Paulino Ungos III

Lawyer | Law Professor | Author

Tag: resolution

  • Prima Facie Evidence of Employee’s Claim

    Reggie alleged that on March 13, 2011, he was hired as a security guard by the employer security agency. Reggie stated that he worked seven days a week from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m., or from 7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m., alternately every two weeks, for a monthly salary of Php8,500.00. Reggie mentioned that his employer did not pay him for overtime work, work rendered on holidays and rest days, as well as 13th month pay, service incentive leave, and night shift differentials.

    Reggie also alleged that on April 21, 2014, he, along with some of his colleagues, received a memorandum suspending them from employment starting April 21, 2014 up to May 20, 2014 without any formal investigation. Reggie claimed that he served the suspension and reported back to work on May 21, 2014. The employer security agency, however, refused to accept him.

    Thus, Reggie filed a complaint against the employer security agency for illegal suspension; underpayment of salary and 13th month pay; non-payment of overtime and holiday pay; holiday and rest day premiums pay; service incentive leave pay; night shift differentials; moral and exemplary damages; and attorney’s fees.

    The employer security agency asserted that Reggie’s suspension was justified since its inspection team caught Reggie sleeping in his post on April 20, 2014. According to the employer security agency, Reggie was directed to report to the head office to explain, but Reggie disregarded the directive. Thus, in a memorandum dated April 21, 2014, the employer security agency suspended him for 30 days, effective April 21, 2014, until May 20, 2014.

    As to Reggie’s money claims, the employer security agency argued that Reggie was oriented as to the salary and benefits to which he is entitled, and he agreed to the same. The employer security agency added that the applicable wage order provides that the minimum wage rate does not apply to persons employed in the personal service of another, such as a private security guard like Reggie.

    The employer security claimed attorney’s fees, and moral and exemplary damages for the besmirched goodwill and reputation that it suffered by reason of the filing of the complaint.

    The Office of the Labor Arbiter ruled that Reggie was validly suspended for sleeping in his post as proved by photographs, which Reggie did not dispute.

    The Office of the Labor Arbiter also held that Reggie failed to substantiate his entitlement to overtime pay, holiday pay, premium pay for holidays and rest days, and night shift differentials.

    The Office of the Labor Arbiter, nonetheless, declared that Reggie is entitled to salary differentials, 13th month pay, and the monetization of his service incentive leave.

    Reggie appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission and insisted on his entitlement to overtime pay, holiday pay, premium pay for holidays and rest days, and night shift differentials.

    The National Labor Relations Commission modified the Decision of the Office of the Labor Arbiter and granted such claims.

    The employer security agency filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals to question the awards of overtime pay, holiday pay, premium pay for holidays and rest days, and night shift differentials in favor of Reggie. It also insisted that the National Labor Relations Commission failed to award damages and attorney’s fees in its favor.

    The Court of Appeals held that the National Labor Relations Commission erred in awarding him overtime pay, premium pay for holidays and rest days, and night shift differentials. Thus, it partly granted the petition of the employer security agency by deleting the award of said benefits.

    According to the Court of Appeals, entitlement to payment of overtime pay must first be established by proof that overtime work was actually performed. The Court of Appeals also ruled that entitlement to premium pay must first be established by proof that work was rendered during rest days and holidays because such benefit is not incurred in the normal course of business.

    The Court of Appeals found that Reggie submitted in evidence photocopies of the entries in a logbook and semi-monthly payroll report for a certain period to support his allegations.

    However, the Court of Appeals also found that the photocopies of entries in the logbook did not prove that Reggie rendered overtime work for such period. Said entries were found to have been made by Reggie and other security guards themselves. Although the Court of Appeals observed that these entries were signed by incoming and outgoing security guards, the same were not countersigned by a supervisor or any authorized representative of the employer security agency. According to the Court of Appeals, this raised serious doubt as to whether Reggie actually rendered work on a given date and time.

    The Court of Appeals then found that the semi-monthly payroll report presented by Reggie revealed a period different from that entered in the logbook.

    For the Court of Appeals, the payroll report submitted by Reggie did not clearly reflect that he performed overtime work as indicated in the photocopies of the entries in the logbook.

    On Reggie’s claim for premium pay for holidays and night shift differential, the Court of Appeals ruled that Reggie was unable to adduce concrete proof showing that he had rendered service during regular holidays or rest days or that he had rendered service between 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.

    Reggie elevated his case to the Supreme Court.

    Was Reggie entitled to the awards of overtime pay, premium pay for holidays and rest days, as well as night shift differentials?

    The Supreme Court ruled that Reggie was not entitled to premium pay, but he was ruled to be entitled to overtime pay and night shift differentials.

    The Court stated that in determining the employee’s entitlement to monetary claims, the burden of proof is shifted from the employer or the employee, depending on the monetary claim sought.

    On claims for payment of salary differentials, service incentive leave, holiday pay, and 13th month pay, the burden rests on the employer to prove payment. This standard follows the basic rule that in all illegal dismissal cases the burden rests on the defendant-employer to prove payment rather than on the plaintiff-employee to prove non-payment. This likewise stems from the fact that all pertinent personnel files, payrolls, records, remittances and other similar documents — which show that the differentials, service incentive leave and other claims of workers have been paid — are not in the possession of the worker but are in the custody and control of the employer.

    On the other hand, for overtime pay, premium pay for holidays and rest days, the burden is shifted on the employee, as these monetary claims are not incurred in the normal course of business. It is thus incumbent upon the employee to first prove that he actually rendered service in excess of the regular eight working hours a day, and that he, in fact, worked on holidays and rest days.

    In the present case, the Court found that in proving his entitlement to the payment of overtime pay, premium pay for holidays and rest days, and night shift differentials, Reggie submitted a photocopy of logbook entries which showed the dates and shift when he reported for work, as well as the specific tasks he performed on that particular work shift. The Court also found that before and after each particular work shift, the incoming and outgoing security guard will sign the corresponding entry in the logbook.

    However, the Court discovered that the logbook did not contain information on whether Reggie worked on holidays or during his rest days. Thus, the Court denied Reggie’s claim for premium pay for lack of factual basis.

    Nonetheless, the Court determined that the entries in the logbook revealed Reggie’s daily 12-hour shifts. Thus, the Court declared him entitled to overtime pay for such work performed beyond eight hours a day, or for four hours for every shift. Based also on the logbook, the Court found that Reggie was entitled to night-shift differentials for each hour of work performed between 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.

    In this regard, the Court acknowledged the following facts:

    • The logbook was only a personal record of Reggie and other security guards; and
    • It was not verified or countersigned by officers or employees of the employer security agency.

    However, the Court stressed that even if the entries were neither verified nor countersigned, the same would not militate against Reggie.

    This was because the entries in the logbook were prima facie evidence of Reggie’s claim.

    Prima facie evidence, said the Court, is such evidence as, in the judgment of the law, sufficient to establish a given fact, or the group, or chain of facts constituting the party’s claim or defense, and which if not rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient. Evidence which, if unexplained or uncontradicted, is sufficient to sustain a judgment in favor of the issue it supports, but which may be contradicted by other evidence. 1Wa-acon v. People, G.R. No. 164575, December 6, 2006.

    In the present case, the Court recognized the employer security agency’s dispute on the veracity of the entries in the logbook. However, the Court noticed that such employer did not proffer evidence to rebut them or showed that it paid Reggie for the services he rendered on the dates and the hours indicated in the logbook.

    The Court stressed that the best evidence for the employer security agency would have been the payrolls, vouchers, payslips, daily time records, and the like, which were in its custody and absolute control.

    For the Court, since the employer security agency failed to present such documents, such failure gave rise to the presumption that either it never had them, or if such employer did, their presentation was prejudicial to its cause.2Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co. v. Mamaril, G.R. No. 225725, January 16, 2019.

    The Court restated the established rule that the burden of showing with legal certainty that the obligation has been discharged with payment falls on the debtor, in accordance with the rule that one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it.3Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co. v. Mamaril, G.R. No. 225725, January 16, 2019. Any doubt arising from the evaluation of evidence as between the employer and the employee must be resolved in favor of the latter.4Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co. v. Mamaril, G.R. No. 225725, January 16, 2019; Dansart Security Force & Allied Services Company v. Bagoy, G.R. No. 168495, July 2, 2010.

    The Court accordingly ruled that Reggie should be paid for overtime work rendered beyond eight hours. In addition, the Court declared that Reggie should be paid night shift differentials.

    The Court thus partly granted Reggie’s petition and consequently modified the decision of the Court of Appeals by declaring his entitlement to the payment of overtime pay, and night shift differentials.

    Further reading:

    • Zonio v. 1st Quantum Leap Security Agency, Inc., G.R. No. 224944, May 5, 2021.

    Subscribe to YouTube and Spotify

  • No Second Contract, No Substitution

    Maria Antoniette alleged that she was hired by Thanaya Al-Yaqoot Medical Specialist through its agent, Fil-Expat Placement Agency, to work as an orthodontist specialist in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

    Maria Antoniette narrated that in May 2016, her employer asked her to sign a document written in Arabic and wanted her to agree that only half of the stipulated salary would be declared to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) government for insurance purposes. She claimed to have expressed hesitation, but she eventually signed the document using a different signature.

    Maria Antoniette stated that the employer then repeatedly forced her to execute a new employment contract. When she refused, the employer subjected her to varied forms of harassment in that she was given additional duties. Her employer also threatened to deduct 10,000 Saudi Riyal from her salary and force her out of her accommodation. Furthermore, her employer attempted to make sexual advances on her, and showed no concern when she suffered a severe allergic reaction to latex surgical gloves.

    After her repatriation on June 24, 2016, she filed a complaint against her employer for constructive dismissal, contract substitution, breach of contract, and damages before the Office of the Labor Arbiter.

    The employer denied that Maria Antoniette was maltreated. It pointed out that Maria Antoniette was visited by the Philippine Overseas Labor Office Local Hire together with the employer’s representative. They observed that Maria Antoniette had no swollen hands, bleeding blisters, and evidence of additional duties or sexual abuse. The employer added that it did not receive any complaint from Maria Antoniette. Although Maria Antoniette mentioned an incident when she was shouted at, the employer explained that it was normal for Arab people to talk in a loud voice.

    The employer also denied that it committed contract substitution. Although it admitted that Maria Antoniette was asked to sign a new employment contract, this was only due to Maria Antoniette’s refusal to provide a copy of her contract and diploma, which must be submitted to the KSA Ministry of Health.

    The employer also stated that Maria Antoniette was not threatened with a salary deduction. Instead, it merely explained to her that it would be fined should it fail to submit a copy of the contracts to the government.

    Finally, the employer retorted that Maria Antoniette’s case could hardly be construed as one of constructive dismissal since she could decide to discontinue her contract. That no dismissal occurred could also be gleaned from its request for her to stay for two more months until her replacement arrives.

    The Office of the Labor Arbiter declared the employer guilty of breach of contract and constructive dismissal.

    This constrained the employer to appeal the Office of the Labor Arbiter’s Decision to the National Labor Relations Commission.

    The Commission reversed the Office of the Labor Arbiter’s Decision and ruled that there was no breach of contract and constructive dismissal. According to the Commission, no contract substitution happened since the employer never intended to prejudice Maria Antoniette in the execution of a new employment contract. The Commission also ruled that since the execution of the new contract was for the purpose of complying with a foreign law requirement of devising a uniform contract for the protection of the worker and the employer, there could be no contract substitution. Furthermore, the Commission ruled out constructive dismissal because if found no evidence that Maria Antoniette’s continued employment was rendered impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely.

    Aggrieved, Maria Antoniette elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.

    The Court of Appeals reinstated the Decision of the Office of the Labor Arbiter because there was substantial evidence that the employer attempted to force Maria Antoniette into signing a new employment contract. The Court of Appeals stressed that the employer’s attempt to commit contract substitution should be punished to avoid repetition. The Court of Appeals also held that Maria Antoniette was compelled to seek repatriation because her employment became intolerable as she suffered verbal and psychological abuses after she refused to sign the new contract.

    The employer assailed the Decision of the Court of Appeals before the Supreme Court.

    Did the employer commit contract substitution?

    The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative.

    The Court stated that substitution or alteration of employment contracts is listed as a prohibited practice under Article 34 (i) of the Labor Code of the Philippines. The Court further stated that to substitute or alter to the prejudice of the worker, employment contracts approved and verified by the Department of Labor and Employment from the time of actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period of the expiration of the same without the approval of the Department of Labor and Employment is considered an act of illegal recruitment under Section 6 (i) of the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.

    In the present case, the Supreme Court noted the admission of the employer that it attempted to make Maria Antoniette sign a new contract.

    However, the Supreme Court doubted the claim of the employer that it had no intention of prejudicing Maria Antoniette relative to the supposed second contract.

    This was because the employer failed to prove the specific foreign law which required a separate employment contract apart from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)-approved Standard Employment Contract.

    In addition, the Supreme Court found it illogical to require Maria Antoniette to sign a second contract for purposes of uniformity if it would only restate the contents of the POEA-approved employment contract, which incidentally, already included an Arabic translation of the agreed terms and conditions between the employee and the employer. The Supreme Court continued that assuming Maria Antoniette failed to provide the employer a copy of the POEA-approved employment contract, the employer could just easily request a copy of the same from its agent.

    The Supreme Court also noted the employer’s contention that because Maria Antoniette did not sign another document, there was no second contract, and hence, no contract substitution happened.

    The Supreme Court rejected such contention because under prevailing jurisprudence, a refusal of the Overseas Filipino Worker to sign another employment contract does not absolve the employer from liability and the mere intention to commit contract substitution should not be left unpunished.

    Was Maria Antoniette constructively dismissed from employment?

    The Supreme Court likewise ruled in the affirmative.

    The Supreme Court discussed that the law recognizes situations wherein the employee must leave his or her work to protect one’s rights from the coercive acts of the employer. The employee is considered to have been illegally terminated because he or she is forced to relinquish the job due to the employer’s unfair or unreasonable treatment. The test of constructive dismissal is whether a reasonable person in the employee’s position would have felt compelled to give up his position under the circumstances.

    In the present case, the Supreme Court found that despite the seeming benevolence of the employer in providing housing accommodation and other benefits to its employees, evidence, nonetheless, showed that Maria Antoniette was singled out and verbally intimidated after she refused to sign the second employment contract. Record revealed the following facts, which impelled Marie Antoniette to seek assistance from the Philippine Embassy and Consulate Officials in Saudi Arabia, as well as from the media:

    • Her employer told her that “she will see hell” if she reports her situation to the Philippine embassy;
    • Her employer threatened to reduce her salary for her refusal to sign the new contract;
    • She was constantly harassed and pressured into signing the new employment contract even in the middle of work;
    • She was humiliated in front of her co-workers and her employer’s relatives and friends; and
    • Her employer showed no concern over her severe allergic reaction to latex surgical gloves.

    Moreover, the Supreme Court criticized the employer’s assertion of Marie Antoniette being overly sensitive. The Court viewed such assertion to be absurd if not downright insulting. According to the Court, Overseas Filipino Workers, especially medical professionals working abroad, could discern a loud voice from abusive language.

    Taken together, the Supreme Court considered the foregoing circumstances as sufficient indications of the employer’s bad faith, hostility, and disdain toward Maria Antoniette. The Court stressed that while there was no formal termination of her services, she was left without any option except to quit her job. Maria Antoniette’s continued employment was rendered unlikely and unbearable, amounting to constructive dismissal.

    Further reading:

    • Fil-Expat Placement Agency, Inc. v. Lee, G.R. No. 250439, September 22, 2020.

    Subscribe to YouTube and Spotify

  • Consequences of Deliberate Concealment

    Magno alleged that on November 13, 2014, he was hired by Goodwood Ship Management, Pte., Ltd., through its agent, Trans-Global Maritime Agency, Inc., as Oiler on board MT G.C. Fuzhou for a period of nine months. He stated that after he was declared fit for sea duty in his pre-employment medical examination, he boarded the vessel on November 15, 2014.

    Magno narrated that on January 25, 2015, he suddenly felt severe chest pain, accompanied by dizziness and weakness while carrying out his duties. He was made to endure his condition until his repatriation on May 18, 2015. Upon arrival in the Philippines, he was referred to the employer-company’s designated physician. From May 20, 2015, he was subjected to various tests and treatment for coronary artery disease. After five months of treatment, the company-designated physician discontinued his treatment. Consequently, he consulted his personal cardiologist, who concluded that the nature and extent of his illness rendered him permanently and totally unfit to work as a seaman. Thus, on January 19, 2016, he filed a complaint for disability benefits, medical expenses, damages and attorney’s fees against his employer.

    For its part, the employer retorted that Magno denied having a history of high blood pressure or any kind of heart disease when he ticked the “No” box opposite “High Blood Pressure” and “Heart Disease Vascular/Chest Pain” under the section, Medical History in his Pre-Employment Medical Examination (PEME). The employer stated that it was on May 17, 2015, that Magno complained of back and chest pains, with difficulty of breathing and easy fatigability, and was thereafter medically repatriated. During his treatment by the company-designated physician sometime in September 2015, Magno disclosed that he was diagnosed, as early as 2009, with coronary artery disease, for which he underwent Percutaneous Coronary Intervention of the left anterior descending artery. The company-designated physicians later stopped his treatment, prompting him to file a complaint for the payment of permanent total disability benefits.

    The Office of the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Magno and awarded him permanent total disability benefits. Said Office considered the company-designated physician’s continuation of Magno’s treatment despite his belated disclosure of his existing coronary artery disease as an instance of employer’s waiver of its right to deny liability for disability benefits. According to the Office of the Labor Arbiter, such treatment constituted an implied admission of compensability and work-relatedness of Magno’s lingering cardio-vascular illness. The Office of the Labor Arbiter further found that the company-designated physician failed to issue a final assessment of Magno’s illness or fitness to work, which failure deemed Magno totally and permanently disabled.

    On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission affirmed the Office of the Labor Arbiter’s ruling because Magno’s illness occurred within the duration of his contract, and his treatment lasted for more than 120 days. For the Commission, the award of permanent total disability benefits was justified.

    The employer then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the petition.

    Thus, the employer sought recourse before the Supreme Court, alleging that the Court of Appeals committed serious errors of law in upholding the Commission’s Decision. The employer insisted that Magno was not entitled to permanent and total disability benefits and his other monetary claims because of deliberate concealment of his coronary artery disease.

    For his part, Magno maintained entitlement to permanent total disability benefits since his illness was work-related and had contributed to the development of his condition that resulted in his disability.

    Is Magno entitled to permanent total disability benefits?

    The Supreme Court ruled that Magno is not entitled to permanent total disability benefits. The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission.

    The Court started by stating that entitlement of seafarers on overseas work to disability benefits is a matter governed, not only by medical findings, but by law and by contract. The Court stated that the material statutory provisions are Articles 197 to 199 of the Labor Code of the Philippines in relation to Section 2 (a), Rule X of the Amended Rules on Employee Compensation. By contract, the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC), the parties’ collective bargaining agreement, if any, and the employment agreement between the seafarer and the employer are pertinent.

    The Court pointed out that Section 20, paragraph E of the POEA-SEC clearly provides that “[a] seafarer who knowingly conceals a pre-existing illness or condition in the Pre-Employment Medical Examination (PEME) shall be liable for misrepresentation and shall be disqualified from any compensation and benefits.” The Court said that such rule seeks to penalize seafarers who conceal information to pass the pre-employment medical examination. It even makes such concealment a just cause for termination.

    Under the POEA-SEC, there is a “pre-existing illness or condition” if prior to the processing of the POEA contract, any of the following is present:

    • the advice of a medical doctor on treatment was given for such continuing illness or condition; or
    • the seafarer has been diagnosed and has knowledge of such illness or condition but failed to disclose it during the pre-employment medical examination, and such cannot be diagnosed during such examination.

    In the present case the Court found that:

    • In his September 18, 2014 PEME, Magno indicated that he was not suffering from any medical condition likely to be aggravated by service at sea or which may render him unfit for sea service;
    • Magno also indicated in the PEME that he did not have a history of heart disease/vascular/chest pain, high blood pressure, or that he underwent treatment for any ailment and was taking any medication; and
    • He signed the PEME certificate acknowledging that he had read and understood and was informed of the contents of such certificate.

    However, the Court further found a medical report issued by the company-designated physician, dated September 17, 2015, which stated therein Magno’s disclosure of a history of coronary artery disease for which he underwent percutaneous coronary intervention of the left anterior descending artery in 2009.

    With this disclosure, the Court declared that Magno had obscured his pre-existing cardiac ailment, and such concealment thus disqualified him from disability benefits notwithstanding the medical attention extended by the company-designated physician upon his repatriation.

    The Court discussed that even if the misrepresentation was discovered during Magno’s treatment with the company-designated physician, the same was immaterial and could not have canceled out his deception.

    The Court reiterated that a PEME is generally not exploratory in nature, nor is it a totally in-depth and thorough examination of an applicant’s medical condition. It does not reveal the real state of health of an applicant, and does not allow the employer to discover any and all pre-existing medical condition with which the seafarer is suffering and for which he may be taking medication. The PEME is nothing more than a summary examination of the seafarer’s physiological condition and is just enough for the employer to determine his fitness for the nature of the work for which he is to be employed.

    Since the PEME is not exploratory, the Court emphasized that its failure to reveal or uncover Magno’s ailments cannot shield him from the consequences of his deliberate concealment. In this regard, the “fit to work” declaration in the PEME cannot be a conclusive proof to show that he was free from any ailment prior to his deployment.

    For knowingly concealing his history of coronary artery disease during the PEME, Magno committed fraudulent misrepresentation which unconditionally barred his right to receive any disability compensation from his employer.

    The Court added that even if it were to disregard Magno’s fraudulent misrepresentation, his claim would still fail.

    Coronary artery disease, which is subsumed under cardio-vascular disease, and hypertension are listed as occupational diseases under item 11, Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC.

    However, before such disease to be compensable, a seafarer must establish concurrence of the following conditions enumerated in the first paragraph of Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC:

    • The seafarer’s work must involve the risk described therein;
    • The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer’s exposure to the described risks;
    • The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it; and
    • There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer.

    Relevant thereto, the Court reiterated prevailing jurisprudence in that the table of illnesses and the corresponding nature of employment in Section 32-A only provides the list of occupational illnesses. However, even if the illness may be considered as work-related for having been specified in the table, the seafarer is still not exempted from providing proof of the conditions under the first paragraph of Section 32-A in order for the occupational illnesses complained of to be considered as compensable. Whoever claims entitlement to benefits provided by law should establish his right thereto by substantial evidence which is more than a mere scintilla; it is real and substantial, and not merely apparent. Further, while in compensation proceedings in particular, the test of proof is merely probability and not ultimate degree of certainty, the conclusion of the courts must still be based on real evidence and not just inference and speculations.

    In the present case, the Court found that Magno failed to present sufficient evidence to show how his working conditions contributed to or aggravated his illness. According to the Court, the general statements in his Position Paper were not validated by any written document or other proof. Neither was any expert medical opinion presented regarding the cause of his condition.

    The Court expounded that although Magno suffered from coronary artery disease, a cardiovascular illness under item 11 of Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC, the conditions for compensability under the same section were not present since Magno did not present any proof of the required conditions to demonstrate that his illness is work-related and, therefore, compensable. Specifically, Magno failed to discharge his burden to prove the risks involved in his work, that his illness was contracted as a result of his exposure to the risks within the period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it, and that he was not notoriously negligent. The Court thus ruled that Magno was not entitled to permanent total disability benefits.

    In deciding against the seafarer in this case, the Court emphasized that the constitutional policy to provide full protection to labor is not meant to be a sword to oppress employers, as justice is for the deserving and must be dispensed within the light of established facts, the applicable law, and existing jurisprudence. The Court said that its commitment to the cause of labor is not a lopsided undertaking. The Court concluded by stating that such commitment cannot and does not prevent it from sustaining the employer when it is in the right.

    Further reading:

    • Trans-Global Maritime Agency, Inc. v. Utanes, G.R. No. 236498, September 16, 2020.

    Subscribe to YouTube and Spotify

  • Nothing Contradictory Between a Definite Employment Period and the Nature of the Employee’s Duties

    Julian, Larry, and a group of co-workers were engaged as janitors, messengers, and utility persons by LBP Service Corporation, which had a manpower service agreement with Land Bank of the Philippines.

    In 2014, the manpower service agreement between LBP Service Corporation and Land Bank of the Philippines expired and resulted in the recall of Julian, Larry and the group.

    Believing that they were illegally dismissed from employment, Julian and the group filed a complaint against LBP Service Corporation before the Office of the Labor Arbiter. In such complaint, they also claimed to be regular employees of LBP Service Corporation since they performed services necessary and desirable to its business.

    LBP Service Corporation countered that Julian, Larry, and the group were supposed to be reassigned to a different client, but they opted to resign.

    On December 10, 2014, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint.

    The Office of the Labor Arbiter declared Julian, Larry, and the group as fixed-term contractual employees of LBP Service Corporation.

    However, the Office of the Labor Arbiter found no evidence that LBP Service Corporation terminated their employment contracts, since the notice of recall did not amount to a termination of their services.

    The Office of the Labor Arbiter ordered Larry and a number of his co-complainants to report for work because their engagement merely lapsed when the manpower services agreement between LBP Service Corporation and Land Bank of the Philippines expired.

    For the Office of the Labor Arbiter, Larry and the group were still in LBP Service Corporation’s workforce and may be deployed to its other clients.

    However, the Office of the Labor Arbiter did not order Julian and another group of co-complainants to return to work because they were found to have voluntarily resigned from their employment.

    Julian, Larry, and the group appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission, but the Commission dismissed their appeal and affirmed the Office of the Labor Arbiter’s Decision.

    Julian, Larry, and the group filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, which, however, affirmed the ruling of the Commission.

    Julian, Larry and the group elevated their case to the Supreme Court, and insisted on their claim that they were regular employees of LBP Service Corporation.

    Were Julian, Larry and the group regular employees of LBP Service Corporation?

    The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. It agreed with the ruling of the Court of Appeals and labor tribunals that Julian, Larry and the group were fixed-term contractual employees of LBP Service Corporation.

    The Court discussed that contracts of employment for a fixed term are not unlawful unless it is apparent from the circumstances that the periods have been imposed to circumvent the laws on security of tenure.

    The Court reiterated the following criteria of a valid fixed-term employment, to wit:

    • The fixed period of employment was knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon by the parties without any force, duress, or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating his consent; or
    • It satisfactorily appears that the employer and the employee dealt with each other on more or less equal terms with no moral dominance exercised by the former or the latter.

    In the present case, the Court found that Julian, Larry and the group were employed on a contract basis to meet LBP Service Corporation’s commitment to its client, the Land Bank of the Philippines.

    The Court also found that at the time of their hiring, they were informed through their respective employment contracts that their engagement was for a specific period.

    The Court further remarked that such employment contracts expressly stipulated the duration of their services, to wit:

    • Employee’s voluntary resignation;
    • Non-renewal or termination of the contract with the client company where the employee is assigned; or
    • When the company of assignment no longer needs the employee’s services, but with future referral and employment with another client.

    In addition, the Court found no evidence indicating that Julian, Larry and the group were pressured into signing their fixed-term contracts or that LBP Service Corporation exhibited dominance over them. The Court remarked that Julian, Larry and the group had the chance to refuse but they consciously accepted their contracts. Significantly, it was found that the periods and conditions stipulated in their employment contracts were likewise not intended to deny them from acquiring security of tenure.

    The Court noted Julian, Larry and the group’s claim that they were regular employees. However, the Court declared such claim to be untenable. The Court stated that the fact that an employee is engaged to perform activities that are necessary and desirable in the usual business of the employer does not prohibit the fixing of employment for a definite period. There is thus nothing essentially contradictory between a definite period of employment and the nature of the employee’s duties.

    For the Court, Julian, Larry and the group were fixed-term employees.

    Further reading:

    • Tuppil, Jr. v. LBP Service Corp., G.R. No. 228407, 10 June 2020.

    Subscribe to YouTube and Spotify

  • Sale of Agricultural Land and Waiver of Retention Rights

    Decision in Department of Agrarian Reform v. Carriedo, G.R. No. 176549, January 20, 2016.

    On 26 June 1986, Romeo C. Carriedo bought approximately 70.4788 hectares of agricultural land covered by the following titles and tax declarations:

    • Transfer Certificate of Title No. 35055
    • Tax Declaration No. 48354
    • Transfer Certificate of Title No. 17681
    • Transfer Certificate of Title No. 56897
    • Transfer Certificate of Title No. 17680

    The area sold to Romeo C. Carriedo included a part covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 17680 of which herein petitioner, Pablo Mendoza, was a tenant.

    In June of 1990, Romeo C. Carriedo then sold these lands to the Peoples’ Livelihood Foundation, Inc. Except for that area covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 17680, the lands were subjected to the Voluntary Land Transfer/Direct Payment Scheme and were awarded to agrarian reform beneficiaries in 1997.

    On 5 October 1999, the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 17680 was divided into five (5) sub-lots.

    Three of these lots were then distributed to beneficiaries under Presidential Decree No. 27 and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 44384, 44385, and 44386, issued on 10 September 1999.

    The remaining two (2) lots, consisting of approximately 5 hectares and which was also the land being occupied by Pablo Mendoza, were registered in the name of Romeo C. Carriedo and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 344281 and 344282, respectively.

    On 26 February 2002, Pablo Mendoza, Corazon Mendoza, and Orlando Gomez filed a Petition for Coverage of these two (2) lots under Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. They claimed that they had been in physical and material possession of the said land as tenants since 1956 and had made the land productive. They prayed that

    • an order be issued placing the land under Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program; and
    • the Department of Agrarian Reform, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer, and the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer be ordered to proceed with the acquisition and distribution of the land in their favor.

    The Regional Director granted the petition in an Order dated 2 October 2002.

    The Supreme Court, in Department of Agrarian Reform v. Carriedo, G.R. No. 176549, January 20, 2016, however, reversed the said order and declared that the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 344281 and 344282 was Romeo C. Carriedo’s retained area.

    In said case, the Court ruled:

    The right of retention is a constitutionally-guaranteed right1Article XIII, Section 4, to wit:

    Section 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.    , subject to certain qualifications specified by the legislature2Through the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which provides:

    Section 6. Retention Limits. — Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a viable family-size farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. x x x

    The right to choose the area to be retained, which shall be compact or contiguous, shall pertain to the landowner: Provided, however, That in case the area selected for retention by the landowner is tenanted, the tenant shall have the option to choose whether to remain therein or be a beneficiary in the same or another agricultural land with similar or comparable features. In case the tenant chooses to remain in the retained area, he shall be considered a leaseholder and shall lose his right to be a beneficiary under this Act. In case the tenant chooses to be a beneficiary in another agricultural land, he loses his right as a leaseholder to the land retained by the landowner. The tenant must exercise this option within a period of one (1) year from the time the landowner manifests his choice of the area for retention.

    In all cases, the security of tenure of the farmers or farmworkers on the land prior to the approval of this Act shall be respected. x x x    . It serves to mitigate the effects of compulsory land acquisition by balancing the rights of the landowner and the tenant by implementing the doctrine that social justice was not meant to perpetrate an injustice against the landowner.

    Deparment of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 02, Series of 20033Under Section 6, which provides:

    SECTION 6. Waiver of the Right of Retention. — The landowner waives his right to retain by committing any of the following act or omission:

    6.1. Failure to manifest an intention to exercise his right to retain within sixty (60) calendar days from receipt of notice of CARP coverage.

    6.2. Failure to state such intention upon offer to sell or application under the VLT/DPS scheme.

    6.3. Execution of any document stating that he expressly waives his right to retain. The MARO and/or PARO and/or Regional Director shall attest to the due execution of such document.

    6.4. Execution of a Landowner Tenant Production Agreement and Farmer’s Undertaking (LTPA-FU) or Application to Purchase and Farmer’s Undertaking (APFU) covering subject property.

    6.5. Entering into a VLT/DPS or VOS but failing to manifest an intention to exercise his right to retain upon filing of the application for VLT/DPS or VOS.

    6.6. Execution and submission of any document indicating that he is consenting to the CARP coverage of his entire landholding.

    6.7. Performing any act constituting estoppel by laches which is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable length of time to do that which he may have done earlier by exercising due diligence, warranting a presumption that he abandoned his right or declined to assert it.     clearly shows that the disposition of agricultural land is not an act constituting waiver of the right of retention.

    The Court further found that Romeo C. Carriedo has not committed any of the acts found under Deparment of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 02, Series of 2003.

    1)

    Romeo C. Carriedo was not shown to have expressly waived in writing his right of retention, as required under sub-section 6.3, Section 6 of Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 02, Series of 2003.

    2)

    Romeo C. Carriedo was not said to have abandoned or declined to assert his right of retention, under subsection 6.7, Section 6 of Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 02, Series of 2003.

    According to the Court, prevailing rules4Section 4 of Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 02, Series of 2003 provides:

    Section 4. Period to Exercise Right of Retention under RA 6657. —

    4.1 The landowner may exercise his right of retention at any time before receipt of notice of coverage.

    4.2 Under the Compulsory Acquisition (CA) scheme, the landowner shall exercise his right of retention within sixty (60) days from receipt of notice of coverage.

    4.3 Under the Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) and the Voluntary Land Transfer (VLT)/Direct Payment Scheme (DPS), the landowner shall exercise his right of retention simultaneously at the time of offer for sale or transfer.     give Romeo C. Carriedo any time before receipt of the notice of coverage to exercise his right of retention, or if under compulsory acquisition, within sixty (60) days from receipt of the notice of coverage. Since the validity of the notice of coverage was the very subject of the present case, the Court ruled that the period within which Romeo C. Carriedo should exercise his right of retention had yet to commence.

    The Court added that even assuming that the period within which Romeo C. Carriedo could exercise his right of retention has commenced, he could not have been said to have neglected to assert his right of retention over the land, for he filed an application for retention which was even contested by Pablo Mendoza’s son, Fernando. Although Romeo C. Carriedo was shown to have subsequently withdrawn his application, his act of filing an application for retention had belied the allegation that he abandoned his right of retention or declined to assert it.

    3)

    Not even the sale made by the herein Romeo C. Carriedo of more than fifty (50) hectares in favor of the Peoples’ Livelihood Foundation, Inc. could have been considered as a waiver of his right of retention.

    In this case, it was asserted that Romeo C. Carriedo has waived his right of retention by way of estoppel under another rule, i.e., Item No. 4, Statement of Policies, Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 05, Series of 2006 which states:

    II. Statement of Policies

    x x x

    4. Where the transfer/sale involves more than the five (5) hectares retention area, the transfer is considered violative of Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6657.

    In case of multiple or series of transfers/sales, the first five (5) hectares sold/conveyed without DAR clearance and the corresponding titles issued by the Register of Deeds (ROD) in the name of the transferee shall, under the principle of estoppel, be considered valid and shall be treated as the transferor/s’ retained area but in no case shall the transferee exceed the five-hectare landholding ceiling pursuant to Sections 6, 70 and 73(a) of R.A. No. 6657. Insofar as the excess area is concerned, the same shall likewise be covered considering that the transferor has no right of disposition since CARP coverage has been vested as of 15 June 1988. Any landholding still registered in the name of the landowner after earlier dispositions totaling an aggregate of five (5) hectares can no longer be part of his retention area and therefore shall be covered under CARP. x x x (emphasis supplied)

    It was argued that Romeo C. Carriedo should have lost his right of retention over the land because he had already sold or disposed, after the effectivity of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, more than fifty (50) hectares of land in favor of Peoples’ Livelihood Foundation, Inc.

    The Court, however, found such assertions untenable. According to the Court, nowhere in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 was it indicated that a multiple or series of transfers/sales of land would result in the loss of retention rights. Neither did it provide that the multiple or series of transfers or sales would amount to the waiver of such right.

    The Court mentioned the following relevant portions of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, as referred to in Item No. 4, Statement of Policies, Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 05, Series of 2006:

    Section 6. Retention Limits. — Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a viable family-size farm, such as the commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. x x x

    x x x

    Upon the effectivity of this Act, any sale, disposition, lease, management, contract or transfer of possession of private lands executed by the original landowner in violation of the Act shall be null and void: Provided, however, That those executed prior to this Act shall be valid only when registered with the Register of Deeds within a period of three (3) months after the effectivity of this Act. Thereafter, all Registers of Deeds shall inform the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) within thirty (30) days of any transaction involving agricultural lands in excess of five (5) hectares.

    Section 70. Disposition of Private Agricultural Lands. — The sale or disposition of agricultural lands retained by a landowner as a consequence of Section 6 hereof shall be valid as long as the total landholdings that shall be owned by the transferee thereof inclusive of the land to be acquired shall not exceed the landholding ceilings provided for in this Act.

    Any sale or disposition of agricultural lands after the effectivity of this Act found to be contrary to the provisions hereof shall be null and void. x x x

    Section 73. Prohibited Acts and Omissions. — The following are prohibited:
    (a) The ownership or possession, for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Act, of agricultural lands in excess of the total retention limits or award ceilings by any person, natural or juridical, except those under collective ownership by farmer-beneficiaries; x x x

    The Court ruled that Sections 6 and 70 are clear in stating that any sale and disposition of agricultural lands in violation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall be null and void. The reasonable reading of these three provisions in relation to the constitutional right of retention reveals that the consequence of nullity pertains to the area/s which were sold, or owned by the transferee, in excess of the five (5)-hectare land ceiling. Thus, the Court ruled that the lands covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 344281 and 344282 fell within Romeo C. Carriedo’s retained area.

    The Court stressed that item No. 4, Statement of Policies, Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 05, Series of 2006 has attempted to defeat the above reading by providing that, under the principle of estoppel, the sale of the first five (5) hectares is valid. But, said rule has also hastened to add that the first five (5) hectares sold corresponded to the transferor/s’ retained area. Thus, since the sale of the first five (5) hectares was valid, therefore, the landowner had lost the five (5) hectares because it happened to be, at the same time, the retained area limit. In reality, Item No. 4, Statement of Policies, Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 05, Series of 2006 had operated as a forfeiture provision in the guise of estoppel. It punished the landowner who had sold agricultural land in excess of five (5) hectares. For the Court, forfeitures, however, partake of a criminal penalty.

    The Court stated that in order for an administrative regulation to have the force of a penal law, (1) the violation of the administrative regulation must be made a crime by the delegating statute itself; and (2) the penalty for such violation must be provided by the statute itself.

    The Court also found that Sections 6, 70 and 73 (a) of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 did not provide that a sale or disposition of land in excess of five (5) hectares results in a forfeiture of the five (5) hectare retention area. According to the Court, Item No. 4, Statement of Policies, Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 05, Series of 2006 imposed a penalty where none was provided by law.

    The Court further stated that the repugnancy between the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 and Item No. 4, Statement of Policies, Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 05, Series of 2006 was apparent by a simple comparison of their texts. The conflict undermined the statutorily-guaranteed right of the landowner to choose the land he shall retain, and Item No. 4, Statement of Policies, Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 05, Series of 2006, in effect, amended the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which should not have happened.

    Consistent with the principle that a statute prevails over an administrative order, the Court declared the invalidity of Item No. 4, Statement of Policies, Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 05, Series of 2006 for being ultra vires. Thus, Romeo C. Carriedo neither waived his right to retain the land, nor was placed under estoppel for his sale the land to the Peoples’ Livelihood Foundation, Inc.

    Resolution of Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration in Department of Agrarian Reform v. Carriedo, G.R. No. 176549, October 10, 2018.

    The Court gave due course to the motion filed by the Department of Agrarian Reform that sought the reconsideration of the Decision dated 20 January 2016.

    The Court noted that the Department of Agrarian Reform is legally mandated to implement the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. The said department possesses the special knowledge and acquired expertise on the implementation of the agrarian reform program. According to the Court, to pay no heed to the issues the said department has raised would ignore the basic precepts of due process. The Court accordingly revisited its Decision by taking into account the arguments and position of the department.

    The Court reversed and set aside its Decision dated 20 January 2016, taking into consideration Item No. 4, Statement of Policies, Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 05, Series of 2006, which provides:

    II. STATEMENT OF POLICIES

    x x x

    4. Where the transfer/sale involves more than the five (5) hectare retention area, the transfer is considered violative of Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6657.

    In case of multiple or series of transfers/sales, the first five (5) hectares sold/conveyed without DAR clearance and the corresponding titles issued by the Register of Deeds (ROD) in the name of the transferee shall, under the principle of estoppel, be considered valid and shall be treated as the transferor/s’ retained area but in no case shall the transferee exceed the five-hectare landholding ceiling pursuant to Sections 6, 70 and 73 (a) of R.A. No. 6657. Insofar as the excess area is concerned, the same shall likewise be covered considering that the transferor has no right of disposition since CARP coverage has been vested as of 15 June 1988. Any landholding still registered in the name of the landowner after earlier dispositions totaling an aggregate of five (5) hectares can no longer be part of his retention area and therefore shall be covered under CARP.

    In the present case, the Court acknowledged that the sale of the first (5) hectares of agricultural land to the Peoples’ Livelihood Foundation, Inc. made by Romeo C. Carriedo could be viewed as valid.

    However, said sale should also be treated as the exercise of Romeo C. Carriedo’s retention rights, such that he would no longer be able to lawfully claim the subject landholding as his retained area.

    Accordingly, the remaining landholding also can no longer be part of his retention area and therefore shall be covered under Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. As narrated above, the remaining land that pertained to Transfer Certificate of Title No. 17680 was divided into sub-lots, of which two (2) of the lots (the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 344281 and 344282) were thereafter registered in the name of Romeo C. Carriedo.

    1)

    Both the Constitution5ARTICLE XIII

    x x x

    Agrarian and Natural Resources Reform

    Sec. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing. (Emphasis supplied.)     and Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 19886Sec. 2. Declaration of Principles and Policies. — It is the policy of the State to pursue a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). The welfare of the landless farmers and farmworkers will receive the highest consideration to promote social justice and to move the nation toward sound rural development and industrialization, and the establishment of owner cultivatorship of economic-size farms as the basis of Philippine agriculture.

    To this end, a more equitable distribution and ownership of land, with due regard to the rights of landowners to just compensation and to the ecological needs of the nation, shall be undertaken to provide farmers and farmworkers with the opportunity to enhance their dignity and improve the quality of their lives through greater productivity of agricultural lands. (Emphasis supplied.)     underscore the underlying principle of the agrarian reform program, that is, to endeavor a more equitable and just distribution of agricultural lands taking into account, among others, equity considerations. The objective of Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 05, Series of 2006 is equitable — that in order to ensure the effective implementation of the law, previous sales of landholding (without Department of Agarian Reform clearance) should be treated as the exercise of retention rights of the landowner, as embodied in Item No. 4 of the said administrative order.

    2)

    The equity in this policy of Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 05, Series of 2006 is apparent and easily discernible. With the sale of the lands, it was reasonably presumed that the landowner already received an amount (as purchase price) commensurate to the just compensation conformable with the constitutional and statutory requirement. At this point, equity dictates that he ought not to claim anymore, either in the guise of his retention area or otherwise, that which he already received in the previous sale of his land.

    3)

    Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 05, Series of 2006 is in consonance with the Stewardship Doctrine, under which private property is supposed to be held by the individual only as a trustee for the people in general, who are its real owners. As a mere steward, the individual must exercise his rights to the property not for his own exclusive and selfish benefit but for the good of the entire community or nation. Property use must not only be for the benefit of the owner but of society as well. The State, in the promotion of social justice, may regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment, and disposition of private property, and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits.

    4)

    The objective of land distribution to the landless farmers and farmworkers is carried out by Item No. 4, Statement of Policies, Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 05, Series of 2006, as it provides for the consequences in situations where a landowner had sold portions of his/her land with an area more than the statutory limitation of five (5) hectares. In this scenario, such administrative order treats the sale of the first five hectares as the exercise of the landowner’s retention rights because, effectively, the landowner has already chosen, and in fact has already disposed of, and has been duly compensated for, the area he is entitled to retain under the law.

    5)

    Item No. 4, Statement of Policies, Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 05, Series of 2006 is consistent with Section 707Sec. 70. Disposition of Private Agricultural Lands. — The sale or disposition of agricultural lands retained by a landowner as a consequence of Section 6 hereof shall be valid as long as the total landholdings that shall be owned by the transferee thereof inclusive of the land to be acquired shall not exceed the landholding ceiling provided for in this Act. x x x of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, as the former likewise treats the sale of the first five hectares (in case of multiple/series of transactions) as valid, such that the same already constitutes the retained area of the landowner. This legal consequence arising from the previous sale of land therefore eliminates the prejudice, in terms of equitable land distribution, that may befall the landless farmers and farmworkers.

    6)

    Finally, the sale of Romeo C. Carriedo’s landholdings was made in violation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 19888Sec. 6. Retention Limits. — x x x

    x x x

    Upon the effectivity of this Act, any sale, disposition, lease, management, contract or transfer of possession of private lands executed by the original landowner in violation of the Act shall be null and void: Provided, however, That those executed prior to this Act shall be valid only when registered with the Register of Deeds within a period of three (3) months after the effectivity of this Act. Thereafter, all Registers of Deeds shall inform the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) within thirty (30) days of any transaction involving agricultural lands in excess of five (5) hectares.    , having been made without the clearance of the Department of Agrarian Reform. To rule that Romeo C. Carriedo was still entitled to retain the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 344281 and 344282 will, in effect, reward the violation, which the Court maintains will not allow. The Court stressed that the right of retention serves to mitigate the effects of compulsory land acquisition by balancing the rights of the landowner and the tenant, and by implementing the doctrine that social justice is not meant to perpetrate an injustice against the landowner.

    In this case, however, the Court noted that Romeo C. Carriedo has claimed his right over the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 344281 and 344282, not because he was “deprived” of a portion of his land as a consequence of compulsory land coverage, but precisely because he already previously sold his landholdings, so that the remaining portion would still be his.

    The Court accordingly stated that although the exercise by a landowner of his retention right is constitutionally guaranteed, the same should not be done without due regard to other considerations which may affect the implementation of the agrarian reform program. This is especially true when such exercise pays no heed to the intent of the law, or worse, when such exercise amounts to its circumvention.

    The Court upheld the validity of Item No. 4, Statement of Policies, Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 05, Series of 2006. As a corollary, Romeo C. Carriedo no longer possessed retention rights to the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 344281 and 344282.

    Further reading:

    • Department of Agrarian Reform v. Carriedo, G.R. No. 176549, January 20, 2016.
    • Department of Agrarian Reform v. Carriedo, G.R. No. 176549 (Resolution), October 10, 2018.

    Check Out My Latest YouTube Video:

    [embedyt] https://www.youtube.com/embed?listType=playlist&list=UUA0qsY28UIiqNcY45Ez2rjg&layout=gallery[/embedyt]

  • Guiding Principle in Conversion of Agricultural Land

    On 15 June 2011, the Supreme Court promulgated a Decision in Ayala Land, Inc. v. Castillo1G.R. No. 178110, June 15, 2011, 667 PHIL 274-350. upholding the Conversion Order issued by the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform on 31 October 1997. The land in this case is in Silang, Cavite.

    The farmers who were parties in this case filed a Motion for Reconsideration to the said decision arguing that conversion is not a legal mode to exempt the property from the coverage of Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.

    The Court denied the motion because the guiding principle2Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 01, series of 2002, Section 1. in conversion governs only prime agricultural lands.3Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 01, series of 2002, Section 4 provides:
    SECTION 4. Areas Non-Negotiable for Conversion — An application involving areas non-negotiable for conversion shall not be given due course even when some portions thereof are eligible for conversion. The following areas shall not be subject to conversion:
    4.1. Lands within protected areas designated under the NIPAS, including mossy and virgin forests, riverbanks, and swamp forests or marshlands, as determined by the DENR;
    4.2. All irrigated lands, as delineated by the DA and/or the National Irrigation Administration (NIA), where water is available to support rice and other crop production, and all irrigated lands where water is not available for rice and other crop production but are within areas programmed for irrigation facility rehabilitation by the government;
    4.3. All irrigable lands already covered by irrigation projects with firm funding commitments, as delineated by the DA and/or NIA; and
    4.4. All agricultural lands with irrigation facilities.

    In the present case, the subject land could not even be classified as agricultural land.

    First, the subject land was already reclassified from agricultural to other uses as early as 7 May 1996.

    Second, various government agencies found that:

    • The property is about 10 kilometers from the Provincial Road;
    • The land sits on a mountainside overlooking Santa Rosa technopark;
    • The topography of the landholding is hilly and has an average slope of over 18%. It is undeveloped and mostly covered with a wild growth of vines, bushes, and secondary growth of forest trees;
    • The dominant use of the surrounding area is its industrial/forest growth as the landholding is sitting on a mountain slope overlooking the Sta. Rosa Technopark; and
    • The area is not irrigated and no irrigation system was noted in the area.

    Finally, the Department of Agrarian Reform had long investigated and ruled that the property was not suitable for agricultural use, as it had remained undeveloped with no source of irrigation.

    The Court thus concluded that the subject land was not prime agricultural land as contemplated under the law. The Department of Agrarian Reform properly issued the assailed Conversion Order.

    Further reading:

    • Ayala Land, Inc. v. Castillo, G.R. No. 178110 (Resolution), January 12, 2016.

  • Mere Reliance on a Causality Presumption

    A seafarer was hired as an assistant butcher on a certain cruise ship. On 22 August 2005, he entered into a 12-month contract of employment with the respondent incorporating the Standard Terms and Conditions the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels (Standard Employment Contract) as prescribed by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). Having passed the medical exam and having been declared fit for work, he boarded the said ship on 26 August 2005.

    During his employment, he was confined in a hospital sometime in December 2005 after suffering a month of rectal bleeding and lower abdominal pain. Soon he was medically repatriated, and upon arrival in the Philippines on 24 December 2005, he was immediately confined in a hospital, where he was found to be suffering from stage IV colon cancer. After months of confinement and treatment for his illness, he passed away.

    His widow thereafter filed a Complaint with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for death benefits, and the case went up to the Supreme Court.

    The Court denied her claims. The basis for the denial was the absence of showing that the cause of his death was one of those covered by the POEA Standard Employment Contract, and that the said cause was not work-related. It found that the Standard Employment Contract (under Section 32-A) lists down certain types of illnesses as compensable, but colon cancer is not one of them. And although there exists a disputable presumption of compensability (under Section 20 B (4)) for illnesses not listed therein, the Court ruled that it should be read in relation to said Section 32-A.

    In other words, she cannot simply rely on the disputable presumption provision mentioned in Standard Employment Contract, as she still has to substantiate her claim in order to be entitled to disability compensation.

    The widow, in this case, did not present any proof of a causal connection or at least a work relation between the employment of her husband and his colon cancer. Neither did she mention the risks that could have caused or, at the very least, contributed to the disease her husband had contracted.

    Because of these findings, the claim was not granted.

    Take away:

    “Claimants in compensation proceedings must show credible information that there is probably a relation between the illness and the work. Probability, and not mere possibility, is required; otherwise, the resulting conclusion would proceed from deficient proofs.”

    Further reading:

    • Joraina Dragon Talosig v. United Philippine Lines, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 198388, July 28, 2014.

  • Sleep Deprivation and Leukemia

    An employee was assigned at a pharmacy as a security guard. Years later, he was diagnosed with Acute Myelogenous Leukemia, and less than a year thereafter, he passed away.

    The Social Security Commission (SSC) granted the Social Security System (SSS) Temporary Total Disability (TTD) benefits, Permanent Partial Disability (PPD) benefits, and Death with Funeral Benefits to his beneficiaries. It, however, denied the claim for Employment Compensation (EC) death benefits on the ground that “there is no causal relationship between Acute Myelogenous Leukemia to [his] job as a security guard.”

    His widow appealed the SSC decision, and her case went all the way to the Supreme Court. She basically argued that employment of her husband regularly required him to take either straight 12 or 24 hours of duty, with only a 24-hour rest period on the last day of each month. He was thus constantly sleep-deprived and his immune system became weak. Eventually, he succumbed to leukemia. She concluded that the risk of contracting acute myelogenous leukemia was increased by her husband’s work or working conditions.

    The Court did not agree. In justifying the denial of her petition, it adopted, among others, the findings of the Court of Appeals.

    Under the law, for the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of a listed occupational disease. Otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions.

    Leukemia is considered as an occupational disease if the nature of employment involved exposure to X-rays, ionizing particles of radium or other radioactive substances or other forms of radiant energy, or it is contracted by operating room personnel due to exposure to anesthetics.

    In this case, other than the widow’s allegation that her husband suffered sleep deprivation due to his work schedule and which then weakened his immune system, she has not provided proof that, as a security guard, her husband was exposed to cancer-causing chemicals in the place/s where he was assigned.

    Record shows that she has only presented a copy of a medical abstract and of her husband’s daily time records in an attempt to prove that his employment increased his chances of contracting leukemia.

    However, the Court did not find anything in the documents that would help them infer or conclude that indeed, her husband’s risk of contracting leukemia increased by reason of his work conditions.

    Further reading:

    • Rosemarie Esmarialino v. Employees’ Compensation Commission, Social Security System (SSS) and Jimenez Protective and Security Agency, G.R. No. 192352. July 23, 2014.