Tag: disputable presumption

A Seafarer’s Cause of Action Arises Upon His Disembarkation from the Vessel

On 4 February 2010, Khalifa Algosaibi, through its agent, 88 Aces, hired Apolinario as an ordinary seaman to board the vessel MV Algosaibi 42. His employment contract was for a duration of 6 months.

After passing the required pre-employment medical examination, Apolinario left Manila on 26 February 2010 and embarked MV Algosaibi 42 in Ras Tanura, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

After completing his contract in August 2010, Apolinario was not repatriated to the Philippines, for he directly entered into a new employment contract with 88 Aces’ foreign principal, Khalifa Algosaibi. This new contract with Khalifa Algosaibi lasted until April 2012.

While on board MV Algosaibi 42 in December 2010, Apolinario suddenly experienced dizziness. As his condition did not improve, he was sent to As Salama Hospital in Al-Khobar, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where he was found to have high glucose and cholesterol. Apolinario notes that he was given medicine by the doctor and was advised to observe proper diet and avoid stress. After taking the doctor’s advice, his medical condition improved and he was able to perform his work well.

However, after 2 years, particularly in January 2012, Apolinario alleged that his dizziness recurred, accompanied by the blurring of his vision. On 2 April 2012, he stated that he returned to As Salama Hospital where he was diagnosed to have diabetes mellitus and dislipedemia.

In 11 April 2012, Apolinario was repatriated in Manila.

Apolinario claims that he immediately reported to the office of 88 Aces to get his unpaid wages and for him to be referred to the company physician. However, 88 Aces viewed that his repatriation happened because he completed his 6-month Philippine Overseas Employment Administration standard employment contract. Thus it declined to shoulder his medical expenses. Apolinario no longer insisted on treatment and just continued taking the medicine given by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia doctor.

Although Apolinario felt well, his illness recurred on 2 August 2013. Apolinario then consulted Dr. Joseph Glenn Dimatatac, an internal medicine physician, who informed him that his illness was indeed diabetes mellitus.

On 17 March 2015, Apolinario consulted Dr. Rufo Luna, the Municipal Health Officer of the Municipality of San Jose, who declared him to be physically unfit to continue work due to his hyperglycemia. Consequently, Apolinario demanded, albeit unsuccessfully, the payment of his disability benefits from his employer.

Apolinario filed his Request for Single Entry Approach at the National Labor Relations Commission on 25 March 2015. Then, on 8 May 2015, he filed a Complaint against Khalifa Algosaibi, 88 Aces, and Jocson (Respondents) before the Office of the Labor Arbiter for the payment of disability benefits.

Respondents, on the other hand, denied liability for the following reasons:

Apolinario filed his Complaint 5 years after the completion of his employment contract in August 2010. Thus, his cause of action had already prescribed, not having been filed within the 3-year prescriptive period set by law.
Apolinario finished his 6-month employment contract in August 2010 without any medical issue whatsoever.
Apolinario actually failed to comply with the 3-day post-employment medical examination requirement.

RULING:

RE: Prescription

Under the standard employment contract of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, a contract between an employer and a seafarer ceases upon its completion, when the seafarer signs off from the vessel and arrives at the point of hire.¹

In this case, while Apolinario’s 6-month contract may have ended as early as August 2010, he nonetheless was able to sign off from MV Algosaibi 42 and arrive at the point of hire only on 11 April 2012.

(Significance: A seafarer’s cause of action arises upon his disembarkation from the vessel.)

As Apolinario’s disembarkation from the Algosaibi 42 was on 11 April 2012, he had three years from the date, or until April 11, 2015, to make a claim for disability benefits.

Apolinario had requested for a Single Entry Approach² before the National Labor Relations Commission as early as 25 March 2015.

The fact that Apolinario filed his Complaint before the Office of the Labor Arbiter only on 8 May 2015 is of no moment. Since the Single Entry Approach is a pre-requisite to the filing of a Complaint before the Office of the Labor Arbiter, the date when Apolinario should be deemed to have instituted his claim was when he instituted his Request for Single Entry Approach on 25 March 2015. Considering that the expiration of Apolinario’s cause of action was on 11 April 2015, his claim was filed well within the 3-year prescriptive period.

RE: Disability benefits

The Supreme Court ruled that Apolinario is entitled to permanent total disability benefits.

Under the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract, those illnesses, such as diabetes mellitus, which are not listed as an occupational disease are disputably presumed as work-related.³

According to the Court, the effect of the legal presumption in favor of the seafarer is to create a burden on the part of the employer to present evidence to overcome the prima facie case of work-relatedness. Absent any evidence from the employer to defeat the legal presumption, the prima facie case of work-relatedness prevails.

To reinforce the prima facie case in his favor, Apolinario stated that during the existence of his contract, he experienced recurring dizziness and was diagnosed at As Salama Hospital in Al-Khobar Saudi Arabia to have contracted diabetes mellitus. In fact, while on board the vessel, he was twice sent to As Salama Hospital in Al-Khobar Saudi Arabia for medical treatment. To support his claim, Apolinario presented the medical record issued by the hospital and the different medical certificates of his physicians after his repatriation in Manila stating that he is already physically unfit to return to work due to his diabetes mellitus.

On the other hand, the Supreme Court found that respondents failed to present a scintilla of proof to establish the lack of casual connection between Apolinario’s disease and his employment as a seafarer.

The Court stated that had respondents granted Apolinario’s request to undergo a post-employment medical check-up, they could have presented a medical finding to contradict the presumption of work-relatedness of Apolinario’s illness. The post-employment medical check-up could have been the proper basis to determine the seafarer’s illness, whether it was work-related, or its specific grading of disability. Having failed to present any evidence to defeat the presumption of work-relatedness of Apolinario’s diabetes mellitus, the prima facie case that it is work-related prevails.

Nonetheless, the Supreme Court clarified that the presumption provided under Section 20 (A) (4) is only limited to the “work-relatedness” of an illness. It does not cover and extend to compensability. In this sense, there exists a fine line between the work-relatedness of an illness and the matter of compensability. Work-relatedness merely relates to the assumption that the seafarer’s illness, albeit not listed as an occupational disease, may have been contracted during and in connection with one’s work, whereas compensability pertains to the entitlement to receive compensation and benefits upon a showing that a seafarer’s work conditions caused or at least increased the risk of contracting the disease.

The Supreme Court noted the medically accepted finding that stress has major effects on a person’s metabolic activity. The effects of stress on glucose metabolism are mediated by a variety of counter-regulatory hormones that are released in response to stress and that result in elevated blood glucose levels and decreased insulin action. In diabetes, because of a relative or absolute lack of insulin, the increase in blood glucose on account of stress cannot be adequately metabolized. Thus, stress is a potential contributor to chronic hyperglycemia in diabetes.

In this case, to prove that his work conditions caused or at least increased the risk of contracting the disease, Apolinario showed that part of his duties as an Ordinary Seaman in MV Algosaibi 42 involved strenuous workload such as assist in the handling and operation of all deck gear such as topping, cradling and housing of booms; aid the carpenter in the repair work when requested; scale and chip paint, handle lines in the mooring of the ship, assist in the actual tying up and letting go of the vessel and stand as a lookout in the vessel. Apolinario further stated that while inside the vessel for several months, he was exposed to physical and psychological stress due to rush jobs, lack of sleep, heat stress, emergency works and homesickness for being away from his family. From the above enumeration of Apolinario’s duties on board the vessel, he was certainly exposed to various strain and stress — physical, mental and emotional.

Respondents failed to adduce any contrary medical findings from the company-designated physician to show that Apolinario’s illness was not caused or aggravated by his working conditions on board the vessel. There was also no showing that Apolinario is predisposed to the illness by reason of genetics, obesity or old age. Thus, the Supreme Court considered that the stress and strains he was exposed to on board contributed, even to a small degree, to the development of his disease. Inasmuch as compensability is the entitlement to receive disability compensation upon a showing that a seafarer’s work conditions caused or at least increased the risk of contracting the disease, Apolinario’s disease was thus declared compensable.

RE: Reportorial Requirement

While the requirement to report within three working days from repatriation appears to be indispensable in character, the Supreme Court enumerated the established exceptions to this rule:

when the seafarer is incapacitated to report to the employer upon his repatriation; and
when the employer inadvertently or deliberately refused to submit the seafarer to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician.⁴

Here, Apolinario avers that two days after his repatriation to Manila on 11 April 2012, he reported to the office of 88 Aces to get his unpaid wages and for him to be referred to the company designated physician. However, since his repatriation was due to the completion of his six-month Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-approved employment contract, he was told by 88 Aces through Jocson that they could not shoulder his medical expenses. Having been denied to undergo the post medical examination, Apolinario just continued taking the medicine given to him by the doctor in Saudi Arabia.

Between the two conflicting allegations from Apolinario and respondents, the Supreme Court resolved the doubt in favor of Apolinario. Besides, the factual backdrop of the case supports Apolinario’s allegation that he requested to be referred to a company designated physician. It noted that Apolinario repeatedly experienced dizziness and headaches, and needed medical attention while on board MV Algosaibi 42. In fact, because of his recurring sickness, he was examined twice at As Salama Hospital in Al-Khobar Saudi Arabia and even underwent thorough treatment thereat 10 days prior to his repatriation to Manila. Given Apolinario’s sensitive medical condition days prior to his repatriation, The Court doubted respondents’ allegation that Apolinario did not request to be referred to post-employment medical examination when he arrived in Manila. Apolinario’s medical condition during and after his employment on board lends credence to his claim that he asked to be medically examined by a company-designated physician but he was prevented so by respondents.

According to the Supreme Court, respondents had the opportunity to refer Apolinario to a company-designated physician, but they chose to escape their responsibility. Between the non-existent medical assessment of the company-designated physician and the medical assessment of Apolinario’s doctor of choice — stating that his disability is permanent and total — the latter evidently stands. Absent a certification from the company-designated physician, the law steps in to conclusively characterize his disability as total and permanent.

My Reliance on the Disputable Presumption of Work-relatedness is Sufficient

Fred Olsen Cruise Lines, Ltd., through its local agent Bahia Shipping Services, Inc., hired the seafarer in 2008 to work as a casino attendant. After working with said employer on two occasions in 2008 to 2009, the seafarer re-boarded the M/S Braemer on 1 August 2009 to work as a senior casino attendant.

In February 2010, the seafarer experienced profuse and consistent bleeding, extreme dizziness, and difficulty in breathing. She went to the ship’s clinic and was given medication. The next day, she experienced severe headache. She again went to the ship’s clinic and was prescribed a different medication. She claims that since her headache worsened after taking the said medication, she stopped taking the same.

The bleeding of the seafarer intensified. She was later advised by the ship’s physician to rest. However, her condition did not improve, so she was taken to a clinic in Barbados. A transvaginal ultrasound conducted on the seafarer revealed that she had two ovarian cysts. She returned to the ship and was assigned to perform light duties.

On 20 March 2010, the seafarer was medically repatriated to the Philippines.

On 22 March 2010, the seafarer was placed under the care of the company-designated physician (an obstetrician-gynecologist). Said physician found that the seafarer had “Abnormal Uterine Bleeding Secondary to an Adenomyosis with Adenomyoma.” The seafarer underwent endometrial dilatation and curettage as part of her treatment.

The company-designated physician was unable to declare the fitness of the seafarer for work by the end of the 120-day period from medical repatriation on 10 March 2010. However, the said physician was able to declare that the seafarer’s fitness to resume sea duties within the 240-day period from said repatriation.

On 8 September 2010, the seafarer filed a complaint to claim permanent disability benefits based on the collective bargaining agreement she signed.

Although the Office of the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission ruled in favor of the seafarer, the Court of Appeals reversed the award. The Court of Appeals found that the seafarer failed to provide substantial evidence to prove her allegation that her illness was work-related. Said court gave greater weight to the findings of the company-designated physician, holding that the latter had acquired detailed knowledge and was familiar with the seafarer’s medical condition.

The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals.

It stated that the seafarer should fulfill the following requisites for a grant of her claim for disability benefits, to wit:

(1) She suffered an illness;

(2) She suffered this illness during the term of her employment contract;

(3) She complied with the procedures prescribed under Section 20 (B) of the 2000 Philippine Overseas Employment Agency Standard Employment Contract;¹

(4) Her illness is one of the occupational diseases within the Standard Employment Contract,² or her illness or injury is otherwise work-related;³ and

(5) She complied with the four conditions enumerated under Section 32-A⁴ of the Standard Employment Contract for an occupational disease, or a disputably-presumed work-related disease, to be compensable.

In the present case, the first four requisites appear to have been met.

In February 2010, the seafarer experienced bleeding during her employment on board the M/S Braemer. The seafarer was medically repatriated to the Philippines and was able to visit the company-designated physician. Said physician thereafter diagnosed the seafarer as suffering from adenomyoma.

Although adenomyoma is not included in the list of occupational diseases under the 2000 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract, the said contract, nevertheless, provides that those illnesses not listed therein are disputably presumed as work-related.

However, it appears that the seafarer was unable to fulfill the fifth requisite.

The Court clarified that while the law recognizes that an illness may be disputably presumed to be work-related, the seafarer must still show a reasonable connection between the nature of work onboard the vessel and the contracted or aggravated illness. The seafarer cannot argue that he does not have the burden to prove that his illness was work-related because it is disputably presumed by law. The seafarer cannot simply rely on the disputable presumption provision mentioned in Section 20 (B) (4) of the 2000 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract.

In other words, to be entitled to compensation and benefits under this provision, it is not sufficient to establish that the seafarer’s illness or injury has rendered him permanently or partially disabled. It must also be shown that there is a causal connection between the seafarer’s illness or injury and the work for which he had been contracted. According to the Court, concomitant with this presumption is the burden placed upon the seafarer to present substantial evidence that his work conditions caused the disease, or at least increased the risk of contracting the same. Only a reasonable proof of work-connection, not direct causal relation, is required to establish compensability of illnesses not included in the list of occupational diseases.

In the present case, the Court found no substantial evidence establishing the relation between the seafarer’s work and the illness she contracted.

The Court also noted that there was no showing that the seafarer’s adenomyoma was pre-existing, thus it was not able to determine whether the adenomyoma was aggravated by the nature of her employment.

The Court acknowledged the seafarer’s arguments that her illness is the result of her “constantly walking upward and downward on board the vessel carrying loads” and that she “acquired her illness on board the employer’s vessel during the term of her employment as a casino attendant.” However, the Court found that the seafarer did not discuss the duties of a casino attendant. She failed to show the causation between walking, carrying heavy loads, and adenomyoma. She merely asserted that since her illness developed while she was on board the vessel, it was work-related.

The Court accordingly ruled that it had no means to determine whether the illness of the seafarer was work-related or work-aggravated, since the latter did not describe the nature of her employment as a casino attendant.

In view of the seafarer’s failure to fulfill the requisites of compensability, the Court ruled against the grant of the seafarer’s claim for disability benefits.

Mere Reliance on a Causality Presumption

A seafarer was hired as an assistant butcher on a certain cruise ship. On 22 August 2005, he entered into a 12-month contract of employment with the respondent incorporating the Standard Terms and Conditions the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels (Standard Employment Contract) as prescribed by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). Having passed the medical exam and having been declared fit for work, he boarded the said ship on 26 August 2005.

During his employment, he was confined in a hospital sometime in December 2005 after suffering a month of rectal bleeding and lower abdominal pain. Soon he was medically repatriated, and upon arrival in the Philippines on 24 December 2005, he was immediately confined in a hospital, where he was found to be suffering from stage IV colon cancer. After months of confinement and treatment for his illness, he passed away.

His widow thereafter filed a Complaint with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for death benefits, and the case went up to the Supreme Court.

The Court denied her claims. The basis for the denial was the absence of showing that the cause of his death was one of those covered by the POEA Standard Employment Contract, and that the said cause was not work-related. It found that the Standard Employment Contract (under Section 32-A) lists down certain types of illnesses as compensable, but colon cancer is not one of them. And although there exists a disputable presumption of compensability (under Section 20 B (4)) for illnesses not listed therein, the Court ruled that it should be read in relation to said Section 32-A.

In other words, she cannot simply rely on the disputable presumption provision mentioned in Standard Employment Contract, as she still has to substantiate her claim in order to be entitled to disability compensation.

The widow, in this case, did not present any proof of a causal connection or at least a work relation between the employment of her husband and his colon cancer. Neither did she mention the risks that could have caused or, at the very least, contributed to the disease her husband had contracted.

Because of these findings, the claim was not granted.

Take away:

“Claimants in compensation proceedings must show credible information that there is probably a relation between the illness and the work. Probability, and not mere possibility, is required; otherwise, the resulting conclusion would proceed from deficient proofs.”