Paulino Ungos III

Lawyer | Law Professor | Author

Category: Labor Law

  • Expletives, Dismissals, and Unfair Labor Practices

    “O” was a professor and the assistant chairperson of the Social Sciences Department of a university. “O” was also the president of the university union, a duly registered labor union and the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the university’s faculty and non-academic personnel.

    On 5 September 2014, the university received an administrative complaint filed by a student against “O.” The student claimed that “O” abused her and accordingly violated the university’s code of conduct and Republic Act No. 7610.

    According to the student, she encountered “O” as the latter was about to enter the university’s faculty room. She held the doorknob on her way out of the office, while “O” held the opposite end of the doorknob. When she stepped aside, “O” allegedly exclaimed the words “anak ng puta” and walked on without any remorse. The student claims that she experienced emotional trauma from “O”‘s conduct.

    The university thus charged “O” with gross misconduct and unprofessional behavior in violation of Section 16 (4) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 232, or the Education Act of 1982.1SECTION 16. Teacher’s Obligations. — Every teacher shall:

    1. Perform his duties to the school by discharging his responsibilities in accordance with the philosophy, goals, and objectives of the school.

    2. Be accountable for the efficient and effective attainment of specified learning objectives in pursuance of national development goals within the limits of available school resources.

    3. Render regular reports on performance of each student and to the latter and the latter’s parents and guardians with specific suggestions for improvement.

    4. Assume the responsibility to maintain and sustain his professional growth and advancement and maintain professionalism in his behavior at all times.

    5. Refrain from making deductions in students’ scholastic ratings for acts that are clearly not manifestations of poor scholarship.

    6. Participate as an agent of constructive social, economic, moral, intellectual, cultural and political change in his school and the community within the context of national policies. (Emphasis supplied)

    The university eventually dismissed “O” after complying with the requirements of procedural due process. “O” then proceeded to file a complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice against the university.

    “O” denied that he “unjustifiably, angrily” yelled “anak ng puta” at the student. He pointed out inconsistencies in her testimony, arguing that he was in his classroom, and not where she had claimed, when the incident happened. In any case, “O” insisted that he had no motive to malign the student, who was never enrolled in any of his classes, and whom he did not know before the alleged incident.

    “O” also contended that “anak ng puta” per se is neither defamatory nor constitutive of gross misconduct and unprofessional behavior. He argued that there was no proof that he had perverse or corrupt motivations in violating the school policy.

    “O” added that should he be found guilty, dismissal was too harsh a penalty for the alleged infraction, especially since it would have been his first offense after 20 years of service. He believed that he was well loved by his students and that he had been professional throughout his stint, mindful of others’ feelings.

    “O” further contended that his dismissal constituted unfair labor practice as it was done on account of his union activities, which involved taking a stand against the school’s K-12 policies. He claimed that the university saw the complaint as an opportunity to get rid of him for being critical of the university’s actions. He also asserted that the dismissal was done at the time the union was mourning the death of its secretary.

    Was “O” validly dismissed from employment?

    The Supreme Court ruled that “O”‘s dismissal was valid.

    Article 297 of the Labor Code of the Philippines provides that an employer may terminate an employment for serious misconduct.

    Misconduct is defined as improper or wrong conduct. It is the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character and implies wrongful intent and not mere error of judgment. The misconduct to be serious within the meaning of the act must be of such a grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial or unimportant. Such misconduct, however serious, must nevertheless be in connection with the work of the employee to constitute just cause from his separation.

    In order to constitute serious misconduct which will warrant the dismissal of an employee under paragraph (a) of Article [297] of the Labor Code, it is not sufficient that the act or conduct complained of has violated some established rules or policies. It is equally important and required that the act or conduct must have been performed with wrongful intent.

    Misconduct is not considered serious or grave when it is not performed with wrongful intent. If the misconduct is only simple, not grave, the employee cannot be validly dismissed.2National Labor Relations Commission v. Salgarino, G.R. No. 164376, July 31, 2006, 529 PHIL 355-376

    The Court stated that a teacher exclaiming “anak ng puta” after having encountered a student is an unquestionable act of misconduct. However, the Court also clarified that whether the said expression constitutes serious misconduct that warrants the teacher’s dismissal will depend on the context of the phrase’s use. “Anak ng puta” is similar to “putang ina” in that it is an expletive sometimes used as a casual expression of displeasure, rather than a personal attack or insult.3Pader v. People, G.R. No. 139157, February 8, 2000, 381 PHIL 932-937

    In the present case, the Court found that the utterance in question, “anak ng puta,” was an expression of annoyance or exasperation. Both “O” and the student were pulling from each side of the door, prompting “O” to exclaim frustration without any clear intent to maliciously damage or cause emotional harm upon the student. That they had not personally known each other before the incident, and that “O” had no personal vendetta against the student as to mean those words to insult her, confirm this conclusion.

    However, the Court considered other relevant circumstances that aggravated the misconduct he committed.

    First, he not only denied committing the act, but he also refused to apologize for it and even filed a counter-complaint against the student for supposedly tarnishing his reputation. He even refused to sign the receiving copy of the notices that sought to hold him accountable for his act.

    According to the Court, while uttering an expletive out loud in the spur of the moment is not grave misconduct per se, the refusal to acknowledge this mistake and the attempt to cause further damage and distress to a minor student cannot be mere errors of judgment. “O”‘s subsequent acts are willful, which negate professionalism in his behavior. They contradict a professor’s responsibility of giving primacy to the students’ interests and respecting the institution in which he teaches. In the interest of self-preservation, “O” refused to answer for his own mistake; instead, he played the victim and sought to find fault in a student who had no ill motive against him.

    The Court added that had he been modest enough to own up to his first blunder, “O”‘s case would have gone an entirely different way.

    Second, a similar complaint had already been filed against “O”: that of verbal abuse against another student.

    And third, “O” was found to have exhibited aggressive behavior to his colleagues in that he shouted at co-professors, displayed a dirty finger sign against his immediate superior, and challenged a co-professor to a fist-fight.

    For the Court, the foregoing circumstances revealed “O”‘s pugnacious character and ill-mannered conduct.

    The Court stressed that in determining the sanction imposable on an employee, the employer may consider the former’s past misconduct and previous infractions.4Sy v. Neat, Inc., G.R. No. 213748, November 27, 2017

    Employers are not expected to retain an employee whose behavior causes harm to its establishment. The law also recognizes the right of the employer to expect from its workers not only good performance, adequate work and diligence, but also good conduct and loyalty. The employer may not be compelled to continue to employ such persons whose continuance in the service will patently be inimical to its interests. 5Sugue v. Triumph International (Phils.), Inc., G.R. Nos. 164804 & 164784, January 30, 2009, 597 PHIL 320-342

    In the present case, “O” cannot rely on his 20-year stay in the university to shield him from liability. The longer an employee stays in the service of the company, the greater is his responsibility for knowledge and compliance with the norms of conduct and the code of discipline in the company.6Punzal v. ETSI Technologies, Inc., G.R. Nos. 170384-85, March 9, 2007, 546 PHIL 704-719

    For the Court, “O”‘s dismissal was valid.

    Did “O”‘s dismissal from employment constitute unfair labor practice?

    The Supreme Court ruled that the university was not guilty of unfair labor practice.

    Under Article 258 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, unfair labor practices are violative of the constitutional right of workers to self-organize.

    Jurisprudence teaches that the person who alleges the unfair labor practice has the burden of proving it with substantial evidence.7UST Faculty Union v. University of Santo Tomas, G.R. No. 180892, April 7, 2009, 602 PHIL 1016-1036 In determining whether an act of unfair labor practice was committed, the totality of the circumstances must be considered. If the unfair treatment does not relate to or affect the workers’ right to self-organize, it cannot be deemed unfair labor practice. A dismissal of a union officer is not necessarily discriminatory, especially when that officer committed an act of misconduct. In fact, union officers are held to higher standards.8Republic Savings Bank v. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. L-20303, October 31, 1967, 128 PHIL 230-247 and Great Pacific Life Employees Union v. Great Pacific Life Assurance Corp., G.R. No. 126717, February 11, 1999, 362 PHIL 452-466

    In the present case, the Court found that “O”‘s dismissal, which was brought about by his personal acts, did not constitute unfair labor practice as provided under the Labor Code of the Philippines. Dismissing him was not meant to violate the right of the university employees to self-organize. Neither was it meant to interfere with the Union’s activities. The Court further stated that “O” failed to prove that the proceedings against him were done with haste and bias. And although the Court noted “O”‘s defense that he was the union president, this does not make him immune from liability for his acts of misconduct.

    The Court reiterated the principle that the employer’s management prerogative to dismiss an employee is valid as long as it is done in good faith and without malice.9 In this case, this Court found no bad faith on the part of the university when it dismissed “O” from employment. “O”‘s claim of unfair labor practice thus failed.

    Further reading:

    • Adamson University Faculty and Employees Union v. Adamson University, G.R. No. 227070, March 9, 2020.

  • My Supervisor Committed Sexual Harassment, Not Me

    On 16 January 2009, MCP started working for LBC as a customer associate in one of its branches. The branch’s team leader and officer-in-charge, AAB, endorsed her application for the post and acted as her immediate superior.

    However, during her employment with LBC, MCP was sexually harassed by AAB.

    On 5 May 2010, MCP reported the incident to the LBC Head Office and also prepared a resignation letter in case management would not act on her complaint. Management acted on her complaint by advising her to request for a transfer to another team while they investigated the matter.

    On 8 May 2010, MCP returned to the LBC Head Office and submitted her formal complaint against AAB. MCP also reported AAB’s acts of sexual harassment to the police.

    On 14 May 2010, MCP resigned from her employment since LBC management did not immediately act on her complaint. According to MCP, she was forced to quit since she no longer felt safe at work.

    On 20 July 2010, MCP filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against LBC.

    Was MCP constructively dismissed from employment?

    The Supreme Court reiterated the principle that constructive dismissal occurs when an employer makes an employee’s continued employment impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, or has made an employee’s working conditions or environment harsh, hostile and unfavorable, such that the employee feels obliged to resign from his or her employment. Common examples are when the employee is demoted, or when his or her pay or benefits are reduced. However, constructive dismissal is not limited to these instances. The gauge to determine whether there is constructive dismissal, is whether a reasonable person would feel constrained to resign from his or her employment because of the circumstances, conditions, and environment created by the employer for the employee1Saudi Arabian Airlines (Saudia) v. Rebesencio, G.R. No. 198587, January 14, 2015, 750 PHIL 791-846. There may be constructive dismissal if an act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes so unbearable on the part of the employee that it could foreclose any choice by him except to forego his continued employment.2Hyatt Taxi Services Inc. v. Catinoy, G.R. No. 143204, [June 26, 2001], 412 PHIL 295-307

    In the present case, the Court found no proof that LBC acted on MCP’s report before they issued AAB a notice to explain. The Court further found that LBC only commenced the formal investigation 41 days after MCP reported the incident. Another month passed before it held an administrative hearing for the case against AAB. 2 more months passed before LBC resolved the matter.

    The Court viewed LBC’s delay in acting on MCP’s complaint as an instance of insensibility, indifference, and disregard for its employees’ security and welfare. In failing to act promptly on MCP’s complaint and in choosing to let the resolution of the complaint hang in the air for a long period of time, LBC had shown that it did not accord her claims the necessary degree of importance, and at best considered it a minor infraction that could wait. LBC, the Court said, belittled her allegations.

    Furthermore, the Court found that during the investigation, AAB resumed his duties as usual. In the meantime, MCP was found to have consumed her vacation leaves just to avoid him while waiting for the approval of her transfer to another branch. LBC’s acts showed that it was MCP who had to change and adjust, and even transfer from her place of work, instead of AAB. For the Court, LBC created create a hostile, unfavorable, unreasonable work atmosphere for MCP.

    Stated otherwise LBC’s insensibility to MCP’s sexual harassment case was a ground for constructive dismissal. MCP was compelled to leave her employment because of the hostile and offensive work environment created and reinforced by AAB and LBC. MCP was thus clearly constructively dismissed.

    Further reading:

    • LBC Express-Vis, Inc. v. Palco, G.R. No. 217101, February 12, 2020.

  • False Report of a Patient’s Maltreatment

    Bernie was hired in November 2007 as a nursing attendant at MPI.

    On 17 March 2016, the mother of a patient appeared at MPI’s facility, demanding to see her son because earlier that day, she received a text message from someone who claimed to be a former staff of MPI, stating that the patient was being subjected to physical assault by MPI employees.

    However, upon checking the patient, no sign of physical injury was found on him.

    Consequently, the patient’s mother called the informant via speaker phone, and as she did, MPI nurses situated nearby recognized Bernie’s voice on the other end.

    MPI reviewed the relevant closed circuit television (CCTV) footage and discovered Bernie flipping through patients’ charts and copying information, which he placed inside his pocket.

    MPI then issued a Memorandum dated 9 July 2016 requiring Bernie to explain his side.

    In his letter dated 9 July 2016, Bernie denied contacting the patient’s mother and alleged that he was merely copying the vital signs of patients for endorsement.

    On 5 September 2016, MPI terminated Bernie’s employment for maliciously relaying false information to the patient’s relatives.

    Bernie then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against MPI.

    Was Bernie’s dismissal from employment based on a valid cause?

    In Metro Psychiatry, Inc., v. Llorente1G.R. No. 245258, February 5, 2020, the Supreme Court found that the dismissal of Bernie was valid.

    The Court reiterated the principle that misconduct is the “transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment.”2Sy v. Neat, Inc., G.R. No. 213748, November 27, 2017 For misconduct to be a just cause for dismissal, the following requisites must concur: “(a) the misconduct must be serious; (b) it must relate to the performance of the employee’s duties showing that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer; and (c) it must have been performed with wrongful intent.”3Sterling Paper Products Enterprises, Inc. v. KMM-Katipunan, G.R. No. 221493, August 2, 2017, 815 PHIL 425-439

    In the present case, the Court considered the following pieces of evidence:

    • the CCTV footage where Bernie was seen copying from the records and pocketing the paper where he wrote the information;
    • MPI’s rule prohibiting employees to get hold of a patient’s personal information; and
    • the written statements of MPI nurses who recognized Bernie’s voice on the speaker phone as the latter talked to the patient’s mother.

    According to the Court, Bernie’s suspicious actuations of copying a patient’s personal information and using it to malign MPI by relaying a false narrative were indicative of his wrongful intent. His actions comprised serious misconduct because as a nursing attendant, he had access to private and confidential information of MPI’s patients, but he did not only illicitly copy the personal information of a patient of MPI, he also used the information to fulfill a deceitful purpose. The Court added that an unauthorized use of a patient’s personal information destroys a medical facility’s reputation in the industry and in this case, could have even exposed MPI to a lawsuit. Coupled with the statements from MPI nurses who had no ill motive against Bernie, the Court found that Bernie’s “connection to the incident catapulted from a mere speculation to reasonable certainty.”

    For the Court, MPI was justified in terminating Bernie’s employment.

    Further reading:

    • Metro Psychiatry, Inc., petitioner, vs. Bernie J. Llorente, G.R. No. 245258, February 5, 2020.

  • Minimum Salary Rates as a Management Prerogative

    An exclusive bargaining representative of the supervisory employees claimed for “accrued differentials and salary adjustments due to underpayment of salary” for its recently regularized members, on the basis of the employer’s Local Policy on minimum salary rates. Record showed that several supervisory employees were regularized by the employer, but the latter provided them with salary rates lower than those prescribed under the Local Policy.

    The employer refused to pay the claims and denied that the Local Policy was binding. It argued that the decision to implement any company policy is a prerogative of management.

    Can the employer refuse to implement its Local Policy relating to the minimum salary rates for regularized employees?

    No.

    The Supreme Court acknowledged that employers enjoy management prerogative when it comes to the formulation of business policies, including those that affect their employees.1Lagatic v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 121004, January 28, 1998, 349 PHIL 172-186 and Pantoja v. SCA Hygiene Products Corporation, G.R. No. 163554, April 23, 2010, 633 PHIL 235-243 However, the Court also clarified that company policies resulting from an exercise of management prerogative can implicate the rights and obligations of employees. The Court added that they become part of the employment contract to that extent.2Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWO v. Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 162994, September 17, 2004, 481 PHIL 687-705

    In the present case, the Court interpreted the Local Policy and found that:

    • The employer has the discretion to pay newly-hired employees a salary rate lower than the minimum rate during the probationary period;
    • However, once the probationary period ends and the employee is regularized, the employer must pay the minimum rate.
    • Entitlement to the minimum rate requires mere regularization based solely on performance review, without need of merit promotion.

    The Court ruled that the employer had no discretion over the payment of the minimum rate upon regularization of an employee. Once the employee is regularized, management prerogative must give way and be subject to the limitations composed by law, the collective bargaining agreement and general principles of fair play and justice.

    For the Court, the employer should implement its Local Policy. The employees should accordingly be granted their claim for salary differentials.

    Further reading:

    • Del Monte Fresh Produce (Philippines), Inc. v. Del Monte Fresh Supervisors Union, G.R. No. 225115, January 27, 2020.

  • But His Dismissal from Employment Was Harsh

    On 31 March 1992, the employee was hired as an able seaman by the employer on board one of its vessels. One of his primary duties entailed being a duty look-out during vessel navigation.

    In 2016, after serving for 24 years, the employee was dismissed from employment for his failure to call out and report instances of oil pilferage when he was on duty. According to the employer, the employee was undoubtedly aware of the oil pilferage, for he had a good vantage point from his post. Despite said pilferage, Cordero did not report the same to his employer.

    When the case reached the Court of Appeals, it affirmed the validity of the employee’s dismissal. However, it also awarded separation pay as a measure of compassionate justice since it found the penalty of dismissal too harsh.

    The issue determined by the Supreme Court was on the propriety of the award of separation pay for this validly-dismissed employee.

    The Supreme Court ruled that the award of separation pay was devoid of basis in fact and in law.

    According to the Court, jurisprudence dictates that as a general rule, an employee who has been dismissed for any of the just causes enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor Code is not entitled to a separation pay. In exceptional cases, however, separation pay has been granted to a legally dismissed employee as an act of “social justice” or on “equitable grounds.” In both instances, it is required that the dismissal (1) was not for serious misconduct; and (2) did not reflect on the moral character of the employee.1Manila Water Co. v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 188747, January 29, 2014, 725 PHIL 513-525 It is stressed that separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in the instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character. A contrary rule would have the effect of rewarding rather than punishing the erring employee for his offense. The policy of social justice is not intended to countenance wrongdoing simply because it is committed by the underprivileged. Equity as an exceptional extenuating circumstance does not favor, nor may it be used to reward, the indolent or the wrongdoer for that matter. A party will not be allowed, in guise of equity, to benefit from his own fault.2Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 80609, August 23, 1988, 247 PHIL 641-652 and Toyota Motor Phils. Corp. Workers Association v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. Nos. 158786, 158789 & 158798-99, October 19, 2007, 562 PHIL 759-817

    In the present case, the Court acknowledged that the dismissal of the employee was valid. It also found that his infractions involved moral turpitude and constituted serious misconduct. No basis thus supported the award of separation pay.

    The Court added that the employee’s long years of service did not serve to mitigate his offense and it should not be considered in meting out the appropriate penalty therefor. According to the Court, the infraction that he committed against his employer demonstrated the highest degree of ingratitude to an institution that has been the source of his livelihood for 24 years, constitutive of disloyalty and betrayal of the trust and confidence reposed upon him. The full trust and confidence reposed by the employer in him, coupled with the fact that he occupied a position that allowed him full access to its property, aggravated the offense.

    Further reading:

    • Herma Shipping and Transport Corp. v. Cordero, G.R. Nos. 244144 & 244210, January 27, 2020.

  • Your New Engagement with Us Terminated Your Previous Employment

    On 17 December 1997, Lailani started working for CML as an Assembly Production Operator. On 6 February 2012, she was dismissed by way of redundancy. She then signed a quitclaim indicating her position as QA Inspector Lead and received a certain amount as severance package. At the time of her dismissal, she was receiving a monthly salary of Php17,047.88.

    On 21 September 2012, Lailani accepted a job with the same employer, CML, for the position of QA Inspector Senior — a position under the QA Inspector Lead. The position had a basic monthly salary of Php10,835.86.

    On 20 April 2015, a first Absence Without Official Leave (AWOL) Notice was given to Lailani due to the latter’s absence from 16 to 18 April 2015. Lailani was directed to report for work on 21 April 2015. Due to Lailani’s continued absence, a second AWOL Notice and a third AWOL Notice were sent to her. As a result of her prolonged unexplained absence, Lailani’s employment was terminated on 11 May 2015. A Termination Letter dated 11 May 2015 was sent to Lailani informing her of the decision to sever her employment.

    Lailani filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against CML.

    In the Court of Appeals (CA), the dismissal of Lailani from employment on 6 February 2012 was affirmed to be illegal. With regard to the awards of separation pay and backwages, although the CA computed the said reliefs using Lailani’s original monthly salary of P17,047.88 for the period of 6 February 2012 to September 2012, the amount of Php10,835.86 was used in computing separation pay and backwages from September 2012 until 11 May 2015. The CA explained that Lailani’s employment in September 2012 constituted a new job because her first employment was effectively terminated on 6 February 2012. The CA added that Lailani’s execution of the employment contract in September 2012 was an acceptance of the lower salary.

    Was Lailani entitled to differentials in the awards of separation pay and backwages?

    The Supreme Court ruled that Lailani was entitled to salary differentials from the time she was re-hired in September 2012 up to the time she was validly dismissed on 11 May 2015.

    In pointing out the error of the CA, the Supreme Court cited Article 294 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, which states:

    Art. 294. Security of Tenure. — An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits of their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.

    The Court explained that since the termination of Lailani’s employment on 6 February 2012 was illegal, Article 294 requires that she be given whatever she was previously entitled to. The Court stated that this did not only include Lailani’s reinstatement to her old position but also the amount of compensation previously received. According to the Court, when Lailani was “re-hired” in September 2012, she was actually reinstated. Thus, she should have been paid her basic monthly salary of Php17,047.88 instead of Php10,835.86. Accordingly, the Supreme Court awarded differential in the amount of Php6,212.02 from September 2012 until 11 May 2015

    Further reading:

    • Hapita v. Cypress Manufacturing Limited, G.R. No. 240512, January 27, 2020.

  • Payment of Employment Bond

    On 4 April 2011, CP, Inc. hired the employee as its Network Engineer.

    The employment contract stated that the employee shall pay an “employment bond” of Eighty Thousand Pesos (Php80,000.00) if she resigns within twenty-four (24) months from the time of her employment.

    On 5 August 2011, the employee informed CP, Inc. of her intention to resign effective 9 September 2011. However, the employee was found to have committed an infraction and was placed on preventive suspension from 25 August up to 9 September 2011.

    The employee thus filed a complaint for illegal suspension, while CP, Inc. pursued its claim of payment of “employment bond” in the same proceedings.

    Should the claim for payment of “employment bond” be filed before the labor tribunals?

    Yes.

    Article 224 of the Labor Code of the Philippines clothes the labor tribunals with original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims for damages arising from employer-employee relationship, viz.:

    Art. 224. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. — (a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code, the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in the absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural: x x x

    4 Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employer-employee relations;

    Jurisprudence1Bañez v. Valdevilla, G.R. No. 128024, May 9, 2000, 387 PHIL 601-612 also teaches that the jurisdiction of labor tribunals is comprehensive enough to include claims for all forms of damages “arising from the employer-employee relations.” Thus, labor tribunals have jurisdiction to award not only the reliefs provided by labor laws, but also damages governed by the Civil Code. Furthermore, while Article 224 of the Labor Code had been invariably applied to claims for damages filed by an employee against the employer, the said provision was also applied with equal force to an employer’s claim for damages against its dismissed employee, provided that the claim had arisen from or was necessarily connected with the fact of termination and entered as a counterclaim in the illegal dismissal case.2Supra Multi-Services, Inc. v. Labitigan, G.R. No. 192297, August 3, 2016, 792 PHIL 336-370. Thus, the “reasonable causal connection with the employer-employee relationship” is a requirement not only in employees’ money claims against the employer but is, likewise, a condition when the claimant is the employer.3Portillo v. Rudolf Lietz, Inc., G.R. No. 196539, October 10, 2012, 697 PHIL 232-250

    In the present case, the Supreme Court found that the controversy was rooted in the employee’s resignation from the company within twenty-four (24) months from the time she got employed, in violation of the “Minimum Employment Length” clause of her employment contract. The Court added that CP, Inc.’s claim for payment was inseparably intertwined with its employment relation with the employee. This was because it was the employee’s act of prematurely severing her employment with the company which gave rise to the latter’s cause of action for payment of “employment bond.” According to the Court, the claim was an offshoot of the employee’s resignation and its complications which eventually led to the filing of the case before the Office of the Labor Arbiter. For the Court, the employer’s claim fell within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the labor tribunals.

    Should the employee pay the “employment bond”?

    The Court ruled that the employee was liable because of her undertaking in the employment contract and since the employee herself neither disputed said liability nor assailed the existence and validity of such provision in said contract.

    Further reading:

    • Comscentre Phils., Inc. v. Rocio, G.R. No. 222212, January 22, 2020.

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  • General Return-to-Work Orders

    The employee alleged that sometime in May 2006, he was hired as a security guard by SF Security Services, Inc. He narrated that on December 25, 2013, he was suddenly relieved from his post upon request of SF Security Services, Inc.’s client. The next day, he received an order suspending him for 10 days. After the lapse of his 10-day suspension, or on January 7, 2014, he reported for work. However, SF Security Services, Inc. informed him that he was placed on floating status and he was just advised to wait for a call.

    The employee further narrated that on May 16, 2014, he received a letter from SF Security Services, Inc. directing him to report to its office within 48 hours from receipt thereof. The employee claimed that he went to SF Security Services, Inc. ‘s office on May 19, 2014, but he was not allowed to enter and was made to wait outside the office. Before leaving the premises, he handed a letter to SF Security Services, Inc. to inform his readiness to report for duty on the same day. SF Security Services, Inc. wrote a second letter dated May 28, 2014, allegedly to make it appear that he failed to report to work despite its return to work order. In a letter dated July 11, 2014, the employee inquired the status of his employment. However, SF Security Services, Inc. refused to provide him with work.

    On July 28, 2014, the employee filed a complaint for constructive dismissal against SF Security Services, Inc.

    SF Security Services, Inc. admitted the suspension of the employee for a period of 10 days, starting December 26, 2013. However, it asserted that on May 14, 2014, it sent the employee a letter directing him to report for posting, but the latter did not comply with the directive. On May 28, 2014, SF Security Services, Inc. sent him another letter reiterating the instruction to report for posting. However, it still received no word from the employee. According to SF Security Services, Inc., it was surprised to learn of the employee’s complaint for illegal dismissal.

    Was the employee validly placed on floating status?

    The Supreme Court stated that in security services, the “floating status” or temporary “off-detail” of an employee may take place when there are no available posts to which the employee may be assigned — which may be due to the non-renewal of contracts with existing clients of the agency, or from a client’s request for replacement of guards assigned to it.1Salvaloza v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 182086, November 24, 2010, 650 PHIL 543-561. It added that while there is no specific provision in the Labor Code of the Philippines governing the “floating status” or temporary “off-detail” of employees, Article 3012Formerly Article 286. Article 301 reads: ART. 301. When Employment not Deemed Terminated. — The bona fide suspension of the operation of a business or undertaking for a period not exceeding six (6) months, or the fulfillment by the employee of a military or civic duty shall not terminate employment. In all such cases, the employer shall reinstate the employee to his former position without loss of seniority rights if he indicates his desire to resume his work not later than one (1) month from the resumption of operations of his employer or from his relief from the military or civic duty. of the said law, by analogy, considers this situation as a form of temporary retrenchment or lay-off.3on ||| Superior Maintenance Services, Inc. v. Bermeo, G.R. No. 203185, December 5, 2018.

    The Court further stated that conformably with the above provision, the placement of an employee on “floating status” must not exceed six months. Otherwise, the employee may be considered constructively dismissed.4Ibon v. Genghis Khan Security Services, G.R. No. 221085, June 19, 2017, 811 PHIL 250-260. Furthermore, the burden of proving that there are no posts available to which the security guard can be assigned rests on the employer.5Nationwide Security and Allied Services, Inc. v. Valderama, G.R. No. 186614, February 23, 2011, 659 PHIL 362-374. However, the mere lapse of six months in “floating status” should not automatically result to constructive dismissal. The peculiar circumstances of the employee’s failure to assume another post must still be inquired upon.6Exocet Security and Allied Services Corp. v. Serrano, G.R. No. 198538, September 29, 2014, 744 PHIL 403-422.

    In the present case, the Supreme Court found that the employee was placed on floating status beginning on the lapse of his 10-day suspension on January 7, 2014 and that he had been on floating status for six months and 21 days from the time he filed the complaint for constructive dismissal on July 28, 2014.

    The Court also found that although SF Security Services, Inc. sent the employee letters dated May 14, 2014 and May 28, 2014, the same were in the nature of general return to work orders. According to the Court, jurisprudence requires not only that the employee be recalled to the agency’s office, but that the employee be deployed to a specific client before the lapse of six months.7Ibon v. Genghis Khan Security Services, G.R. No. 221085, June 19, 2017, 811 PHIL 250-260.

    The Court stated that considering that the employee was placed on floating status for more than six months without being deployed to a specific assignment he was deemed to have been constructively dismissed from employment. The employee was granted the reliefs of separation pay 8considering that he no longer asked to be reinstated and backwages.

    Could the employee be said to have abandoned his employment?

    The Court ruled that with the finding of constructive dismissal it followed that the employee could not have abandoned his employment. The Court stressed that abandonment is incompatible with constructive dismissal.

    The Court reiterated the principle that abandonment, as a just cause for termination, requires “a deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his work, coupled with a clear absence of any intention of returning to his or her work.”9Veterans Security Agency Inc. v. Gonzalvo Jr., G.R. No. 159293, December 16, 2005, 514 PHIL 488-505 The following elements must therefore concur: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor and being manifested by some overt acts.10Icawat v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 133573, June 20, 2000, 389 PHIL 441-447

    In the present case, the Court found no proof that the employee intended to sever his employment. On the contrary, the Court found strong indications of the employee’s desire to resume work. According to the Court, after the employee served his 10-day suspension, he reported for work but was instead told that he was being placed on floating status and instructed to wait for a call. The employee also sent SF Security Services, Inc. a letter dated May 19, 2014 to inform the latter that he was ready to report for duty, and a letter dated July 11, 2014 to inquire on the status of his employment. He also filed the complaint for constructive dismissal shortly after the lapse of his six-month floating status. For the Court, his immediate filing of the complaint sufficiently established his desire to return to work and negated any suggestion of abandonment. In addition, considering that the employee been in the service of SF Security Services, Inc. since 2006, or for eight years already before his dismissal in 2014, the employee could not have had such intention to abandon his work. The Court concluded that the totality of these circumstances negated the existence of a clear intention to sever the employment relation.

    Further reading:

    • Seventh Fleet Security Services, Inc. v. Loque, G.R. No. 230005, January 22, 2020.

  • Human Barricades and Obstructions for Collective Self-Defense

    On 16 February 2000, the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) Employees and Workers Association (MEWA), the official bargaining unit of MERALCO, through its former President, Juanito, filed a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation Mediation Board (NCMB) due to bargaining deadlock.

    After conducting a strike vote in June 2000, Juanito informed the NCMB Administrator of its result in a Letter dated 12 July 2000. The letter was served through registered mail on 17 July 2000.

    After 4 days, or on 21 July 2000, MEWA staged a strike. Record showed that the following persons joined the strike:

    UNION OFFICERSUNION MEMBERS
    FedericoMarcelo
    CatalinoGerardo
    RomeoRolando
    DonatiloEdgardo
    AllanLeonides
    ArturoAmadeo
    RestitutoMelandro
    Dominador
    Lito
    Arnaldo
    Edwin

    The Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment issued an Assumption Order dated 21 July 2000, assuming jurisdiction and directing the striking workers to return to work within 24 hours from notice. Copies of the order were published in 3 major newspapers on 23 July 2000 and served to union officers and its lawyers. MERALCO’s security guards also exhibited the order to the strikers but they refused to obey.

    On 24 July 2000, several strikers wearing masks chained and padlocked the 3 gates of the MERALCO Center. They laid on the pavement and blocked the entry and exit gates of MERALCO. The strikers stated that they formed human barricades and placed obstructions, but only for collective self-defense because the guards used unnecessary force in dispersing them. Consequently, on 25 July 2000, the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment issued another Order reminding the parties to comply with the return-to-work order. He even deputized the PNP Chiefs of the National Capital Region, Region III and Region IV to ensure compliance.

    On 2 August 2000, MEWA and MERALCO executed an Agreement directing all employees who have not been placed on duty (except the 13 union officers and 13 members who were facing charges) to report for work. MERALCO also issued a Memorandum stating that the resumption of office was without prejudice to an administrative investigation for prohibited acts committed during the strike and/or defiance of the Assumption Orders. From 2 August to 11 October 2000, 66 employees were terminated from employment.

    Was the strike illegal?

    Yes.

    The Supreme Court stated that a strike is the most powerful weapon of workers in coming to an agreement with management as to the terms and conditions of employment. Premised on the concept of economic war between labor and management, staging a strike either gives life to or destroys the labor union and its members, as well as affect management and its members.1Phimco Industries, Inc. v. Phimco Industries Labor Association, G.R. No. 170830, August 11, 2010, 642 PHIL 275-307

    The Court added that in order to be legitimate, a strike should not be antithetical to public welfare, and must be pursued within legal bounds. The right to strike as a means of attaining social justice is never meant to oppress or destroy anyone, least of all, the employer.2Phimco Industries, Inc. v. Phimco Industries Labor Association, G.R. No. 170830, August 11, 2010, 642 PHIL 275-307 Since strikes affect not only the relationship between labor and management, but also the general peace and progress of the community, the law has provided limitations on the right to strike.3Phimco Industries, Inc. v. Phimco Industries Labor Association, G.R. No. 170830, August 11, 2010, 642 PHIL 275-307 According to the Court, Article 2634Art. 263. Strikes, picketing and lockouts of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6715, and Rule XXII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code outline the following procedural requirements for a valid strike:

    • A notice of strike, with the required contents, should be filed with the DOLE, specifically the Regional Branch of the NCMB, copy furnished the employer of the union;
    • A cooling-off period must be observed between the filing of notice and the actual execution of the strike thirty (30) days in case of bargaining deadlock and fifteen (15) days in case of unfair labor practice. However, in the case of union busting where the unions existence is threatened, the cooling-off period need not be observed. x x x
    • Before a strike is actually commenced, a strike vote should be taken by secret balloting, with a 24-hour prior notice to NCMB. The decision to declare a strike requires the secret-ballot approval of majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned.
    • The result of the strike vote should be reported to the NCMB at least seven (7) days before the intended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off period. (emphasis supplied)

    Jurisprudence5Pilipino Telephone Corp. v. Pilipino Telephone Employees Association, G.R. Nos. 160058 &160094, June 22, 2007, 552 PHIL 432-452 teaches that these requirements are mandatory in nature and failure to comply therewith renders the strike illegal.

    In the present case, the Court found that MEWA failed to comply with the 7-day strike ban rule which was counted from the time the union furnished the NCMB the strike vote result. It also found that MEWA also failed to furnish the NCMB the results of the vote at least 7 days before the intended strike. The Court noted that although the letter containing the strike vote result was dated 12 July 2000, it was sent through registered mail only on 17 July 2000, which was 4 days before the strike. The Court stressed that the NCMB thus did not have sufficient time to determine if the intended strike was approved by majority of the union workers. For the Court, the strike was illegal.

    Was the dismissal of strikers from employment valid?

    The Court relied on Article 264 of the Labor Code which enumerates the prohibited acts during a strike, to wit:

    ARTICLE 264. Prohibited Activities. — (a) No Labor organization or employer shall declare a strike or lockout without first having bargained collectively in accordance with Title VII of this Book or without first having filed the notice required in the preceding Article or without the necessary strike or lockout vote first having been obtained and reported to the Ministry.
    No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Minister or after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout.
    Any worker whose employment has been terminated as a consequence of any unlawful lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with full backwages. Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided, That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike.
    x x x
    (e) No person engaged in picketing shall commit any act of violence, coercion or intimidation or obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employer’s premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares. (emphasis supplied)

    The Court explained that the above-cited provision of the Labor Code presents a substantial distinction between the consequences of an illegal strike for union officers and mere members of the union. For union officers, knowingly participating in an illegal strike is a valid ground for termination of their employment. However, for union members who participated in an illegal strike, their employment may be terminated only if there is substantial evidence or proof that they committed prohibited and illegal acts during the strike.6Magdala Multipurpose & Livelihood Cooperative v. Kilusang Manggagawa ng LGS, G.R. Nos. 191138-39, October 19, 2011, 675 PHIL 861-877

    In the present case, the Court declared the dismissal of the following union officers valid considering the illegality of the 21 July 2000 strike for noncompliance with the law:

    • Federico;
    • Catalino;
    • Romeo;
    • Donatilo;
    • Allan;
    • Arturo; and
    • Restituto.

    Furthermore, the Court found substantial evidence proving that the following union members performed some of the prohibited acts mentioned in Article 264 of the Labor Code:

    • Marcelo;
    • Gerardo;
    • Rolando;
    • Edgardo;
    • Leonides;
    • Amadeo;
    • Melandro;
    • Dominador; and
    • Lito.

    The Court stated that photographs submitted by MERALCO revealed that these union members committed the prohibited acts, which were then corroborated by security guards who were present during the strike. The Court stressed that the security guards identified the said members to have barricaded the gates and prevented other employees from entering MERALCO’s premises. The Court accordingly declared their dismissal valid for their illegal acts during the illegal strike.

    However, the Court reached a different conclusion with regard to 2 union members (Arnaldo and Edwin), since it found that the testimonies of the security guards revealed that they only saw these members joining the picket line without performing any illegal act during the strike.

    The Court reiterated the proof required to terminate union members, to wit:

    For the rest of the individual respondents who are union members, the rule is that an ordinary striking worker cannot be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike. There must be proof that he or she committed illegal acts during a strike. In all cases, the striker must be identified. But proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required. Substantial evidence available under the attendant circumstances, which may justify the imposition of the penalty of dismissal, may suffice. Liability for prohibited acts is to be determined on an individual basis7Solidbank Corporation v. Gamier, G.R. Nos. 159460 & 159461, November 15, 2010, 649 PHIL 54-83.

    For the Court, absent any clear, substantial and convincing proof of illegal acts committed by Arnaldo and Edwin during the strike, MERALCO could not arbitrarily dismiss them from employment.

    Should Arnaldo and Edwin be granted backwages?

    No, the Court ruled that they should not be granted backwages in view of the illegality of the said strike.

    The Court reiterated the principles in G & S Transport Corporation v. Infante,8G & S Transport Corporation v. Infante, G.R. No. 160303, September 13, 2007, 559 PHIL 701-716 where the Court held:

    It can now therefore be concluded that the acts of respondents do not merit their dismissal from employment because it has not been substantially proven that they committed any illegal act while participating in the illegal strike. x x x
    x x x
    With respect to backwages, the principle of a “fair day’s wage for a fair day’s labor” remains as the basic factor in determining the award thereof. If there is no work performed by the employee there can be no wage or pay unless, of course, the laborer was able, willing and ready to work but was illegally locked out, suspended or dismissed or otherwise illegally prevented from working. While it was found that respondents expressed their intention to report back to work, the latter exception cannot apply in this case. In Philippine Marine Officers’ Guild v. Compañia Maritima, as affirmed in Philippine Diamond Hotel and Resort v. Manila Diamond Hotel Employees Union, the Court stressed that for this exception to apply, it is required that the strike be legal, a situation that does not obtain in the case at bar9G & S Transport Corporation v. Infante, G.R. No. 160303, September 13, 2007, 559 PHIL 701-716.

    Accordingly, the Court ruled although Arnaldo and Edwin N. Reyes could be reinstated, they are not entitled to backwages.

    Further reading:

    • Ilagan v. Manila Electric Co., G.R. Nos. 211746 & 212077, January 22, 2020.

  • Invalid Addendum

    Norly M. Baybayan (Baybayan) was hired by Wacoal through its agent, petitioner Prime Stars, for a contract period of 24 months or two years, with a monthly salary of NT$15,840.00. However, he soon discovered that he was only paid NT$9,000.00 a month. Upon inquiry, he was informed that an amount of NT$4,000.00 was being deducted from his salary for expenses for his board and lodging. Since he still had debts to pay back home, he finished the contract and returned to the Philippines on 19 May 2009. He then instituted a complaint for underpayment of salaries and the reimbursement of his transportation expenses against petitioners Prime Star and Peralta.

    Michelle V. Beltran (Beltran) was hired by Avermedia, through its agent, petitioner Prime Stars, as an “operator” who assembles TV boxes and USBs. Her contract duration was for two years with a monthly salary of NT$17,280.00. She was deployed on 22 June 2008. After a year, she was abruptly and unceremoniously dismissed by her supervisor and was immediately repatriated to the Philippines on 3 July 2009. Beltran then instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal and sought for the payment of salaries for the unexpired portion of her contract, the refund of her repatriation expenses, plus damages and attorney’s fees against the petitioners.

    Petitioners denied that Baybayan was underpaid as his payslips for the months of March and April 2009 indicated that he received a monthly salary of NT$17,280.00 during his employment with Wacoal. Petitioners explained that Baybayan signed an Addendum to the Employment Contract (Addendum), which authorized the deduction of the amount of NT$4,000.00 as payment for his monthly food and accommodation. In the same Addendum, Baybayan was apprised that the transportation expenses for his round trip tickets from the Philippines to Taiwan shall be at his own expense. Petitioners further explained that these were supported by Baybayan’s sworn statement, Written Acknowledgment, Foreign Worker’s Affidavit Regarding Expenses Incurred for Entry into the Republic of China to Work and the Wage and Salary and Overseas Contract Worker’s Questionnaire.

    With respect to Beltran, petitioners contended that it was Beltran who voluntarily preterminated her contract for personal reasons. According to petitioners, Beltran approached them and expressed her intent to return to the Philippines, as evidenced by her handwritten statement which she duly signed on 4 July 2009. Petitioners add that the handwritten statement was supported by her sworn statement, written acknowledgment, Foreign Worker’s Affidavit, and Overseas Contract Worker’s Questionnaire.

    The issues of illegal dismissal, salary differentials, transportation expenses, damages, attorney’s fees and liability of petitioner Peralta were elevated to the Supreme Court.

    RULING:

    Beltran did not voluntarily preterminate her employment contract. She was illegally dismissed.

    The Supreme Court found that petitioners’ complete reliance on Beltran’s alleged voluntary execution of the Mutual Contract Annulment Agreement and the Worker Discontinue Employment Affidavit to support the claim that Beltran voluntarily preterminated her contract was unavailing. This was because her supposed resignation was inconsistent with her filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal.

    Furthermore, the Court found the wordings of Beltran’s relinquishment of her contract of employment ambiguous and doubtful. The burden of proving that Beltran voluntary preterminated her contract fell upon petitioners as the employer. Petitioners failed to discharge such burden despite their claim that the latter resigned.

    Specifically, the Court found it highly unlikely that Beltran would just quit even before the end of her contract after all the expenses she incurred and still needed to settle and the sacrifices she went through in seeking financial upliftment. According to the Court, it was incongruous for Beltran to simply give up her work, return home, and be unemployed once again given that so much time, effort, and money have already been invested to securing her employment abroad and enduring the tribulations of being in a foreign country, away from her family.

    Beltran was accordingly awarded her salaries for the unexpired portion of her employment contract.

    Baybayan and Beltran should be granted salary differentials and refund of transportation expenses.

    Paragraph (i) of Article 34 of the Labor Code of the Philippines prohibits the substitution or alteration of employment contracts approved and verified by the Department of Labor and Employment from the time of the actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period of expiration of the same without the approval of the said Department.

    Furthermore, Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, explicitly prohibits the substitution or alteration to the prejudice of the worker of employment contracts already approved and verified by the Department of Labor and Employment from the time of actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period of the expiration of the same without the approval of the said Department.

    In the present case, petitioners admitted that the employment contracts of Baybayan and Beltran were indeed amended, but posited that the Addendum, while apparently did not appear to contain any indication of Philippine Overseas Employment Administration approval, actually contained provisions which have been approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration through Baybayan and Beltran’s Foreign Worker’s Affidavits.

    The Supreme Court did not agree.

    According to the Court, the clear and categorical language of the law imposes upon foreign principals minimum terms and conditions of employment for land-based overseas Filipino workers, which include basic provisions for food, accommodation and transportation. The licensed recruitment agency shall also, prior to the signing of the employment contract, inform the overseas Filipino workers of their rights and obligations, and disclose the full terms and conditions of employment, and provide them with a copy of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-approved contract, to give them ample opportunity to examine the same.

    Article IV of Baybayan and Beltran’s Employment Contract, in relation to Section 2, Rule 1, Part V of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Land-based Overseas Workers,1“Section 2. Minimum Provisions of Employment Contract. — Consistent with its welfare and employment facilitation objectives, the following shall be considered minimum requirements for contracts of employment of land-based workers:

    x x x

    b. Free transportation to and from the worksite, or offsetting benefit;

    c. Free food and accommodation, or offsetting benefit;”     provided Baybayan and Beltran with:

    • free food and accommodation for the duration of the contract
    • an economy class air ticket from the country of origin to Taiwan
    • a ticket back to the country of origin upon completion of the contract.

    Furthermore, it was stated therein that an employment contract cannot be altered or modified without the prior approval of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration.

    In the present case, the Addendum required Baybayan and Beltran shoulder their food and accommodation and transportation fare.

    Although the Court recognized the fact that the parties may stipulate on other terms and conditions of employment as well as other benefits, such stipulations should not violate the minimum requirements required by law as these would be disadvantageous to the employee. Section 3, Rule 1, Part V of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Land-based Overseas Workers states:

    “Section 3. Freedom to Stipulate. — Parties to overseas employment contracts are allowed to stipulate other terms and conditions and other benefits not provided under these minimum requirements; provided the whole employment package should be more beneficial to the worker than the minimum; provided that the same shall not be contrary to law, public policy and morals, and provided further, that Philippine agencies shall make foreign employers aware of the standards of employment adopted by the Administration.”

    The Court found that the minimum provisions for employment of Baybayan and Beltran were not met, and that there was diminution of their benefits which were already guaranteed by law and granted in their favor under their Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-approved contracts of employment.

    Accordingly, the Court ruled that the Addendum, absent the approval of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, was declared invalid for being contrary to law and public policy.

    Baybayan and Beltran should be awarded moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.

    This was because the acts of the petitioners were evidently tainted with bad faith. Petitioners’ failure to comply with the stipulations on the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-approved employment contracts constituted an act oppressive to labor and more importantly, contrary to law and public policy. Petitioners even tried to justify the execution and validity of the Addendum and cloak the latter as legal and binding through Baybayan and Beltran’s execution of Foreign Worker’s affidavits. According to the Court, petitioners’ circumvention of labor laws and the intentional diminution of employee’s benefits to land-based overseas workers were indicative of petitioners’ exercise of bad faith and fraud in their dealings with Filipino workers.

    With regard to Beltran’s dismissal from employment, the Court found nothing “voluntary” in putting words into Beltran’s own mouth in the guise of her handwritten statement of resignation. Petitioners’ attempt to demonstrate voluntariness should fail since “cooperate” was more of an imposition coming from the employer rather than from a disadvantaged overseas employee. The Court considered the execution of the documents plainly oppressive and violative of Beltran’s security of tenure.

    The Court accordingly awarded Baybayan and Beltran moral and exemplary damages to allay the sufferings they experienced and by way of example or correction for public good, respectively.

    Peralta should be solidarily liable with Prime Stars.

    Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 mandates solidary liability among the corporate officers, directors, partners and the corporation or partnership for any claims and damages that may be due to the overseas workers, viz.:

    “Section 10. Monetary Claims. — x x x The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under this section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The performance bond to be filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all money claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages.”

    Further Reading:

    • Prime Stars International Promotion Corp. v. Baybayan, G.R. No. 213961, January 22, 2020.

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