Tag: seafarer

The Liability Continues

Antonio was employed by a foreign principal employer, Fairport Shipping Co., Ltd. (Fairport Shipping) to work as Master on board the vessel M/V Orionis from August 4, 2009 to July 24, 2010.

Antonio states that Fairport Shipping did not pay his salary and benefits, but assured him that these will be paid in full upon disembarkation. Although Antonio disembarked from the vessel on July 27, 2010, he did not receive his salary and benefits despite his demand.

On July 24, 2012, Antonio filed a complaint before the Office of the Labor Arbiter for money claims against Fairport Shipping and its current local manning agency Stella Marris Shipmanagement, Inc. (Stella Marris).

Stella Marris denied liability for Antonio’s claims. Although Stella Marris acknowledged having executed an Affidavit of Assumption of Responsibility, the same only pertained to the assumption of full and complete responsibility for all contractual obligations to the seafarers originally processed and recruited by its immediate predecessor, Global Gateway Crewing Services, Inc. (Global Gateway). Stella Marris explained that Antonio was originally hired by Skippers United Pacific, Inc. (Skippers United), whose obligations under Antonio’s contract were transferred to Global Gateway. Since said obligations were beyond the coverage of its Assumption of Responsibility, Stella Marris posited that it should not be held liable for Antonio’s claims.

The Office of the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Antonio and held the three manning agencies, i.e., Skippers United, Global Gateway, and Stella Marris solidarily liable with Fairport Shipping to pay Antonio his claims. The Office of the Labor Arbiter found Skippers United liable as signatory to the employment contract and Global Gateway as substitute manning agent, which assumed full and complete responsibility for all contractual obligations to the seafarers originally recruited and processed by Skippers United.

The National Labor Relations Commission, in turn, ruled that the Office of the Labor Arbiter erred in holding Skippers United and Global Gateway solidarily liable with Fairport Shipping since they were not impleaded as parties in the complaint. The Commission then found no basis to hold Stella Marris liable, considering that the latter was not the local manning agency which originally deployed Antonio and it did not assume the liability of Skippers United as the deploying agency. According to the National Labor Relations Commission, it was Skippers United which should have been held liable pursuant to Section 10 of the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, as amended, which provides that the liability of the original manning agency continues during the entire period of the employment contract and is not affected by the transfers or substitutions of manning agencies. Finally, it observed that the liability assumed by Stella Marris under its Affidavit of Assumption of Responsibility pertained only to those employees originally recruited by Global Gateway, and not of Skippers United, as Antonio was in this case.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission. Said Court ruled that Skippers United, as Fairport Shipping’s original manning agent, was solidarily liable with Fairport Shipping for Antonio’s claims under the applicable 2003 POEA Rules and Regulations¹ (POEA Rules and Regulations) since its liability continued during the entire period of the employment contract and was not affected by the transfers or substitutions of manning agencies. Although Fairport Shipping was a party in the complaint, the Court of Appeals still dismissed Antonio’s petition.

Could Stella Marris be held liable for Antonio’s claims?

The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.

The Court stated that while the POEA Rules and Regulations allow the transfer of the registration and/or accreditation of the foreign principal to another local manning agency, which includes the transfer of the full and complete responsibility over all contractual obligations of the principal to the seafarers, the said transfer, covers only those contractual obligations to seafarers “originally recruited and processed by the former agency” relating to the registration of principal and the transfer of registration.

In the present case, the Court found that Skippers United recruited Antonio and processed his employment as the original local manning agency of Fairport Shipping. For the Court, Skippers United assumed joint and solidary liability with Fairport Shipping under the contract of employment of Antonio as mandated by law.

The Court likewise found that Fairport Shipping thereafter transferred its accreditation or registration to Global Gateway in accordance with POEA Rules and Regulations. And by virtue of an Affidavit of Assumption of Responsibility Global Gateway assumed full and complete responsibility and without qualification all contractual obligations to the seafarers originally recruited and processed by Skippers United for the vessel M/V Orionis. Stella Marris then executed an Affidavit of Assumption of Responsibility covering those contractual obligations of Fairport that were “originally processed and recruited by Global.”

Since the Court considered Stella Marris’ limited assumption of liability to be consistent with the POEA Rules and Regulations which, to reiterate, pertained only to the liability of the substitute manning agent to those contracts originally recruited by the transferor, the Court found no basis to hold Stella Marris liable for Antonio’s claims.

Did the Court deny Antonio’s claims for his failure to implead Skippers United and Global Gateway?

No.

The Court cited relevant portions of Section 10 of the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, as amended, which provides that the local manning agency assumes joint and solidary liability with the employer for all claims and liabilities which may arise in connection with the implementation of the employment contract.

This liability remains intact and extends up to and until the expiration of the employment contracts of the employees recruited and employed pursuant to the said agreement and covers any and all claims arising therefrom. The solidary liability of the foreign principal and the recruitment agency to the employees shall not be affected by any substitution, amendment or modification made locally or in a foreign country of the said contract.

According to jurisprudence,² this must be so, because the obligations covenanted in the recruitment agreement entered into by and between the local agent and its foreign principal are not coterminous with the term of such agreement so that if either or both of the parties decide to end the agreement, the responsibilities of such parties towards the contracted employees under the agreement do not at all end, but the same extends up to and until the expiration of the employment contracts of the employees recruited and employed pursuant to the said recruitment agreement. Otherwise, this will render nugatory the very purpose for which the law governing the employment of workers for foreign jobs abroad was enacted.

The Court added that even if an Affidavit of Assumption of Responsibility was validly executed by the transferee agent assuming the full and complete responsibility over all contractual obligations of the principal to the seafarers originally recruited and processed by therein original manning agent, the latter’s liability to its recruited workers remained intact because the said workers were not privy to such contract of transfer.

In the present case, the Court discovered that prior to the filing of the complaint in the present case, Antonio had earlier filed a complaint against Skippers United and Fairport Shipping. The Court also noticed that during the pendency thereof, Fairport Shipping’s manning agent transferred from Skippers United to Global Gateway, and Global Gateway to Stella Marris.

However, the Office of the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision dismissing this earlier complaint, without prejudice to Antonio’s refiling of the case against the alleged proper parties, i.e., Global Gateway, Fairport Shipping, and Stella Marris. Antonio appealed this Decision before the National Labor Relations Commission, but the appeal was dismissed due to his failure to sign the certificate of non-forum shopping. Unfortunately, Antonio no longer moved for reconsideration of the said Resolution.

According to the Court, since both Skippers United and Global Gateway were not impleaded in the present complaint; it could not adjudge their respective liabilities to Antonio.

Nonetheless, the Court took into account the mistake of the Office of the Labor Arbiter in dismissing the earlier complaint. Said the Court: “so as not to cause Antonio serious injustice absent any fault or wrongdoing, the Court deems it proper to remand the present case back to the Office of the Labor Arbiter in order to further implead both Skippers United and Global Gateway as respondents together with Fairport Shipping, the original respondent.”

The Court explained that such course of action found bearing in Section 11, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which provides that parties may be added by order of the court on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just.

The Court stated that once Skippers United and Global Gateway, together with Fairport Shipping, are properly impleaded, Antonio’s monetary claims in the present complaint should be resolved by the Office of the Labor Arbiter with utmost dispatch on its merits.

Unfit to Work as a Seaman

Feliciano was hired by a foreign employer, Barker Hill Enterprises (Barker Hill), through its agent, Pacific Ocean Manning, Inc. (Pacific Ocean Manning) to work as a fitter on board the vessel MT Tequila under a Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract (POEA Standard Employment Contract) and a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). Feliciano boarded the vessel on May 9, 2012.

Feliciano alleged that in July 2012, he figured in an accident when he bumped his right knee on the step of the stairs while on board the ship. On October 25, 2012, Feliciano consulted the on-board doctor due to pain in his right knee. The on-board doctor diagnosed Feliciano with “Damage of the Meniscus of the Right Knee.” He was then referred to a doctor in Poland, who made the same diagnosis. On October 28, 2012 he was medically repatriated to the Philippines.

Upon arrival in Manila, Feliciano reported to Pacific Ocean Manning’s office and was referred to the company-designated physician. On October 30, 2012, Feliciano was diagnosed with chondromalacia patella, right or patellofemoral syndrome. He was prescribed medications and advised to undergo physical rehabilitation. Feliciano had follow-up consultations on December 4, 2012, as well as January 9, February 8, and March 7, 2013.

On March 27, 2013, Feliciano consulted his personal doctor, who issued a medical report which stated that Feliciano was unfit for sea duties as he was suffering from partial permanent disability with a disability rating of Grade 10.

On April 11, 2013, Feliciano had a check-up with the company-designated physician, who issued an interim disability assessment also of Grade 10 and advised Feliciano to continue physiotherapy. Feliciano had another check-up on May 8, 2013, after which, Feliciano’s condition was declared by the company-designated physician to be work-related with a final disability rating of Grade 10. Feliciano had follow-up check-ups on June 10, July 19, and August 2, 2013. During the last consultation on August 2, 2013, the company-designated physician advised that Feliciano’s physiotherapy be stopped and for Feliciano to continue on a home exercise program.

On October 2, 2013, Feliciano consulted a different personally-appointed doctor, who gave a disability rating of Grade 6.

Thereafter, Feliciano filed a complaint before the Office of the Labor Arbiter for total and permanent disability compensation. During the preliminary conference, the parties agreed to refer Feliciano to a third and independent doctor, who diagnosed Feliciano with valgus knee 2º to moderate-severe degenerative osteoarthritis and declared him unfit to work as a seaman, with a disability rating of Grade 7.

Should Feliciano be granted total and permanent disability compensation?

The Supreme Court ruled that Feliciano is only entitled to partial permanent disability compensation of Grade 7.

The Court cited the last paragraph of Section 20 (A) (3) of the POEA Standard Employment Contract providing for the mandatory conflict resolution procedure when the findings of the company-designated physician and the seafarer’s appointed physician are different. The provision states: “If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer. The third doctor’s decision shall be final and binding on both parties.”

In the present case, the Court found that the company-designated physician and Feliciano’s personal doctor were consistent in their diagnoses that Feliciano was suffering from partial permanent disability and that they differed only as to the disability rating. On the one hand, the company-designated physician issued a disability rating of Grade 10. On the other hand, Feliciano’s personal doctor gave a disability rating of Grade 6. The Court noted that in any event, the parties agreed to refer Feliciano’s condition to a third doctor in compliance with the mandatory conflict resolution procedure under the POEA Standard Employment Contract. Said doctor issued a medical report which rated Feliciano’s disability as Grade 7 which is a partial permanent disability under the POEA Standard Employment Contract.

The Court explained that Section 32 of the POEA Standard Employment Contract provides a schedule of disability from Grade 1 to Grade 14 and only disabilities classified as Grade 1 are considered total and permanent disability. Disabilities with a rating from Grade 2 to Grade 14 are classified as partial permanent disability.

The Court stressed that the third doctor’s medical report must be viewed and upheld in its entirety. Said medical report did not indicate that Feliciano was suffering from total and permanent disability. According to the Court, were it so, the third doctor would have rated Feliciano’s disability as Grade 1. The phrase “unfit to work as a seaman”, said the Court, should be understood in the context of the third doctor having also given a Grade 7 rating. Thus, the rational understanding of this phrase “unfit to work as a seaman” was that it merely indicated that Feliciano was suffering from a disability which rendered him physically incapable for sea duties. The report clearly did not declare that Feliciano was suffering from total and permanent disability but rather, that he was suffering only from Grade 7 partial permanent disability.

Furthermore, the Court considered the company-designated physician’s medical report as a final and conclusive assessment of Feliciano’s condition because although treatment of Feliciano continued after he was found to be suffering from disability, the same did not automatically negate the finality of the third doctor’s diagnosis, since there may be illnesses, injuries, or other health conditions which require regular treatment, follow-up consultations, rehabilitation, and maintenance medication.

Also, the Court stated that the fact that Feliciano had not been redeployed within 240 days from repatriation did not mean that his disability could be deemed total and permanent. This is because Section 20 (A) (6) of the POEA Standard Employment Contract expressly states that the disability shall be based exclusively on the disability ratings under Section 32 and shall not be measured or determined by the number of days a seafarer is under treatment or the number of days in which sickness allowance is paid.

Finally, the Court no longer gave credence to Feliciano’s assertion of entitlement to total and permanent disability by operation of law in view of the claim that he was not furnished with a copy of the company-designated physician’s medical report. According to the Court, such was a novel allegation that was never raised before the labor tribunals. The Court reiterated the principle that points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not previously raised before the lower court or quasi-judicial tribunal cannot be raised for the first time on appeal or review. Parties are not permitted to belatedly raise new issues or arguments which had not been previously determined by the lower courts or tribunals. To allow parties to do so would be offensive to the tenets of fair play and due process.¹

In sum, the Court upheld the final and binding medical report of the third doctor and affirmed the finding that Feliciano was suffering from a Grade 7 disability or partial permanent disability.

A Verbal Notice of the Seafarer’s Disability Rating Is Not Enough

Gregorio was engaged under a 10-month employment contract by Panstar Shipping Co., Ltd. (Panstar), through its agent Abosta Shipmanagement Corporation (Abosta) to work as an oiler on board the M/V Sino Trader. He was deployed on March 20, 2016.

On June 23, 2016, Gregorio and several crewmates were ordered to carry ship supplies and food provisions. While carrying a sack of rice, Gregorio claimed to have felt a sudden snap on his left lower back with a sharp pain radiating down to his thigh/leg. He immediately reported the incident to his superiors, and he was given pain relievers and a waist protector. Since his condition did not improve, he was brought to a medical center in Singapore where he was diagnosed with “Lumbar spondylosis with discopathy at L4-L5, L5-S1” and also prescribed medication. He was again brought to a hospital in Brazil because of persistent pain. On August 6, 2016, he was repatriated to the Philippines for further medical treatment.

Upon arrival, Gregorio immediately reported to the company-designated physician on August 8, 2016. After running a series of laboratory tests on Gregorio, the company-designated physician diagnosed him with “Herniated Nucleus Pulposus L3-L4, Disc Protrusion L5-S1 and L-4 Radiculopathy,” and recommended that he undergo physical therapy. Gregorio claimed, however, that the employer ceased his treatment and rehabilitation on February 16, 2017.

During a conference held on February 20, 2017, the employer informed Gregorio that he suffered from Grade 8 disability and offered him the corresponding disability benefits in the amount of US$16,795.00. Gregorio requested for further treatment or an improved monetary offer, but his requests were denied.

On April 25, 2017, Gregorio consulted his personal doctor, an orthopedic surgeon, who diagnosed him with “Disc Protrusion L5-S1 & Radiculopathy” and declared him permanently unfit for sea duty in any capacity.

Gregorio instituted a complaint for payment of total and permanent disability benefits against the employer. According to Gregorio, the company-designated physician failed to timely issue a final medical assessment. He emphasized that the employer was not able to present any final medical assessment even during the mandatory conferences before the Office of the Labor Arbiter.

The employer contended that based on an alleged November 22, 2016 Medical Assessment issued by the company-designated physician, Gregorio only suffered from a Grade 8 disability. The employer posited that said November 22, 2016 Medical Assessment should prevail. Said employer also stressed that Gregorio failed to provide a copy of the medical assessment of his personal doctor of choice prior to his filing of complaint.

In the meantime, the parties agreed to refer the conflicting medical findings to a third doctor. The appointed third doctor recommended Gregorio to undergo a Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) scan and Electromyography (EMG) test. Despite the release of the MRI scan and EMG test results, the medical assessment of the third doctor was not secured. Gregorio claimed that the non-completion of the conflict-resolution procedure was due to the fault of the employer, which the latter denied.

Is Gregorio entitled to total and permanent disability benefits?

The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative.

The Court stated that claims for disability benefits for injuries suffered by seafarers on board or during the term of their employment contract are governed by the provisions of Section 20 (A) of the POEA Standard Employment Contract¹ in that the seafarer has the obligation to report to the company-designated physician within three days from his repatriation, while the company-designated physician has the corresponding obligation to issue a final assessment of the seafarer’s disability within the periods mandated by law. The Court clarified that it is, however, not enough for the company-designated physician to issue a medical assessment within 120 or 240 days from the seafarer’s repatriation. In order to be binding, the medical assessment must be final, definite, and conclusive, otherwise, the law will step in and consider the seafarer totally and permanently disabled. Jurisprudence² has described a final, conclusive and definite medical assessment as that which must clearly state whether the seafarer is fit to work or the exact disability rating, or whether such illness is work-related, and without any further condition or treatment. It should no longer require any further action on the part of the company-designated physician and it is issued by the company-designated physician after he or she has exhausted all possible treatment options within the periods allowed by law. Jurisprudence³ also teaches that apart from issuing a final, conclusive, and definite medical assessment, the company-designated physician and/or the company must also furnish the seafarer a copy thereof. To require the seafarer to seek the decision of a neutral third-party physician without primarily being informed of the assessment of the company-designated physician is a clear violation of the tenets of due process and is not countenanced.

In the present case, the Court found that the company-designated physician failed to furnish Gregorio with a copy of the November 22, 2016 Medical Assessment within the periods mandated by law. The Court also found that Gregorio was informed of his Grade 8 disability rating only during the conference held on February 20, 2017 before the Office of the Labor Arbiter.

The Court stressed that a verbal notice of the seafarer’s disability rating is not enough. The reason for furnishing the seafarer with a copy of the final medical assessment is to afford the seafarer the opportunity to evaluate the same and decide whether he agrees with it or not. Should the seafarer disagree with it, he ought to bring the same to an independent doctor who can only get a better understanding of the opinion of the company-designated physician through a copy of the latter’s medical assessment.

In the present case, the Court stated that Gregorio cannot be expected to make an informed decision on the medical assessment of the company-designated physician based on a mere verbal declaration of his purported disability. Said the Court: Insofar as he is concerned, no final medical assessment was issued by the company-designated physician to contest. As such, Gregorio need not seek the opinion of an independent physician, more so refer the matter to a third doctor. Without proper notice of the November 22, 2016 Medical Assessment to Gregorio, he was already deemed totally and permanently disabled by operation of law, and therefore entitled to the corresponding disability benefits under the POEA Standard Employment Contract. The medical assessment of Gregorio’s personal doctor, as well as the absence of a medical assessment from a third doctor became immaterial.

The Court added that the November 22, 2016 Medical Assessment, as an attachment to respondents’ Position Paper, was furnished Gregorio on September 8, 2017, or 396 days from his repatriation. For the Court, the final medical assessment of the company-designated physician was clearly not furnished to Gregorio within the 120 or 240-day periods mandated by law.

The Court ordered the employer to pay total and permanent disability benefits to Gregorio.

A Mere Finding that the Illness is Not Work-Related is Not Automatically a Valid Medical Assessment

In Starocean Manning Philippines, Inc. v. Saturnino,¹ the Supreme Court stressed that sufficient basis must support the assessment of the company-designated physician:

Regardless of who the doctor is and his or her relation to the parties, the overriding consideration should be that the medical conclusions are based on (a) the symptoms and findings collated with medically acceptable diagnostic tools and methods, (b) reasonable professional inferences anchored on prevailing scientific findings expected to be known to the physician given his or her level of expertise, and (c) the submitted medical findings or synopsis, supported by plain English annotations that will allow the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission to make the proper evaluation.²
If the company-designated physician failed to provide a final and definite medical assessment within the required periods, the seafarer’s condition shall be, by operation of law, characterized as total and permanent.³

Here, the employer failed to adduce evidence supporting the assessment that the seafarer’s illness was not work-related. For the Court, such unsupported finding of non-work-relatedness is an invalid medical assessment.

The seafarer was accordingly ruled to be entitled to total and permanent disability benefits by operation of law. The Court further applied Section 20(A)(7) of the 2010 POEA-SEC, which requires that such benefits be separate and distinct from, and be in addition to whatever benefits which the seafarer is entitled to under Philippine laws such as from the Social Security System, Overseas Workers Welfare Administration, Employees’ Compensation Commission, Philippine Health Insurance Corporation, and Home Development Mutual Fund.

Consequences of Deliberate Concealment

Magno alleged that on November 13, 2014, he was hired by Goodwood Ship Management, Pte., Ltd., through its agent, Trans-Global Maritime Agency, Inc., as Oiler on board MT G.C. Fuzhou for a period of nine months. He stated that after he was declared fit for sea duty in his pre-employment medical examination, he boarded the vessel on November 15, 2014.

Magno narrated that on January 25, 2015, he suddenly felt severe chest pain, accompanied by dizziness and weakness while carrying out his duties. He was made to endure his condition until his repatriation on May 18, 2015. Upon arrival in the Philippines, he was referred to the employer-company’s designated physician. From May 20, 2015, he was subjected to various tests and treatment for coronary artery disease. After five months of treatment, the company-designated physician discontinued his treatment. Consequently, he consulted his personal cardiologist, who concluded that the nature and extent of his illness rendered him permanently and totally unfit to work as a seaman. Thus, on January 19, 2016, he filed a complaint for disability benefits, medical expenses, damages and attorney’s fees against his employer.

For its part, the employer retorted that Magno denied having a history of high blood pressure or any kind of heart disease when he ticked the “No” box opposite “High Blood Pressure” and “Heart Disease Vascular/Chest Pain” under the section, Medical History in his Pre-Employment Medical Examination (PEME). The employer stated that it was on May 17, 2015, that Magno complained of back and chest pains, with difficulty of breathing and easy fatigability, and was thereafter medically repatriated. During his treatment by the company-designated physician sometime in September 2015, Magno disclosed that he was diagnosed, as early as 2009, with coronary artery disease, for which he underwent Percutaneous Coronary Intervention of the left anterior descending artery. The company-designated physicians later stopped his treatment, prompting him to file a complaint for the payment of permanent total disability benefits.

The Office of the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Magno and awarded him permanent total disability benefits. Said Office considered the company-designated physician’s continuation of Magno’s treatment despite his belated disclosure of his existing coronary artery disease as an instance of employer’s waiver of its right to deny liability for disability benefits. According to the Office of the Labor Arbiter, such treatment constituted an implied admission of compensability and work-relatedness of Magno’s lingering cardio-vascular illness. The Office of the Labor Arbiter further found that the company-designated physician failed to issue a final assessment of Magno’s illness or fitness to work, which failure deemed Magno totally and permanently disabled.

On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission affirmed the Office of the Labor Arbiter’s ruling because Magno’s illness occurred within the duration of his contract, and his treatment lasted for more than 120 days. For the Commission, the award of permanent total disability benefits was justified.

The employer then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the petition.

Thus, the employer sought recourse before the Supreme Court, alleging that the Court of Appeals committed serious errors of law in upholding the Commission’s Decision. The employer insisted that Magno was not entitled to permanent and total disability benefits and his other monetary claims because of deliberate concealment of his coronary artery disease.

For his part, Magno maintained entitlement to permanent total disability benefits since his illness was work-related and had contributed to the development of his condition that resulted in his disability.

Is Magno entitled to permanent total disability benefits?

The Supreme Court ruled that Magno is not entitled to permanent total disability benefits. The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission.

The Court started by stating that entitlement of seafarers on overseas work to disability benefits is a matter governed, not only by medical findings, but by law and by contract. The Court stated that the material statutory provisions are Articles 197 to 199 of the Labor Code of the Philippines in relation to Section 2 (a), Rule X of the Amended Rules on Employee Compensation. By contract, the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC), the parties’ collective bargaining agreement, if any, and the employment agreement between the seafarer and the employer are pertinent.

The Court pointed out that Section 20, paragraph E of the POEA-SEC clearly provides that “[a] seafarer who knowingly conceals a pre-existing illness or condition in the Pre-Employment Medical Examination (PEME) shall be liable for misrepresentation and shall be disqualified from any compensation and benefits.” The Court said that such rule seeks to penalize seafarers who conceal information to pass the pre-employment medical examination. It even makes such concealment a just cause for termination.

Under the POEA-SEC, there is a “pre-existing illness or condition” if prior to the processing of the POEA contract, any of the following is present:

the advice of a medical doctor on treatment was given for such continuing illness or condition; or
the seafarer has been diagnosed and has knowledge of such illness or condition but failed to disclose it during the pre-employment medical examination, and such cannot be diagnosed during such examination.

In the present case the Court found that:

In his September 18, 2014 PEME, Magno indicated that he was not suffering from any medical condition likely to be aggravated by service at sea or which may render him unfit for sea service;
Magno also indicated in the PEME that he did not have a history of heart disease/vascular/chest pain, high blood pressure, or that he underwent treatment for any ailment and was taking any medication; and
He signed the PEME certificate acknowledging that he had read and understood and was informed of the contents of such certificate.

However, the Court further found a medical report issued by the company-designated physician, dated September 17, 2015, which stated therein Magno’s disclosure of a history of coronary artery disease for which he underwent percutaneous coronary intervention of the left anterior descending artery in 2009.

With this disclosure, the Court declared that Magno had obscured his pre-existing cardiac ailment, and such concealment thus disqualified him from disability benefits notwithstanding the medical attention extended by the company-designated physician upon his repatriation.

The Court discussed that even if the misrepresentation was discovered during Magno’s treatment with the company-designated physician, the same was immaterial and could not have canceled out his deception.

The Court reiterated that a PEME is generally not exploratory in nature, nor is it a totally in-depth and thorough examination of an applicant’s medical condition. It does not reveal the real state of health of an applicant, and does not allow the employer to discover any and all pre-existing medical condition with which the seafarer is suffering and for which he may be taking medication. The PEME is nothing more than a summary examination of the seafarer’s physiological condition and is just enough for the employer to determine his fitness for the nature of the work for which he is to be employed.

Since the PEME is not exploratory, the Court emphasized that its failure to reveal or uncover Magno’s ailments cannot shield him from the consequences of his deliberate concealment. In this regard, the “fit to work” declaration in the PEME cannot be a conclusive proof to show that he was free from any ailment prior to his deployment.

For knowingly concealing his history of coronary artery disease during the PEME, Magno committed fraudulent misrepresentation which unconditionally barred his right to receive any disability compensation from his employer.

The Court added that even if it were to disregard Magno’s fraudulent misrepresentation, his claim would still fail.

Coronary artery disease, which is subsumed under cardio-vascular disease, and hypertension are listed as occupational diseases under item 11, Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC.

However, before such disease to be compensable, a seafarer must establish concurrence of the following conditions enumerated in the first paragraph of Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC:

The seafarer’s work must involve the risk described therein;
The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer’s exposure to the described risks;
The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it; and
There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer.

Relevant thereto, the Court reiterated prevailing jurisprudence in that the table of illnesses and the corresponding nature of employment in Section 32-A only provides the list of occupational illnesses. However, even if the illness may be considered as work-related for having been specified in the table, the seafarer is still not exempted from providing proof of the conditions under the first paragraph of Section 32-A in order for the occupational illnesses complained of to be considered as compensable. Whoever claims entitlement to benefits provided by law should establish his right thereto by substantial evidence which is more than a mere scintilla; it is real and substantial, and not merely apparent. Further, while in compensation proceedings in particular, the test of proof is merely probability and not ultimate degree of certainty, the conclusion of the courts must still be based on real evidence and not just inference and speculations.

In the present case, the Court found that Magno failed to present sufficient evidence to show how his working conditions contributed to or aggravated his illness. According to the Court, the general statements in his Position Paper were not validated by any written document or other proof. Neither was any expert medical opinion presented regarding the cause of his condition.

The Court expounded that although Magno suffered from coronary artery disease, a cardiovascular illness under item 11 of Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC, the conditions for compensability under the same section were not present since Magno did not present any proof of the required conditions to demonstrate that his illness is work-related and, therefore, compensable. Specifically, Magno failed to discharge his burden to prove the risks involved in his work, that his illness was contracted as a result of his exposure to the risks within the period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it, and that he was not notoriously negligent. The Court thus ruled that Magno was not entitled to permanent total disability benefits.

In deciding against the seafarer in this case, the Court emphasized that the constitutional policy to provide full protection to labor is not meant to be a sword to oppress employers, as justice is for the deserving and must be dispensed within the light of established facts, the applicable law, and existing jurisprudence. The Court said that its commitment to the cause of labor is not a lopsided undertaking. The Court concluded by stating that such commitment cannot and does not prevent it from sustaining the employer when it is in the right.

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2020 September 16

PTSD and Claims for Disability Benefits

On 30 October 2013, the seafarer entered into a 7-month employment contract with Anglo-Eastern (ANTWERP), NV, through its agent, Anglo-Eastern Crew Management Philippines (Anglo-Eastern Crew), Inc., to work as a Messman aboard the M/V Mineral Water. On 23 February 2014, the seafarer boarded the vessel.

The seafarer claimed that sometime in June 2014, he was sexually harassed by the chief officer of the vessel during the course of his employment. He also claimed that the chief officer also threatened to kill him upon learning that he filed a complaint against the latter before the ship captain. After the incident, the seafarer opted for voluntary repatriation and was able to return to the Philippines on 12 July 2014.

On 24 November 2014 the seafarer consulted his personal doctor, a clinical psychologist, who diagnosed him with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). The diagnosis of this doctor was verified by another doctor, who concluded that the seafarer cannot return to his job as a seafarer.

Due to his illness, the seafarer requested for compensation from Anglo-Eastern Crew. However, his request remained unheeded.

On 2 March 2015, the seafarer filed a complaint for constructive dismissal, sexual harassment and maltreatment. In addition, he prayed for the payment of disability benefits, damages and attorney’s fees since he claims to have been rendered permanently and totally disabled due to his post-traumatic stress disorder from his unfortunate experience onboard the vessel.

The Office of the Labor Arbiter awarded the salaries of the seafarer for the unexpired portion of his employment contract because of the finding that the seafarer was forced to repatriate himself due to the hostile environment brought about by the filing of the complaint. The Office of the Labor Arbiter also awarded him moral damages for the mental torture that he endured and exemplary damages to dissuade such incident from further occurring. It also granted the claim for attorney’s fees since the seafarer was constrained to avail the services of a lawyer.

When the case reached the Supreme Court, the seafarer insisted on his entitlement to disability benefits. However, the Court denied his claim for said benefits. The Court ruled:

To support his claim for disability benefits, petitioner presented a psychiatric report and a medical certificate. These documents only prove that he was diagnosed with PTSD, prescribed to take medication, and recommended for psychotherapy sessions. However, there was no disability grading.
The medical certificate states that “[a]t this point in time he cannot return to his work as a seafarer.” This statement is not sufficient for this court to conclude that petitioner is permanently and totally disabled to work as a seafarer. It does not instruct us how petitioner’s PTSD is work-related or work-aggravated. It also does not tell us whether petitioner underwent psychotherapy sessions, as recommended by his physicians. Assuming that petitioner underwent psychotherapy sessions and took his prescribed medication, no evidence was presented showing how he responded to treatment.
It is established that petitioner suffered some form of injury, but the pieces of evidence he submitted are not sufficient to convince this Court that he has been rendered permanently and totally disabled. Thus, this Court is precluded from awarding disability benefits, not because of his non-compliance with the 3-day reportorial requirement, but because there is barely any evidence to support the claim for disability benefits.

Foreign Doctor Who Provided Urgent Care — a Company-Designated Physician?

On 7 August 2015, the seafarer entered into a 9-month employment contract with Beks Gemi Isletmeciligi Ve Ticaret A.S. through its agent, Status Maritime Corporation, to work as a fitter.

Before boarding the vessel, the seafarer underwent a pre-employment medical examination and was declared fit to work.

On 25 March 2016, the seafarer’s shoulder snapped and was dislocated while he was allegedly lifting a heavy object. He was repatriated and recommended for surgical repair after being diagnosed with recurrent left shoulder dislocation.

Immediately after repatriation, the seafarer reported to Status Maritime, which referred him to the company-designated physician. Although the company-designated physician initially recommended that the seafarer undergo an MRI, Status Maritime disapproved of the procedure and rejected the seafarer’s sickness allowance claim.

The seafarer then consulted his personal doctor. After undergoing an MRI, the seafarer was diagnosed with “Rotator cuff tear (Supraspinatus), left shoulder.” Said personal doctor declared him permanently disabled and “unfit to work” as a seafarer.

On 16 June 2016, the seafarer filed a complaint for permanent total disability benefits before the Office of the Labor Arbiter.

The Office of the Labor Arbiter found that when the seafarer underwent pre-employment medical examination, he misrepresented that he was not suffering from any illness. However, when he was diagnosed abroad, he admitted to a certain Dr. Selvarajah that it was already his third time to sustain a left shoulder dislocation and that two episodes occurred before he boarded the vessel.

The Office of the Labor Arbiter added that even if the seafarer did not conceal his medical history, he still could not claim disability benefits because his injury was not work-related. While his condition manifested onboard, the seafarer failed to show the connection of his injury to the nature of his work as a fitter. For his failure to present substantial evidence that his work condition caused or aggravated his injury, the seafarer was accordingly denied his claim for disability benefits.

When the case reached the Supreme Court, the seafarer asserted the following:

No diagnosis was made by a company-designated physician. Dr. Selvarajah, a foreign doctor, was not a company-designated physician and, therefore, not qualified to make conclusive findings. The failure of a company-designated physician to give a definite medical finding after the period set under the POEA Standard Employment Contract renders his disability permanent and total.
He did not willfully conceal his medical condition during his pre-employment medical examination. He merely forgot to disclose his medical history and, being a layman without medical background, thought there was no need to disclose this information.
There was a presumption of fitness which was uncontroverted by evidence.
His medical condition should have been detected during the pre-employment medical examination because it was an apparent and external injury. Status Maritime was estopped because it had all the opportunity to screen him for the injury.

Did Status Maritime comply with its obligation to refer the seafarer to a company-designated physician?

The requirement of a post-employment medical examination can be gleaned in the provisions of Section 20 (A) of the POEA Standard Employment Contract.¹

Jurisprudence teaches that the conduct of the post-employment medical examination is a reciprocal obligation shared by the seafarer and the employer. The seafarer is obliged to submit to an examination within 3 working days from his or her arrival, and the employer is correspondingly obliged to conduct a meaningful and timely examination of the seafarer.²

This post-employment medical examination is primarily conducted by the company-designated physician.³ However, to be reliable, the assessment or findings of the company-designated physician must be “complete and definite to give the proper disability benefits to seafarers.” When the employer refuses to comply with its obligation to have the seafarer examined, the seafarer may rely on the medical findings of his or her chosen doctor.⁴ Between a non-existent medical assessment of a company-designated physician and the medical assessment of the seafarer’s doctor of choice, the latter evidently stands.⁵

In the present case, the Supreme Court found that the seafarer went to Status Maritime immediately after arriving in the Philippines. However, when he requested a medical diagnosis of his condition, Status Maritime refused to subject him to a post-employment medical examination. This compelled the seafarer to go to a doctor of his choice. As noted above, this personal doctor declared him permanently disabled and “unfit to work” as a seafarer.

On the other hand, the Court ruled that Dr. Selvarajah’s diagnosis could not be considered as that rendered by a company-designated physician. This is because a strict reading of the POEA Standard Employment Contract requires that the company-designated physician be the one to diagnose the seafarer upon repatriation.

The Court further stated that even if the rules were to be applied liberally, the assessment of Dr. Selvarajah could not be considered thorough, final, and definitive, as it was merely for the seafarer’s urgent medical care. In Dr. Selvarajah’s medical report, there was no showing that he conducted tests to arrive at a proper diagnosis. In fact, he even recommended for the seafarer to undergo further tests to determine the extent of the injury. Furthermore, Dr. Selverajah’s report explicitly stated that it was not meant for any medicolegal proceedings, that it should not be used as a reference in any court hearing and that it does not support any compensation claim. The provisional nature of Dr. Selvarajah’s diagnosis was further supported by his act of recommending that the seafarer see an orthopedic surgeon for further assessment.

The Court thus ruled that when there is no post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician, the evaluation of the seafarer’s personal doctor is considered by law as binding between the parties. The refusal of Status Maritime to submit the seafarer to a medical examination was a contravention of its responsibility under the POEA Standard Employment Contract. Thus, the Court upheld the permanent disability rating of the seafarer’s personal doctor.

Was the seafarer qualified to claim disability benefits?

Despite the conclusion of his personal doctor, the Supreme Court declared that the seafarer was disqualified from claiming disability benefits on the ground of fraudulent concealment.

Section 20 (E) of the POEA Standard Employment Contract states that “[a] seafarer who knowingly conceals a pre-existing illness or condition” is disqualified from claiming compensation and benefits.⁶

In the present case, the Court found that the seafarer knowingly concealed his history of shoulder dislocation. According to the Court, the seafarer had two instances of left shoulder dislocation prior to his employment — once in June 2015 and another in July 2015. Knowing that he had this recurring condition, the seafarer should have disclosed this fact during his pre-employment medical examination. This non-disclosure was apparent in his medical certificate, wherein he answered “no” to the question “Is applicant suffering from any medical condition likely to be aggravated by service at sea or to render the seafarer unfit for service. . .?”

The Court further stated that the seafarer could not bank on the fact that he was cleared during the pre-employment medical examination. Jurisprudence dictates that this examination is not exploratory in nature and employers are not burdened to discover any and all pre-existing medical condition of the seafarer during its conduct. Pre-employment medical examinations are only summary examinations. They only determine whether seafarers are fit to work and does not reflect a comprehensive, in-depth description of the health of an applicant. This is precisely why Section 20 (E) mandates the seafarer to disclose his or her medical history during the pre-employment medical examination.⁷

According to the Court, intentional concealment of a pre-existing illness or injury is a ground for disqualification for compensation and benefits under the POEA Standard Employment Contract. While the laws give ample protection to our seafarers, this protection does not condone fraud and dishonesty.

In the present case, the seafarer could not feign ignorance and downplay the concealment of his medical condition. The seafarer knew that he had a recurring shoulder dislocation and never denied this fact. Hence, his disability claim was not granted.

Recurrence of Lumbar Problem from a Previous Employment

On 22 August 2012, the seafarer entered into a 7-month employment contract with WSM Ltd., through its agent, WSBM, Inc., to work as a third engineer on board the vessel M/V NOCC Puebla. On 5 September 2012, the seafarer boarded the said vessel.

The seafarer alleged that sometime in March 2013, he felt pain on his back while conducting maintenance works. He said that the pain was so severe that he fell on his knees. He added that although he was given pain relievers, he was advised to be medically repatriated for further examination.

The seafarer was repatriated on 28 March 2013 and was seen by the company-designated physician. He was diagnosed to have S/P Laminotomy, L4 Bilateral Interspinous Process Decompression Coflex. He was advised to regularly consult with the specialists for the monitoring of his condition. He also underwent out-patient rehabilitation sessions at the Metropolitan Medical Center.

On 9 July 2013, the company-designated physician issued a letter addressed to a co-specialist, stating that the seafarer’s prognosis was guarded and that the latter had already reached his maximum medical improvement. Consequently, the company-designated physician gave the seafarer a disability grading of 8 or 2/3 loss of lifting power of the trunk. Despite this, the company-designated physician still advised the seafarer to continue with his medications and rehabilitation. The seafarer was also directed to see the co-specialist sometime in May 2014.

On 5 June 2014, the seafarer independently consulted his personal doctor. On 21 July 2014, said personal doctor issued a Medical Certificate, stating that the seafarer’s disability was total and the cause of injury was work-related/work-aggravated, thus, declaring the seafarer unfit to go back to work as a seafarer. This prompted the seafarer to file a complaint for total and permanent disability benefits against his employer.

In denying liability for total and permanent disability benefits, the employer countered that the seafarer’s condition was merely brought about by the recurrence of his lumbar problem from his previous employment, for which he had already claimed total and permanent disability benefits from his previous employer.

Can the seafarer be granted his claim of total and permanent disability benefits?

Yes.

The Court emphasized the requirement of a final and definite disability assessment within the 120-day or 240-day period.¹ According to the Court, such kind of assessment is neccessary under the rules to truly reflect the true extent of the sickness or injuries of the seafarer and his capacity to resume to work as such.² Otherwise, the corresponding disability benefits awarded might not be commensurate with the prolonged effects of the injuries suffered.³

In the present case, the Court found that although the company-designated physician subjected the seafarer to a series of medications and rehabilitation, he failed to give any definite disability assessment.

The Court pointed out that the Grade 8 disability rating given by the company-designated physician could not be considered as the complete, definite, and final medical assessment contemplated by the rules, as such assessment was merely addressed to another specialist, who still advised the seafarer to continue with his medications and rehabilitation. The Court further found that:

Up to May 2014, the seafarer was still ordered to see the said specialist for re-evaluation
The seafarer’s treatment lasted for over a year, evidencing that his condition remained unresolved.
The company-designated physician’s prognosis on the seafarer’s condition was guarded in that the outcome of his illness was in doubt.

The Court added that the employer could not rely on Section 20 (A) (6) of the 2010 POEA-SEC which states that “[t]he disability shall be based solely on the disability gradings provided under Section 32 of this contract, and shall not be measured or determined by the number of days a seafarer is under treatment or the number of days in which sickness allowance is paid.” According to the Court, before the disability gradings under Section 32 should be considered, the disability ratings should be properly established and contained in a valid and timely medical report of a company-designated physician or the third doctor agreed upon by the parties. In other words, the periods prescribed by the rules should still be complied with. Thus, the foremost consideration of the courts should be to determine whether the medical assessment or report of the company-designated physician was complete and appropriately issued; otherwise, the medical report shall be set aside and the disability grading contained therein cannot be seriously appreciated.⁴ The Court reiterated that no final and complete assessment was given in this case.

The Supreme Court ruled that with this failure of the company-designated physician to issue a complete, definite, and final medical assessment, the seafarer’s disability, under legal contemplation, is deemed total and permanent.⁵

An Assessment Reflective of the Seafarer’s Medical Condition

On 25 March 2015, the seafarer entered into an 8-month employment contract with SSA, PTE. LTD., through its agent, MSM, Inc. to work as a cabin stewardess in the vessel Viking Mimir. She boarded the vessel and commenced her work on 15 May 2015.

The seafarer alleged that on 17 July 2015, she assisted in the unloading of luggage of departing passengers and in retrieving boxes of mattresses and bedsheets from the laundry section to the state rooms. She then felt pain in her back while in the middle of replacing the mattresses. When the pain did not subside the following day, she went to see the ship’s doctor and was given pain relievers. She was allowed to continue her work, but the pain persisted and became unbearable after almost 2 weeks of continuous duty.

She further alleged that she was able to visit a hospital in Hungary on 23 July 2015, where she was diagnosed to have lower back pain and muscle strain. Despite having been prescribed pain relievers, her back pain worsened. She was able to have an X-ray and MRI on her back in Germany on 29 July 2015. There, she was suspected to have lumbar spine problem. She was prescribed with medicines to alleviate the pain and advised to have a thorough check-up.

As she was unable to receive further check up, her condition deteriorated and her mobility was seriously impaired after 2 months of heavy manual labor. Thus, when the vessel arrived in Austria on 21 September 2015, she was sent to a hospital. She was found to have serious back pain and was advised to be repatriated and undergo physiotherapy.

She was finally repatriated on 24 September 2015 and was able to visit the company-designated physician. She underwent various laboratory examinations the results of which revealed that she was suffering from back pain and Lumbago. She was advised to undergo physical therapy sessions and continue her medications.

She claimed that despite treatment and therapy, she was not able to recover from her back pain.

On 1 December 2015, the company-designated doctor cleared the seafarer from the cause of her repatriation despite her failure to recover, declared that her Lumbago was resolved, discontinued her treatment, and ignored her plea to continue medical treatment.

The seafarer stated that this constrained her to consult her personal doctor (an orthopedic specialist). Upon advice of said doctor, she underwent MRI on her thorax and lumbar spine on 4 February 2016 and was prescribed pain relievers. On 10 March 2016, her personal doctor issued a Certification declaring her “permanently UNFIT in any capacity to resume her sea duties as a Sea woman.”

Without observing the third doctor referral provision in the POEA-SEC, the seafarer filed a complaint for total and permanent disability benefits against her employer.

Was the seafarer entitled to payment of total permanent disability benefit despite her failure to observe the third-doctor referral provision in the POEA-SEC?

Yes.

The Supreme Court stated that the POEA-SEC provides for the procedure to be followed in case there is a divergence in medical findings between the company-designated physician and the seafarer’s personal doctor. Under Section 20 (A) (3) of the 2010 POEA-SEC, “[if] a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer. The third doctor’s decision shall be final and binding on both parties.” The provision refers to the declaration of fitness to work or the degree of disability. It presupposes that the company-designated physician came up with a valid, final and definite assessment as to the seafarer’s fitness or unfitness to work before the expiration of the 120-day or 240-day period. The company can insist on its disability rating even against a contrary opinion by another doctor, unless the seafarer signifies his intent to submit the dispute assessment to a third physician. The duty to secure the opinion of a third doctor belongs to the employee asking for disability benefits. He must actively or expressly request for it.¹ This referral to a third doctor has been held to be a mandatory procedure² and the seafarer’s non-compliance with the conflict-resolution procedure results in the affirmance of the fit-to-work certification of the company-designated physician.³

The Court, however, stressed that non-compliance with the third doctor referral does not automatically make the diagnosis of the company-designated physician conclusive and binding on the courts. The Court has previously held that, “if the findings of the company-designated physician are clearly biased in favor of the employer, then courts may give greater weight to the findings of the seafarer’s personal physician. Clear bias on the part of the company-designated physician may be shown if there is no scientific relation between the diagnosis and the symptoms felt by the seafarer, or if the final assessment of the company-designated physician is not supported by the medical records of the seafarer.”⁴ A seafarer’s compliance with such procedure presupposes that the company-designated physician came up with an assessment as to his fitness or unfitness to work before the expiration of the 120-day or 240-day periods. Alternatively put, absent a certification from the company-designated physician, the seafarer has nothing to contest and the law steps in to conclusively characterize his disability as total and permanent.⁵

In the present case, the Court found that the medical report of the company-designated physician failed to state a definite assessment of the seafarer’s fitness or unfitness to work, or to give a disability rating of her injury. According to the Court, the report lacked substantiation on the medical condition of the seafarer concerning her fitness to return to the type of work she was performing at the time of her injury. Furthermore, the report showed that the seafarer has not fully recovered from her injury as she “was advised to continue home exercises and that pain was foreseen to improve with time” and since she had to undergo “15 Physical Therapy Sessions.” The Court construed such statements as an admission from the company-designated physician that the pain experienced by the seafarer was still subsisting and that it was thru the passage of time that it was expected to improve.

On the other hand, the Court considered the medical report issued by the seafarer’s personal doctor, and found that this doctor gave an explanation on the nature, cause, effects, and possible treatment of the injury sustained by the seafarer. The Court pointed out that the medical report of the company-designated physician merely described the MRI of the Lumbosacral spine as “unremarkable,” while the report of the personal doctor on the MRI of the Thoraco-Lumbar Spine (Non-Contrast) conducted on the seafarer, contained the following impression: “L4-L5: Mild bilateral neural foraminal narrowing due to disc bulge; L5-S1: Mild bilateral neural foraminal narrowing due to disc bulge and facet hypertrophy; Facet arthrosis and ligamentum flavum hypertrophy; Mild lumbar curvature to the right may be positional versus mild lumbar dextroscoliosis; Small non-specific pelvic fluid; Small uterine myomas.” The Court found that consistent with the result of the said MRI, the seafarer’s personal doctor explained that:

“The significance of this posterior bulge of the degenerated disc is that this is the area where the nerves run that supply the extremities. This patient has been complaining of back pain. The vast majority of patients responded well to non-surgical treatment though. Probably the most important of which is time, that is to say, that no matter what is done, most cases of acute back and neck pain slowly resolve if given enough time to get better. x x x If a long term and more permanent result are desired however, she should refrain from activities producing torsional stress on the back and those that require repetitive bending and lifting. Things Ms. Briones is expected to do as a Sea woman.”

The Court, thus, viewed the assessment of the personal doctor as exhaustive and more reflective of the seafarer’s medical condition especially so since both medical reports acknowledged the passage of time as a key factor in resolving the back pain experienced by Briones.

The Court clarified that a total disability does not require that the employee be completely disabled, or totally paralyzed, for what is necessary is that the injury must be such that the employee cannot pursue his or her usual work and earn from it. It added that a total disability is considered permanent if it lasts continuously for more than 120 days, as what is crucial is whether the employee who suffers from disability could still perform his work notwithstanding the disability he incurred.⁶

Food Provisions on a Ship

The seafarer entered into a 6-month employment contract with CTI, through UPLI, to work as a stateroom steward aboard the vessel Carnival Glory. After passing the pre-employment medical examination, he joined the vessel on 26 February 2014.

Sometime in March 2014, the seafarer reported passing out fresh blood during bowel movement but with no fever, abdominal pain or vomiting. He was treated at the vessel infirmary. Thereafter, he was brought to the Charleston Endoscopy Center in South Carolina, USA for colonoscopy. His biopsy, however, indicated “Segments of Invasive Moderately Differentiated Adenocarcinoma.”

On 12 June 2014, the seafarer was medically repatriated. Upon his arrival in Manila, UPLI immediately referred him to the Marine Medical Services for further evaluation and management. Thereafter, the company-designated doctor confirmed that respondent was suffering from “Moderately Differentiated Adenocarcinoma Rectum.” The seafarer underwent a surgical operation (Abdominal Resection) and was subsequently subjected to concurrent chemotherapy and radiation therapy.

On 18 January 2016, respondent filed a complaint for permanent total disability benefits against UPLI and CTI.

ULPI and CTI countered that the seafarer’s illness was not compensable because it was not work-related or listed among the occupational diseases under the Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Overseas Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Ships (POEA-SEC). It added that respondent likewise did not prove the causal relation between his illness and his work as stateroom steward.

Should the seafarer be granted his claim for permanent total disability benefits?

The Supreme Court granted the seafarer’s claim for permanent total disability benefits.

The Court cited Section 20 (A) of the POEA-SEC, and ruled that in order for a disability to be compensable, (i) the injury or illness must be work-related; and, (ii) the work-related injury or illness must have existed during the term of the contract of the seafarer. In turn, “work-related illness” pertains to such sickness listed as occupational disease under Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC with the set conditions therein satisfied. An illness not listed as occupational disease is, nonetheless, disputably presumed work-related provided that the seafarer proves, by substantial evidence, that his or her work conditions caused or, at the least, increased his or her having contracted the same.¹

The Court also emphasized that for a disease to be compensable, the nature of work need not be the only reason for the seafarer to suffer his or her illness. What is crucial is the reasonable connection between the seafarer’s disease and one’s work leading a rational mind to conclude that such work contributed to or aggravated the development of the illness.²

On the one hand, the Court found that the seafarer was able to establish a reasonable link between his having suffered rectal cancer and his work. Similarly, he was able to establish that his work conditions increased his having contracted his illness considering that the dietary provision on the vessel (food high in cholesterol and fat and low in fiber) was a known cause of rectal cancer.

The Court mentioned that it has already taken judicial notice of the food provisions on a ship which are produced at one time for long journeys across the oceans and seas. In Skippers United Pacific, Inc. v. Lagne,³, the Court recognized that the food provided to seafarers are mostly frozen meat, canned goods and seldom are there vegetables which easily rot and wilt and, therefore, impracticable for long trips. Also, in the case of Jebsens Maritime, Inc. v. Alcibar,⁴ the Court similarly ruled that rectal cancer of therein respondent was work-related as the latter proved that the cause thereof was the poor provisions — high in fat and cholesterol and low in fiber — given to him while at sea. Such poor provisions were on the same level with those given to herein respondent while he was still aboard the vessel. Furthermore, the Court had already pronounced the compensability of colorectal cancer in Leonis Navigation Co., Inc. v. Villamater.⁵ According to the Court, it cannot be gainsaid that the poor diet of the herein seafarer while at sea contributed to his having developed rectal cancer during the term of his employment contract.

On the other hand, the Court also found that although UPLI and CTI argued that the company-designated doctor declared the seafarer’s illness as not work-related, the pronouncement of the company-designated physician had actually bolstered the contention that the seafarer’s diet on the vessel contributed to him having suffered from rectal cancer. The Court highlighted the company-designated physician’s medical report of 14 June 2014 which read:

Adenocarcinoma’s risk factors include age, diet rich in saturated fat; fatty acid and linoleic acid and genetic predisposition and is likely not work-related.⁶

For the Court such report cited that one of the risk factors of rectal cancer was poor diet. Also, such report did not categorically state that respondent’s illness was not work-related but that it was just likely not work-related without any explanation for saying so.

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