Paulino Ungos III

Lawyer | Law Professor | Author

Category: Labor Law

  • But She Went Home for Personal Reasons

    On 7 November 2010, Hazel entered into a 2-year employment contract with Kuwait by Al-Masiya, through its agent, Saad Mutlaq Al Asmi Domestic Staff Recruitment Office (Saad Mutlaq)/Al Dakhan Manpower where she to work as a domestic helper with a monthly salary of US$400.00.

    Hazel arrived in Kuwait on 8 November 2010. Due to disagreement in the working conditions, Hazel’s employment with her first and second employers did not succeed. Her employment with her third employer also did not succeed as the latter could not obtain a working visa for her.

    On 16 December 2010, Hazel went to the Philippine Embassy where she related her employment problems to a Labor Attaché in Kuwait who offered to help them.

    On 5 January 2011, Hazel left the Philippine Embassy after a certain Mr. Mutlaq offered to give her a job at a chocolate factory. However, this chocolate factory turned out to be inexistent.

    Then, the employees of Al Rekabi, an employment agency, told her that they would be bringing her to Hawally at night. She refused to take the trip as it was cold and drizzling. She then attempted to report the matter to the Labor Attaché using her cellular phone, but the employees of Al Rekabi confiscated it. Mr. Hassan, the Manager of Al Rekabi, did not accede to her request to postpone the trip to the following day. It came to a point where Mr. Hassan scolded Hazel and forced her to make a written admission that her employers treated her well.

    Sometime after 6 January 2011, Hazel was brought to the office of Al Rekabi at Salmiya. On an unspecified date thereafter, at around 7:00 p.m., two men offered her a job at a restaurant in front of the main office of the agency. She accepted the offer. However, instead of being brought to a restaurant in Hawally, where she was supposed to work, Hazel was taken to a flat where she was told to apply makeup and wear attractive and sexy clothes. Another man joined them. Hazel was then told that she would be brought to her place of work. However, she was instead taken to an unlighted area which had buildings but no restaurant or coffee shop signboards. At the area, she saw another man walking. After recognizing that the man was an employee of Al Rekabi, she asked him to bring her to the main office of the agency. She was able to leave at around 11:00 p.m. when the three other men agreed to release her.

    On 7 February 2011, Hazel was asked to affix her signature on a letter that she copied purportedly showing that she admitted having preterminated her contract of employment and that she no longer had any demandable claim as she was treated well. Hazel’s execution of this letter of resignation was made as a precondition to the release of her passport and plane ticket which were in the possession of petitioners.

    Hazel arrived in the Philippines on 12 February 2011 and thereafter filed a complaint for constructive dismissal against her employer.

    In response to Hazel’s complaint, the employers filed a motion to dismiss on 11 May 2011, alleging that on 7 February 2011, Hazel executed an Affidavit of Quitclaim and Desistance, Sworn Statement, and Receipt and Quitclaim before the Assistant Labor Attaché in Kuwait, where she allegedly stated that she voluntarily agreed to release her employers from all her claims arising from her employment abroad. They also presented her handwritten statement where she expressed that her cause for terminating her employment was her own personal reasons.

    Was Hazel constructively dismissed from employment?

    The Supreme Court stated that in cases of constructive dismissal, the impossibility, unreasonableness, or unlikelihood of continued employment leaves an employee with no other viable recourse but to terminate his or her employment. “An employee is considered to be constructively dismissed from service if an act of clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer has become so unbea[r]able to the employee as to leave him or her with no option but to forego his or her continued employment.” From this definition, it can be inferred that various situations, whereby the employer intentionally places the employee in a situation which will result in the latter’s being coerced into severing his ties with the former, can result in constructive dismissal.1Torreda v. Investment and Capital Corporation of the Philippines, G.R. No. 229881, September 5, 2018 and Agcolicol, Jr. v. Casiño, G.R. No. 217732, June 15, 2016.

    The Court found that the circumstances of the present case strongly indicated that Hazel was constructively dismissed.

    First, Hazel’s foreign employer never secured a working visa for her, in violation of the categorical requirement for an employer’s accreditation with the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency.

    Second, Hazel was not properly paid in accordance with the terms of her employment contract. During her 3-month stay, she was only paid US$227.75 instead of the stipulated pay of US$400 per month.

    Third, Hazel was not assigned to a permanent employer abroad for the entire contractual period of 2 years. Upon her arrival in Kuwait, she was consistently promised job placements which were found to be inexistent. The Court found it clear that the foreign employer intended to use Hazel as an entertainer of some sort in places of ill repute; and she would have fallen victim to human trafficking “[w]ere it not for some favorable providence.”

    Finally, Hazel was made to copy and sign a prepared resignation letter and this was made as a condition for the release of her passport and plane ticket.

    For the Court, it was logical for Hazel to consider herself constructively dismissed. since the impossibility, unreasonableness, or unlikelihood of continued employment has left her with no other viable recourse but to terminate her employment. The Court further stated:

    Our overseas workers belong to a disadvantaged class. Most of them come from the poorest sector of our society. Their profile shows they live in suffocating slums, trapped in an environment of crimes. Hardly literate and in ill health, their only hope lies in jobs they find with difficulty in our country. Their unfortunate circumstance makes them easy prey to avaricious employers. They will climb mountains, cross the seas, endure slave treatment in foreign lands just to survive. Out of despondence, they will work under sub-human conditions and accept salaries below the minimum. The least we can do is to protect them with our laws.

    On that note, the Court reminds petitioners to observe common decency and good faith in their dealings with their unsuspecting employees, particularly in undertakings that ultimately lead to waiver of workers’ rights. The Court will not renege on its duty to protect the weak against the strong, and the gullible against the wicked, be it for labor or for capital. The Court scorns petitioners’ reprehensible conduct. As employers, petitioners are bound to observe candor and fairness in their relations with their hapless employees.

    Further reading:

    • Al-Masiya Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. v. Viernes, G.R. No. 216132, January 22, 2020.

  • Perfection of Appeals and Article 128

    The Supreme Court reiterated the following rule:

    The perfection of an appeal of the Order of the Regional Director involving a monetary award in cases which concern the visitorial and enforcement powers of the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment is subject to the requirements prescribed under Article 128, to wit:

    Art. 128. Visitorial and Enforcement Power. — x x x

    An order issued by the duly authorized representative of the Secretary of Labor and Employment under this article may be appealed to the latter. In case said order involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Secretary of Labor and Employment in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the order appealed from.1Emphasis supplied.

    The Court explained that the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission is separate and distinct from that of the Secretary of Labor and Employment. In the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, each agency is governed by its own rules of procedure. The rules of procedure of the Commission are thus different from (and do not apply in) cases cognizable by the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment.

    The Court added that unlike the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, as amended, no provision in the Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standards Cases governs the filing of a motion for the reduction of the amount of the bond. However, on matters that are not covered by the Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standards Cases, the suppletory application of the Rules of Court (and not the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, as amended) is authorized. In this regard, the Department of Labor and Employment has no authority to accept an appeal under a reduced bond.

    Further reading:

    • Blazing Star Security and Investigation Agency, Inc. v. Miraflor, G.R. No. 196022, January 22, 2020.

  • Your Employment Shall Start When You Are Issued a Boarding Confirmation

    Sometime in December 2012, a seafarer applied with Naess Shipping for possible employment as seaman upon learning of a job opening in its domestic vessel operations. He had completed the training on International Safety Management Code and had undergone the mandatory pre-employment medical examination where he was declared fit for sea service.

    On 15 February 2013, the seafarer signed an Embarkation Order stipulating the terms and conditions of his employment. On 18 February 2013, the seafarer executed a 6-month “Contract of Employment for Marine Crew on Board Domestic Vessels” with Royal Dragon, through its agent Naess Shipping, where he was to work as Second Officer with a gross monthly salary of Php30,000.00 aboard the vessel “M/V Melling 11,” an inter-island bulk and cargo carrier. It was stipulated that the contract shall take effect on 12 March 2013.

    Subsequently, the seafarer and Royal Dragon executed an “Addendum to Contract of Employment for Marine Crew Onboard Domestic Vessels” stating that the employment relationship between them shall commence once the Master of the Vessel issues a boarding confirmation to the seafarer.

    On 8 March 2013, Naess Shipping informed the seafarer that Royal Dragon cancelled his embarkation.

    As the seafarer was unable to leave, he filed a complaint for breach of contract against Royal Dragon and Naess Shipping before the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission.

    Royal Dragon and Naess Shipping, however, countered that the labor arbiter had no jurisdiction over the complaint. According to them, no employer-employee relationship had existed because the Master of the Vessel had not issued a boarding confirmation to the seafarer.

    The labor tribunals ruled in favor of the seafarer. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the said ruling. According to the Court of Appeals, the Office of the Labor Arbiter did not acquire jurisdiction over the seafarer’s complaint because no employer-employee relationship existed between him and Royal Dragon. It emphasized that the supposed contract of employment did not commence since the seafarer’s deployment to his vessel of assignment did not materialize.

    Did an employer-employee relationship exist between the seafarer and Royal Dragon?

    The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative.

    The Court found that a contract of employment had already been perfected between the seafarer and Royal Dragon. Such contract had passed the negotiation stage or the time the prospective contracting parties had manifested their interest in the contract. It had reached the perfection stage or the so-called “birth of the contract” as it was clearly shown that the essential elements of a contract, i.e., consent, object, and cause, were all present at the time of its constitution. The seafarer and Royal Dragon, freely entered into the contract of employment, affixed their signatures thereto and assented to the terms and conditions of the contract (consent), under which the seafarer bound himself to render service (object) to Royal Dragon on board the domestic vessel “M/V Meiling 11” for the gross monthly salary of P30,000.00 (cause). According to the Court, the seafarer and Royal Dragon assumed obligations which pertain to those of an employer and an employee by virtue of said contract.

    Although the Court acknowledged that parties to a contract are free to adopt such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, such is qualified by the requirement that contractual stipulations therein should not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.

    The Court found that the stipulation contained in Section D of the Addendum was a condition which held in suspense the performance of the respective obligations of the seafarer and Royal Dragon under the contract of employment, or the onset of their employment relations. The Court stated that such condition was solely dependent on the will or whim of Royal Dragon since the commencement of the employment relations was at the discretion or prerogative of the latter’s master of the ship through the issuance of a boarding confirmation to the seafarer. Applying the law1Article 1182 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which reads: Art. 1182. When the fulfillment of the condition depends upon the sole will of the debtor, the conditional obligation shall be void. If it depends upon chance or upon the will of a third person, the obligation shall take effect in conformity with the provisions of this Code. and jurisprudence,2Naga Telephone Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107112, February 24, 1994, 300 PHIL 367-389. the Court viewed this kind of condition as a “potestative condition,” the fulfillment of which depends exclusively upon the will of the debtor, in which case, the conditional obligation is void.

    The Court clarified that where the so-called “potestative condition” is imposed not on the birth of the obligation but on its fulfillment, only the condition is avoided, leaving unaffected the obligation itself.3Romero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107207, November 23, 1995, 320 PHIL 269-284 In this regard, the condition set forth in the Addendum was one imposed not on the birth of the contract of employment since the contract has already been perfected, but only on the fulfillment or performance of their respective obligations, i.e., for the seafarer to render services on board the ship and for Royal Dragon to pay him the agreed compensation for such services. The Court accordingly ruled that a purely potestative imposition, such as the one in the Addendum, must be obliterated from the face of the contract without affecting the rest of the stipulations considering that the condition related to the fulfillment of an already existing obligation and not to its inception. The Court added that the condition imposed for the commencement of the employment relations offends the principle of mutuality of contracts ordained in Article 1308 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which states that contracts must bind both contracting parties, and its validity or compliance cannot be left to the will of one of them. The Court was accordingly constrained to treat the condition as void and of no effect, and declare the respective obligations of the parties as unconditional. Consequently, the Court declared that the employer-employee relationship between the seafarer and Royal Dragon should be deemed to have arisen as of the agreed effectivity date of the contract of employment, or on 12 March 2013.

    Further reading:

    • Gemudiano, Jr. v. Naess Shipping Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 223825, January 20, 2020.

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  • Recomputation of Accrued Benefits and Immutability of Judgment

    Execution is the final stage of litigation, the end of the suit. Backwages must be computed from the time the employee was unjustly dismissed until his or her actual reinstatement or upon payment of his or her separation pay if reinstatement is no longer feasible. Hence, insofar as accrued backwages and other benefits are concerned, the employer’s obligation to the employee continues to accumulate until the employer actually implements the reinstatement aspect of the final judgment or fully satisfies the monetary award in case reinstatement is no longer possible.1Mt. Carmel College v. Resuena, G.R. No. 173076, October 10, 2007, 561 PHIL 620-646.

    In one case, the Office of the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision dated 12 September 2003 declaring the employer liable for illegal dismissal of the employee, with separation pay, backwages, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.

    On 29 July 2004, the National Labor Relations Commission affirmed the illegality of the employee’s dismissal from employment, as well as the monetary award, when it dismissed the appeal of the employer for non-perfection. This Decision became final and executory on 10 January 2005. As soon as an entry of judgment thereon was issued on 17 January 2005, the corresponding writ of execution was implemented and satisfied in full.

    This, notwithstanding, the employer opted elevate the case before the Court of Appeals and later, before the Supreme Court. However, the employer lost in both fora. The Supreme Court’s Resolution dated 23 June 2008 dismissing the employer’s petition became final and executory on 21 August 2008.

    On 3 November 2008, the employee sought for additional increments to her monetary award. She posited that her backwages, separation pay, and other benefits should be computed up to 21 August 2008 when the resolution of the Supreme Court became final and executory.

    May the employee be granted a recomputation of accrued backwages, separation pay, and other benefits?

    The Supreme Court ruled in the negative, since the employee was no longer entitled to a recomputation or increase of the monetary award already paid her.

    While the Court noted that the employer formally opposed the employee’s claims, record, nonetheless, shows that the judgment was executed way back in 2005. For the Court, the employer had already satisfied the final monetary benefits awarded to the employee. Corollary, “the latter may not ask for another round of execution, lest, it violates the principle against unjust enrichment.” There was no additional increment which accrued to the employee by reason of the Supreme Court’s Resolution dated 23 June 2008 which did not modify, let alone, alter the long executed judgment of the National Labor Relations Commission.

    Jurisprudence2Mercury Drug Corp. v. Spouses Huang, G.R. No. 197654, August 30, 2017, 817 PHIL 434-464 dictates that a final judgment may no longer be altered, amended, or modified, even if the alteration, amendment or modification is meant to correct a perceived error in conclusions of fact and law and regardless of what court renders it. More so when, as in this case, such final judgment had already been executed and fully satisfied.

    The Court stressed that the employee’s receipt of full backwages, separation pay, and other benefits in 2005 effectively severed the employer-employee relationship between her and the employer. From that point up until the finality of the Court’s Resolution dated 23 June 2008, the employee no longer had a right to demand further benefits as such.

    The Court stated that “granting a recomputation and, consequently, another round of execution would indubitably alter the original decision which had been completely satisfied, nay, unjust enrichment would certainly result.”

    Further reading:

    • Tan v. Dagpin, G.R. No. 212111, January 15, 2020.

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  • Leniency and Substantial Justice

    In labor cases, rules of procedure should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. They are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, and where their strict application would result in the frustration rather than promotion of substantial justice, technicalities must be avoided. Technicalities should not be permitted to stand in the way of equitably and completely resolving the rights and obligations of the parties. Where the ends of substantial justice shall be better served, the application of technical rules of procedure may be relaxed. In certain cases, leniency was granted in the observance of rules of procedure to advance substantial justice. After all, cases should be determined on the merits, after the parties have been given full opportunity to ventilate their causes and defenses, rather than on technicality or procedural imperfection.1Tres Reyes v. Maxim’s Tea House, G.R. No. 140853, February 27, 2003; Malixi v. Baltazar, G.R. No. 208224, November 22, 2017; Jaro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127536, February 19, 2002, 427 PHIL 532-549

    The Supreme Court remanded a certain case to the Court of Appeals, and directed it to reinstate and take action on the Petition for Certiorari filed by the employees. Record revealed that the Court of Appeals had previously dismissed the said petition for having been filed beyond 60 days from notice, based on the employees’ own allegations therein.

    Leniency was afforded the employees since they were able to prove that their Petition for Certiorari was actually filed within the reglementary period and the error was merely in the statement of material dates in the said petition. Specifically, the employees were able, albeit belatedly, to append to their Petition for Review on Certiorari a copy of the Bailiff’s Return dated 4 October 2018, which indicated that the Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission was received by the employees’ counsel on 3 October 2018 (and not 25 September 2018, as erroneously stated by the employees in their Petition for Certiorari). Thus, the Supreme Court found that the Petition for Certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals on 3 December 2018 was filed on time. However, the Court reminded the employees and their counsel to be more circumspect in the indication of material dates and other factual matters in their pleadings to avoid any confusion and to prevent delay. The Court further warned them that other procedural missteps will not be granted the same leniency.

    Further reading:

    • San Felipe v. Armscor Global Defense, Inc., G.R. No. 247639, January 15, 2020.

  • Food Provisions on a Ship

    The seafarer entered into a 6-month employment contract with CTI, through UPLI, to work as a stateroom steward aboard the vessel Carnival Glory. After passing the pre-employment medical examination, he joined the vessel on 26 February 2014.

    Sometime in March 2014, the seafarer reported passing out fresh blood during bowel movement but with no fever, abdominal pain or vomiting. He was treated at the vessel infirmary. Thereafter, he was brought to the Charleston Endoscopy Center in South Carolina, USA for colonoscopy. His biopsy, however, indicated “Segments of Invasive Moderately Differentiated Adenocarcinoma.”

    On 12 June 2014, the seafarer was medically repatriated. Upon his arrival in Manila, UPLI immediately referred him to the Marine Medical Services for further evaluation and management. Thereafter, the company-designated doctor confirmed that respondent was suffering from “Moderately Differentiated Adenocarcinoma Rectum.” The seafarer underwent a surgical operation (Abdominal Resection) and was subsequently subjected to concurrent chemotherapy and radiation therapy.

    On 18 January 2016, respondent filed a complaint for permanent total disability benefits against UPLI and CTI.

    ULPI and CTI countered that the seafarer’s illness was not compensable because it was not work-related or listed among the occupational diseases under the Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Overseas Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Ships (POEA-SEC). It added that respondent likewise did not prove the causal relation between his illness and his work as stateroom steward.

    Should the seafarer be granted his claim for permanent total disability benefits?

    The Supreme Court granted the seafarer’s claim for permanent total disability benefits.

    The Court cited Section 20 (A) of the POEA-SEC, and ruled that in order for a disability to be compensable, (i) the injury or illness must be work-related; and, (ii) the work-related injury or illness must have existed during the term of the contract of the seafarer. In turn, “work-related illness” pertains to such sickness listed as occupational disease under Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC with the set conditions therein satisfied. An illness not listed as occupational disease is, nonetheless, disputably presumed work-related provided that the seafarer proves, by substantial evidence, that his or her work conditions caused or, at the least, increased his or her having contracted the same.1Ilustricimo v. NYK-Fil Ship Management, Inc., G.R. No. 237487, June 27, 2018.

    The Court also emphasized that for a disease to be compensable, the nature of work need not be the only reason for the seafarer to suffer his or her illness. What is crucial is the reasonable connection between the seafarer’s disease and one’s work leading a rational mind to conclude that such work contributed to or aggravated the development of the illness.2Ilustricimo v. NYK-Fil Ship Management, Inc., G.R. No. 237487, June 27, 2018.

    On the one hand, the Court found that the seafarer was able to establish a reasonable link between his having suffered rectal cancer and his work. Similarly, he was able to establish that his work conditions increased his having contracted his illness considering that the dietary provision on the vessel (food high in cholesterol and fat and low in fiber) was a known cause of rectal cancer.

    The Court mentioned that it has already taken judicial notice of the food provisions on a ship which are produced at one time for long journeys across the oceans and seas. In Skippers United Pacific, Inc. v. Lagne,3G.R. No. 217036, August 20, 2018, the Court recognized that the food provided to seafarers are mostly frozen meat, canned goods and seldom are there vegetables which easily rot and wilt and, therefore, impracticable for long trips. Also, in the case of Jebsens Maritime, Inc. v. Alcibar,4G.R. No. 221117, February 20, 2019. the Court similarly ruled that rectal cancer of therein respondent was work-related as the latter proved that the cause thereof was the poor provisions — high in fat and cholesterol and low in fiber — given to him while at sea. Such poor provisions were on the same level with those given to herein respondent while he was still aboard the vessel. Furthermore, the Court had already pronounced the compensability of colorectal cancer in Leonis Navigation Co., Inc. v. Villamater.5G.R. No. 179169, March 3, 2010, 628 PHIL 81-100. According to the Court, it cannot be gainsaid that the poor diet of the herein seafarer while at sea contributed to his having developed rectal cancer during the term of his employment contract.

    On the other hand, the Court also found that although UPLI and CTI argued that the company-designated doctor declared the seafarer’s illness as not work-related, the pronouncement of the company-designated physician had actually bolstered the contention that the seafarer’s diet on the vessel contributed to him having suffered from rectal cancer. The Court highlighted the company-designated physician’s medical report of 14 June 2014 which read:

    Adenocarcinoma’s risk factors include age, diet rich in saturated fat; fatty acid and linoleic acid and genetic predisposition and is likely not work-related.6Emphasis supplied.

    For the Court such report cited that one of the risk factors of rectal cancer was poor diet. Also, such report did not categorically state that respondent’s illness was not work-related but that it was just likely not work-related without any explanation for saying so.

    Further reading:

    • United Philippine Lines, Inc. v. Romasanta, Jr., G.R. No. 239256, January 15, 2020.

  • Seafarer’s Surviving Legitimate Spouse, a Necessary Party in a Complaint for Death Benefits

    In Leonis Navigation Agency, Inc. v. Dagos,1G.R. No. 241909, January 14, 2019. the Supreme Court ruled that the surviving legitimate spouse of the seafarer is not an indispensable party but only a necessary party in a complaint for death benefits. According to the Court, there is no law stating that only the legal spouse has the legal standing to institute a complaint to claim death benefits under the Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Overseas Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Ships2Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Memorandum Circular No. 10-10.. The failure to implead her will not result in the dismissal of the claim.

    Further reading:

    • Leonis Navigation Agency, Inc. v. Dagos, G.R. No. 241909, January 14, 2019.

  • Guarded Prognosis

    In one case, the Supreme Court reiterated the following rules relating to seafarer claims of total and permanent disability benefits:

    • The company-designated physician must issue a final medical assessment on the seafarer’s disability grading within a period of 120 days from the time the seafarer reported to him;
    • If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the said period of 120 days without any justifiable reason, then the seafarer’s disability becomes permanent and total;
    • If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the said period of 120 days with a sufficient justification (e.g., seafarer required further medical treatment or seafarer was uncooperative), then the period of diagnosis and treatment shall be extended for another 120 days (or up to 240 days from the time the seafarer reported to him). The employer has the burden to prove that the company-designated physician has sufficient justification to extend the period; and
    • If the company-designated physician still fails to give his assessment within the said extended period, then the seafarer’s disability becomes permanent and total, regardless of any justification.

    With regard to the company-designated physician’s medical assessment, the Court set forth the following requirements for determining the seafarer’s condition:

    • The assessment must be issued within the 120/240-day window; and
    • It must be final and definitive.

    In the present case, the Supreme Court found that the company-designated physician’s medical report was issued within the 240-day period. However, the Court ruled that the said report was not final and definitive.

    According to the Court, a final and definitive disability assessment is necessary in order to truly reflect the extent of the sickness or injuries to the seafarer and his or her capacity to resume work as such. To be conclusive, the medical assessments or reports:

    • must be complete and definite to give the proper disability benefits to seafarers
    • must also be supported with sufficient bases.

    The Court found that the company-designated physician’s medical report merely states that

    • the seafarer’s “prognosis for returning to sea duties is guarded” and
    • “if patient is entitled to disability, his suggested disability grading is Grade 10 — loss of grasping power for large objects.”

    The Court added that the report was notably bereft of any statement or explanation as to how the company-designated physician arrived with her medical conclusion. The report also did not even contain a definite statement as to the seafarer’s fitness to return to sea duties as it states that his prognosis of returning to his sea duties is still guarded.

    Furthermore, the company-designated physician failed to explain in detail the progress of the seafarer’s treatment and the approximate period needed for him to fully recover. Said physician merely adopted the findings or observations of the Orthopedics and Spine Surgery specialist.

    Thus, the Court ruled that the company-designated physician’s medical assessment was not final and definitive. The seafarer’s disability is deemed permanent and total by operation of law. The seafarer was awarded $110,000.00 under the CBA.

    Further reading:

    • Wilhelmsen-Smithbell Manning, Inc. v. Aleman, G.R. No. 239740 (Notice), January 8, 2020.

  • Demonstrated Litigiousness of the Parties

    On 6 June 1996, Papertech hired Katando as a machine operator in its office at Pasig City.

    On 14 December 2013, Katando received a memorandum from Papertech stating that due to urgency of business, she will be transferred to its Makati office. The memorandum stated that she will still be under the same employment terms and conditions but will be tasked to clean the area.

    Papertech issued a memorandum dated 6 February 2014 to Katando reiterating her transfer to its Makati office. Thereafter, Papertech issued a notice to Katando requiring her to explain within 48 hours why she refused to receive the 6 February 2014 memorandum. Katando submitted her explanation.

    Papertech issued another notice to Katando on 17 February 2014 directing her to explain why she should not be administratively charged for refusing to transfer to its Makati office. Despite submitting her explanation, Papertech issued a notice on 24 February 2014 dismissing Katando for her insubordination. Katando filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Papertech and its officers.

    The Office of the Labor Arbiter held that no just cause attended Katando’s dismissal. Papertech failed to prove the existence of a legitimate urgency which justified her transfer to the Makati office. In fact, Papertech did not disprove a certification from the Makati City Business Permit Office that it is not a registered entity in Makati City.

    Thus, the Office of the Labor Arbiter ordered Papertech to pay Katando backwages. However, Katando’s prayer for reinstatement was not granted. Instead, Papertech was ordered to pay her separation pay. According to the Office of the Labor Arbiter, “[t]he filing of the instant case and the attempts of Papertech to transfer the complainant have brought about antipathy and antagonism between them, thereby resulting to strained relationship.”

    Katando partially appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission.

    The National Labor Relations Commission agreed with the Office of the Labor Arbiter that separation pay should be given to Katando in lieu of her reinstatement. Katando went to the Court of Appeals.

    The Court of Appeals granted Katando’s petition and ordered Papertech to immediately reinstate her to her previous position without loss of seniority rights in addition to the award of backwages.

    The Court of Appeals ruled that the doctrine of strained relations cannot apply to Katando as she is part of the rank and file workforce and does not occupy a managerial or key position in the company. She even asked for her reinstatement. In addition, there is no proof of strained relations between her and Papertech. The fact that Katando and Papertech had been involved in several cases (illegal dismissal in connection with a strike and illegal suspension which happened around 2008) is not sufficient because no strained relations should arise from a valid and legal act of asserting one’s right.

    Papertech filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the Court of Appeals.

    Issue:

    Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the reinstatement of Katando instead of granting her separation pay.

    Ruling:

    In this case, the Supreme Court explained the doctrine of strained relations, which contemplates a situation where a monetary award is to be paid to an employee as an alternative to a reinstatement that can no longer be effected.

    According to the Court, the following factors should be considered in applying the doctrine of strained relations:

    • The employee must occupy a position where he or she enjoys the trust and confidence of his or her employer;
    • It is likely that if reinstated, an atmosphere of antipathy and antagonism may be generated as to adversely affect the efficiency and productivity of the employee concerned;
    • It cannot be applied indiscriminately because some hostility is invariably engendered between the parties as a result of litigation; and
    • It cannot arise from a valid and legal act of asserting one’s right.

    The doctrine cannot apply when the employee:

    • has not indicated an aversion to returning to work;
    • does not occupy a position of trust and confidence; or
    • has no say in the operation of the employer’s business.

    Furthermore, strained relations between the parties must be proven as a fact.

    In the present case, the Court noted that Katando did not occupy a position of trust and confidence as a machine operator. However, the Court found it apt to apply the doctrine of strained relations.

    Although acknowledging that litigation between the parties per se should not bar the reinstatement of an employee, the Court found the present case was not the only case that involved Papertech and Katando. Papertech and Katando had been in conflict for more than 10 years. The length of time from the occurrence of the incident to its resolution and the demonstrated litigiousness of the parties showed that their relationship is strained. Protracted litigation between the parties here sufficiently demonstrated that their relationship was already strained.

    Papertech had not even bothered to appeal the ruling of the Labor Arbiter, and even stated that “in order not to prolong the proceedings, and for both parties to peacefully move on from this unwanted situation, Papertech is willing to pay the judgment award of separation pay.” The Court took this as a confirmation that Papertech no longer wanted Katando back as its employee.

    Moreover, what remained in the Pasig City premises of Papertech was its sales, marketing, and distribution operations since its manufacturing and production departments were transferred to the province. Consequently, the position held by Katando was abolished. Katando’s reinstatement as a machine operator in Papertech’s Pasig City premises was no longer possible.

    The Court awarded separation pay to Katando, being the only viable option under the circumstances.

    Further reading:

    • Papertech, Inc. v. Katando, G.R. No. 236020, January 8, 2020.

  • I Didn’t Report for Work Because You Failed to Answer My Query

    In 2002, respondent company GRRI hired Neren as a part-time employee in its resort, LLB Resort and Spa. She became a regular employee on 1 February 2003, and was eventually promoted as head of the Housekeeping Department in 2005 and as head of the Front Desk Department in 2008.

    Sometime in 2013, Neren was charged with and found guilty of violating company policies, i.e., abuse of authority, when she rejected walk-in guests without management approval, and threat to person in authority, when she threatened the assistant resort manager with physical harm. Neren was meted the penalty of seven days suspension without pay, subject to the agreement that Neren would be under strict performance monitoring and that any further violation which would warrant suspension would be elevated to immediate dismissal. After serving her suspension, Neren resumed her task.

    In March 2014, GRRI implemented a reorganization in LLB Resort and Spa and issued a Notice to Transfer to Neren. Through the Notice to Transfer, she was informed of the reorganization within LLB Resort and Spa and was advised that she would be laterally transferred from the Reception Department to the Storage Department without diminution in rank and benefits.

    However, Neren refused to sign the Notice to Transfer and remained at the reception area for two days before reporting to her new station on 4 March 2014. Neren also sent an e-mail addressed to GRRI on 9 March 2014 asking questions regarding her transfer.

    On 10 March 2014, a Memorandum was issued to Neren directing her to explain within 24 hours from notice why she should not be penalized for insubordination for her repeated failure to sign the Notice to Transfer. In her handwritten letter dated 11 March 2014, Neren explained that she refused to sign the Notice to Transfer pending answers to the questions she sent to GRRI via e-mail.

    GRRI also issued Neren a Notice of Preventive Suspension on 14 March 2014 placing her under preventive suspension until 21 March 2014 pending resolution of the charge against her.

    Neren, however, failed to report back to work after the lapse of the period of her preventive suspension on 22 March 2014 until 26 March 2014. Thus, on 26 March 2014, GRRI’s Human Resource (HR) department issued Neren another Memorandum directing her to report to the HR department within 24 hours and to explain her absences without leave.

    Upon reporting thereat, Neren was handed a Termination Notice dated 21 March 2014 advising her that GRRI found her guilty of:

    • “inhuman and unbearable treatment to person in authority; abuse of authority; serious misconduct — insubordination by not accepting her memorandum of re-assignment by the Executive Committee; and
    • gross and habitual neglect of duties — AWOL”

    Can Neren’s employment be terminated on the ground of insubordination for her failure to sign the Notice to Transfer?

    No.

    In an illegal dismissal case, the onus probandi rests on the employer to prove that the employee’s dismissal was for a valid cause. A valid dismissal requires compliance with both substantive and procedural due process — that is, the dismissal must be for any of the just or authorized causes enumerated in Article 297 1Formerly Article 282. and Article 298 2Formerly Article 283., respectively, of the Labor Code of the Philippines, and only after notice and hearing3Under paragraph (b) of Article 292 (formerly Article 277) of the Labor Code of the Philippines..

    Insubordination or willful disobedience requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) the employee’s assailed conduct must have been willful or intentional, the willfulness being characterized by a “wrongful and perverse attitude”; and (2) the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge.4Gold City Integrated Port Services v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 86000, September 21, 1990, 267 PHIL 863-875.

    The Supreme Court ruled that both requirements were not present in this case.

    The Court found that as stated by Neren in her handwritten explanation, she withheld her signature on the Notice to Transfer because she was awaiting answers to the questions she raised to GRRI via e-mail. She could not be forced to affix her signature thereon if she did not really fully understand the reasons behind and the consequences of her transfer. While her action was willful and intentional, it was nonetheless far from being “wrongful and perverse.” The Court added, respondents failed to prove that there was indeed an order or company procedure requiring a transferee’s written conformity prior to the implementation of the transfer, and that such order or procedure was made known to Neren.

    Given the foregoing, there was no basis to dismiss Neren on the ground of insubordination for her mere failure to sign the Notice to Transfer.

    Was there cause to terminate Neren’s employment on the ground of gross and habitual neglect for her absences without leave from 22 to 26 March 2014?

    No, because the Court found that Neren’s four-day absence without leave could not be characterized as gross and habitual neglect of her duties.

    Jurisprudence5National Bookstore, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146741, February 27, 2002, 428 PHIL 235-249 and Cavite Apparel, Inc. v. Marquez, G.R. No. 172044, February 6, 2013, 703 PHIL 46-58. provides that in order to constitute a valid cause for dismissal, the neglect of duties must be both gross and habitual. Gross negligence has been defined as “the want or absence of or failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them.” On the other hand, habitual neglect “imparts repeated failure to perform one’s duties for a period of time, depending on the circumstances.” A single or isolated act of negligence does not constitute a just cause for the dismissal of the employee.

    Since the above-mentioned grounds failed to justify Neren’s dismissal from employment, should such dismissal be declared illegal?

    No, because the Court, nonetheless, found that Neren’s absences from 22 to 26 March 2014 were still without justification. Therefore, while there may be no basis to dismiss her on the grounds of insubordination and gross and habitual neglect, Neren was still guilty of having committed a violation. For the Court, the principle on totality of infractions may thus be considered in determining the imposable sanction for her current infraction.

    Under jurisprudence6Merin v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 171790, October 17, 2008, 590 PHIL 596-604., the totality of infractions or the number of violations committed during the period of employment shall be considered in determining the penalty to be imposed upon an erring employee.

    The Court said that the offenses committed by Neren should not be taken singly and separately. Fitness for continued employment cannot be compartmentalized into tight little cubicles of aspects of character, conduct and ability separate and independent of each other. While it may be true that Neren was penalized for his previous infractions, this did not and should not mean that her employment record would be wiped clean of her infractions. After all, the record of an employee is a relevant consideration in determining the penalty that should be meted out since an employee’s past misconduct and present behavior must be taken together in determining the proper imposable penalty. Despite the sanctions imposed upon Neren, she continued to commit misconduct and exhibit undesirable behavior on board. Indeed, the employer could not be compelled to retain a misbehaving employee, or one who was guilty of acts inimical to its interests. It had the right to dismiss such an employee if only as a measure of self-protection.

    In the present case, Neren alleged that she did not report back to work after serving her preventive suspension because GRRI did not reply to her query as to when she needed to report. However, the Court ruled that this reasoning did not justify her absences. The Notice of Preventive Suspension served on her clearly stated that the period of her preventive suspension was from 14 to 21 March 2014. Thus, she was expected to report back to work on her next working day. The Court noted that GRRI had already previously warned Neren that the penalty for her next infraction would be elevated to dismissal. For the Court, the dismissal of Neren, on the basis of the principle of totality of infractions, was justified.

    What consequence does this new finding have insofar as procedural due process is concerned?

    The Court ruled that Neren’s dismissal could be said to suffer from procedural lapses.

    Jurisprudence7King of Kings Transport, Inc. v. Mamac, G.R. No. 166208, June 29, 2007, 553 PHIL 108-119. has delineated the requirements of procedural due process for termination of employment, viz.:

    (1) The first written notice to be served on the employees should contain the specific causes or grounds for termination against them, and a directive that the employees are given the opportunity to submit their written explanation within a reasonable period. “Reasonable opportunity” under the Omnibus Rules means every kind of assistance that management must accord to the employees to enable them to prepare adequately for their defense. This should be construed as a period of at least five (5) calendar days from receipt of the notice to give the employees an opportunity to study the accusation against them, consult a union official or lawyer, gather data and evidence, and decide on the defenses they will raise against the complaint. Moreover, in order to enable the employees to intelligently prepare their explanation and defenses, the notice should contain a detailed narration of the facts and circumstances that will serve as basis for the charge against the employees. A general description of the charge will not suffice. Lastly, the notice should specifically mention which company rules, if any, are violated and/or which among the grounds under Art. [297] is being charged against the employees.

    In the present case, GRRI failed to observe the foregoing requirements, as follows:

    • While the Termination Notice cited four grounds for Neren’s dismissal, the Memorandum dated 10 March 2014 only charged Neren with insubordination for her refusal to sign the Notice to Transfer.
    • Neren was only given 24 hours to submit an explanation.
    • No administrative hearing was held, or even scheduled.
    • The Termination Notice already cited Neren’s absences without leave as ground for her dismissal even before she was even given any opportunity to be heard.

    The Court ruled that Neren should be awarded nominal damages.

    Further reading:

    • Villanueva v. Ganco Resort and Recreation, Inc., G.R. No. 227175, January 8, 2020.