Paulino Ungos III

Lawyer | Law Professor | Author

Tag: death

  • Effect of the Death of a Complainant to a Pending Suit for Illegal Dismissal

    On September 2, 2010, Florencio was employed as a driver by a taxi company.
    Florencio filed a constructive dismissal complaint with the National Labor Relations Commission on October 29, 2013, but he passed away while the case was still pending.
    Emma, the widow of deceased Florencio, filed an Omnibus Motion (For Substitution and Extension of Time to File Position Paper).

    When Emma was able to file a position paper, she claimed that Florencio was constructively dismissed from employment since he was placed on indefinite floating status. Emma added that the floating status was conditioned upon the payment of a penalty of Php6,000.00, which he could not raise because he was not allowed to work.

    The taxi company countered that the complaint for constructive dismissal did not involve property or property rights. Thus, it did not survive the death of Florencio, and Emma could no longer pursue it.

    The taxi company also denied that Florencio was constructively dismissed, and instead averred that Florencio was an on-call taxi driver who stopped driving after failing to remit boundary payments in 2013. The taxi company asserted that no documentary evidence supported the allegations in the complaint.

    This case reached the Supreme Court.

    On the issue of illegal dismissal, the Court ruled that Florencio, through Emma, failed to prove the fact of his dismissal. According to the Court, there was no evidence as to the nature of the supposed suspension, as well as the circumstances of the alleged constructive dismissal. Neither was there documentary proof to substantiate the claim that the taxi company required Florencio to pay Php6,000.00, and that, due to his alleged nonpayment, he was not permitted to work. For the Court, the charge of constructive dismissal was not established.

    In this case, the Court looked into a matter that was not raised as an issue in the petition filed before it. According to the Court, the present case presented the opportunity to clarify the effect of the death of a complainant to a pending suit for illegal dismissal.

    The Court mentioned the case of Fontana Development Corp. v. Vukasinovic1Fontana Development Corp. v. Vukasinovic, G.R. No. 222424, September 21, 2016. which characterized a complaint for illegal dismissal as one that involves injury to the person and, thus, does not survive the death of the employee.

    According to the Court, the application or use of the classification of ordinary civil actions as to cause or foundation on the effect of death of any of the parties to a pending action, as ruled in Fontana Development Corp., involved an inherent acknowledgment that such classification properly applies to labor complaints for illegal dismissal.

    In the present case, the Court scrutinized the propriety of applying such classification to a labor complaint. It asked:

    Should a complaint for illegal dismissal be analyzed through the lens that one views an ordinary civil action — classified as either one that involves injury to the person or one that primarily affects property or property rights?

    The Court answered in the negative. The Court ruled that a complaint for illegal dismissal may not be classified, like an ordinary civil action, as to cause or foundation for purposes of determining the effect of death of any of the parties to the case.

    The Court laid down two reasons.

    • First, an employment contract is one imbued with public interest.

    The Court explained that the Civil Code of the Philippines declares that the relations between capital and labor are not merely contractual. It is, in fact, one impressed with public interest.2 Article 1700

    Accordingly, the interest involved in an employment contract is not merely private and individual, but also public.

    Considering that such contractual relations are imbued with public interest, the enforcement of rights and obligations under such employment contract is also of public interest. Concomitantly, any violation of the employment contract would necessarily be of public interest.

    • Second, an illegal dismissal is a violation of the Labor Code of the Philippines and its implementing rules and regulations.

    The Court noted that it is easy to mistake a complaint for illegal dismissal as one that is personal to the complainant, the alleged illegally dismissed employee.

    The Court, however, pointed out that such characterization fails to take into consideration an important matter in that when an employer illegally dismisses an employee, said employer is essentially violating a statute.

    The Labor Code of the Philippines expressly upholds the constitutionally guaranteed right to security of tenure by ordaining that a regular employee may not be terminated from service except for just or authorized cause.3Article 294, formerly Article 279 Thus, an illegal dismissal — a dismissal without just or authorized cause — is not only a violation of the contractual relations between the employer and the employee but is, in fact, a violation of the Labor Code of the Philippines and its implementing rules and regulations.

    The Court said that these two important considerations, which affect the very nature of a complaint for illegal dismissal, separate and distinguish it from the realm of mere contractual obligations normally implicated in a civil complaint. These considerations are of such character and weight that a complaint for illegal dismissal should not and cannot be classified in the same manner as ordinary civil actions.

    In this regard, the Court highlighted the dual character of a complaint for illegal dismissal. It stated that it is an action predicated upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff, the purportedly illegally dismissed employee. One’s employment is a right and its violation is an injury. At the same time, the award arising from the finding of illegal dismissal — the payment of backwages — is not merely for redress of a private right, but a command for the employer to make public reparation for his or her violation of the Labor Code.

    The Court added if one couples this dual character with the public interest imbued in labor contractual relations, it would be evident that complaints for illegal dismissal cannot be classified as to cause or foundation in the same manner as ordinary civil actions insofar as the death of any of the parties and its effects are concerned. To do so would be to oversimplify the nature of a complaint for illegal dismissal and, in the process, ignore certain characteristics of illegal dismissal complaints which distinguish and prevent them from fitting said mold of ordinary civil actions.

    The Court thus ruled that substitution by the heirs of the deceased complainant in a pending complaint for illegal dismissal should be allowed. This approach respects and breathes life to the public interest imbued in contractual relations between the employer and the employee. Further, it allows for public reparation by the employer in case he or she is found to have violated the Labor Code.

    Further reading:

    • Nedira v. NJ World Corp., G.R. No. 240005, December 6, 2022.

  • Seafarer’s Work-related Death During Employment

    On 24 April 2002, the seafarer was hired as a messman on board the M/T Umm Al Lulu by the employer, Abu Dhabi National Tanker Company, through its local manning agency, C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. The seafarer and the employer signed a ten-month contract of employment, which was approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration on 9 May 2002.

    Before embarkation, the seafarer underwent a pre-employment medical examination and was declared physically fit to work. He then boarded the M/T Umm Al Lulu on 20 May 2002.

    The seafarer was repatriated in Manila on 16 March 2003. The next day, 17 March 2003, he went to a medical clinic in Kawit, Cavite where he was examined by his personal doctor who then diagnosed him with “Essential Hypertension.” Said doctor advised the seafarer to take the prescribed medication and rest for a week.

    On 19 March 2003, the seafarer died. The certificate of death stated the causes for his death, thus:

    Immediate cause: Irreversible Shock
    Antecedent cause: Acute Myocardial Infarction
    Underlying cause: Hypertensive Heart Disease

    The seafarer’s legal heirs filed a complaint against the employer for the recovery of death compensation benefits and of burial and children’s allowances.

    Employer’s Contentions:

    The employer contended that the seafarer’s death was not compensable based on the following reasons:

    1) The death of the seafarer did not occur during the term of his employment.

    A seafarer’s term of employment commences from his actual departure from the airport or seaport in the point of hire and ceases upon completion of his period of contractual service, signing-off, and arrival at the point of hire.

    The seafarer’s ten-month contract was about to expire on 20 March 2003 when he was safely repatriated without any medical condition a few days earlier, on 16 March 2003, as he was already in a convenient port. In other words, the seafarer finished his employment contract upon signing off from M/T Umm Al Lulu and arriving in Manila, his point of hire, on 16 March 2003.

    Thus, the seafarer’s death on 19 March 2003 could not have been compensable because it happened beyond the term of his contract.

    2) The seafarer’s death was not work-related.

    As a messman, the seafarer’s duties were limited to assisting the chief cook in food preparation. Said duties could not have contributed to his demise or increased the risk of acquiring the illness which caused his death, for there was no showing that the seafarer was subjected to any unusual strain or required to perform any strenuous activity that could have triggered a heart attack.

    3) The seafarer failed to disclose his ailment during his pre-employment medical examination.

    Hypertensive heart disease takes years to develop and most probably the seafarer was already suffering from said disease even before the start of his employment contract. However, the seafarer failed to disclose his ailment during his pre-employment medical examination. This fact barred the seafarer’s heirs from receiving death benefits on the ground of concealment of a pre-existing illness.

    4) The seafarer likewise failed to submit himself to a mandatory post-employment medical examination within three working days from his disembarkation.

    The Court’s Ruling:

    The Supreme Court disagreed with the contentions of the employer and ruled that the seafarer’s heirs were entitled to the benefits they claimed.

    The Court noted the following provisions of Section 20 (A) of the 1996 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract, as these were applicable to the case:

    SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS. —

    A. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR DEATH

    1. In case of death of the seafarer during the term of his contract, the employer shall pay his beneficiaries the Philippine Currency equivalent to the amount of Fifty Thousand US dollars (US$50,000) and an additional amount of Seven Thousand US dollars (US$7,000) to each child under the age of twenty-one (21) but not exceeding four (4) children, at the exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment.

    x x x

    4. The other liabilities of the employer when the seafarer dies as a result of injury or illness during the term of employment are as follows:

    a. The employer shall pay the deceased’s beneficiary all outstanding obligations due the seafarer under this Contract.

    b. The employer shall transport the remains and personal effects of the seafarer to the Philippines at employer’s expense except if the death occurred in a port where local government laws or regulations do not permit the transport of such remains. In case death occurs at sea, the disposition of the remains shall be handled or dealt with in accordance with the master’s best judgment. In all cases, the employer/master shall communicate with the manning agency to advise for disposition of seafarer’s remains.

    c. The employer shall pay the beneficiaries of the seafarer the Philippine currency equivalent to the amount of One Thousand US dollars (US$1,000) for burial expenses at the exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment. (Emphasis supplied.)

    The Court addressed the employer’s contentions, as follows:

    1) Clarification of the phrase “work-related death of the seafarer, during the term of his employment contract”

    The Court found that Section 20 (A) (1) of the 1996 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract covered cases wherein the seafarer’s death occurred “during the term of his contract.” The Court also noted that the same phrase could be found in Section 20 (A) (1) of the 2000 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract, only this more recent version of the provision additionally required that the death be “work-related.”

    The Court acknowledged that although medical repatriation of the seafarer at the point of hire strictly meant the termination of his employment, heirs of a seafarer who has died after his medical repatriation could still recover compensation and benefits.

    Applying the rule on liberal construction, the Court stated that medical repatriation cases should be considered as an exception to Section 20 of the Standard Employment Contract.

    1.1)

    Accordingly, the phrase “work-related death of the seafarer, during the term of his employment contract” under Part A (1) of the Standard Employment Contract should not be strictly and literally construed to mean that the seafarer’s work-related death should have precisely occurred during the term of his employment.

    Rather, it is enough that the seafarer’s work-related injury or illness which eventually causes his death should have occurred during the term of his employment.

    According to the Court, it is by this method of construction that undue prejudice to the seafarer and his heirs may be obviated and the State policy on labor protection be championed. For if the seafarer’s death was brought about (whether fully or partially) by the work he had harbored for his employer’s profit, then it is but proper that his demise be compensated.

    1.2)

    It is not required that the employment be the sole factor in the growth, development or acceleration of the illness to entitle the seafarer or the heirs to benefits provided therefor. It is enough that the employment had contributed, even in a small degree, to the development of the disease and in bringing about seafarer’s death.

    1.3)

    Even assuming that the ailment of the seafarer was contracted prior to his employment, this still would not deprive him or his heirs of compensation benefits. For what matters is that the work of the seafarer had contributed, even in a small degree, to the development of the disease and in bringing about his eventual death.

    1.4)

    Neither is it necessary, in order to recover compensation, that the seafarer be in perfect health at the time he contracted the disease. A seafarer brings with him possible infirmities in the course of his employment, and while the employer is not the insurer of the health of his seafarers, he takes them as he finds them and assumes the risk of liability. If the disease is the proximate cause of the seafarer’s death for which compensation is sought, the previous physical condition of the seafarer is unimportant, and recovery may be had for said death, independently of any pre-existing disease.

    The Court concluded that medical repatriation is an exceptional circumstance and allows the heirs of the seafarer who died after he had been medically repatriated to recover the compensation and benefits provided in Section 20 (A) of the 1996 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract .

    The phrase “death of the seafarer during the term of his contract” in Section 20 (A) (1) of the 1996 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract should not be strictly and literally construed to mean that the seafarer’s death should have occurred during the term of his employment; it is enough that the seafarer’s work-related injury or illness which eventually caused his death occurred during the term of his employment.

    2) Context of the illness that caused the seafarer’s death

    According to the Court, for a seafarer’s death to be compensable under the said contract, the illness leading to the eventual death of the seafarer need not be shown to be work-related in order to be compensable, but must be proven to have been contracted during the term of the contract. Neither is it required that there be proof that the working conditions increased the risk of contracting the disease or illness. An injury or accident is said to arise “in the course of employment” when it takes place within the period of employment, at a place where the employee reasonably may be, and while he is fulfilling his duties or is engaged in doing something incidental thereto.

    The Court ruled in favor of the seafarer’s heirs since the particular circumstances in the present case revealed that the seafarer contracted the illness which eventually caused his death during the term of his contract or in the course of his employment.

    3) Seafarer’s hypertension and/or heart disease easily detected by standard/routine tests

    The Court found that before the seafarer boarded M/T Umm Al Lulu on 20 May 2002, he underwent a pre-employment medical examination and was declared fit to work. In this regard, the Court ruled that the same negated the employer’s claim that the seafarer concealed a pre-existing illness.

    The Court acknowledged its declarations that the pre-employment medical examination could not be relied upon to inform the employer/s of a seafarer’s true state of health, and there were instances when the pre-employment medical examination could not have divulged the seafarer’s illness considering that the examinations were not exploratory.

    However, the Court noted that the seafarer’s hypertension and/or heart disease could have been easily detected by standard/routine tests included in the pre-employment medical examination, i.e., blood pressure test, electrocardiogram, chest x-ray, and/or blood chemistry.

    The Court added that even assuming that the ailment of the seafarer was contracted prior to his employment on board the M/T Umm Al Lulu, this could not be a drawback to the compensability of the disease.

    The Court reiterated that it is not required that the employment be the sole factor in the growth, development or acceleration of the illness to entitle the claimant to the benefits provided therefor. It is enough that the employment had contributed, even in a small degree, to the development of the disease and in bringing about his death.

    Neither is it necessary, in order to recover compensation, that the seafarer must have been in perfect condition or health at the time he contracted the disease. Every workingman brings with him to his employment certain infirmities, and while the employer is not the insurer of the health of his seafarers, he takes them as he finds them and assumes the risk of liability. If the disease is the proximate cause of the seafarer’s death for which compensation is sought, the previous physical condition of the seafarer is unimportant and recovery may be had therefor independent of any pre-existing disease.

    4) Post-employment medical examination of the seafarer by a company-designated physician within three days from arrival not a requisite for recovery of compensation and benefits relating to a seafarer’s death

    Finally, the Court ruled that the insistence of the employer on the post-employment medical examination of the seafarer by a company-designated physician within three days from arrival at the point of hire was misplaced.

    Said post-employment medical examination was required under Section 20 (B) (3) of the 1996 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract for compensation and benefits for a seafarer’s injury or illness; it was not a requisite under Section 20 (A) of the 1996 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract for compensation and benefits for a seafarer’s death.

    In addition, Section 20 (B) (3) of the 1996 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract itself allowed as an exception from said requirement a seafarer who is physically incapacitated from complying with the same.

    The Court found that the seafarer in this case was already of poor health and weak physical condition upon his repatriation on 16 March 2003, which necessitated his immediate visit to a nearby clinic the very next day, on 17 March 2003.

    In any event, the seafarer still had until 19 March 2003 to see a company-designated physician but he died on the same day of a cause (“Hypertensive Heart Disease”) directly linked to the illness (“Essential Hypertension”) he developed during his term of employment on M/T Umm Al Lulu and for which he was medically repatriated.

    The Court reiterated the principle that the post-employment medical examination requirement is not absolute and admits of an exception, i.e., when the seaman is physically incapacitated from complying with the requirement.

    For a man who was terminally ill and in need of urgent medical attention, one could not reasonably expect that he would immediately resort to and avail of the required medical examination, assuming that he was still capable of submitting himself to such examination at that time.

    Under the circumstances, the seafarer’s surviving heirs cannot be denied their right to claim benefits under the law.

    Further reading:

    • C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. v. Legal Heirs of Repiso, G.R. No. 190534, February 10, 2016.