following should be considered in terminating the services of employees:

    • The first written notice to be served on the employees should contain the specific causes or grounds for termination against them, and a directive that the employees are given the opportunity to submit their written explanation within a reasonable period of at least five (5) calendar days from receipt of the notice.
    • After serving the first notice, the employers should schedule and conduct a hearing or conference wherein the employees will be given the opportunity to explain and clarify their defenses to the charge against them; present evidence in support of their defenses; and rebut the evidence presented against them by the management.
    • After determining that termination of employment is justified, the employers shall serve the employees a written notice of termination indicating that: all circumstances involving the charge against the employees have been considered; and grounds have been established to justify the severance of their employment.

    In the present case, the Court found that the employer bus company was unable to send Wilfredo a first written notice containing the specific causes or grounds for termination against him. Although Wilfredo submitted a lengthy explanation letter dated June 3, 2015 explaining his side on the incident that transpired two months back, the Court stressed that such explanation did not excuse the fact that there was a complete absence of the first notice. The Court thus sanctioned the employer bus company for disregarding due process requirements.

    According to the Court, where the dismissal is for a just cause, as in this case, the lack of statutory due process will not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal or ineffectual. The employer will not be required to pay the employee backwages. However, the employer should indemnify the employee for the violation of his statutory right in the form of nominal damages in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (Php30,000.00) in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.

    Further reading:

    • Mariano v. G.V. Florida Transport, G.R. No. 240882, 16 September 2020.

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  • To Have Enough of Enough…

    In 1997, Home Credit gave its employee her first service vehicle. Later, the employee purchased the vehicle from Home Credit at its depreciated value.

    In 2003, Home Credit granted the employee’s request for a second service vehicle. However, Home Credit required the employee to pay for additional equity in excess of the maximum limit of Php660,000.00. In 2008, the employee again purchased the vehicle at its depreciated value.

    In 2009, the employee applied for a third service vehicle. This time, Home Credit informed the employee that she must pay the equity more than Php550,000.00. Home Credit likewise adopted a cost sharing scheme where the employer must shoulder 40% of the acquisition price.

    Aggrieved, the employee filed a complaint against Home Credit for violation of Article 100 of the Labor Code on non-diminution of benefits.

    Was the employee’s benefit diminished?

    The Supreme Court ruled that no diminution of benefits occurred.

    According to the Court, employees generally have a vested right over existing benefits that the employer voluntarily granted them.1University of the East v. University of the East Employees Association, G.R. No. 179593, September 14, 2011, 673 PHIL 273-290 These benefits cannot be reduced, diminished, discontinued or eliminated2Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. v. Eastern Telecoms Employees Union, G.R. No. 185665, February 8, 2012, 681 PHIL 519-536; and Tiangco v. Leogardo, Jr., G.R. No. L-57636, May 16, 1983, 207 PHIL 235-247 consistent with the constitutional mandate to protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.3CONSTITUTION, Art.II, Sec. 18; and Art. XIII, Sec. 3. Article 100 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, provides:

    ART. 100. Prohibition against Elimination or Diminution of Benefits. — Nothing in this Book shall be construed to eliminate or in any way diminish supplements, or other employee benefits being enjoyed at the time of promulgation of this Code. (Emphasis Supplied.)

    Jurisprudence4Arco Metal Products, Co., Inc. v. Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Arco Metal-NAFLU, G.R. No. 170734, May 14, 2008, 577 PHIL 1-12, citing CONSTITUTION, Article II, Section 18 and Article XIII, Section 3. dictates that the principle of non-diminution of benefits is founded on the constitutional mandate to “protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare” and “to afford labor full protection.” The Court clarified that the basis for non-diminution rule is not Article 100 which refers solely to “benefits enjoyed at the time of the promulgation of the Labor Code,” thus:

    x x x Article 100 refers solely to the non-diminution of benefits enjoyed at the time of the promulgation of the Labor Code. Employer-employee relationship is contractual and is based on the express terms of the employment contract as well as on its implied terms, among them, those not expressly agreed upon but which the employer has freely, voluntarily and consistently extended to its employees. Under the principle of mutuality of contracts embodied in Article 1308 of the Civil Code, the terms of a contract — both express and implied — cannot be withdrawn except by mutual consent or agreement of the contracting parties.

    The Court added that the non-diminution rule applies only if the benefit is based on an express policy, a written contract, or has ripened into a practice.5Central Azucarera de Tarlac v. Central Azucarera de Tarlac Labor Union-NLU, G.R. No. 188949, July 26, 2010, 639 PHIL 633-642

    In the present case, the Court found that the employee’s claim that the car plan was part of her hiring package was unsubstantiated. Record shows that Home Credit had no existing car plan at the time of the employee’s hiring. Her employment contract did not even contain any express provision on her entitlement to a service vehicle at full company cost.

    The Court also found that that the car plan had not ripened into a company practice. According to the Court, a “practice” or “custom” is not a source of a legally demandable or enforceable right. In labor cases, however, benefits which were voluntarily given by the employer, and which have ripened into company practice, are considered as rights and are subject to the non-diminution rule.6Makati Stock Exchange, Inc. v. Campos, G.R. No. 138814, April 16, 2009, 603 PHIL 121-134 To be considered a company practice, the benefit must be consistently and deliberately granted by the employer over a long period of time. It requires an indubitable showing that the employer agreed to continue giving the benefit knowing fully well that the employee is not covered by any provision of law or agreement for its payment.7Vergara, Jr. v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 176985, April 1, 2013, 707 PHIL 255-266 The burden to establish that the benefit has ripened into a company practice rests with the employee.8Galang v. Boie Takeda Chemicals, Inc., G.R. No. 183934, July 20, 2016, 790 PHIL 582-604

    In the present case, the Court found that Home Credit’s act of giving service vehicles to the employee had been a company practice — but not as to the non-participation aspect. There was no substantial evidence to prove that the car plan at full company cost had ripened into company practice. The Court reiterated that the only time the employee was given a service vehicle fully paid for by the company was for her first car. For the second vehicle, the company already imposed a maximum limit of P660,000.00 but the employee never questioned this. She willingly paid for the equity in excess of said limit. Thus, the elements of consistency and deliberateness were not present.

    Further reading:

    • Home Credit Mutual Building and Loan Association v. Prudente, G.R. No. 200010, August 27, 2020.

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  • Nothing Contradictory Between a Definite Employment Period and the Nature of the Employee’s Duties

    Julian, Larry, and a group of co-workers were engaged as janitors, messengers, and utility persons by LBP Service Corporation, which had a manpower service agreement with Land Bank of the Philippines.

    In 2014, the manpower service agreement between LBP Service Corporation and Land Bank of the Philippines expired and resulted in the recall of Julian, Larry and the group.

    Believing that they were illegally dismissed from employment, Julian and the group filed a complaint against LBP Service Corporation before the Office of the Labor Arbiter. In such complaint, they also claimed to be regular employees of LBP Service Corporation since they performed services necessary and desirable to its business.

    LBP Service Corporation countered that Julian, Larry, and the group were supposed to be reassigned to a different client, but they opted to resign.

    On December 10, 2014, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint.

    The Office of the Labor Arbiter declared Julian, Larry, and the group as fixed-term contractual employees of LBP Service Corporation.

    However, the Office of the Labor Arbiter found no evidence that LBP Service Corporation terminated their employment contracts, since the notice of recall did not amount to a termination of their services.

    The Office of the Labor Arbiter ordered Larry and a number of his co-complainants to report for work because their engagement merely lapsed when the manpower services agreement between LBP Service Corporation and Land Bank of the Philippines expired.

    For the Office of the Labor Arbiter, Larry and the group were still in LBP Service Corporation’s workforce and may be deployed to its other clients.

    However, the Office of the Labor Arbiter did not order Julian and another group of co-complainants to return to work because they were found to have voluntarily resigned from their employment.

    Julian, Larry, and the group appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission, but the Commission dismissed their appeal and affirmed the Office of the Labor Arbiter’s Decision.

    Julian, Larry, and the group filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, which, however, affirmed the ruling of the Commission.

    Julian, Larry and the group elevated their case to the Supreme Court, and insisted on their claim that they were regular employees of LBP Service Corporation.

    Were Julian, Larry and the group regular employees of LBP Service Corporation?

    The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. It agreed with the ruling of the Court of Appeals and labor tribunals that Julian, Larry and the group were fixed-term contractual employees of LBP Service Corporation.

    The Court discussed that contracts of employment for a fixed term are not unlawful unless it is apparent from the circumstances that the periods have been imposed to circumvent the laws on security of tenure.

    The Court reiterated the following criteria of a valid fixed-term employment, to wit:

    • The fixed period of employment was knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon by the parties without any force, duress, or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating his consent; or
    • It satisfactorily appears that the employer and the employee dealt with each other on more or less equal terms with no moral dominance exercised by the former or the latter.

    In the present case, the Court found that Julian, Larry and the group were employed on a contract basis to meet LBP Service Corporation’s commitment to its client, the Land Bank of the Philippines.

    The Court also found that at the time of their hiring, they were informed through their respective employment contracts that their engagement was for a specific period.

    The Court further remarked that such employment contracts expressly stipulated the duration of their services, to wit:

    • Employee’s voluntary resignation;
    • Non-renewal or termination of the contract with the client company where the employee is assigned; or
    • When the company of assignment no longer needs the employee’s services, but with future referral and employment with another client.

    In addition, the Court found no evidence indicating that Julian, Larry and the group were pressured into signing their fixed-term contracts or that LBP Service Corporation exhibited dominance over them. The Court remarked that Julian, Larry and the group had the chance to refuse but they consciously accepted their contracts. Significantly, it was found that the periods and conditions stipulated in their employment contracts were likewise not intended to deny them from acquiring security of tenure.

    The Court noted Julian, Larry and the group’s claim that they were regular employees. However, the Court declared such claim to be untenable. The Court stated that the fact that an employee is engaged to perform activities that are necessary and desirable in the usual business of the employer does not prohibit the fixing of employment for a definite period. There is thus nothing essentially contradictory between a definite period of employment and the nature of the employee’s duties.

    For the Court, Julian, Larry and the group were fixed-term employees.

    Further reading:

    • Tuppil, Jr. v. LBP Service Corp., G.R. No. 228407, 10 June 2020.

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