Paulino Ungos III

Lawyer | Law Professor | Author

Author: Paulino Ungos III

  • Continuing Need and Desirability of Services

    The Supreme Court did not give credence to the claim that Mr. L was not OH, Inc.’s regular employee.

    The Labor Code of the Philippines1Under Article 295 (formerly Article 280) provides:

    Art. 295. Regular and casual employment. — The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking, the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.


    An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such activity exists.

    In this case, the Court found that Mr. L was under the continuous employ of OH, Inc. since 3 March 1995 until the latter placed him on floating status in February 2000.

    OH, Inc. was engaged in the business of managing residential and commercial condominium units at the OE Residences, a condominium hotel building in Makati City. Its business required that it maintained a pool of housekeeping staff to ensure that the premises remain an uncluttered place of comfort for the occupants.

    OH, Inc. continuously employed Mr. L precisely because of the indispensability of his services to its business.

    According to the Court, his uninterrupted employment by OH, Inc., that spanned more than a year, manifested the continuing need and desirability of his services, which characterize regular employment.

    Further reading:

    • Olympia Housing, Inc. v. Lapastora, G.R. No. 187691, January 13, 2016.

  • Guiding Principle in Conversion of Agricultural Land

    On 15 June 2011, the Supreme Court promulgated a Decision in Ayala Land, Inc. v. Castillo1G.R. No. 178110, June 15, 2011, 667 PHIL 274-350. upholding the Conversion Order issued by the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform on 31 October 1997. The land in this case is in Silang, Cavite.

    The farmers who were parties in this case filed a Motion for Reconsideration to the said decision arguing that conversion is not a legal mode to exempt the property from the coverage of Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.

    The Court denied the motion because the guiding principle2Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 01, series of 2002, Section 1. in conversion governs only prime agricultural lands.3Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 01, series of 2002, Section 4 provides:
    SECTION 4. Areas Non-Negotiable for Conversion — An application involving areas non-negotiable for conversion shall not be given due course even when some portions thereof are eligible for conversion. The following areas shall not be subject to conversion:
    4.1. Lands within protected areas designated under the NIPAS, including mossy and virgin forests, riverbanks, and swamp forests or marshlands, as determined by the DENR;
    4.2. All irrigated lands, as delineated by the DA and/or the National Irrigation Administration (NIA), where water is available to support rice and other crop production, and all irrigated lands where water is not available for rice and other crop production but are within areas programmed for irrigation facility rehabilitation by the government;
    4.3. All irrigable lands already covered by irrigation projects with firm funding commitments, as delineated by the DA and/or NIA; and
    4.4. All agricultural lands with irrigation facilities.

    In the present case, the subject land could not even be classified as agricultural land.

    First, the subject land was already reclassified from agricultural to other uses as early as 7 May 1996.

    Second, various government agencies found that:

    • The property is about 10 kilometers from the Provincial Road;
    • The land sits on a mountainside overlooking Santa Rosa technopark;
    • The topography of the landholding is hilly and has an average slope of over 18%. It is undeveloped and mostly covered with a wild growth of vines, bushes, and secondary growth of forest trees;
    • The dominant use of the surrounding area is its industrial/forest growth as the landholding is sitting on a mountain slope overlooking the Sta. Rosa Technopark; and
    • The area is not irrigated and no irrigation system was noted in the area.

    Finally, the Department of Agrarian Reform had long investigated and ruled that the property was not suitable for agricultural use, as it had remained undeveloped with no source of irrigation.

    The Court thus concluded that the subject land was not prime agricultural land as contemplated under the law. The Department of Agrarian Reform properly issued the assailed Conversion Order.

    Further reading:

    • Ayala Land, Inc. v. Castillo, G.R. No. 178110 (Resolution), January 12, 2016.

  • Defiance of Assumption/Certification Orders

    Once the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute, a strike, whether actual or intended, is automatically enjoined. If a strike has been declared, the strikers must return to work even if they filed a motion for reconsideration of the assumption order.1ARTICLE 278. (Formerly 263) Strikes, Picketing, and Lockouts. — x x x (g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. x x x

    The moment a striker defies a return-to-work order, he is deemed to have abandoned his job. It is already in itself knowingly participating in an illegal act. Considering that an illegal act was committed, all strikers, whether union officers or plain members, may be declared to have lost their employment status.2ARTICLE 279. (Formerly 264) Prohibited Activities. — (a) x x x Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status x x x

    In this case, the Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines (ALPAP) filed a Notice of Strike on June 5, 1998 and staged a strike against the Philippine Airlines (PAL) on the same day at around 5:30 in the afternoon. The Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) issued a Return-to-Work Order on 7 June 1998 after failing to to amicably settle the dispute between them. The said order stated:

    “WHEREFORE, FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED, all striking officers and members of ALPAP are hereby ordered to return to work within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of this Order and for PAL management to accept them under the same terms and conditions of employment prior to the strike.


    “Our directive to both parties to cease and desist from committing any and all acts that will exacerbate the situation is hereby reiterated.”

    ALPAP was served a copy of the Return-to-Work Order on 8 June 1998. Thus, the ALPAP strikers had 24 hours, or until 9 June 1998, to comply with said Order. However, the strikers only reported back to work on 26 June 1998. As a result of their defiance of the DOLE Secretary’s Return-to-Work Order, the strikers lost their employment status as of 9 June 1998.

    One pilot, Ruderico C. Baquiran, filed a complaint claiming that he was illegally dismissed from employment. The Supreme Court, however, disagreed for it found no evidence that he complied, or at least, attempted to comply with the Return-to-Work Order. Neither was there a showing that he reported back for work with the other ALPAP members on 26 June 1998. According to the Court, Baquiran cannot be in a better position than the other ALPAP members who belatedly reported for work on 26 June 1998 and were still deemed to have lost their employment. Baquiran simply abandoned his job.

    By contrast, the Court reached a different conclusion with regard to another pilot, Gladys L. Jadie, also a complainant in the illegal dismissal case. The Court found that Jadie was on maternity leave during the strike. She did not join the strike and could not be reasonably expected to report back for work by 9 June 1998 in compliance with the Return-to-Work Order. PAL’s act of terminating her employment was accordingly declared illegal.

    Further reading:

    • Rodriguez v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., G.R. Nos. 178501 & 178510, January 11, 2016.

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  • Transfer versus Promotion

    Somido and Cortes were engaged as a Warehouse Checker and Forklift Operator, respectively.

    The employer in this case dismissed these employees for insubordination. It explained that it merely transferred the latter to the Delivery Section to work as a Delivery Supervisor/Coordinator without any change in ranks, status and salaries. Since said employees arrogantly refused to comply with its directive, they were consequently dismissed from employment for valid cause.

    The Supreme Court disagreed.

    The Court examined the positions of Warehouse Checker and Forklift Operator and found that they were classified as rank-and-file employees. On the other hand, the Court found that the job of a Delivery Supervisor/Coordinator required the exercise of discretion and judgment from time to time. Specifically, a Delivery Supervisor/Coordinator

    • assigned teams to man the trucks;
    • oversaw the loading of goods;
    • checked the conditions of the trucks;
    • coordinated with account specialists in the outlets regarding their delivery concerns; and
    • supervised other personnel about their performance in the warehouse.

    A Delivery Supervisor/Coordinator’s duties and responsibilities were apparently not of the same weight as those of a Warehouse Checker or Forklift Operator. Despite the fact that no salary increases were effected, the Court viewed the employees’ assumption of the post of a Delivery Supervisor/Coordinator as a promotion. The employees’ refusal to accept the same was therefore valid.

    An employee is not bound to accept a promotion, which is in the nature of a gift or reward. Refusal to be promoted is a valid exercise of a right. Such exercise cannot be considered in law as insubordination, or willful disobedience of a lawful order of the employer, hence, it cannot be the basis of an employee’s dismissal from service.

    Further reading :

    • Echo 2000 Commercial Corp. v. Obrero Filipino-Echo 2000 Chapter-CLO, G.R. No. 214092, January 11, 2016.

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  • Proving Involuntary Resignations

    It is incumbent upon an employee to prove that his or her resignation is not voluntary.

    The overseas Filipino worker in this case maintained that she was threatened and coerced by her employer to write the resignation letter, to accept the financial assistance and to sign the waiver and settlement. She insisted that her act of resigning was involuntary and thus concluded that she has been illegally dismissed from employment.

    Resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who is in a situation where one believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service, and one has no other choice but to dissociate oneself from employment. It is a formal pronouncement or relinquishment of an office, with the intention of relinquishing the office accompanied by the act of relinquishment. As the intent to relinquish must concur with the overt act of relinquishment, the acts of the employee before and after the alleged resignation must be considered in determining whether in fact, he or she intended to sever from his or her employment.

    In this case, the Supreme Court was not convinced of complainant’s assertions, for it was unable to find proof supporting the same.

    First, in illegal dismissal cases, the employer has the burden of proving that the employee’s dismissal was legal. However, to discharge this burden, the employee must first prove, by substantial evidence, that he had been dismissed from employment. Here, the Court found no competent evidence to prove that her employer used force and threat before she wrote the resignation letter.

    For intimidation to vitiate consent, the following requisites must be present:

    • that the intimidation caused the consent to be given;
    • that the threatened act be unjust or unlawful;
    • that the threat be real or serious, there being evident disproportion between the evil and the resistance which all men can offer, leading to the choice of doing the act which is forced on the person to do as the lesser evil; and
    • that it produces a well-grounded fear from the fact that the person from whom it comes has the necessary means or ability to inflict the threatened injury to his person or property.

    In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that the worker had failed to prove the existence of the essential requisites. Thus, it concluded that the worker’s bare allegations of threat or force did not constitute substantial evidence to support a finding of forced resignation.

    And second, the following circumstances of the resignation led the Court to rule-out a finding of involuntariness:

    • The worker executed a resignation letter in her own handwriting;
    • She also accepted the amount of P35,000.00 as financial assistance and executed an Affidavit of Release, Waiver and Quitclaim and an Agreement, as settlement and waiver of any cause of action against her employer; and
    • The affidavit of waiver and the settlement were acknowledged/subscribed before a Philippine Labor Attache, and duly authenticated by the Philippine Consulate. The Agreement likewise bears the signature of a conciliator-mediator.

    The Court clarified that an affidavit of waiver duly acknowledged before a notary public is a public document which cannot be impugned by mere self-serving allegations. Proof of an irregularity in its execution is absolutely essential.

    Furthermore, the signatures of these officials sufficiently proved that the worker was duly assisted when she signed the waiver and settlement. The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The Court, however, remarked that no such evidence was presented.

    A waiver or quitclaim is a valid and binding agreement between the parties, provided that it constitutes a credible and reasonable settlement, and that the one accomplishing it has done so voluntarily and with a full understanding of its import.

    Since there was no extant and clear proof of the alleged coercion and threats the worker allegedly received from her employer that, in turn, led her to terminate her employment relations with her employer, the Court concluded that the worker resigned voluntarily.

    Further reading:

    • Iladan v. La Suerte International Manpower Agency, Inc., G.R. No. 203882, January 11, 2016.

  • Strikes and Good Faith

    To be lawful, a strike must have a lawful purpose and should be executed through lawful means.

    The union in this case asserted that it conducted a strike in good faith. It claimed to have had a sincere belief that its employer had committed an unfair labor practice. Also, it hoped that the said employer would be willing to negotiate the economic aspects of their collective bargaining agreement that was to expire soon. The union further insisted that all it did was to conduct an orderly, peaceful, and moving picket.

    The Supreme Court disagreed.

    The union’s disregard of the procedural requirements for conducting a valid strike had negated its claim of good faith. If such a claim were to be upheld, it was not enough for the union to believe that the employer was guilty of unfair labor practice. It must also sufficiently show that the strike complied with the law.

    Under the procedural requirements1Article 263 of the Labor Code specifies the limitations on the exercise of the right to strike, viz.:

    Article 263. Strikes, picketing, and lockouts. . . .

    xxx xxx xxx

    (c) In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the duly certified or recognized bargaining agent may file a notice of strike or the employers may file a notice of lockout with the [Department] at least 30 days before the intended date thereof. In cases of unfair labor practices, the period of notice shall be 15 days and in the absence of a duly certified or recognized bargaining agent, the notice of strike may be filed by any legitimate labor organization in behalf of its members. However, in case of dismissal from employment of union officers duly elected in accordance with the union constitution and by-laws, which may constitute union busting, where the existence of the union is threatened, the 15-day cooling off period shall not apply and the union may take action immediately.

    (d) The notice must be in accordance with such implementing rules and regulations as the [Secretary] of Labor and Employment may promulgate.

    (e) During the cooling-off period, it shall be the duty of the [Department] to exert all efforts at mediation and conciliation to effect a voluntary settlement. Should the dispute remain unsettled until the lapse of the requisite number of days from the mandatory filing of the notice, the labor union may strike or the employer may declare a lockout.

    (f) A decision to declare a strike must be approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned, obtained by secret ballot in meetings or referenda called for that purpose. A decision to declare a lockout must be approved by a majority of the board of directors of the corporation or association or of the partners in a partnership, obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose. The decision shall be valid for the duration of the dispute based on substantially the same grounds considered when the strike or lockout vote was taken. The [Department] may, at its own initiative or upon request of any affected party, supervise the conduct of the secret balloting. In every case, the union or the employer shall furnish the [Department] the results of the voting at least seven days before the intended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off period herein provided.

    xxx xxx xxx     for a valid strike, the following should be present:

    • a notice of strike filed with the Department of Labor and Employment at least 30 days before the intended date thereof, or 15 days in case of unfair labor practices;
    • a strike vote approved by the majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned, obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose; and
    • a notice of the results of the voting at least seven days before the intended strike given to the Department of Labor and Employment.

    These requirements are mandatory, such that non-compliance therewith by the union will render the strike illegal.

    In the present case, the Court found that the employees failed to:

    • file the notice of strike with the Department of Labor and Employment;
    • observe the cooling-off period; and
    • submit the result of the strike vote.

    In addition, although the union conducted a strike vote, the same was done by open, not secret, balloting.

    Significantly, the strike was far from orderly and peaceful. When the strike started, the union had on several instances obstructed the ingress into and egress from the employer’s offices. Record revealed evidence that depicted the acts of obstruction, violence and intimidation committed by the union during the picketing. Record even bared proof that the union forced the employer’s officers to resort to unusual means of gaining access into its premises at one point.

    The Court concluded that although the claim of good faith may have attached in so far as the union’s grounds for the strike, the same cannot be said as regards its conduct of the strike. The union should therefore bear the consequence of its non-compliance with the legal requirements.

    Further reading:

    • Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corp. Employees Union v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 156635, January 11, 2016.

  • Prove That An Employer-Employee Relationship Exists

    If you find yourself in a situation where the other party denies having an employer-employee relationship with you, make sure that you prove the following:

    • it had the power to select you to be an employee;
    • it paid your wages;
    • it had the power to dismiss you; and
    • it exercised control of the methods and results by which the your work is accomplished.

    In one case, the Supreme Court did not grant the claims of the complainants because they were not able to prove the existence of the mentioned elements. It said:


    “It must be recalled that when Belleza was the canteen concessionaire from 1993 to 1996, herein petitioners Daisog and Dimalanta were and continuously working thereat. When Catalan took over the management thereof in May 1997 they also continued their employment thereat.

    “However, when private respondent Ma. Theresa Ayuson took over the canteen management on April 29, 1999, she offered to Daisog and Dimalanta to continue working under her new management but the latter refused and they did not accept the separation pay being offered to them.

    “Based on the foregoing factual backdrop, it could be deduced that petitioners Daisog and Dimalanta’s employers if at all were Belleza and Catalan and not herein private respondent Ma. Theresa Ayuson.

    “However, Belleza and Catalan could not be held liable since they were not impleaded to the complaint. Neither was there evidence which directly established that petitioners Daisog and Dimalanta were employees of private respondent Cainta Coliseum which is managed by co-private respondent Ken K.C. Yu. Likewise, the record is bereft of any evidence which showed that private respondents Cainta Coliseum and/or Ken K.C. Yu and Maria Theresa Ayuson were the one who hired petitioners Daisog and Dimalanta; neither did it prove that private respondents have the power to control the conduct of petitioners. As also found out by public respondent which read:


    “‘Contrary to the allegation of complainants, the alleged payrolls do not bear the name of respondent Kenneth Yu, their alleged employer. Respondents denied that there was a signature of Kenneth Yu on the supposed payrolls. What is established in the records is that complainants are employees of canteen concessionaires operating in the respondent coliseum.’ x x x

    x x x

    “Admittedly petitioners Daisog and Dimalanta miserably failed to show by convincing evidence that there exists an employer-employee relationship between them and private respondents.”

    (Emphasis, mine.)

    Further reading:

    • Carmelita V. Dimalanta and Arturo C. Daisog v. Caita Coliseum, Inc. Ken K.C. Yu, Owner/President/General Manager, and Maria Theresa Ayuson as responsible officers, and National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 161058, July 30, 2014.

  • Not Every Form of Control is Indicative of Employer-Employee Relationship

    If a real estate agent’s performance is subject to company rules, regulations, code of ethics, and periodic evaluation, does this mean that it has passed the control test for determining the existence of employer-employee relationship?

    The Supreme Court in a case said no. “Not every form of control is indicative of employer-employee relationship. A person who performs work for another and is subjected to its rules, regulations, and code of ethics does not necessarily become an employee.”

    In this case, it was found that the said rules, regulations, code of ethics, and periodic evaluation were found to not involve any control over the means and methods by which the real estate agent was to perform his job. In other words, the real estate company’s acts of:

    • Fixing prices;
    • Imposing requirements on prospective buyers;
    • Laying down the terms and conditions of the sale, including the mode of payment, which the independent contractors must follow;
    • Allocating inventories among its independent contractors;
    • Determining who has priority in selling the same;
    • Granting commission or allowance based on predetermined criteria; and
    • Regularly monitoring the result of their marketing and sales efforts

    do not pertain to the means and methods of how the said real estate agent was to perform and accomplish his task of soliciting sales. Neither do they dictate upon him the details of how he would solicit sales or the manner as to how he would transact business with prospective clients.

    Furthermore, it was likewise found that the said agent did not even cite specific rules, regulations or codes of ethics that supposedly imposed control on his means and methods of soliciting sales and dealing with prospective clients. Except for soliciting sales, the real estate company did not assign other tasks to him. He had full control over the means and methods of accomplishing his tasks as he can “solicit sales at any time and by any manner which deem appropriate and necessary.” He performed his tasks on his own account free from the control and direction of real estate company in all matters connected therewith, except as to the results thereof.

    The Court in declaring the absence of employer-employee relationship between them concluded: “As long as the level of control does not interfere with the means and methods of accomplishing the assigned tasks, the rules imposed by the hiring party on the hired party do not amount to the labor law concept of control that is indicative of employer-employee relationship.”

    Further reading:

    • Royale Homes Marketing Corporation v. Fidel P. Alcantara, G.R. No. 195190, July 28, 2014.

  • Do Your Employees Know Your Company Policies?

    The employer hired 2 sales ladies, who were assigned to a particular branch office. One day, the employer discovered that proceeds from the sales for two particular days were missing in the said branch. Upon investigation, it was found that the loss of the money was a result of an inside job. The employer then required the said employees to explain in writing why they should not be dismissed for having violated a company policy of prohibiting sales proceeds to be kept in the cash register. The employees submitted their written explanations, where they both denied the existence, and the knowledge of the existence, of such company policy. Despite this, they were dismissed. Thus, they filed a case for Illegal Dismissal against their employer.

    The Supreme Court in this case ruled in favor of the employees. It said that the employer must show by substantial evidence:

    “1) the existence of the subject company policy;

    “2) the dismissed employee must have been properly informed of said policy;

    “3) actions or omissions on the part of the dismissed employee manifesting deliberate refusal or wilful disregard of said company policy; and

    “4) such actions or omissions have occurred repeatedly.”

    With regard to the first and second points, although the employer claimed that the said company policy has existed for some time via a memorandum, the Court found that there was nothing in the record to indicate that the employees were informed of it. According to the Court, the employer could have easily produced a copy of the said memorandum bearing the signatures of the employees to show that, indeed, they have been notified of the existence of said company rule and that they have received, read, and understood the same. It could likewise have simply called some of its employees to testify on the rule’s existence, dissemination, and strict implementation. However, the record also show that it did not do so.

    Since the employer was not able to show a clear, valid, and legal cause for the employment termination, the Court thus declared the employees as illegally dismissed.

    Thoughts:

    A few weeks ago, I mentioned a case similar to this one in that the employee also argued that he did not know that there was a parking policy in his company (See Have You Read Your Employee Code of Conduct?). In other words, both employees assert that they didn’t know that there was a certain company policy that governed their actions.

    Note, however, the distinctions. In this present case, the employees would not have known of the existence of the specific company policy, simply because it was not properly disseminated to them. In the earlier case, the company policy on parking was clearly written down on the tickets that the employee used. This is why the Court did not accept the employee’s defense of lack of knowledge of the same.

    Further reading:

    • FLP Enterprises Inc.-Francesco Shoes/Emilio Francisco B. Pajaro v. Ma. Joeralyn D. Dela Cruz and Vilma Malunes, G.R. No. 198093, July 28, 2014.

  • Mere Reliance on a Causality Presumption

    A seafarer was hired as an assistant butcher on a certain cruise ship. On 22 August 2005, he entered into a 12-month contract of employment with the respondent incorporating the Standard Terms and Conditions the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels (Standard Employment Contract) as prescribed by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). Having passed the medical exam and having been declared fit for work, he boarded the said ship on 26 August 2005.

    During his employment, he was confined in a hospital sometime in December 2005 after suffering a month of rectal bleeding and lower abdominal pain. Soon he was medically repatriated, and upon arrival in the Philippines on 24 December 2005, he was immediately confined in a hospital, where he was found to be suffering from stage IV colon cancer. After months of confinement and treatment for his illness, he passed away.

    His widow thereafter filed a Complaint with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for death benefits, and the case went up to the Supreme Court.

    The Court denied her claims. The basis for the denial was the absence of showing that the cause of his death was one of those covered by the POEA Standard Employment Contract, and that the said cause was not work-related. It found that the Standard Employment Contract (under Section 32-A) lists down certain types of illnesses as compensable, but colon cancer is not one of them. And although there exists a disputable presumption of compensability (under Section 20 B (4)) for illnesses not listed therein, the Court ruled that it should be read in relation to said Section 32-A.

    In other words, she cannot simply rely on the disputable presumption provision mentioned in Standard Employment Contract, as she still has to substantiate her claim in order to be entitled to disability compensation.

    The widow, in this case, did not present any proof of a causal connection or at least a work relation between the employment of her husband and his colon cancer. Neither did she mention the risks that could have caused or, at the very least, contributed to the disease her husband had contracted.

    Because of these findings, the claim was not granted.

    Take away:

    “Claimants in compensation proceedings must show credible information that there is probably a relation between the illness and the work. Probability, and not mere possibility, is required; otherwise, the resulting conclusion would proceed from deficient proofs.”

    Further reading:

    • Joraina Dragon Talosig v. United Philippine Lines, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 198388, July 28, 2014.